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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
 
“What citizen of Europe has not been assisted in some way by the rulings of the 
European Court in Luxembourg? As long as the Court goes on handing down 
judgments that enable ordinary men and women to savor the fruits of integration, it 
will continue to demonstrate its usefulness.”1  
1.1  Individual Litigants Before the European Court of Justice 
Over the past sixty years, the integration of Europe has exceeded many expecta-
tions. Among other accomplishments, the European Union (EU) has completed 
its common market, created a common currency and has expanded to include 
twenty-eight Member States. European political and economic integration has 
been to a great extent a legal process with an important role for the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ).2 Among legal scholars and political scientists alike, there 
is general agreement that the dynamics of that process have in large part relied 
on the critical influence the ECJ has exerted through the preliminary reference 
system. The latter allows national judges in national proceedings to refer ques-
tions regarding the interpretation of EU law to the ECJ. The judgments of the 
ECJ in such preliminary reference cases have been transformational in European 
legal and political dynamics. Not only have preliminary rulings by the ECJ been 
responsible for significant integration of the national legal systems, the proce-
dure has been the main means by which individual rights can be and have been 
invoked, consolidated and expanded. The preliminary reference procedure is 
therefore widely considered the backbone of the European legal system, and the 
ECJ as a catalyst in the integration of the European Union.3 
                                                        
1  Mancini & Keeling 1995, 413. 
2  The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the collective term for the Euro-
pean Union’s judicial arm, but the single institution consists of separate courts, each en-
joying its own specific jurisdiction. Established in 1952 as the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Communities, renamed in 1958 the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities, and with the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, the Court’s official name became Court of Justice of the European Union, offi-
cially designating the institution’s two main courts, the Court of Justice and the General 
Court, along with its former specialised court, the Civil Service Tribunal, which ceased 
to exist on 1 September 2016. This study deals almost exclusively with preliminary ref-
erence cases, which are dealt with by the Court of Justice, colloquially known by its for-
mer name: the European Court of Justice. From here on I will use both the acronym ECJ 
as well as the Court (with a capitalised C) as synonyms to denote the institution.  
3  Vauchez 2008b. 
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Although the ECJ’s case law, and therefore litigation, is recognised as an es-
sential element in the process of European integration, the litigation process in 
itself has remained a rather unexplored topic. A large body of research into the 
integration of Europe has given special weight to the role of private litigation in 
activating the preliminary reference system and by extension fostering integra-
tion dynamics in Europe. However, while there is strong consensus about the 
pivotal role the procedure has had in the transformation of Europe, there remains 
significant disagreement on why the system is used, and who is primarily re-
sponsible for its success. While private litigants are seen as central actors in this 
integration dynamics there is still little insight into who goes to Court in Europe, 
and why. As such, so-called ‘Euro-litigation’ remains somewhat of a black box. 
1.2  Changing Power Relations in Europe 
In studying European integration dynamics, a voluminous body of scholarship 
deals with the institutional make-up of the EU and recognises EU law, the pre-
liminary reference procedure and the ECJ as essential features of European inte-
gration.4 The new legal constellation changed power relations within Europe, 
shifting the political centre from the national to the supranational and making 
citizens subject to new international norms, with far-reaching implications for 
the (legal) position of the citizen. The rise of the ECJ itself stems from the per-
ceived ‘reciprocal empowerment’, the linking of the Court with various groups 
and institutions that sought to profit from further integration.5 On the one hand, 
these developments have resulted in critical evaluations of the EU’s democratic 
deficits, focusing particularly on the lack of popular representation.6 On the 
other hand, a growing narrative sees this federalizing aspect of the EU as trans-
forming the relationship between citizen and state, possibly in favour of the 
former.7  
Each year, over a thousand decisions are made by the ECJ on the basis of 
EU legislation that affects governance in the Members States as well as the lives 
of their citizens. These citizens now are no longer citizens only of their countries 
but also European Union citizens. This status is reflected in the way EU law is 
formulated. The ‘language of rights’ or ‘rights based regime’ – the notion that 
the EU legal system functions predominantly by formulating (enforceable) 
rights – stands at the basis of much change within Europe through the jurispru-
dence of the ECJ.  
                                                        
4  For a comprehensive literature review see Conant 2007.  
5  Burley & Mattli 1993.  
6  Forst & Schmalz-Bruns 2011. 
7  Cichowski 2006.  
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Box I: A Union Based on Law8 
 
The European Union started out as an economic endeavour aimed at integrating a 
single economic market in which the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
workers were to be ensured. This undertaking slowly but surely progressed into a po-
litical integration of the Member States aimed at ‘an ever closer union of the peoples 
of Europe’. In essence the economic consortium of the Member States of the first hour 
has evolved into a multinational economic and political union of federal-like pro-
portions. This process has from the earliest instances on been facilitated by a body of 
legal rules and regulations aimed at ensuring uniform application of the Treaties 
agreed upon. At first, this legal body focused exclusively on matters of transnational 
movement of goods, workers and capital and the establishment of a single market in 
Europe. Over the past decades, this European body of rules has transformed into a 
fully-fledged federal-like system of law, binding all Member States, and its peoples, to 
a plethora of supranational laws and regulations in a vast number of policy areas. At 
the top of this European legal system stands the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the 
final arbiter when it comes to interpreting European legislation. Through its judgments 
the ECJ has had a fundamental influence on the European legal as well as political 
landscape. Many of the Court’s most transformative judgments have come from cases 
that reached the Court through the preliminary reference system, which allows and 
sometimes requires national judges to refer national cases to the ECJ.  
Established as early as 1952, the ECJ has been of seminal importance in the creation 
of this federal-like union of European nation-states. Not only by being mandated with 
ensuring uniform application of the Treaties across Member States, but moreover by 
constitutionalising EU law, and by making EU legislation directly applicable in a na-
tional context through the now famous decisions in Van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen in 1963, and in Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. in 1964, two 
of the very first preliminary references to the ECJ. With these judgments the Court 
formally enshrined the semi-constitutional character of EU law and, moreover, gave 
private parties, including individual citizens, a stake in the application of EU law.9 The 
doctrine of supremacy stipulates that whenever there is a conflict between national 
laws and EU laws, the former shall be subordinated to the latter. According to the 
direct effect principle, rights conferred on individuals by EU legislation should be 
enforceable by those individuals in national courts. 
 
The analysis of this jurisprudence, and the influential precedential function and 
ground-breaking effects thereof, have led scholars to conclude that EU law and 
the preliminary reference procedure give individuals and civil society a stake in 
the transformation of Europe’s political and legal order. The authority of the 
ECJ to interpret EU legislation combined with a growing focus on individual 
rights seems to signal a shift towards greater empowerment of the individual 
                                                        
8  Paragraphs on the general institutional design of the EU will be presented in textboxes.  
9  Stein 1981. See also Micklitz 2012. 
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within the European legal system. This ‘empowerment-through-law’ narrative 
focuses mainly on the preliminary reference procedure with the assumption that 
it gives firstly, the possibility of having government legislation, policy and acts 
reviewed by a higher judicial authority, the ECJ, and secondly, the power to 
influence the course and pace of European legal and political development. 
1.3  Euro-Litigation: A View from the Inside 
The aforementioned legal and political dynamics give rise to questions of how 
and to what extent individuals are able to profit from the changing legal land-
scape. The position of individuals in the European legal system, and their oppor-
tunities for invoking rights under EU law, has been the subject of debate ever 
since the ECJ became operative. The general lack of empirical substantiation of 
the claims underpinning narratives about the ECJ and EU law raises questions 
about the tenability of this idea and forms the starting point of this research. We 
still know very little about who actually goes to court in Europe. As will be 
discussed further in Chapter 2, the individual is given centre stage as a ‘subject’ 
in the discourse on the ‘European project’, and as a ‘private litigant’ in scholarly 
analysis of the European legal system, yet the individual as an ‘actor’ has only 
sparsely been the serious focus of research. As once concluded by Friedman, 
“[i]ntellectual debate does not make case-law; cases are controversies, and they 
presuppose conflicts, not to mention people and groups who take steps to set the 
legal process in motion”.10 Following earlier studies that have focused on the 
legal system from the perspective of those who make use of it,11 this research 
will focus on the preliminary reference system by placing the actors that feature 
in Euro-litigation at the centre of attention.   
In this light Banakar stresses the need to combine both top-down and bot-
tom-up approaches, and argues that the contextualization of laws in comparative 
studies of law is necessary in order to transcend the understanding of law as 
(merely) a body of rules and doctrines, and to situate “legal action, behavior, 
institution, tradition, text and discourse in specific time and socio-legal space, 
thus, revealing law’s embeddedness in societal relations, structures, develop-
ments and processes”.12 Where a top-down perspective characterizes most stud-
ies on the European legal system, this study aims to add a bottom-up approach 
to reveal how EU law is embedded in and manifests itself at different levels of 
                                                        
10  Friedman 1975, 2. 
11  See for instance Bouwen & McCown 2007; Bruinsma 2010; Felstiner, Abel & Sarat 
1980; Fitzgerald & Dickins 1980; Friedman 1989; Galanter 1974; Harding 1980; Kritzer 
1980; Macaulay 1963; and Miller & Sarat 1980. 
12  Banakar 2009, 71.  
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European society. It critically examines the image created of the ECJ as an arena 
for change, and the preliminary reference procedure as an opportunity for em-
powerment. It approaches the preliminary reference procedure from a bottom-up 
perspective in order to reveal what actors are involved in these procedures, what 
their aims and strategies are, the opportunities these actors have in the deliberate 
use of it, and moreover, what relative power relations exist in the exploitation of 
these legal avenues.  
The spirit of this study, with a particular focus on the individual’s stake in 
EU law and politics, results in a necessarily narrowed view. The focus on indi-
viduals and the preliminary reference procedure has a twofold, though interre-
lated, theoretical foundation. Firstly, the important role of preliminary reference 
cases before the ECJ in shaping and steering European integration raises the 
important question of their origins (hence the intensive focus in European inte-
gration studies on the relationship between national courts and the ECJ as well 
as efforts to try to understand the variation in the number of references between 
Member States, as discussed in Chapter 3). And secondly, the purported em-
powerment through law – as well as the agreement in the political science litera-
ture that business interests are much better represented in ‘Brussels’ when it 
comes to lobbying and access to the policy process at the EU level13 and in soci-
ology of law literature when it comes to litigation opportunities and strategies,14 
– raises the question of the means and relative success of the ‘have-nots’ in mo-
bilising EU law and Euro-litigation.  
In other words this study focuses on: whose interests, whose actions and 
what possibilities, challenging a notion of individual empowerment by critically 
examining access to justice in the European context. By looking in depth at 
cases brought before the ECJ and investigating the motives of the parties in-
volved, this study aims to open the ‘black box’ of Euro-litigation and provide an 
answer to the central research question:  
 
To what extent can EU law in general and specifically the preliminary reference 
procedure be considered an opportunity for empowerment and who is (most) 
likely to use it?  
  
In order to provide an answer to this central research question, different parts of 
this study aim to answer the following sub questions: 
  
                                                        
13  Coen & Richardson 2008.  
14  Galanter 1974.  
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- Who goes to court in Europe, and why? 
- Who is (most) likely to make use of the opportunities in EU law and which 
legal strategies are effective? 
- To what extent can Euro-litigation be considered empowering to individual 
litigants?  
1.4  Methodology 
In order to answer the main research question of this study, and with the practi-
cal limitations of in-depth research in mind, this study focuses on preliminary 
references from one Member State in particular; the Netherlands. With respect 
to the judicial review function of EU law – the possibility of having government 
legislation, policy and acts reviewed by a higher judicial authority – the Nether-
lands provides an interesting case study. As compared to a country like France, 
that has a rich history of constitutional review in its domestic system, and was 
therefore classified by Lijphart15 as a country with a ‘medium-strength’ judicial 
review, the Netherlands shares no such history and more closely resembles the 
British model of parliamentary sovereignty. The Dutch system, wherein the 
balance between courts and politics leans more firmly towards the legislator, 
was therefore considered by Lijphart as a country with ‘no judicial review’.16 
However, as Koopmans has pointed out, while the Dutch system does not allow 
the courts to review the constitutionality of legislation, they have progressively 
come to scrutinize legislation for compatibility with international norms, thus 
moving closer to a system of legal review that resembles that of countries like 
France and Germany.17 The Dutch legal system has been, since its constitutional 
reform in 1956, ‘monist’ in nature, in the sense that national and international 
law are considered as forming a single legal order. Therefore the Dutch case is 
one where international law to a significant extent performs the role played by 
constitutional law in other countries. Historically, the Netherlands has been in 
the top three Member States making the most use of the possibility for referral to 
the ECJ, together with Germany and Italy.18 Additionally, in their analysis of the 
different ‘worlds of compliance’, the domestic political cultures related to the 
implementation of EU legislation, Falkner et al. label the Netherlands under the 
header of ‘world of domestic politics’.19 This category includes Member States 
                                                        
15  Lijphart, A. 1999, 229. 
16  Lijphart, A. 1999, 229. 
17  Koopmans 2003, 84. 
18  See Appendix B, which includes the number of references according to Member States, 
both in absolute numbers as well as for the period studied for this research. 
19  Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib 2007. 
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making cost-benefit calculations when it comes to the implementation of EU 
legislation, in which conflicts between EU obligations and national political 
interests will more frequently lead to non-compliance. Consequently, the Neth-
erlands is a Member State that finds itself before the ECJ on a regular basis. 
Selection of cases 
This study focuses on preliminary reference cases from the Netherlands that 
involve individual litigants, and thus excludes cases where the litigants are busi-
nesses and institutions. The case selection covers all Dutch references dealt with 
by the court in the period 2008-2012. Given that the procedure for the ECJ alone 
takes on average up to two years to conclude, selecting more recent cases in-
creased the chances of vivid recollection of the procedures by the individuals 
involved. Selecting to the end of 2012 provided a long enough period since the 
ruling by the ECJ for the cases to have been further adjudicated by the national 
court. The cases under investigation in this study were selected using the search 
form on the ECJ’s website20 and selecting ‘Reference for a preliminary ruling’, 
‘Preliminary reference – urgent procedure’, and selecting ‘Netherlands’ as the 
‘Source of a question referred for a preliminary ruling’. The selected period 
spanned five years, from January 1st 2008 up to December 31st 2012. The date 
on which a judgment was delivered (or the case was otherwise dealt with) was 
used as a selecting criterion. This search resulted in a total of 114 separately 
registered cases concerning preliminary references originating from Dutch 
courts during the selected five years. These 114 included fourteen cases that did 
not result in a separate judgment. These were either joined with other cases, 
withdrawn prematurely or dealt with by reasoned order. As a result the baseline 
number of cases was a well-rounded 100.   
The focus on individuals requires some clarification. A distinction is made 
between ‘natural persons’ and ‘legal persons’. This distinction is necessarily 
somewhat arbitrary for the simple reason that determining the actual subject of 
the procedure is a matter of definition – typically one grounded in legal termi-
nology. For example, this study excludes small businesses (that may in fact be 
individual enterprises) but includes farmers (even though, similarly, these may 
be subject to a procedure as the owners of an enterprise) based on the fact that 
the law in the selected cases addresses the former in terms of a legal entity and 
the latter as individuals. For the purposes of this study, the distinction is justified 
by the fact that when discussing the relationship between the ECJ and European 
society and especially when considering the ‘individual rights narrative’ we are 
not discussing businesses but individuals. Additionally, it is safe to assume mo-
                                                        
20  http://curia.europa.eu/.  
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tives of individually affected litigants to be of a different nature than motives in 
the case of a business.   
Since there was no option in the Court’s database to select cases based on 
types of litigant (no possibility of selecting either natural persons, businesses or 
institutions), the only way was to go over the Court’s documents case by case. 
Any case in which at least one individual was mentioned as a party in the pro-
ceedings was selected. This excluded cases involving only institutions, corpora-
tions or other organizations.21 This method of selection resulted in a total of 
forty-six different preliminary reference cases that involved an individual liti-
gant (out of a total of 100 references). Of these cases six were joined with other 
cases by the ECJ,22 resulting in a total of forty separate cases, as dealt with by 
the Court. Of these forty cases thirty-six received an actual judgment (of which 
two were by way of reasoned order23) and four cases were removed from the 
register because at some point in the proceedings the request for a preliminary 
ruling had been retracted. These forty cases thus constituted all of the ECJ cases 
involving individual litigants originating from Dutch courts and tribunals over 
the selected five-year period. They form the basis of analysis in this study.  
The description of cases and quotes has been anonymised as much as possi-
ble without losing the context of a case or subject. Where cases are dealt with 
without anonymisation or where complete anonymity could not be guaranteed 
(through the context of a case) respondents have been asked for their explicit 
consent. In order to facilitate readability throughout the book and in order to 
improve anonymisation of respondents, the twenty-six cases studied have been 
given nicknames in order to be able to refer back to them without having to 
describe continuously their context and subject and without using the official 
names assigned to the cases by the ECJ, which may refer back to the names of 
individual litigants. Appendix A includes nicknames and short descriptions of the 
                                                        
21  This process of selection was not always straightforward. For instance, some cases, 
which in first instance showed an individual as party to the proceedings, had to be ex-
cluded on closer inspection due to the fact that the individual mentioned turned out to be 
an appointed liquidator, managing the assets of a corporation that had become insolvent. 
As a guiding principle of selection those individuals involved had to be a natural person. 
This thus excluded individuals acting in other than a personal capacity.  
22  Typically, the Court joins references cases that are filed by the same national judge, on or 
around the same day, involving the same legal dispute (although each reference involves 
a separate litigating party). In my analysis I treat these joined cases as a single reference. 
23  Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
‘Where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a question 
on which the Court has already ruled, where the reply to such a question may be clearly 
deduced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question referred for a prelim-
inary ruling admits of no reasonable doubt, the Court may at any time, on a proposal 
from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide to rule by rea-
soned order.’ 
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cases to help the reader when needed. In the text, cases will be referred to by 
their nickname, while Appendix A includes the official case number for refer-
ence. 
Interviews 
The aim was to interview actors involved in these cases in order to both recon-
struct the case trajectories, as well as get the participants’ perspective on the 
procedures. A total of forty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted, of 
which thirty-five interviews were with the parties directly involved in the select-
ed cases: twenty-three with counsellors (lawyers and advisors), eleven with 
individual litigants and one counsellor for the opposing party. An additional ten 
of the total of forty-five interviews were conducted with other actors involved in 
the preliminary reference, including academic experts (four), one staff member 
of the European Commission’s legal department (one), one former agent of the 
Netherlands before the Court of Justice (one), additional counsellors with expe-
rience of preliminary references falling outside the selection period (two), and 
representatives of a labour union (one) and an NGO (one) involved in litigation 
before the ECJ. Additionally, several informal conversations and meetings with 
counsellors, union representatives and EU law scholars took place, which were 
used as reference material. These supplementary interviews were conducted 
with lawyers involved in proceedings that fell outside the selected period and 
several informal interviews at a meeting aimed at working out supranational 
litigation strategies with regard to the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. 
In addition to my own fieldwork, a number of interviews were conducted by 
law students of the Faculty of Law of the Radboud University Nijmegen in the 
context of the course ‘Sociology of Law in European Perspective’, which served 
as an exploratory phase of this research. A total of eight cases were dealt with, 
and related to these a total of thirteen interviews were conducted by students. 
They also included interviews with several parties in cases that fell outside the 
selected period for this research. The quality of these interviews varied consid-
erably, from very brief surveys by email to extensive in-depth interviews. These 
cases included, next to the preliminary references, direct actions and cases not 
involving individuals, but small businesses or organizations. For the purposes of 
this study, most of these additional interviews were used to explore the viability 
of the research design and as complementary data in analysis.   
Respondents were traced by different means. Information on parties directly 
involved in the ECJ proceedings were collected using ECJ documentation, espe-
cially judgments, wherein in most cases the names of the litigants were men-
tioned, occasionally including place of residence, and in most cases including 
the names of their legal representatives. On occasion, national court documents 
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had to be consulted in order to trace counsel because, depending on whether the 
counsel had been physically present at the ECJ hearing,24 they were not always 
listed in ECJ documents. This was especially the case where a court hearing had 
not taken place and the counsel had submitted no written observations. Because 
of their professional registration, counsel was generally easier to trace than indi-
viduals for whom usually only a name was available. Most counsellors were 
approached directly, some via intermediaries. Individuals were approached di-
rectly or via their lawyer.  
As part of the fieldwork for this study, in twenty-six out of the forty selected 
cases at least one of the parties involved (litigant, lawyer and/or third party) was 
traced and interviewed. The larger part of the analyses is based on these inter-
views. In the remaining fourteen out of forty cases, none of the parties directly 
involved were successfully traced, either due to a lack of personal information, 
respondents living abroad, in two cases because the litigants were now deceased, 
or those involved were unwilling to participate. With the exception of one inter-
view that was conducted via online videoconference with a respondent abroad, 
and one interview over the phone, all interviews were carried out face to face. 
The choice for the location of the interview was left to the respondents. In the 
case of legal professionals this was usually at their office, and in the case of the 
individuals this was at their home. The average duration of the interviews was 
approximately 1.5 hours, ranging from forty minutes to two hours and forty-five 
minutes. The interviews were conducted between the spring of 2013 and the 
summer of 2016, with the majority in 2013 and 2014. Most respondents were 
interviewed separately. In two instances both individual and counsellor were 
interviewed simultaneously. Forty-five semi-structured interviews were subse-
quently transcribed verbatim and analysed using qualitative data analysis soft-
ware Atlas.ti.  
Case studies 
The starting point for the case studies was four of the ECJ judgments that were 
part of the research selection. The aim of the in-depth case studies was to reveal 
their genesis and evolution from the perspective of those behind the legal action 
and place them in their larger legal and political context. By tracing the way in 
which these cases had originated and evolved, the case studies reconstructed the 
events and actors’ efforts that led to these four specific ECJ judgments. The case 
studies allowed for further investigation into the consequences and further de-
                                                        
24  Not all ECJ cases include a court hearing. Therefore the names of counsel are only avail-
able in the court’s documents whenever there has been a hearing, and the counsel in 
question actually attended.  
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velopments surrounding the subjects of the cases and provided a substantive 
account of the different ways in which EU law had been mobilised at the local 
level.  
The four case studies are included separately and are scattered throughout 
the book in-between the chapters. The selection of these specific cases from 
among the broader case selection was partly based on theoretically informed a 
priori criteria. Among these was the aim to ensure empirical variety of both 
legal subjects and types of litigants, and a prerequisite of having more than one 
respondent available who had been part of the litigation effort. However, not all 
criteria were formulated prior to the actual case selection. Since many relevant 
aspects of the cases studied surfaced only after the initial phase of empirical 
work (exploration, reading and interviewing) a number of criteria were more 
emergent and unforeseen. Substantively, these cases were selected based on 
their ability to illustrate varying themes that were relevant to the analyses 
throughout the book. The cases should therefore be read as illustrative with re-
gard to certain subjects. The choice for such themes was based not on their 
prevalence, but on their salience with respect to certain themes. For example, the 
last case study (Integration Abroad) is used mainly to illustrate Member States 
governments’ ability to influence and obstruct certain legal developments and 
prevent unwelcome judgments by the ECJ.  
The abundance of both legal and non-legal perspectives and materials in 
these case studies necessitated certain selection. The methodology used for the 
focus of analysis can be considered abductive. Abduction is the method through 
which the researcher follows the questions, puzzles and problems as they present 
themselves during analysis. Following particular themes and issues (informed by 
preliminary analysis and further conceptualisation), analysis focused more on 
certain aspects while other (in other respects possibly interesting) elements re-
mained less developed. Consequently, empirical materials for the different cases 
were selected and collected based on a combination of induction and deduction, 
rather than being driven by an aspiration to be comprehensive. Below is a short 
description of the types of sources that were used for the different case studies. 
Case Study A: Catering Employees 
The analysis in Case Study A on the rights of employees is based on newspaper 
articles, legal academic literature on the court cases, as well as information 
available on a website set up by the employees to inform all those involved of 
relevant developments, including correspondence with their former and current 
employer, court documents and online discussions among the employees.25 Ad-
                                                        
25  http://www.bierkater.nl/ [last accessed 2 November 2017]; the website is no longer up-
dated. 
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ditionally three semi-structured interviews were conducted with the employee 
largely responsible for the legal action, the lawyer in the court proceedings and a 
legal expert from the labour union who supported the employees.  
Case Study B: Pensioners Abroad  
The analysis in Case Study B on the pensioners is based on newspaper articles, 
secondary legal analysis, as well as information retrieved from the website cre-
ated by the association for the purposes of informing the large membership and 
other affected pensioners of the developments surrounding their (legal) ac-
tions.26 The extensive information available on this website included corre-
spondence of the association with government officials, relevant decisions by 
government bodies and insurance companies, court documents and online dis-
cussions among the members of the association. Additionally, four semi-
structured interviews were conducted with two of the leading members includ-
ing the chair of the association and two of the involved individual litigants.   
Case Study C: Fees in Migration Law  
The analysis in Case Study C on the fees in migration law is based on documen-
tation provided by two key actors: the files of the Consultative Council of Turk-
ish Migrants in the Netherlands (Stichting Inspraak Orgaan Turken in Neder-
land, IOT) as well as the personal dossier of one of the academics involved in 
the working group that was responsible for the legal action. These files were 
provided to the Institute for Sociology of Law of the Radboud University for the 
purposes of this research. The dossiers, consisting of five binders and a CD-
ROM with documents, contain collections of legal documents such as the judg-
ments, opinions and memoirs of relevant court cases as well as minutes of meet-
ings of the working group responsible for the litigation efforts and internal 
communications and emails. Additionally, several semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with the actors involved, including the previously mentioned 
academic, the lawyer central to the court cases, three lawyers laterally involved 
in the working group, a representative from the IOT as well as the individual 
litigant.  
Case Study D: Integration Abroad  
The analysis in Case Study D on the Dutch policy on integration abroad is, apart 
from the study of newspaper articles and secondary legal analysis of the court 
cases, mainly based on four semi-structured interviews conducted with the aca-
demic involved in the effort to put pressure on the Dutch policy, the lawyer in 
                                                        
26  http://www.vngsint.com/ [last accessed 15 February 2016]; the website is no longer 
available and has been replaced by https://vbngb.eu/ [last accessed 2 November 2017]. 
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the case, a representative of the Dutch Refugee Council and a former representa-
tive of the Netherlands before the ECJ. 
1.5  Aims and Limitations  
Before moving on to a discussion of the literature on the Court and Euro-
litigation, I want to make clear what one should and should not expect from this 
study. By looking at litigation before the ECJ through the preliminary reference 
procedure from the ground up, this study aims to offer a better understanding of 
the relationship between local interests, litigation and judicial politics from a 
relatively understudied perspective, namely the micro and local level, connect-
ing the EU and its legal system to its constituents.  
This study thus aims to understand and explore the how of Euro-litigation 
through the preliminary reference procedure. The focus is on one particular 
element: the practice of references and the position of the individual within liti-
gation dynamics. Admittedly, when approaching the subject of Euro-litigation in 
this way, this study has some inherent limitations. The social realities of qualita-
tive, in-depth study make for a reduced number of bases to potentially cover. 
Firstly, a lack of base line comparison limits the possibility of projecting find-
ings of this analysis on to possible long-term trends. We will be looking with a 
microscope, which we cannot use to look at the stars. Secondly, the focus will 
be on only one Member State. A comparison with other Member States lies 
beyond the scope of this study, and therefore insights will vary in their generali-
zability to other Member States or other contexts. Thirdly, not all actors poten-
tially involved in litigation will be part of the analysis. The explicit focus on the 
perspective of the litigating parties runs the risk of underestimating the rele-
vance of other actors and factors: i.e. national judge, opposition parties, structur-
al dynamics etc. A further limitation, the focus on only ‘individual litigants’ as 
subject of study, requires some further clarification. This study includes a tenta-
tive assessment of the salient question of whether EU litigation is “monopolized 
by the powerful or open to participation by the marginalized”.27 And while the 
effort to provide a full picture of the structural imbalances in EU law litigation 
would advocate for inclusion of businesses as well, the set-up of this research – 
only spanning a five-year period and having a small-n case selection – does not 
allow for structural comparison over a longer period of time and would run the 
risk of over-essentializing certain differences. Alternatively, a more focused 
approach on certain of these features – e.g. the type of legal representation of 
litigants: specialized in EU, large versus small law firms, international orienta-
                                                        
27  Pavone 2016. 
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tion etc. – would be more fruitful in trying to uncover structural imbalances. In 
that respect, differently structured studies, like the novel spatio-temporal ap-
proach by Kelemen and Pavone trying to explain temporal and spatial varia-
tion in the use of the preliminary reference procedure,28 are promising in dis-
cerning meaningful structural comparisons. As for this study, its theoretical con-
tribution should be sought not in testing such hypotheses, but in raising new 
questions and suggesting new narratives for the study of the role of law in Eu-
rope, as well as to critically approach some existing ones. 
The aim of this study is therefore ambitious in one sense and modest in an-
other. The ambition lies in trying to connect the local with the supranational; the 
micro with the macro. By utilizing in-depth methodology and bringing out the 
micro perspective, the aim is to contribute to a more ‘embodied’ understanding 
of Euro-litigation. The modest aim lies in the fact that the analysis as well as the 
results will be limited when it comes to discerning general trends or giving a 
comprehensive account of the phenomenon under study. However, a distinct 
advantage of in-depth study is that elements are revealed that may go unnoticed 
or that become obscured when one aims for the largest possible variance in pre-
determined factors. The trade-off is therefore that the micro approach offers the 
distinct advantage of revealing details that help to better understand the com-
plexities and context of Euro-litigation, which in macro approaches remain un-
derexposed or even entirely invisible. When taking into account these caveats 
and acknowledging them here wholesale, the insights gained from such an ap-
proach should outweigh its shortfalls at least by the fact that these methods are 
the only way to break into the world of litigation at the ground level. It is sub-
mitted that these insights are invaluable when questioning the underpinnings of 
the more meta-narratives on European integration and the relationship between 
European law and democracy. 
1.6  Structure of the Book 
The book is divided into four parts. Part I (Chapters 2 and 3), starts with a de-
scription of the theoretical position of the individual in the European legal sys-
tem, and reviews the literature on the ECJ and litigation. Chapter 2 deals with 
the narratives surrounding the Court and the way in which it is portrayed as an 
ally to civil society and European citizens. Chapter 3 goes deeper into the theo-
ries of European integration that have sought to explain the dynamics of the 
European legal system, and exposes some of the inherent dead angles in both 
                                                        
28  Kelemen & Pavone 2016. 
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legal and political science approaches to the topic of European integration and 
the ECJ.  
Part II (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) presents the results of the empirical analysis, 
guided by the question: who goes to court in Europe, and why? Chapter 4 deals 
with the assumptions of rational action and interest in previous studies on Euro-
litigation, gives a tentative typology of individual litigants in the Dutch context 
and analyses the various ways in which national court cases reach the ECJ. 
Chapter 5 focuses further on how individual cases may be proxies for larger 
interests, either by organised collectives or due to the transformative effects of a 
reference to the ECJ. It deals with how lawyers aim to have cases referred to the 
ECJ as well as the tensions that arise between litigants and lawyers aiming to 
serve more collective interests. Chapter 6 directs our attention to the practical 
aspects of ‘lawyering a reference’ and focuses on the ways in which legal practi-
tioners deal with the challenges in exercising their professional duties when 
confronted with a reference to the ECJ.  
Building on the insights about the potential in preliminary reference cases 
for the championing of collective interests, Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) deals with 
the more strategic aspects of Euro-litigation and places the actors in a field of 
opportunities and constraints, pitting them against other interested parties in 
order to map out the legal arena at the supranational level. Chapter 7 aims to 
answer the question of the strategic employment of EU law, and dissects who is 
(most) likely and able to use the preliminary reference procedure as a means to 
an end. Chapter 8 subsequently focuses on two other actors that feature promi-
nently in the supranational legal arena – the European Commission and the 
Member States – and analyses the ways in which litigating parties may be con-
fronted with extra opposition or how they may find allies or opponents before 
the ECJ. 
Part IV reflects on the analyses presented in Parts II and III. Chapter 9 re-
turns to the main question of this study and reflects on the main findings in light 
of the theoretic frame sketched out in Chapters 2 and 3. The final chapter con-
cludes with an impetus for further research by offering several new avenues for 
inquiry.  
The four more in-depth case studies are included throughout the book to 
provide substantive and illustrative material for analyses in the various chapters. 
They are written in a largely descriptive manner and can be read separately from 
the main chapters of the book. Conversely, the analyses in the chapters draw on 
insights from the case studies but recapitulate where necessary; therefore the 
main chapters can be read without examining the case studies.  
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2 Promises and Expectations 
2.1  Introduction 
When it was founded, the European legal system was not particularly integrated, 
and the position the ECJ now enjoys, as an important adjudicator in an impres-
sive supranational legal constellation, was not evident from the outset. The crea-
tion of an integrated community in Europe was a contested project from the very 
early days. As a first step towards a better understanding of the relationship 
between the Court and Europe’s citizens, this chapter deals with the way in 
which the European legal system evolved and how the relationship between the 
ECJ and the citizens of Europe developed over time. It discusses the narratives 
on the ECJ as a ‘people’s court’ and the ways in which the Court has tried to 
draw legitimacy directly from the peoples of Europe, mainly by pointing espe-
cially to the benefits its judgments created for European citizens. I will describe 
the tensions that exist between the ideological position of the European citizen 
as a ‘subject of EU law’, the ‘emancipatory functionalism’ that is seen as legiti-
mizing the ECJ itself, and the institutional position of the citizen within the Eu-
ropean legal system. 
2.2  The Promise of the European Court of Justice  
The interlinked processes of juridification – the increase in laws that permeate 
more and more spheres of social life, and the related judicialization – the in-
creased inclination by people to regulate social relations by settling disputes 
within the sphere of law, give rise to an augmentation of the political weight of 
judicial decision-making. It is in this light that some describe how judges in 
general increasingly view themselves as the ‘keepers of promises’.1 Because of 
this trend of judicialization “judges will be called upon more and more to uphold 
not just the law but moral standards, legitimate expectations, fairness: to keep 
everyone’s promises”.2 The waning of the nation-state as a national collective 
and more or less clearly demarcated political entity has, in the international 
sphere, amplified the role of law as an instrument of governance as well as the 
curbing of state power. The growing distrust in government and administration 
purportedly has propelled the judge into the position of what Shapiro has called 
                                                        
1  Garapon 1996.  
2  Schepel & Blankenburg 2001, 9. 
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the ‘anti-bureaucratic hero’.3 This curbing of state power is inscribed in the pos-
sibility of judicial review of legislation and administration. In the European 
context, through the doctrines of ‘direct effect’ and ‘supremacy’ of EU law, the 
ECJ effectively affirmed the possibility of judicial review of national adminis-
trative action at the supranational level, and with it itself as the arbitrator with 
final jurisdiction. The ECJ, according to legal sociologists Schepel and 
Blankenburg, is the keeper of this ‘greatest of promises’, the protection of citi-
zens against the abuse of power by the state.4 By placing the individual (and not 
the peoples, or states) ‘at the heart of its activities’,5 the EU has formulated its 
objective of ‘the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice’ for its citi-
zens,6 and by effect the ECJ acts as the ‘conscience’ of the peoples of Europe.  
Sticking to this ‘language of promises’ the ECJ has made significant prom-
ises to the European citizen. The landmark decision of the Court in Van Gend & 
Loos in 1963 was not only a first step in effectively establishing the political 
union as a legal unity, it also expressed a clear vision by the Court of the stake 
European citizens were to have in this ‘ever closer union of the peoples of Eu-
rope’. Against the explicit objection of the Member States,7 the Court pro-
claimed that: 
 
“[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order [...] for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of the Member States, Community law therefore not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but it also intended to confer upon them 
rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where 
they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the 
Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the 
Member States and upon the institutions of the Community.”8 
 
Van Gend & Loos constituted recognition of the interests of individuals in EU 
law and transformed the EU legal system, by formally including the citizens of 
Europe, who were now able to assert EU law rights before national courts. Arti-
                                                        
3  Shapiro 1993, 47. 
4  Schepel & Blankenburg 2001, 9.  
5  European Commission 2010.  
6  Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (from here on: 
TFEU). With respect to the ambitions of the European Union, see the famous quote by 
Jean Monnet, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the European Economic Community: 
“Nous ne coalisons pas les états, nous rassemblons les hommes.” Thus, heralding at once 
the renewed focus on the individual and the diminishing of state sovereignty. 
7  Craig & De Búrca 2003, 204.  
8  Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v Tariefcommissie [1963], ECR I, 12. 
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cle 67(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) fur-
thermore provides for the constitution of “an area of freedom, security and jus-
tice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and tradi-
tions of the Member States”.9 And through its case law the ECJ contributes to 
“[the creation of] a legal environment for citizens by protecting the rights, which 
European Union legislation confers on them in various areas of their daily 
life”.10 The Court itself does not shy away from this message, and emphasising 
the significance of its work for the benefit of ‘the people’. For instance, one of 
the Court’s press releases announcing its annual report reads: “The cases dealt 
with […] once again demonstrate the importance of Community law in the day-
to-day life of citizens of the Union”.11 And on its website the Court recurrently 
relates its case law to the purported benefits this has brought to Europe’s citi-
zens, especially stressing the ‘fundamental freedoms’ of the EU, the protection 
of fundamental rights, social and equality rights and citizenship. Thus, the ECJ 
presents itself, and draws legitimacy from, the idea of a court for the benefit of 
the peoples of Europe.12 
2.3  The Promise of EU Law 
The legal order of the EU functions as an important unifying factor in European 
society, regulating relations between Member States, EU institutions and citi-
zens as subjects of EU law. European governance is ‘legalized’ to a high degree. 
The EU is not merely created by law; it also pursues its objectives by means of 
law. The common economic and social life of the peoples of Europe is governed 
to a large degree by the law of the Union. In this sense, European society is 
above all a ‘community based on law’. According to the so-called integration-
through-law narrative, law has succeeded in Europe where ‘iron and blood’ have 
failed in the past.13 Through the proliferation of binding legislation at the EU 
level, more and more aspects of life in Europe are regulated at the supranational 
level and ultimately fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union, which has the task to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Treaties the law is observed’.14 An important characteristic of this 
                                                        
9  Article 67(1) TFEU. 
10  https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/en/ [last accessed 7 November 2017]. 
11  ECJ Press release 18/99, 18 March 1999, available at  
http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp99/cp9918en.htm [last accessed 7 Novem-
ber 2017]. 
12  Wernicke 2007.  
13  Vauchez 2008b.  
14  Article 13 TEU. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
22 
system of law is that not only the Member States, but also individuals, are sub-
ject to that law. The expanding scope of EU law, penetrating national legal sys-
tems and framing national policy to a large extent, has increased the significance 
of the EU legal system in the lives of EU citizens. Article 2 TEU states: 
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, demo-
cracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in 
a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.” 
 
Furthermore Article 3 TEU stresses that the Union not only promotes the well-
being of its peoples, but it shall also offer its citizens an ‘area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice without internal frontiers’. This formulation of the promise made 
by the European Union directly to the peoples of Europe highlights the nature of 
the Union as going beyond mere intergovernmental politics.  
In addition, a strong focus on individual rights manifest in the EU’s legisla-
tion was reiterated in 2010 in the so-called ‘Stockholm Programme’ which states 
that “[p]riority should be given to mechanisms that facilitate access to justice, so 
that people can enforce their rights throughout the Union”.15 This European 
‘language of rights’ or ‘rights based regime’ – the notion that the EU legal sys-
tem functions by formulating (enforceable) rights – stood at the basis of much 
change within Europe. Through the jurisprudence of the ECJ in judgments on 
preliminary references and the efforts of the European Commission in holding 
Member States accountable for their failure to comply with EU law, the EU has 
been able to extend the reach of supranational influence on national policy. 
Schepel describes this idea of ‘emancipatory functionalism’ as one of the appar-
ent self-legitimating descriptions of the role of EU law by the earliest lawyers of 
the ‘European persuasion’.16 These Europeans of the first hour saw in European 
law the next step in the expansion of social life beyond the nation-state and saw 
law as “liberating civil society from the shackles of parliamentary democra-
cies”.17 This self-description, according to Schepel, is essential in understanding, 
on the one hand, the success of the European legal system (in that it effectively 
worked as described, most notably in curtailing the power of the nation-states), 
but on the other hand, also in the ways in which this system has been justified 
and legitimized by its propagators, by reference to the individual empowerment 
and benefit that allegedly resulted from it. The generous assumption is that 
“[l]aw belongs to civil society, and civil society finds in European law the 
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framework for its cross border dynamism”.18 The sole authority of the ECJ to 
interpret EU legislation combined with a growing focus on individual rights 
seems to signal a shift towards greater empowerment of the individual within the 
European legal system, by giving him or her a voice at the supranational level. 
In the famous words of Federico Mancini – one of the most influential ECJ 
judges in the history of the institution – “[taking] law out of the hands of bu-
reaucrats and politicians and [giving] it to the people”.19 As such, Schepel views 
this legitimizing rhetoric as “a spectacularly unsubstantiated claim to the loyal-
ties of Europe’s citizenry”.20 Apart from an attempt to shield the nascent legal 
system from criticism and drawing legitimacy directly from the peoples of Eu-
rope, European law also needed the citizen for another purpose, as I will de-
scribe in the next paragraph. 
2.4  Giving the Citizen a Role in European Law Enforcement 
Apart from making a promise to European citizens, the European legal system 
also has a more functional role reserved for private parties in the enforcement of 
EU rules. Private enforcement of EU law through the courts has been an essen-
tial element in the functioning of the European legal system. In fact, the EU, 
with its significantly limited administrative capacity, has always struggled to 
ensure compliance by the Member States. One of the ways this has been offset 
has been by relying on the legal system to reveal and address breaches of EU 
law obligations by Member States. As a result, the enforcement of EU law relies 
in large part on private parties invoking EU law before national courts. With this 
in mind, the European Commission calls upon citizens to actively enforce their 
rights under EU law and it is a fervent proponent of private standing to enforce 
EU legal norms.21 For example, Kelemen describes what he calls the ‘Passenger 
rights saga’, wherein the European Commission sponsored posters featured at 
European airports informing passengers of their right, under EU law, to com-
pensation for delayed flights.22 The passenger rights saga not only encompasses 
these efforts by the Commission but includes a strain of litigating efforts before 
the ECJ that has served to both establish as well as expand individual rights, 
which, according to Kelemen, illustrate a new trend of practices throughout 
                                                        
18  Schepel 2004, 2. 
19  Mancini & Keeling 1994, 183.  
20  Schepel 2004, 2. 
21  European Commission 2008. 
22  Similarly, the ‘Citizens First Initiative’ launched by the European Commission aimed at 
increasing people’s awareness of rights conferred upon them by EU law and to help those 
who have difficulty in exercising those rights.  
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Europe. He concludes: “The emphasis on the language of rights – EU rights no 
less – and the courtroom battles between regulators and the regulated would 
have been out of step with the more cooperative and decidedly less judicialized 
approaches to regulation that prevailed across Europe [well into the 1980s].”23  
 
Box II: The Enforcement of EU Law 
 
The European Union and its courts cannot alone ensure the effective application of 
European Union law. It depends strongly on domestic courts, individuals and 
organisations that initiate proceedings before these courts to enforce their rights under 
European Union law. The domestic judge must apply European Union law because it 
enjoys precedence over domestic law. Any conflicting provision of national law is in-
applicable. The domestic judge can apply European Union law because it has direct 
effect, if it is sufficiently clear and unconditional. The provisions of the Treaties and of 
Regulations as such do not require any additional measures by Member States to 
become effective. In contrast, Directives require transposition into national law by 
Member States within a certain time limit. Nevertheless, once the time limit for their 
implementation has expired Directives, too, can have direct effect. European Union 
law can also have indirect effects because all provisions of domestic law must be 
interpreted, as far as possible, in order to achieve the result sought by the relevant 
European Union law, its effet utile. Finally, European Union law requires effective 
judicial protection, which means that if European Union law creates rights, Member 
States must provide access to courts to enforce these rights. 
 
This judicialized approach has been part and parcel of governance in Europe and 
in practice diminishes the enforcement burden on European public authorities.24 
Moreover, this form of mobilisation of EU law by private actors through litiga-
tion above and against their state is a symbolic and potentially real shift of pow-
er from the states towards their citizens, and is a weapon in the hands of those 
aiming to further integration.25 In this sense, litigation opportunities can be seen 
as an “attempt to extend the types of juridical checks found at the domestic level 
to the international governance level”,26 and an effort to extend the scope and 
enhance the power of EU law. On the impact of European integration on the 
lives of European citizens, Mancini and Keeling write: “And let there be no 
mistaking the impact of Community law on the citizens of Europe. Natural and 
legal persons are intimately involved in the application of the Treaty by the 
Community institutions and the Member States. They are the ones who profit 
directly by an unhindered flow of goods, services and capital throughout the 
common market; they are the beneficiaries of the rules on labour mobility and of 
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26  Alter 2010, 22. 
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the right to share, on a par with local workers, the social advantages available in 
the country to which they move.”27 
Within this narrative, the role of the ECJ is seen as having been invaluable 
for promoting and ensuring individuals’ rights. EU law, in this line of reasoning, 
has not only transformed the face of Europe but also actively promoted the 
rights of the European citizen. At the same time, the citizen, as a ‘private en-
forcer’, has been integral to the application of EU law at the national level. The 
next paragraphs deal with the ways in which this new role for the European 
citizen can also be seen to expand his or her power in the political realm. 
2.5  EU Law and the New ‘Public Power’ 
The supremacy and direct applicability of EU law have served as federalizing 
instruments, altering the status of states in international law and introducing 
private parties as subjects of international law.28 By granting access to the Court, 
the EU legal system contributes to expanding the public power of private par-
ties, who are now able to subject government acts to judicial scrutiny.29 And this 
in turn implies the establishment of a ‘European rule of law’, with a common 
judicial tribunal with sole jurisdiction over EU law: the ECJ. Alongside the doc-
trines of supremacy and direct effect, more recent developments in EU citizen-
ship case law and the area of freedom, security and justice are giving more and 
more substance to the idea of European rule of law, protecting the fundamental 
values listed in the Treaties, including democracy and fundamental rights.30 One 
element strongly connected with the idea of the rule of law is what is called 
‘public power’, which entails the possibility of non-state actors, including indi-
viduals, to invoke judicial authority against the abuse of power by the state.  
A public power approach to the institutional role of the ECJ as ‘supreme 
court’ of the EU postulates that, since the Court has jurisdiction over the inter-
pretation of EU law especially where it relates to national governmental action, 
                                                        
27  Mancini & Keeling 1994, 182. 
28  Cf. Weiler, who critically examines the actual status of individuals as ‘subjected’ but not 
‘subjects’. On understanding the relation between law and democracy in Europe he 
writes: “Individuals, not only States, are thus subjects. Semantically, in English, ‘sub-
jects’ is often synonymous with citizenship. The Queen’s subjects of old are the present 
citizens of the Realm. It could seem, thus, that in the very articulation of one of the prin-
ciple ‘constitutionalizing’ doctrines – direct effect – the condition was provided by ele-
vating individuals to the status of full subjects alongside Member States.” […] “But note, 
individuals are ‘subjects’ only in the (direct) effect of the law. In this sense alone is Eu-
rope a new legal order. […] Enjoying rights created by others does not make you a full 
subject of the law.” Weiler 1998, 380.  
29  With restrictions of course, see Scheingold 1965. 
30  Micklitz 2012. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
26 
it effectively enforces the power of constitutional judicial review.31 Access to 
courts from a supranational rule of law perspective thus brings with it elements 
of scale and impact not found at the national level.32 Access to justice in this 
supranational setting is seen by some as empowering citizens to influence na-
tional policy, and by extension the scope of international constitutionalism, 
through the opportunity to invoke the reviewing powers of a higher judicial 
authority. 33 In the case of the EU, this judicial authority is the ECJ, which is 
charged with the task of ensuring a uniform interpretation and application of EU 
rules and norms. Access to the ECJ might thus provide the individual a stake in 
a game in which he or she is structurally disadvantaged. As stated by Dalton, 
Cain and Scarrow: “From a strictly governmental perspective, the expansion of 
the opportunity for citizens [to influence legislative and administrative deci-
sions] alters the administrative structure in very important ways, and might have 
significant long-term effects on systemic performance and policy legitimacy.”34  
This expansion of the public power of citizens through the legal system is of 
course predicated on the accessibility of judicial institutions. However, the locus 
standi of individuals before the ECJ has been shaped only restrictively, as will 
be explained in the next section. 
2.6  Access to the European Court of Justice 
As we have seen, the Court portrays its own role within European society as a 
protector of citizens’ rights, and the reviewing powers of the Court are seen by 
some as the best example of citizens’ empowerment against their national gov-
ernment. Although the Court presents itself as the “embodiment of a new Euro-
pean Volksgeist, one that emphasizes the emancipatory power of legal rationality 
over (national) politics and judicial process over political debate”,35 such cele-
bratory proclamations should be approached with some scepticism. For one, the 
European citizen has never enjoyed full and direct access to the Court. As Cos-
ta’s critical study of direct litigation before the Court reveals, there is no men-
tion of the terms ‘citizens’ or ‘individuals’ in any of the texts, projects and re-
ports of the ECJ.36 Neither term exists in any rules and regulations that address 
the procedures of the Court, which Costa takes to be a token of the gap between 
                                                        
31  Shapiro 1998. 
32  It should be noted that – while not in the Netherlands – a number of EU countries have 
constitutional courts that have similar institutional positions. 
33  Kumm 2011.  
34  Dalton, Cain, & Scarrow 2003, 265-6. 
35  Schepel & Blankenburg 2001, 11. 
36  Costa 2003, 750.  
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the Court’s self-portrait and the concrete possibilities for any private litigant to 
go to court.37 The official denotation of parties is by the word ‘person’ and the 
rules of procedure only distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘legal’ persons on one 
occasion.38 Costa concludes on this point that the Court’s judges consider the 
Court to be the guardian of the respect for Union law (as is its mandate through 
Article 19 TEU) in order to further European integration, “but not as a means for 
citizens to be involved in the governance of the Union, or to be protected from 
excesses from Community institutions. Legal practice and judges’ opinions lend 
little credit to the possible advent of a ‘judicial democracy’, which would go 
beyond the mere judicialization of European politics.”39 
For a court that has presented itself as being ‘for the people’40 it is not the 
most accessible institution for Europe’s citizens. In reality, direct access to the 
ECJ by private parties is limited to contesting the validity of EU measures, and, 
from an individual’s perspective, to the relationship between the citizen and the 
EU. Furthermore, the strict interpretation of standing rules for private parties by 
the ECJ means that EU measures can only be contested if and when they directly 
affect the individual. In practice, this means that only a small minority of private 
parties may be eligible to access the ECJ via this route. Individual claimants 
therefore make up only a fraction of these direct actions.41 Based on interviews 
with its judges and clerks, and by studying the Court’s case law as well as its 
internal structural reforms, Costa concludes that “[t]he [ECJ] seems to consider 
that broader dissemination of the Court’s jurisprudence and the principle of 
supremacy of Community law over national law contribute more to democracy 
in the Union and better protection of fundamental rights than easier access to the 
Court”.42 This is in line with the conclusion drawn by Rasmussen decades earli-
er that the Court made efforts to channel questions of judicial review through 
preliminary references.43 When looking at the possibility of direct petitioning of 
the Court’s authority vis-à-vis the EU there is therefore a strong discrepancy 
between the restrictive access to the ECJ, limiting the possibilities of bringing 
                                                        
37  The only mention of the term individual is in Article 104§6 on the possibility of judicial 
aid by the ECJ. 
38  Costa 2003, footnote 34. The selection of cases for this study also quickly revealed this 
lack of distinction in any of the Court’s information, neither in any of the official docu-
ments of specific cases, nor in the statistics provided on the Court’s judicial activity. 
39  Costa 2003, 756.  
40  Lecourt 1976, 309. 
41  Additional to strict standing rules, Costa describes a few elements that can be dissuasive 
for potential litigants in deciding to start these kinds of proceedings: Length of the pro-
ceedings, legal costs and needed expertise combined with the risks of losing. 
42  Costa 2003, 754. 
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direct actions to a privileged minority, and the ambition of furthering legitimacy 
of the Court by directly addressing the European citizen.44 
 
Box III: The Preliminary Reference Procedure 
 
The responsibility for ensuring the enforcement of EU law in large part falls upon the 
national courts. In their capacity as ‘decentralised EU judges’ national judges are task-
ed with applying EU law in national proceedings. The Treaties have provided for a 
mechanism that allows national courts to usher in the assistance of the ECJ. Under 
Article 267 TFEU a national judge may request the ECJ to provide an interpretation of 
EU law that is needed to resolve a dispute pending before its court. Whenever there is 
doubt as to the interpretation and applicability of EU law in any case, national judges 
can (and in some instances must) refer the matter to the ECJ through a so-called re-
quest for a preliminary ruling. 
The preliminary reference procedure performs three separate functions. Firstly, and 
most importantly, it ensures a uniform interpretation of EU law. Secondly, the pro-
cedure facilitates the application of EU law at the national level by offering national 
courts a ‘helping hand’ in resolving the problems that may accompany the application 
of EU law. And finally, the preliminary reference procedure may serve as a means to 
protect the rights that citizens derive from EU law. 
Although formally the ECJ does not concern itself with the interpretation of national 
law, having jurisdiction only over the interpretation of Union law, the nature of 
preliminary rulings is often that of a veiled form of review. These rulings given by the 
Court, on the constituent elements of the reference made by the national judge(s), 
effectively function as vertical precedent in that the Court’s decision provides an 
explanation on the basis of which the cases at hand are to be decided by the national 
judge. They also have horizontal effect in that the Court’s decisions apply to all Mem-
ber States and its rulings establish the principles on which courts in all Member States 
are to rule in similar cases in future. 
During the examination of the question before the ECJ, proceedings before the 
national court will be suspended. Having received clarification from the ECJ, the na-
tional court then resumes its proceedings leading to its final judgment.  
 
Critical literature more generally reveals, on the one hand, a discrepancy be-
tween the ‘promise’ of the Treaties and of the ECJ, and on the other hand, the 
practical impossibility of challenging legislative and administrative action, espe-
cially of EU institutions, by private parties.45 On judicial protection and individ-
ual rights in a European context, Ward concludes that effective judicial protec-
tion and individual rights have been used in the European legal order to justify 
the ‘federal-type’ constitutional design as crafted over the years by the ECJ. The 
need for effective judicial protection and protection of individual rights has been 
expansively – yet selectively – addressed by the preliminary reference procedure 
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in order to ensure the uniform enforcement of EU legislation at national level.46 
She finds that these imperatives have been actively addressed by the ECJ in 
anchoring EU law in the legal systems of the Member States but private parties 
have had little success in challenging EU institutions to the same degree, thus 
signifying the double standard developed over the years that constrains Member 
States but insulates EU institutions from similar judicial accountability for their 
actions. The growing role of EU regulations in the everyday life of citizens gives 
great significance to the question as to what possibilities citizens have in mobi-
lising the authority of the Court, especially when considering the emphasis of 
the ECJ itself on ensuring an area of freedom, security and justice. To conclude, 
the opportunities for citizens to profit from this system seems to be limited to a 
large extent to the profits they may enjoy from EU law, and forcing compliance 
by their national government, by invoking EU law in national courts and by 
activating the preliminary reference procedure. 
2.7  An Infringement Procedure for the European Citizen? 
Over the years the ECJ has been fairly successful in enforcing compliance with 
EU legislation and its judgments. One structural ally for the Court in this respect 
has been the European Commission, that is tasked with ensuring compliance 
with EU law by Member States, and that can bring Member States before the 
Court on charges of not fulfilling their obligations under EU law. Since Van 
Gend & Loos it has become clear that the Court also, and arguably predominant-
ly, relies on private parties to enforce EU law by mobilising their rights. The 
success, or relevance, of the preliminary reference procedure is reflected in the 
number of cases brought before the ECJ, which has been increasing steadily 
since the first reference in 1961, to upwards of 400 a year since 2011. The work-
load has increased to such an extent that in 2011 the Court requested that the 
rules of procedure be recast to reflect the predominance of the ECJ’s caseload of 
preliminary rulings.47  
Whereas the European Commission and the Member States can resort to Ar-
ticles 258 and 259 TFEU, private parties are provided no ‘European level’ judi-
cial control over Member States’ violations of Treaty obligations. 48 They in turn 
have to rely on ‘national level’ control by invoking the direct effect of EU law in 
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national court proceedings. While the enforcement function of the European 
Commission was clearly marked out in the Treaty from the outset, the second 
route to rights enforcement was developed some years later by the ECJ itself in 
Van Gend & Loos. In its judgment, the Court effectively established the legal 
means for private parties to hold Member States accountable for any violation of 
the rights conferred upon them by the Treaty, albeit in a less direct form than the 
procedures available for Member States and the European Commission. In addi-
tion, addressing objections by Member States, that argued that Articles 258 and 
259 (then 169 and 170) TFEU already provided a system for exercising supervi-
sion of Treaty violations, the Court proclaimed: “The vigilance of individuals 
concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition 
to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the 
Commission and of the Member States.” Thus, a second avenue for challenging 
the breach of EU law, one that included private parties as possible benefactors of 
EU law, was called into existence.  
This ‘dual vigilance’,49 of both the European Commission and the popula-
tion at large, not only made it more likely for Treaty provisions to be observed 
by contracting states, it also stood at the basis of the transformation of the entire 
European legal system. Private parties were now able to invoke EU law and 
rights conferred upon them before national courts. With regard to the main func-
tions of the preliminary reference procedure50 in particular and the ECJ’s man-
date in general, the ensuring of a uniform application of EU law in all Member 
States, it must be stressed that formally the ECJ does not have constitutional 
review powers. It has jurisdiction over international – and not constitutional – 
law. A true European constitution never made it beyond the 2005 referenda in 
the Netherlands and France, and the authority of the ECJ as the highest court of 
Europe, trumping national constitutions has not gone unchallenged.51 On the 
other hand, although Member States do remain sovereign states with their own 
constitutions, the principles of direct effect and supremacy of EU law and the 
way the ECJ has interpreted and applied EU legislation has resulted in a body of 
higher order norms that has substantially constrained the manoeuvrability of the 
national legislature. In this respect Mancini and Keeling conclude: 
 
“[A]ware of the difficulties faced by the national judge, the Court does not confine 
itself to interpreting the Community rule; instead it enters into the heart of the 
conflict submitted to its attention, but it takes the precaution of rendering it abstract, 
that is to say it presents it as a conflict between Community law and a hypothetical 
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national provision having the nature of the provision in issue before the national 
court. The technique thus described, which is formally impeccable and of great use 
to the national court, results in the Court of Justice acquiring a power of review 
which is analogous to – though of course narrower than – that routinely exercised by 
the Supreme Court of the United States and the constitutional courts of some 
Member States.”52 
 
Even though formally the Lisbon Treaty is not the constitutional document it 
was designed to be, in reality the practical design of the EU legal system has the 
effect as if it were. In this respect former ECJ judge Pierre Pescatore refers to 
the preliminary reference procedure as having effectively “become the infringe-
ment procedure for the European citizen”.  
The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of EU law established by the 
Court in the early 1960s, transformed EU governance and paved the way for a 
decentralized form of enforcement. With EU law since then having direct effect 
at the national level, citizens, companies and groups were provided the means to 
challenge Member States’ compliance with EU law. These parties are now able 
to invoke EU law directly before national judges and the preliminary reference 
procedure (now Article 267 TFEU) provides the means to activate the reviewing 
powers of the ECJ. The doctrine of supremacy of EU law has dramatically di-
minished public authorities’ possibility of relying on national law to justify na-
tional policy and national judges, in their capacity as EU judges, are required to 
resolve any conflict between national and EU law by ruling in favour of the 
latter. For individuals, the preliminary reference procedure is as of now the prin-
cipal route to the ECJ for supranational contesting of government action.53 With 
reference to Dworkin, a report published by the European Parliament expresses 
this view on the preliminary reference procedure: “Thus, individuals may use 
EU law both as a ‘shield’ (to defend themselves from action by national authori-
ties which infringes EU rights) and as a ‘sword’ (to challenge national measures 
on the grounds of incompatibility with EU laws). Consequently, the preliminary 
ruling procedure provides an opportunity for individuals and national courts to 
question governmental actions”.54 Considering that more and more areas of law 
are governed by EU rules and regulations, national governments’ actions in-
creasingly fall within the realm of EU law.  
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2.8  Conclusion 
The relatively limited enforcement capacity of the EU in combination with the 
emergence of powerful courts encourages the EU legislator to “introduce direc-
tives and regulations with strict substantive and procedural requirements and to 
encourage judicial enforcement – including by private parties – of these legal 
norms”.55 Judicialization has thus formed a solution to the principal-agent prob-
lem in power delegation as a result of political fragmentation and the extremely 
limited administrative capacities of the EU. In others words, legislators “have an 
incentive to frame policies as rights and to encourage private parties to enforce 
them on their own through the courts”.56 Kelemen thus not only foresees a con-
tinuing increase in the judicialization of the political sphere but he gives much 
weight to the potential of private action in producing systemic change in the 
political structure. International regimes throughout the world are witnessing an 
increase in judicial authority and with it an “increase in the opportunity for indi-
viduals to bring rights claims, and a liberalization of legal standing rules ena-
bling wider citizen and interest group participation in the development, monitor-
ing and enforcement of laws”.57 International law in general, and EU law in 
particular, in effect functions as a form of restriction of the lawmaking power of 
national governments. Moreover, overcoming this restriction by changing legis-
lation imposes a higher threshold on national governments when routine law-
making is undesirably restricted by a higher order law, since changes must be 
effectuated by a different lawmaking body, namely at the supranational level. 
These changes are thus beyond the powers of the national lawmaking bodies to 
unilaterally alter. From a rule of law perspective this results in more effective 
limitations on lawmaking powers.58 The involvement of private actors in the 
exercise of political power greatly influences the form of public power and with 
it the legitimacy of public institutions. The Court has effectively created a quasi-
bill of rights in several countries that had previously not known such a body of 
judicially enforceable rights.59 
The extension of the competence of the EU granted by earlier Treaties, be-
yond the purely economic, has increased the influence of the EU on domestic 
policy, and with it its significance in the lives of the European people. With the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, generally expanding the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ to interpret and review the EU ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ 
(AFSJ) legislation and policies, and by transforming the EU charter of funda-
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mental rights into a legally binding ‘bill of rights’60 it can be expected that the 
ECJ will be called upon more often to review the implementation of EU legisla-
tion and practices in accordance with the EU charter. The role and function of 
the ECJ can thus be expected to change, as well as the relative position of both 
Member States and EU citizens. Earlier studies have shown how domestic poli-
cy terrains falling within these competences, under the influence of litigation 
before the ECJ, have been put under pressure and eventually conceded. Exam-
ples include consumer protection,61 environmental policy and equal treatment,62 
and domestic commercial policy.63  
The private access to the ECJ, channelled through the preliminary reference 
procedure, has potential impact on the whole of the EU and on domestic govern-
ance. As Alter has shown, private access to the compulsory jurisdiction of an 
international court as a tool for individuals to challenge the national implemen-
tation of supranational rules is a trait found only in Europe (ECJ and the 
ECtHR).64 Although it is not clear whether in this respect EU courts are in fact 
the model or the exception, it seems that Europe provides a unique test case for 
this role played by courts and private parties in an international setting. Kelemen 
has described how increasing judicialization of the policy process serves as a 
solution in a constellation characterised by fragmentation and a principal-agent 
problem. It has incentivised lawmakers to frame policies as rights and to en-
courage private parties to enforce them on their own through the courts. It has 
encouraged judicial independence, strengthening courts to “act as a check 
against bureaucratic drift enforcing legal norms against bureaucratic agents who 
may seek to deviate from them”. Not only has this process made both courts and 
citizens as litigants part of the institutional make-up of the European Union, 
framing policies in the language of individual rights has been thrust forward 
rhetorically as a promise to enhance the EU’s legitimacy and show that it is 
serving the interests of its citizens.65 This interrelation between court litigants 
and international governance is thus an important element in the EU legal struc-
ture that is bound to develop further. The rhetorical promise to European citi-
zens gives reason for critical examination of the usage of European law by indi-
viduals and the preliminary reference procedure, connecting individuals with the 
ECJ, and allows for study of the way in which European law has found its way 
into the fabric of European society. 
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3 The Political Role of the ECJ 
3.1  Introduction 
Arguably, the most captivating feature of the ECJ as an international court is the 
pivotal role it performs at the intersection of the legal and political spheres. As a 
central actor in transforming the European legal system, the ECJ came to play an 
unmistakable part in the integration of Europe, with legal integration succeeding 
where political integration proved more difficult. As Scharpf concludes: “[B]y 
the end of the 1970s, European integration had reached a highly asymmetric 
institutional configuration: attempts to remove national barriers to trade through 
legislative harmonization continued to be severely impeded by the ‘joint deci-
sion trap’, whereas ‘integration through law’ was able to move forward without 
political interference through the seemingly inexorable evolution of judicial 
doctrines protecting and extending the Treaty-based rights of private individuals 
and firms.”1 The ECJ, through its doctrinal development, has thus been a central 
arena of political development in Europe. And although this idea of the Court as 
embodying one of the essential spaces where the government of Europe is being 
produced2 is now well established, the scholarly interest in the Court did not get 
off to a flying start. This chapter outlines a brief historical overview of how and 
why the Court has gained scholarly interest over the last half a century, followed 
by a critical review of what has generally remained an underexplored element in 
the study of the Court; individual litigants and the very notion of ‘interests’. 
Finally, I will outline how this study will contribute to taking the lid off this 
‘black box’. 
3.2  Early Scholarly Interest in the Court of Justice  
Before the 1980s, studies on European integration were characterised by their 
legalism and formalism and the Court attracted little attention from other than 
the legal disciplines in the first decades of its existence. As Snyder concluded: 
“[I]t has often been regarded (and taught) simply as a highly technical set of 
rules, a dense doctrinal thicket into which only the ignorant or the foolish would 
‘jump in and scratch out their eyes’, still less try to understand in terms of social 
                                                        
1  Scharpf 2010, 220. The ‘joint decision trap’ refers to the idea that the requirement of 
unanimous decisions will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a 
‘problem-solving’ (as opposed to a ‘bargaining’) style of decision-making can be main-
tained. See Scharpf 1988. 
2  Vauchez 2007. 
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theories of law”.3 Stein’s seminal 1981 article ushered in a new focus on a con-
textual analysis of the Court’s case law. He described how the ECJ, while func-
tioning ‘under the radar’ of the mass media and scholarly interest, in the first 
decades of its existence, transformed the traditionally international law method-
ology of the European Community Treaties and fashioned an essentially ‘consti-
tutional framework for a federal-type structure’ in Europe.4 Weiler furthered 
Stein’s analysis by showing how this newly formed ‘interstate government 
structure defined by a constitutional charter’ transformed the relationship be-
tween the Member States and the Community. This was made possible by the 
ECJ’s constitutional doctrines of supremacy and direct effect and the strengthen-
ing of legal ties of Member States to the Community’s constitutionalized frame-
work, effectively limiting Member States’ options for non-compliance.5 Weiler 
played an essential part in giving academic credentials to this theory, now 
known as the ‘integration-through-law’ theory, or more critically the ‘European-
ization-though-law-narrative’.6 He argued that the dwindling political push for 
integration during the 1960s and 70s was counterbalanced by the European legal 
system, with the European Court of Justice taking on the role of an integration 
actor.7  
With this increasing awareness of the politically significant role played by 
the ECJ, the Court attracted attention as well as criticism, being deemed an ac-
tivist court that usurped legislative functions. Contrary to the prevailing belief 
by EC legal scholars that the Court’s case law encountered little resistance, 
Rasmussen famously argued in 1986 that numerous examples of attempts by the 
‘countervailing powers’ (most notably the Member States) to curb the Court’s 
power showed how the Court was stretching its legitimacy to the limit by en-
croaching on the legislative branch.8 Although the Court had not been wholly 
immune from attacks by politicians, the criticisms did not pose a sustained chal-
lenge. Yet, with the ensuing debate,9 Rasmussen’s work did bring about an im-
portant impetus to the scholarly attention paid to the ECJ by both legal scholars 
with a normative approach to the Court’s legitimacy, as well as a contextual ap-
                                                        
3  Snyder 1987, 180. 
4  Stein 1981. See also Mancini 1989, 596. 
5  Weiler 1991. 
6  Integration-through-law was the title of a large-scale research and multi-volume publica-
tion project launched at the European University Institute, Florence in 1981. For a critical 
analysis of the support which this concept had received early on from an enthusiastic Eu-
ro-law community, see Vauchez 2008b.  
7  Integration is defined as the “process, leading gradually, with the passage of time, to an 
increase in the exchanges between the various societies concerned and to a more central-
ized form of government”. Dehousse & Weiler 1990, 244. Emphasis in original. 
8  Rasmussen 1986.  
9  See especially Weiler 1987 as well as Cappelletti 1987.  
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proach ‘beyond doctrine’ that started to focus on judicial developments in rela-
tion to the reception of the Court’s case law by other actors. In this new wave of 
interest the Court started attracting increased attention from political scientists 
interested in the relationship between law and politics.  
3.3  Competing Political Science Perspectives on European Integration 
With the notable exception of Scheingold,10 who very early on recognised the 
Court’s contribution to integration, political scientists were remarkably late in 
recognising the ECJ as an important political actor.11 This changed after the 
aforementioned contributions by Stein and Weiler. Political researchers subse-
quently tried to explain how the ECJ’s legal doctrines had become politically 
transformative within the social and political context. Within this new ‘law in 
context’ approach to the role of law in European integration, two contending 
paradigms – intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism – battled over explain-
ing the dynamics of legal integration, largely focusing on the relationship be-
tween the Court and the ‘Masters of the Treaties’; the Member States.12 As Co-
nant describes, for political scientists “the spectre of a supranational court elicit-
ing the obedience of states was puzzling from the perspective of traditional in-
ternational relations theories”.13 The big question was how the ECJ had played a 
role in transforming Europe from an international free-trade constellation into a 
supranational polity, transcending state sovereignty. The two competing inter-
pretative paradigms subsequently started quarrelling over the best explanation 
for the dynamic towards integration and supranationalization without the back-
lash of the nation-states who saw their sovereignty gradually diminish.  
The first paradigm, the intergovernmentalist ‘camp’, most famously propa-
gated by Garrett, contended that the ECJ encouraged compliance by aligning its 
decisions with the preferences of the most powerful states.14 Based on a rational 
choice institutionalist approach, the Court in this view is seen as strategically 
positioning itself in relation to the preferences of the most powerful ‘principals’. 
Basing his conclusions on traditional rational choice analysis and game theory, 
Garrett argued that the ECJ tends to uphold Member States’ interests, being 
influenced by the reaction it expects from national governments, placing the 
Court under the Member States’ ultimate control. The Court’s mandate in this 
view derives from its “collective utility in enforcing pre-established bargains 
                                                        
10  Scheingold 1965. 
11  Burley & Mattli 1993.  
12  Alter 1998.  
13  Conant 2007, 47. 
14  Garrett 1992; 1995. 
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related to trade liberalization and efficiently filling gaps in the ‘incomplete con-
tract’ of European law”.15 
The dismissal of judicial autonomy in the intergovernmentalist approach 
sparked a challenge by neofunctionalists who argued that legal integration did 
indeed erode the dominance of states, including the more powerful ones. This 
second paradigm, contrary to the intergovernmental view, submitted that legal 
integration was the result of the activity of both sub- and supranational actors 
that pursued their own interests. The neofunctionalist view accorded much more 
weight to the mechanism for dialogue between national judges and the ECJ, the 
preliminary reference procedure, and the resulting possibilities for judicial re-
view of government acts. In their seminal contribution in which they outlined 
their ‘political theory of legal integration’, Burley and Mattli stressed the im-
portance of the structures of opportunity that were created by the ECJ.16 In a 
reasoning that ventures close to the ideal of the European legal system as de-
scribed in Chapter 2, the neofunctionalist account described ‘integration-
through-law’ in three constitutive elements.  
The first element consists of the ‘constitutional’ doctrines of the European 
legal system that were created by the ECJ in a series of transformational judg-
ments. As a second element, they identify, on the one hand, the mobilisation of 
EU law by multinational companies, transnational interest groups and EU insti-
tutions, seizing the newly formed institutional opportunities, and on the other 
hand, the national courts’ progressive (yet turbulent17) acceptance of the general 
principles established by the ECJ. The final element of their theory sees the 
resulting dynamic, the support by private and national actors that in turn offers 
new opportunities for the Court to assert and extend the scope of its case law, 
thus creating a self-reinforcing mechanism that catches interest groups, multina-
tionals, EU institutions, Member States and the ECJ in a virtuous circle of Euro-
peanization.18 This system has thus not been designed by any specific actor, has 
no principals and agents, but everybody contributes in its own way. The fact that 
national governments have accepted this transfer of power and undermining of 
their sovereignty is due to legal justifications masking the implications of rul-
ings and as a result shielding the ECJ from attack.19 
                                                        
15  Conant 2007, 47. 
16  Burley & Mattli 1993.  
17  Mattli & Slaughter 1998, 191. 
18  Stone Sweet 2004.  
19  Burley & Mattli 1993; Mattli & Slaughter 1998.  
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3.4  The Magic Triangle of the Legal System 
The competition between intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist views of 
European integration to this day remains an instructive partition in the analysis 
of the tensions between supranationalization and more entrenchment on the part 
of Member States. However, the mechanism as described by the neofunctionalist 
account of integration has become widely accepted as an explanatory mecha-
nism for how Europe’s legal system and the ECJ have contributed to integration. 
The European political and economic integration has been to a great extent a 
legal process, the dynamics of which do not rely exclusively on some inherent 
force of EU law, or on the activism of the ECJ and the boldness of its rulings, 
but more widely on the way sub- and supranational actors have used the ‘su-
premacy’ and ‘direct effect’ doctrines of EU law in pursuit of their own inter-
ests. According to this theory of the dynamics behind this process of ‘integra-
tion-through-law’, it unfolded predominantly through the dynamics of the Euro-
pean legal system, and the activation of that system by various actors. Vauchez, 
analysing the genesis of ‘integration-through-law’ as a theory, describes how the 
‘magic triangle’ of the EU legal system – the doctrines of direct effect and su-
premacy of EU law combined with the preliminary reference procedure – has 
come to be regarded as the explanatory mechanism for how Europe became 
more integrated through the functioning of its legal matrix: “Despite being pos-
sibly deterring for non-lawyers, [‘direct effect’, ‘supremacy’ and ‘preliminary 
ruling’] have become crucial keywords for grasping the specific nature of the 
EU polity. Taken individually, any of these notions is merely a legal principle 
utterly incapable of founding a political order on its own. Taken together, their 
effects appear to beget a dynamic of circular reinforcement.”20 The combination 
of ‘supremacy’ and ‘direct effect’ with the preliminary reference procedure is 
thus considered the essential channel, if not the real engine, of integration itself. 
The subsequent rise of the ECJ itself stems from this ‘reciprocal empowerment’ 
linking the latter with all those various groups and institutions.21  
The neofunctionalist account spawned a host of new strands of research, fo-
cusing especially on the preliminary reference procedure as an essential cog in 
the ‘integration-through-law’ machinery. Over the last two decades this link 
between Europe’s legal matrix and the building of the European polity has be-
come more and more evident as abundant literature started documenting the 
examples of the use of the legal opportunities by a host of actors, in pursuit of 
their own interests.22 
                                                        
20  Vauchez 2008b, 1. 
21  Burley & Mattli 1993; Vauchez 2007. 
22  For an overview of literature see Conant 2007.  
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3.5  Integrationist Dynamic: The Inter-Court Dialogue 
Early literature on integration and the ECJ remained largely theoretical and de-
scriptive, with next to no systematic empirical testing of competing claims. The 
neofunctionalist theory inspired new research agendas that aimed to empirically 
underpin its foundational elements. Subsequent waves of scholarship began to 
test competing claims against empirical evidence and specify theoretical expec-
tations.23 Much of the literature exploring legal integration was framed to speak 
to the international relations debate and a lot of emphasis was placed on the 
relative power of EU and national institutions. The literature trying to specify 
the nature of interaction between law, politics and society started to analyse ECJ 
case law and focused especially on the relationship between national courts and 
the ECJ. The idea was that it was in this ongoing ‘inter-court cooperation’ that 
the integration mechanism is activated, with preliminary references providing 
the ECJ with the possibility to enhance the scope of its case law, and in effect 
foster further integration. Analysing the interaction between international courts, 
governance and democracy, the ‘dialogue’ between national courts and the ECJ 
became an important and much studied subject with respect to European integra-
tion. Over the decades, a lot of scholarly work has gone into explaining the strik-
ing differences in the number of preliminary references sent by different courts 
in different Member States.24 As his or her role is crucial in referring cases, the 
analyses have mostly focused on the national judge as the central actor. The 
most notable example is the work done by Stone Sweet and Brunell who, in 
order to do a rigorous analysis, created a database of all cases starting from the 
earliest preliminary reference originating in the Netherlands in 1961 up until 
2006.25 
Since then, a number of authors have made use of this dataset with the aim 
of clarifying the unequal distribution in references between Member States and 
between different referring courts. Subsequent research has employed quantita-
tive analysis of ECJ case law and the participation of national courts in the EU 
legal system in attempts to explain the variable degrees of ‘responsiveness to EU 
Law’, or ‘societal demand for integration’. Using mainly econometric methods, 
authors have tried to find causal links between preliminary reference rates and as 
diverse variables as ‘density of EU legislation’, ‘intra-EU trade’, ‘size of EU 
migrant worker populations’, ‘monist or dualist legal traditions’ and ‘the pub-
                                                        
23  Conant 2007.  
24  Judges in Belgium, for instance, call on the ECJ approximately ten times as often as do 
judges in Portugal. 
25  Dataset available at: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Sweet/datapage.htm [last accessed 
10 November 2017]. 
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lic’s political awareness’.26 Other research has started to focus more on the role 
of national judges in the integration dynamic and has approached the coopera-
tion between courts as an opportunity for national lower courts to empower 
themselves vis-à-vis the national high courts.  
Tridimas and Tridimas for example, use a so-called ‘public choice model’ to 
examine factors that influence the use of the preliminary reference procedure by 
national judges.27 The authors put forward a rational action based model as a 
tool for the analysis of national judges’ motives for referring to Luxembourg. 
Using their ‘public choice’ model, defined as ‘the principles of optimizing be-
haviour and equilibrium on political outcomes’, they analyse the process of legal 
integration as the equilibrium outcome of demand and supply factors in the in-
teraction between individual litigants, national judges and the ECJ, wherein each 
decision maker is modelled as pursuing its own interests under the relevant sets 
of constraints. They argue that the ‘market’ for rulings based on this procedure 
is not a direct interaction between consumer and producer, since demand and 
supply, by the nature of the procedure itself, are channelled through the interme-
diation of national courts. In this view, courts, like other organs of government, 
are assumed to have their own preferences over policy. Courts are seen as pursu-
ing, using their judgments, preferred policy outcomes. Reference to the ECJ for 
national courts is seen to have two benefits. The first is the ‘judicial empower-
ment’ of national judges as a result of this newly formed legal order, as de-
scribed by Weiler, who stated that “[l]ower courts and their judges were given 
the facility to engage with the highest jurisdiction in the Community and thus to 
have de facto judicial review of legislation”.28 The second benefit is the protec-
tion of judgments, through ECJ rulings, against reversal by a higher national 
court. With this the authors describe the national courts and their decisions 
whether or not to refer, not as mechanical conduits but as ‘eclectic agents’, and 
therefore conclude that the preliminary ruling mechanism has empowered the 
ECJ to deliver judgments that would not have been possible in the absence of 
the mechanism.29 In return, ECJ rulings “enhance the power of national courts in 
their own legal systems vis-á-vis the executive and legislative branches by 
                                                        
26  Wind Martinsen & Rotger 2013; Broberg & Fenger 2013; Carrubba & Murrah 2005.  
27  Tridimas & Tridimas 2004.  
28  Weiler 1991, 2426. 
29  Other institutionalist analysis of law and courts: Shapiro & Stone 1994; On judicial 
empowerment: Golub 1996; On the judicial empowerment of national judges Alter earli-
er added the important insight that the integration dynamics did not empower all judges 
equally, and that it were mostly lower judges who had the strongest incentive to refer, 
she demonstrated that the stream of references from lower courts led higher courts to 
begin to send their own references in an effort to control the case law of the ECJ. Alter 
1996. 
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providing the opportunity for review of national legislation”.30 This empower-
ment narrative subsequently found its continuation in a focus on what these 
developments meant for the relationship between the EU and European society, 
and for the relative position of the individual in this legal system. 
3.6  Connecting the Citizen to EU Law 
Within the search for explanatory theories on the dynamics of integration, the 
significance of the transforming relationship between law and society became 
obvious. Legal instruments formulated at the Union level are binding upon the 
Member States as well as on their citizenry. By the increase in the amount of EU 
legislation as well as its expansion into more and more areas of law, the Union’s 
legal order directly affects daily life to a seemingly ever-increasing extent. It 
accords rights and imposes duties on the individual, so that as a citizen of both 
Member State and of the Union he or she has become subject to a hierarchy of 
legal orders — a phenomenon resembling federal constitutional systems. Like 
any legal order, that of the European Union provides a system of legal protec-
tions for the purpose of recourse to as well as the enforcement of Union law. 
The Member States are obliged to take all appropriate measures to ensure ful-
filment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from action taken 
by the institutions of the European Union, facilitating the achievement of the 
EU’s tasks and to abstain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment 
of the objectives of the Treaties. Member States are answerable to their citizens 
for any harm caused by violations of their Treaty responsibilities. 
The ECJ’s case law has potential impact on the way national governments 
act and on the room for manoeuvring available to them, and the set-up of the 
legal system provides opportunities for various state (and non-state) actors, in-
cluding national judges, individuals and societal groups. The neofunctionalist 
model has stressed this point by incorporating non-governmental actors into the 
system and process of European governance through litigation before the ECJ. 
Neofunctionalist approaches, although focusing on different aspects and differ-
ent actors in the integration dynamics, all underline the pivotal role played by 
litigation as an essential part in the reciprocal mechanisms of the EU legal sys-
tem. Alter, in a quest to explain when and how international legal authority is 
constructed and how the ECJ’s legal doctrines have become politically trans-
formative within a social and political context illuminates how the Court has 
gained influence and has encouraged greater respect for and adherence to Euro-
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pean rules by allying itself with societal actors.31 With this Alter refers to the 
occasions where the Court has been able to assert its authority and expand the 
scope of EU law through the mobilisation of EU law by private litigants bring-
ing cases through the preliminary reference procedure, as well as through at-
tempts to activate the European Commission. Wernicke describes the broaden-
ing range of litigants able to participate in the Court’s proceedings and the ECJ’s 
own efforts to reformulate EU law into individual rights, in pursuit of direct 
democratic legitimacy.32 In this way, the ECJ and private parties find themselves 
in a relationship of mutual interest. More generally, Alter states that “it is clear 
that private access to [international courts] to challenge supranational actors can 
help facilitate rights claiming, international organization’s accountability, and 
the rule of law within supranational governance systems”.33  
As part of the functioning of the ‘magic triangle’, the activation of the legal 
system is indeed critical for keeping the integrationist train running by providing 
the ECJ with the means to expand its case law. As such, preliminary references 
provide the fuel for the integrationist machinery of the European legal system. 
Therefore the European Union is not only a ‘community based on law’, but 
moreover a ‘community built on case law’.34 Although the bulk of the studies 
has focused on the institutional interconnection between the national and supra-
national level, giving more or less weight to the role of purposeful actors, in-
cluding national judges and societal groups, the integration theory gives a clear 
and important role to litigation. 
3.7  Participation Through Law Enforcement 
The question of the wider connection between law and European society has 
given more recent studies cause to focus on the interconnection between the 
legal sphere and civil society. The peculiar nature of the EU legal system, with 
an elevated role for private parties leads to an emphasis on the possible influ-
ence society has on the scope and direction of European integration. In the 
words of Cichowski: “In the EC, individuals can activate transnational adjudica-
tion processes on their own. In virtually all other international regimes, individ-
uals must rely on intermediaries, usually representatives of governments, to 
press their claims and to pursue their other interests. But in the EC, the operation 
of the legal system has progressively reduced the capacity of national govern-
                                                        
31  Alter 2009. 
32  Wernicke 2007. See also: De Búrca 1995; Wigger & Nolke 2007; and more critically 
discussed by Schepel & Blankenburg 2001.  
33  Alter 2010, 45. 
34  Vauchez 2008; Kelemen 2011. 
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ments to control policy outcomes, while it has enhanced the policy influence of 
the EC’s supranational institutions, national judges, and private actors.”35 It is at 
these crossroads of European governance and litigation that theories of empow-
erment of individuals and civil society are focusing. This strand of research, 
therefore, places its emphasis on the so-called ‘participation-through-law-
enforcement’.36 
This approach takes the idea of an increase in opportunities for private ac-
tion within a newly structured supranational sphere as having far-reaching con-
sequences for power structures and for the democratic nature of this political 
constellation. Litigation before the ECJ as a result acquires a more significant 
role in EU governance and new possibilities for individuals to invoke EU law 
and appeal to individual rights beyond the nation-state emerge.37 Cichowski 
concludes that legal integration operates to diminish Member States’ control and 
therefore empowers individuals. This empowerment is not limited however to 
the possibility for judicial remedy beyond the domestic legal system. 
Cichowski’s argument goes further by claiming that “[t]he EU is a most likely 
case for courts to enhance (democratic) participation in international govern-
ance”. To support this claim she points to the fragmentation of political authori-
ty in the EU, which has led to a relative increase in the power of nonmajoritarian 
institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Court of Jus-
tice.38 This increase in power has in turn been reinforced by the aforementioned 
supremacy of European law and its direct effect, which provides citizens, firms, 
and societal groups with the legal opportunity to plead in national courts for the 
enforcement of European law.39 Cichowski concludes that the possibility for 
disadvantaged individuals and groups at the domestic level to obtain rights at the 
national and EU level through EU law and litigation before the ECJ can be seen 
as “giving civil society a voice and place in EU politics”.40 This is possible 
through the mobilisation of transnational public interest groups that provide new 
power and a voice to EU citizens who may be excluded from domestic political 
deliberation.  
Cichowski argues that not only are the ECJ and civil society of integral im-
portance to the process of creating a European polity, but that the balance of 
                                                        
35  Cichowski 2006.  
36  Börzel 2006. Wind, Martinsen & Potger 2013; Cichowski 2006; Cichowski & Stone 
Sweet 2003. 
37  These developments have enticed questions as to whether there is a need for reformula-
tion of the way we view the primacy of parliamentary legislature in the light of a growing 
democratic deficit of policy-driven delegated legislation. See Van Gestel 2013.  
38  See also Börzel 2003; Tallberg 2003; Kelemen 2011. 
39  Cichowski 2006; Conant 2002. 
40  Cichowski 2007. 
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power in EU politics between national governments, EU organizations and civil 
society have shifted under the influence of institutional and organizational 
change, making the ECJ a site of democratic empowerment for individuals and 
civil society. Cichowski explicitly voices an idea of democratic enhancement 
defining it as “greater accountability, transparency and individual participation 
in political processes”. She claims that her studies illustrate how supranational 
legal mechanisms can provide increased accountability “through enforcing the 
law, rights claiming and greater legal protection for individuals”.41 In this view, 
EU law, the legal system and the opportunities provided by the ECJ create a 
situation of empowerment for individuals and civil society. 
3.8  Token Cases and Selecting on the Dependent Variable 
Because of the ground-breaking effects of preliminary rulings in the history of 
the ECJ, the preliminary reference procedure is widely considered the central 
mechanism, or backbone, of the European legal system and moreover is put 
forward as the main means by which individual rights can be (and have been) 
invoked, consolidated and expanded. This model of a dynamic and relatively 
autonomous system of integration gives an important role to litigants as provid-
ing the ‘demand for integration’, as well as promotes the idea of law as a partic-
ularly powerful tool against national governments. As Schepel and Blankenburg 
conclude, the model “fits nicely with the court’s self-styled role as liberator of 
European civil society”.42 
In the development of the empowerment and participation narratives on the 
EU legal system, the Defrenne cases (I, II and III), the so-called ‘Sunday Trad-
ing Saga’, and the case of the British Equal Opportunities Commission are fa-
mous examples frequently used to illustrate the successful exploitation of the 
opportunities provided by the EU legal system to put pressure on national poli-
cies. The first revolved around the non-implementation of the equal pay provi-
sion in the Treaty of Rome (Article 141). While not one national government 
had undertaken domestic policy changes to implement the provision since the 
signing of the Treaty, Article 141 was ‘brought to life’ as a result of the strategic 
action and activism of a Belgian lawyer. Eliane Vogel-Polsky, who specialized 
in social and labour law, regarded Article 141 as a stepping-stone to expanding 
                                                        
41  However this accountability seems to be only directed towards national policies vis-á-vis 
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women’s labour rights. Through a series of test cases involving Miss Gabrielle 
Defrenne, a flight attendant with a Belgian national airline, Vogel-Polsky was 
able to solicit ground-breaking judgments that expanded the scope of the provi-
sion and began to provide real situations in which Article 141 was applicable.43 
The second famous example showed the recourse to Community law by British 
retailers who set out to attack the British ban on Sunday trading in the UK, after 
running into the limitations of a court strategy in domestic law.44 These large 
retailers were successful in what Rawlings called playing ‘the Eurolaw game’, 
which entails the “sounding in [of] Community law, to challenge the product of 
the national legal and political order”.45 In other words, the ‘outflanking’ of the 
domestic legal system. Especially when the national arena is characterized by a 
deadlock in doctrine, breaking out of the confines of the national legal system 
can be a very attractive option. In the third example British equal opportunity 
groups used the EU legal system to force a conservative British government to 
make considerable reforms to its equality policy. The reforms included extend-
ing work benefits to part-time workers, eliminating the cap on the size of dis-
crimination awards, and stopping the policy of dismissing women from the mili-
tary because of pregnancy.46 
These cases are used repeatedly to highlight the empowering aspects of EU 
law, and the ways in which EU law strategies have been transformative in the 
past. However, in focusing on such cases one runs the risk of a confirmation 
bias, and the meaning of certain cases is transformed into a token of a certain 
narrative. As Börzel argues, “research on litigation and participation in the EU 
tends to suffer from a selection bias on the dependent variable. Cases in which 
citizens and groups fail to bring claims against their governments for non-
compliance with international law are hardly considered”.47 Focusing on single 
judicial events, such as a particular court case, obviously provides incentives to 
select those that stand out in some way, as most such cases of litigation are high-
ly uneventful from the perspective of integration. Not only are we not seeing 
failed attempts, or non-attempts, these studies also fail to consider that refer-
ences may not always constitute a ‘demand’ for a ruling, or an attempt at partic-
ipation or expecting a net gain from invoking EU law. A related critical observa-
tion is the fact that these studies have a significant methodological problem in 
focusing on past examples of successful mobilisation of EU law. In other words, 
research on Euro-litigation has a tendency to focus on results and what is visible, 
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46  See Alter & Vargas 2000; Barnard 1995; Harlow & Rawlings 1992; Mazey 1998.  
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thus looking merely at ‘successful’ litigation. Those who have lost, or have not 
litigated, for lack of resources or other reasons, are not part of the equation. And 
in the case of the debate on empowerment and democracy on the other hand, the 
issue is only dealt with in abstracto and in posse. As a result, the presented 
model of European integration creates a narrative in which private parties (and 
when focusing on rights specifically individuals) are particularly well off. The 
emancipatory functionalism of EU law is expected to benefit the citizens of 
Europe, and those citizens are expected to grasp the opportunities in EU law 
whenever it serves their interests. While the cases often used to underscore this 
idea provide a particularly strong case for such model of empowerment, this 
selective presentation of success stories is unsatisfactory when trying to under-
stand Euro-litigation as a phenomenon in its own right. 
3.9  Playing the Eurolaw Game: Indications of an Uneven Playing Field 
The assumption of the equality of power between participants in the legal sys-
tem was challenged by Galanter’s work on the structural disadvantage of ‘one-
shotters’ before the courts.48 Galanter described a way of analysis that defines 
positions of structural (dis)advantage between contending parties in a legal sys-
tem that, although formally neutral, may perpetuate and reinforce advantages of 
the ‘haves’ over the ‘have-nots’. Distinguishing between rules, courts, lawyers 
and parties as the essential elements of contemporary legal systems he reverses 
the usual legal analysis that takes rules as a starting point and works to see what 
effects these rules have on the parties concerned, by starting with those parties 
and examining what effect different kinds of parties may have on the system of 
law. He identified two key players in the legal system – one-shotters and repeat 
players. A one-shotter is a person, or organisation that deals with the legal sys-
tem only infrequently. These actors tend to have few resources at their disposal. 
Repeat players on the other hand, have had, and anticipate having repeated liti-
gation. They tend to be institutions and tend to have more resources at their 
disposal. Moreover, repeat players have the opportunities to establish and devel-
op lasting facilities and informal relationships with institutional officials, and 
their ‘bargaining reputation’ serves as a resource. They are able to calculate 
risks of maximum loss and deploy strategies to maximize gains over a long se-
ries of cases, thus ‘playing the odds’.49 Galanter argues that these repeat players 
                                                        
48  Galanter 1974. 
49  Playing for the rules can also be done outside the courtroom, mainly by lobbying for the 
creation, adaptation or adoption of certain relevant rules. This is of course a focus on the 
‘input side’ of legislation – the main focus of the debate on the purported democratic def-
icit of EU legislation. The argument being that people of Europe directly or indirectly 
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have the ability to “play the litigation game differently from [a one-shotter]”50 
and this ability affords them substantial advantages and benefits. His central 
proposition is that even though ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ are formally equal be-
fore the law, social mechanisms lead to a structural advantage for the ‘haves’. 
Within European integration studies, the exclusive focus on the judicial di-
mension of legal integration, underscored by the profusion of quantitative analy-
sis on judicial proceedings and on the fact that supranational case law is consid-
ered almost automatically a by-product of ‘civil society’, leaves us with a par-
ticularly rosy picture of the work done by the ECJ. In the words of Vauchez: 
“[A] very optimistic vision of the contribution of law and of Courts to the eman-
cipation of citizens from the allegedly close and exclusive circuit of majoritarian 
institutions.”51 The fact that the legal system in itself is not a level playing field 
is a critical element in such considerations. 
Rawlings’ article on the ‘Sunday trading saga’ is one of the exceptions that 
do pay attention to dimensions of power. He describes how Euro-litigation can 
be part of political action campaigns by powerful actors that play what he calls 
the ‘Eurolaw game’.52 Rawlings’ article shows how such legal strategies cannot 
be understood as separate from the social, economic, political and legal conflict 
surrounding them, both in terms of the objectives and strategies of the litigating 
parties, and in terms of the responses of courts and authorities. Rawlings stresses 
that the Sunday trading saga is an exceptional example of litigating efforts and 
political pressure through law. The sheer scale and complexity, ranging across 
the domestic legal system as well as several trips across the continent, make this 
a great example of the ways in which litigation is used as a successful strategy 
for change. At the same time the scale and complexity make this story just that: 
exceptional. It reveals political struggle, extensive strategic use of the legal sys-
tem and it shows the different actors involved in such a process, as well as their 
relative power and incentives for action. However, it can hardly be seen as ex-
emplary for strategic Euro-litigation per se. As Rawlings acknowledges: “For 
Britain, it is without doubt the most considerable Community law litigation to 
date, and it has only a few serious rivals across the Community as a whole”.53 
The Sunday trading saga was a very exceptional example of a lengthy coordi-
nated legal campaign by a large number of retailers, and by all accounts very 
powerful repeat players. 
                                                        
have too little say in what is developed and implemented as EU law. In this field it is of 
course even more obvious that those with the numbers, resources, experience and exper-
tise, in short agency, are ‘coming out ahead’. 
50  Galanter 1974, 98. 
51  Vauchez 2008.  
52  Rawlings 1993, 332. 
53  Rawlings 1993, 331-2. 
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Similarly, the oft-cited Defrenne cases were revealed to be part of a long 
battle by one particular activist lawyer. Éliane Vogel-Polsky, the cause lawyer 
behind the Defrenne cases, was by no means an average litigator. She was at the 
time a young law professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles, trained under the 
patronage of former Belgium Minister of labour and former president of the 
WTO Board Léon-Eli Troclet and a member of the milieu of Brussels’ Euro-
lawyers, including Michel Waelbroeck, one of the major repeat players of the 
ECJ, and Jean-Victor Louis, a well-established authority in the field of European 
law.54 Vogel-Polsky would later become an expert advisor to the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and the European Council. Looking at such contextual 
factors should lead to the preliminary conclusion that examples like these could 
be therefore more likely the exception than the rule. The cases of Ms Defrenne 
are a famous example of how individual cases may disguise the existence of 
cause lawyering or interest group activity behind an individual façade. The pro-
verbial ‘straw man’ has been used in this sense to describe cases where individ-
ual interests are actually merely the ‘vehicle’ by which a more strategic game is 
played.55 
Such insights direct our attention to the maxim that the legal system has a 
tendency to be favourable to ‘the haves’, and should trigger sensitivity to this 
misbalance. When it comes to the European legal system there are still more 
questions than answers, which is why Alter and Vargas conclude that “EC law 
litigation strategies are one way that European integration is changing domestic 
politics. But the argument we make—that domestic groups can pull in EC law in 
a strategy to shift the domestic balance of power—raises almost as many ques-
tions as it answers” and that it is therefore “time to move beyond vague state-
ments that actors following their interests further integration”. Presumptions 
based on rational considerations by actors that are “purported to have a clear and 
unbiased perception of the various opportunities offered in the European are-
nas”,56 give very limited insight into what transpires at the ground level before a 
reference is made to the ECJ and which actors are most able and likely to use the 
EU legal system to their advantage. This research will therefore analyse the 
                                                        
54  Vauchez 2008. Cichowski does mention Vogel-Polsky’s strategic endeavour including 
the fact that Vogel-Polsky also published an article in a Belgian legal journal suggesting 
the direct effect of Article 119, but does so only in a footnote. Evidently, this aspect of 
the Defrenne saga was not the main focus of Cichoski’s analysis, however, the underes-
timation of the capital and credentials necessary for such strategic mobilisation to work 
undermines Cichowski’s final and optimistic conclusion of Euro-legalization as the de-
mocratisation of a European public sphere.  
55  This phenomenon traditionally makes it particularly difficult, from a research standpoint, 
to assess the amount of organised litigation without using more pervading (and with it 
more time- and resource consuming) methodology.  
56  Vauchez 2007, 2. 
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specific ways in which, next to an opportunity, the preliminary reference proce-
dure has its own specific obstacles that have to be overcome by strategic actors, 
and I will focus on the coping strategies some actors have developed to navigate 
the specific characteristics of the European legal system. 
3.10  The View from a Distance 
As has already been pointed out early on by Mattli and Slaughter, there is more 
to litigation before the ECJ than a mere case judgment relationship.57 A host of 
different legal, procedural and political variables and ‘a community of actors 
above and below the state’ can be distinguished.58 The statistical and case-
centred approaches to the analysis of supranational litigation goes a long way in 
showing the results and consequences of such legal action and can be seen to 
show the resulting macro shifts in power relationships. However, this approach 
does not reveal the ways in which these cases are brought before the Court, or 
the strategies and goals behind litigation at a micro level. The approaches using 
econometric methods and those focusing on the interaction between national 
courts and the ECJ are not erroneous in their attempts to come to grips with 
integration dynamics; however there is a lot that remains invisible that way. 
Moreover, while the aim is to understand the role of law in the dynamics of 
integration, there is a lot that gets swept up in such analyses that strictly has 
nothing to do with the integration of Europe,59 and therefore these models in-
clude spurious correlations and various studies produce contradictory results.60 
The 2005 article by Carrubba and Murrah is an excellent example of a mac-
ro-theoretical approach and the testing of hypotheses by econometric methods. 
Not surprisingly they conclude after analysis “that no single, mono-causal ar-
gument is sufficient for explaining the development of European legal integra-
tion”.61 As their findings suggest, “future study of the preliminary ruling system 
needs to incorporate and control for all steps in the legal process, from case 
generation to actual reference”.62 The authors also signal the important over-
sight of the role of the European public at large in the top-down study of Euro-
pean legal integration, which has focused largely on elite actors, i.e. the ECJ, 
national courts, and organized business interests. Numerical analyses like Stone 
Sweet and Brunell’s database provide information on the relative distribution of 
                                                        
57  Mattli & Slaughter 1996. See also Slaughter, Stone Sweet, & Weiler 1998. 
58  Mattli & Slaughter 1995.  
59  Chalmers 2000; Schepel & Blankenburg 2001, 31.  
60  Conant 2007. 
61  Carrubba & Murrah 2005, 414. 
62  Carrubba & Murrah 2005, 414 my emphasis. 
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preliminary references, according to subject area, country and referring court; 
however they give little insight into how cases reach the Court and the role 
played by different actors involved in the process. If the objective is to say any-
thing about Euro-litigation and the relationship between EU law and society, we 
have to look at cases in depth, especially from the perspective of private parties, 
as will be done in the study at hand. Only then will we be able to identify mean-
ingful characteristics that are not evident in quantitative analysis. That is, for 
example, the involvement of interest groups, test cases, the need for financial 
support and significant expertise, all of which have some bearing on the nature 
of Euro-litigation and the position of individuals in this ‘Eurolaw game’. 
As to the macro-level analysis, in most research Conant argues that “[i]n-
depth qualitative research has generally yielded more compelling findings than 
efforts to explain aggregate national trends in references”.63 Similarly, Alter 
concludes that “[c]ase study analysis risks being more impressionistic than 
quantitative. But given the over-aggregated nature of the ECJ’s reference data, 
and the current impossibility of determining the number and content of national 
court cases that are not referred to the ECJ, it may be the only way to capture the 
many factors shaping judicial behavior”.64 The atomized, disembodied under-
standing of action gives general indications of trends and differentiations but it 
reduces actors to rational and unified units and fails to account for the social 
complexity in which the cases in practice arise and unfold. Generally, the re-
search on preliminary references based on econometric methods starts with the 
methodologically necessary premise that under the same circumstances all ac-
tors will act alike. It fails to account for possible constraints, independent of 
direct interaction. 
3.11  Materialising the Individual Litigant 
In studies on Euro-litigation, the motives of the litigating parties are often im-
plicitly (and sometimes explicitly) assumed, as is customary to rational choice 
theories, to be based solely on an assessment of (financial) gain. Such assump-
tions of rational choice and ‘demand for ECJ rulings’ runs counter to insights 
from socio-legal studies, sociology of law and litigation and mobilisation studies 
that reveal the complexity of the world of litigation and the use of the legal sys-
tem.65 When the role of individual litigants is discussed, the rational choice basis 
of their model shines through: “Private litigants will resort to litigation and in-
                                                        
63  Conant 2007, 54. 
64  Alter 2000, 501. 
65  A selection: Galanter 1986, Felstiner, Abel & Sarat 1980, Fitzgerald & Dickins 1980, 
Macaulay 1963 and Rosenthal 1974. For an overview, see Friedman 1989.  
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voke EC law if they expect a net gain, financial or otherwise, from doing so”.66 
The success stories of the use of the ECJ are repeatedly put forward as examples 
that affirm a certain idea of empowerment of the less powerful by means of EU 
law.67 However, these much-repeated examples may lead to an overstatement of 
the opportunities provided by the EU legal system. 
As pointed out by Börzel, the selection bias possibly blinds us to the less fit-
ting findings we may encounter when looking beyond the success stories. In 
similar vein, Shaw concluded earlier that “there is very little authoritative or 
non-anecdotal evidence to buttress claims for the centrality of individual rights 
as the key to the connection between so-called ‘Community citizens’ and the EC 
constitutional order. The only evidence which has been collected takes as its 
model litigants (rather than potential litigants, or a class of aggrieved citi-
zens)”.68 With the latter she points to work done by Harding. Indeed, Harding 
was one of the few examples of attempts at an empirical approach to the dynam-
ics behind litigation. In 1980, Harding pioneered an approach to the ECJ’s case 
law by not only focusing on the legal significance of adjudication and its trans-
formative power within the legal sphere but also by looking at who actually 
gives acte de presence in Luxembourg.69 The most significant result flowing 
from Harding’s preliminary statistical analysis is that most questions can only be 
answered by directly confronting the litigants themselves as to their strategies, 
objectives and hopes when engaging in litigation before the ECJ. However, his 
work was not met at the time with a lot of subsequent in-depth research.70 
The general agreement that cases brought by private litigants continue to 
play a central role in the EU legal process stresses the need for more insight into 
the dynamics behind litigation. As Alter concludes: “The question remains, 
however, whether the ECJ’s success at transforming the system with the help of 
private litigant cases means that a never-ending process of legal expansion has 
been set in motion. When do private litigants and national court actions help to 
advance legal integration? To answer this question, we need to better understand 
the interests of the ECJ’s key intermediaries (private litigants and national judg-
es) and thus the factors shaping where, when, and why they use the EU legal 
system to promote their objectives”.71 Similarly, Kelemen and Schmidt con-
                                                        
66  Tridimas & Tridimas 2004, 132. 
67  Cichowski 2007. 
68  Shaw 1996. 
69  Harding 1980, followed by Harding 1992 and Rawlings 1993, shows the usefulness of a 
focus on litigants and strategies in explaining litigation before the ECJ. Notable excep-
tions focusing on socio-legal dynamics: Harlow and Rawlings 1992 and Chalmers 2000. 
70  In 2005, Harding still concludes that a non-qualitative inquiry into litigation gives no 
insight into motivation and strategies of litigants. See Harding & Gibbs 2005, 368. 
71  Alter 2000, 492. 
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clude, “we still know far too little about the conditions under which private liti-
gants actually claim their European rights in front of national courts”.72 
Harding, as one of the few legal scholars to adopt a different approach, ar-
gued that systems of judicial review of actions taken by public authorities are 
usually solely assessed on the basis of purely judicial criteria, i.e. the judicial 
framework as provided by the constructors of the system, rather than in the sub-
jective sense based on the strategies, motivations and habits of the private indi-
viduals that may take these kinds of actions. Similar critique has been voiced by 
Harlow and Rawlings, who concluded: “Doctrine and case analysis we possess; 
research into who litigates, how often, and in respect of which governmental 
activities, has been singularly lacking.”73 Moreover it can be said that there is a 
tendency to analyse litigation in isolation from alternative non-judicial or non-
legal, usually political strategies. These tendencies can probably be ascribed to 
the all too ready assumption that litigious behaviour is primarily determined by 
legal opportunities, a misconception that was exposed earlier.74 To their credit, 
in their early work Mattli and Slaughter professed that “[t]he next generation of 
scholarship on EC legal integration, as with European integration more general-
ly, will require far more nuanced attention to the identification of both interests 
and constraints in very specific contexts. It will move away from contending 
paradigms such as realism and neofunctionalism and toward the development of 
mid-range hypotheses that are both theoretically sophisticated and empirically 
informed”.75  
3.12  Conclusion 
There seems to be a disciplinary bifurcation between legal and political science 
perspectives on the preliminary reference procedure. Where the former perspec-
tive emphasises the procedure as a technical dialogue between courts, potential-
ly under-estimating the political aspects inherent in the procedure as an en-
forcement mechanism, the latter takes the procedure as the focal point of Euro-
pean integration, running the risk of unduly assuming purposeful action by in-
terested actors. Jurisprudence of the ECJ, and especially the influential prece-
dential function and ground-breaking effects thereof, leads to the conclusion that 
the preliminary reference procedure gives individuals and civil society a stake in 
the transformation of Europe’s political and legal order. Not only are they active 
participants in the enforcement of EU law, it also provides them with the oppor-
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73  Harlow & Rawlings 1984, 257. 
74  Macaulay 1963. 
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tunity to defend their rights, leading some scholars to conclude that this is in fact 
an avenue for empowerment for individuals and civil society.76 The ultimate 
promise to the European citizen in this narrative can be formulated as follows: 
the fragmentation of political power transforms democratic structures and di-
minishes national sovereignty. When political power is mediated to a large ex-
tent by legal structures, access to these structures is seen as a way of influencing 
the political process. The ECJ is seen as the place where citizens and civil socie-
ty can challenge national policy and are thus in a sense ‘empowered’ against 
their government, because this mechanism enables them to ‘outflank’ the na-
tional jurisdiction. This scenario sounds attractive, yet for legal sociologists it 
poses some important questions about the realities of legal mobilisation. 
The common point between the aforementioned approaches is that they tend 
to be ontologically rationalist. They emphasize material aspects over ideational 
ones and assume the rationality of agents without much regard for structural 
influences and actors’ relative agency. This rational choice approach also shines 
through in a positivist tendency to try to establish strong causal links between 
actors’ actions and outcomes, as well as a predominant reliance on quantitative 
research strategies and tools (e.g. statistics and econometric models). Finally, 
deductive approaches tend to prevail over inductive ones, selecting and inter-
preting events and facts to test and support the explanations of European integra-
tion. Econometric methodology, macro-approaches and the remnants of rational 
action theory all contribute to the continuing disembodied nature of the study of 
the role of law and litigation in the integration of Europe. It is submitted that 
such reductions can impair the explanatory virtues of these analyses, to the ex-
tent that they are likely to overestimate the purposefulness of actors while un-
derestimating the complexities involved in litigation and judicial decision-
making. 
A host of unanswered questions thus remain when it comes to Euro-
litigation and the role of the parties in these proceedings. Apart from some gen-
eral assumptions with regard to the motives and capacity of non-institutional 
actors, there is little insight into how and why both individual and organised 
interests bring cases before the national courts, as well as whether or not these 
litigants play a role by pushing the national court towards making a reference. 
Especially when looking at the democratic empowerment of citizens suggested 
by some, a study into the objectives of and constraints on litigation from the 
perspective of the litigant will be a vital contribution to interrelated debates on 
juridification, empowerment, democracy and the legitimacy of the ECJ. Alt-
hough some of the more vocal judges of the ECJ paint a positive picture, one of 
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the ECJ as a ‘people’s court’,77 the actual possibility for citizens to address legal 
issues at the ECJ might be a significant overstatement.78 However, individual 
cases do reach the Court, and so citizens are actors within the judicial system of 
EU law. An in-depth approach with regard to power relationships between the 
actors involved in litigation will reveal the ways in which politics and law coin-
cide in this arena of political development. 
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4 A Look Below the Surface 
4.1  Introduction 
A number of unanswered questions remain when it comes to the role of individ-
uals in the European legal system. While neofunctionalist theories of integration 
stress the role played by private actors, they do not differentiate between indi-
viduals and other actors. From the theories of participation- and empowerment-
through-law we may expect significant participation of individuals, while other 
researchers with more critical examinations of the practical position of individu-
als in the EU legal system suggest that the individual has been largely left out of 
the ‘Eurolaw game’, by being excluded from legal arenas that would allow them 
to challenge suspect government practices.1 Based on such literature one would 
expect the number of cases including individual litigants to be marginal. On the 
other hand, the number of high-impact rulings in individual preliminary refer-
ence cases suggests that the idea of EU law as solely managing the internal mar-
ket, and thus being a field where only economic actors are able to participate, 
may be insufficient, or at least outdated. The true extent to which individuals 
play a part in the EU’s legal system remains a marginalized discourse. To fill 
this gap, this chapter sets out to investigate what kinds of cases involving indi-
viduals are brought before the ECJ, who are the litigants and what are the mo-
tives behind litigation. 
The following paragraphs analyse the Dutch preliminary references in the 
selected period of 2008-2012 and compare them on a number of characteristics 
for which statistics are available. Firstly, the number of individuals’ cases is 
compared to the total number of references. Secondly, the cases are differentiat-
ed according to the referring national court. And finally, the subject matter is 
used to differentiate cases and give an idea of the areas of EU law that are most 
prominent when it comes to individual litigation. These numbers will give us 
some general characteristics of both the types of cases and the types of litigants 
before the ECJ. Such numerical analysis of case law only get us so far in under-
standing litigation dynamics; they give little insight into why and how cases 
reach the Court and the role played by different actors. Therefore, after the nu-
merical scrutiny of these cases, this chapter will go further into the question of 
who in fact are individual participants in the EU legal system. For that purpose it 
is necessary to disaggregate the concept of ‘individuals’, which encompasses a 
wide range of actors with various interests as well as resources. Therefore the 
second part addresses these questions and delves deeper into the possible ex-
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planatory factors that help understand the trajectory of the cases. I focus on the 
litigants, the motives behind litigation and take a closer look at the behavioural 
factors of the litigating parties and interests that lie behind these legal actions. 
4.2  Preliminary References in Numbers 
Individual Involvement in ECJ case law 
Looking at Dutch preliminary reference cases in the period 2008-2012, the first 
relevant observation to be made is that while a majority does not include any 
individual party, the percentage of cases that does, more than a third, is substan-
tial.2 While the number of preliminary references is only indicative of the total 
range of national cases wherein matters of EU law come to the fore, this per-
centage is a testament to the extent to which individuals are in fact involved in 
the European legal system, are impacted by the application of EU law and po-
tentially the course of integration. This observation thus nuances the assumption 
by some that the EU’s legal system remains heavily market-driven, mainly ad-
dresses matters of trade and that the role and stake of the individual in EU law is 
thus very limited.3 Especially when considering the preliminary reference pro-
cedure from a legal remedy perspective, these numbers of cases involving indi-
viduals at first glance seem to paint a slightly more inclusive picture than we 
would expect following critical literature.4 A quick survey of a previous period 
of five years of preliminary references from the Netherlands, judgments between 
January 1st 1988 and December 31st 1992, reveals that at least for the Nether-
lands this is not at all a recent trend. Out of a total of seventy-three adjudicated 
cases in that period, thirty-three, or 45% involved individual litigants. 
Private v Public 
When looking at the total of 114 references in the selected period, two out of 
114 cases were disputes between two private parties, but not necessarily indi-
viduals. All other ninety-two cases were disputes with public or (semi-)public 
institutions.5 When we further selected for individuals this relative amount in-
creased. A total of thirty-nine out of the forty cases including individual litigants 
                                                        
2  Forty cases out of a total of 114. One caveat is in place here. As stated, all figures and 
conclusions are based on analysis of Dutch cases only. Comparisons to other Member 
States fall outside of the scope of this study.  
3  An idea not lastly brought forward by the ECJ’s judges themselves. See Costa 2003, 752.  
4  Conant 2003, 13. 
5  Harding found that over half of all references included a dispute with a public authority. 
Harding 1992, 105. 
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involved a dispute between (a number of) individual(s) and a public institution. 
These included predominantly ministries, administrative bodies (such as the 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service) and the tax authorities. Only one case 
was an exception to this rule showing a dispute between two private parties. 
This case involved a group of former employees (supported by a labour union) 
and a catering firm in connection with the outsourcing by their former employer 
of its catering activities to the latter and the resulting substantial loss of wages 
and fringe benefits.6 One other case, while in fact a dispute between an individ-
ual and a public authority, was not a matter of administrative law. This case 
revolved around the question of whether Community law required a lessee, on 
the expiry of the lease, to deliver to the lessor the leased land along with the 
payment entitlements accumulated thereon or relating thereto, or to pay him 
compensation. And although the opposing party was in fact a municipality, it 
was part of the proceedings as lessor of a number of parcels of agricultural land 
and not as a public authority. 
This distribution of cases is a reflection of the nature of EU rules. The ap-
plicability of EU rules, as litigated in national courtrooms, concerns mainly the 
relationship between private parties and public authorities; the ‘horizontal’ ef-
fect of EU legislation remains limited. The remaining disputes between two 
corporations mostly concern trademark disputes, regulated by EU intellectual, 
industrial and commercial property regulations.7 When it comes to individuals, 
the vast majority of cases fall within the category of public law. It is thus almost 
entirely in disputes with national public authorities that individuals may find 
themselves and their case being decided upon by the ECJ. This confirms the idea 
that where EU law touches upon the lives of individuals in a national context it 
does so predominantly by setting administrative standards and boundaries to 
national governance as well as providing individual rights that may be invoked 
in citizens’ dealings with the authorities. 
Referring Courts 
Out of the total of forty individuals’ cases under study, thirty cases were brought 
by the four highest courts in the Netherlands: either the Supreme Court (Hoge 
Raad: ten cases) that has exclusive final jurisdiction over civil and criminal 
matters, or one of the three highest courts in administrative law; the Council of 
State (Raad van State: eleven cases), the Central Board of Appeals (Centrale 
                                                        
6  This case is included as one of the case studies (Case Study A) in part to juxtapose it with 
other disputes, based on this private-private dimension. 
7  In fact, almost half of the twenty-two cases not involving a public authority also are 
about questions of intellectual, industrial and commercial property. 
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Raad van Beroep: five cases) or the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (Col-
lege van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven: four cases). The remaining ten cases 
were either brought by lower courts (Rechtbanken: seven cases), or courts of 
appeal (Gerechtshoven: three cases). In comparison to the other, non-individual, 
references the number of cases referred by the highest court was similar, with 
78.5% of cases in the same period. These numbers were a little higher than, but 
not greatly out of step with the general statistics for the Netherlands with two-
thirds of all references coming from the highest courts and one-third from lower 
courts.8 These numbers are brought together in Figure I.  
 
Figure I: Dutch references according to referring court in the period 2008-
20129 
                                                        
8  Statistics from the first Dutch reference in 1961 up until 2015. Hoge Raad: 29%, Raad 
van State: 11%, Centrale Raad van Beroep: 16% and College van Beroep voor het Be-
drijfsleven: 7%%. Including 4% by the (former) Tariefcommissie, the referring court in 
Van Gend en Loos, which no longer exists.  
9  Derived from http://curia.europa.eu/. Note of criteria selected: Procedure and result = 
“Reference for a preliminary ruling”, “Preliminary reference - urgent procedure” Source 
of a question referred for a preliminary ruling = “Netherlands” Period or date = “Date of 
delivery”; period= “from 01/01/2008 to 31/12/2012”. 
 Individuals 
40 
Other 
74 
Total 
114 
Highest Courts 30 
(75%) 
58 
(78%) 
88 
(77%) 
 Supreme Court  
(Hoge Raad) 
10 44 54 
Council of State  
(Raad van State) 
11 8 19 
Central Board of Appeals  
(Centrale Raad van Beroep) 
5 0 5 
Trade and Industry Appeals Tribu-
nal (College van Beroep voor het 
Bedrijfsleven) 
4 6 10 
Lower Courts 10 (25%) 16 (22%) 26 (23%) 
 Courts of appeal (Gerechtshoven) 3 6 9 
Lower courts (Rechtbanken) 7 10 17 
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Duration 
Excluding the cases that are dealt with through the urgent procedure (PPU) the 
average duration of the proceedings before the ECJ amounts to over one and a 
half years,10 with the shortest just under a year11 and the longest over three and a 
half years.12 This average is a little longer than the Court’s most recent accom-
plishment in keeping the procedure as short as possible, averaging at fifteen 
months in 2015.13  
The total duration of the proceedings, including the national procedure, is 
significantly harder to determine, because establishing the start of a case can be 
somewhat arbitrary. One could start counting at the date of the first lodging of 
actual legal proceedings, or, and from a litigant’s perspective this is arguably 
more accurate, one should start counting from the start of the actual dispute. 
Taking the first official decision (the declaration or, for instance, tax notice that 
sparked the proceedings) as a starting point, the average time these cases spend 
before being referred to the ECJ is over two and a half years,14 with outliers of 
as much as five and a half years.15 Of course, these numbers vary widely and 
drawing any general conclusions from it would be tentative; however, it does 
underscore the fact not often acknowledged that although the ECJ does a re-
markable job in working its way through the ever increasing number of prelimi-
nary references within reasonable time frames, the time a case spends in Lux-
embourg is added onto an often already lengthy domestic procedure. 
Subject Matter 
In recent years, a lot of effort in the study of the ECJ and the preliminary refer-
ences has gone into explaining the variation in references between different 
Member States, the different courts and tribunals filing a reference request and 
different areas of EU law. Categorical differentiation points in the direction of 
some general characteristics in cases that get referred, as is also apparent in the 
cases under investigation in this study. Due to the multitude of EU rules that 
may be the subject of references, it is not straightforward distinguishing between 
general areas of law. Stone Sweet and Brunell have, however, devised a way to 
                                                        
10  18 months and 17 days. 
11  11 months and 8 days. 
12  43 months and 16 days. 
13  From the ECJ’s own reporting, available at:  
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-08/rapport_annuel_2015_ 
activite_judiciaire_en_web.pdf [last accessed 10 November 2017]. 
14  31 months and 17 days. 
15  67 months and 13 days. 
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subdivide cases into thirteen ‘meta-categories’ that account for 80-90% of all 
references made to the ECJ, regardless of country of origin.16 The dataset creat-
ed by Stone Sweet and Brunell has been the basis for many studies trying to 
explain variations in the usage of the preliminary reference procedure.17 
It should be noted that these categories were defined based on the numbers 
available up until 2006, and based upon a categorization as provided by the ECJ. 
Between 2006 and 2012 EU law developed significantly (the Lisbon Treaty of 
2009 is a case in point) and consequently some categories that are ascribed to 
the cases in this study did not exist as such in the previous period. There are 
further inherent limitations to the method devised by Stone Sweet and Brunell, 
as some cases may fall into two or more categories which means the total scor-
ing is somewhat skewed. Stone Sweet and Brunell were interested in the EU law 
side of references, and not necessarily in litigation as such, which provides an 
explanation for the inherent lack of precision and nuance in these numbers from 
that perspective. With George Canning’s maxim in mind that ‘nothing is so 
fallacious as facts, except figures’,18 applying it to the cases in this study gives a 
tentative insight into their distribution and the dimension of the subject matter, 
and it reveals some striking contrasts when differentiating between individuals 
and other litigants.  
A comparison is made between the number of cases according to subject 
matter, between the number of cases including an individual litigant and the 
total number of cases from the Netherlands in the period 2008-2012. Figure II 
shows the distribution of cases, using the categories as employed by Stone 
Sweet and Brunell. The first column shows the number of cases (to be precise 
the number of scorings on a specific category) per area of EU law for the cases 
including individual litigants, with the second column specifying those cases for 
which at least one of those involved was interviewed. The third column shows 
the same scorings for the remainder of cases in the selected period. Comparing 
these numbers gives insight into the relative weight of different areas of EU law 
                                                        
16  Stone Sweet and Brunell differentiate cases along several dimensions, including the 
following: date, Member State, court of referral, legal domain or subject matter (meta-
categories include Agriculture, Free Movement of Goods, Competition and Dumping, Ex-
ternal Relations, Social Security, Social Provisions, Environment, Establishment, Free 
Movement of Workers and Persons, Taxation, Transportation, Commercial Policy, Ap-
proximation of Laws) and the official European Court Reports citation.  
17  Among others: Stone Sweet & Brunell 1998; Stone Sweet & Caparoso 1998; Cichowski 
1998; and Carrubba and Murrah 2005. 
18  See also the critical remarks by Felstiner, Abel & Sarat with regard to the inclination to 
view court cases as things and the subsequent temptation to count them. Felstiner, Abel 
& Sarat 1980, footnote 1. Galanter states that “figures like litigation rates are theories, 
especially slippery ones because the assumptions embedded in them are hard to see and 
especially persuasive ones because they are disguised as mere facts.” Galanter 1986, 15. 
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when differentiating between individuals and the remainder of the cases. In 
order to facilitate comparison, the categories in bold are the meta-categories as 
defined by Stone Sweet and Brunell. 
 
Figure II: Dutch references according to area of EU law 
Categories Individual Cases Other cases 
All 40 cases 26 (interviews) 
    
Free movement of workers 9 8 0 
Agriculture 6 5 6 
External19 6 6 1 
Social security 5 4 0 
Freedom of Establishment 4 3 12 
Free movement of goods 3 3 15 
Taxation 3 2 14 
Social Provisions 2 1 0 
Approximations of laws 1 0 13 
Environment 1 0 2 
Common policy 0 0 1 
Competition 0 0 13 
Transport 0 0 13 
Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice20 
5 2 5 
Citizenship of the Union 4 2 0 
Visa, Asylum, Immigration 4 4 0 
Principles of the treaties 3 2 0 
Border Control 2 0 0 
General Provisions 2 1 0 
Cooperation in civil matters 1 0 5 
Fundamental Rights 1 1 0 
Human Rights 1 0 0 
Right of Entry and Residence 1 1 0 
Other 0 0 3 
   
Total 100% (64)21 100% (108) 
                                                        
19  A miscellaneous category including all EC economic policies affecting the European 
Free Trade Area, the GATT, and Association Agreements with non-EC states. 
20  Categories not in bold are categories that as such did not yet exist before 2006, the end of 
the existing dataset. The categories used here are the same as used by the ECJ. 
21  Although most references are limited to a single subject matter of EC law, some refer-
ences contain claims based on as many as five subject matters. This accounts for the dif-
→ 
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Some general conclusions can be derived from these numbers. While substan-
tively preliminary references may concern a very broad range of issues, from the 
interpretation of general principles derived directly from the Treaties to the spe-
cific meaning of certain words in Directive texts, a number of patterns are visi-
ble in the types of cases in the selection. When considering the preliminary ref-
erence procedure with respect to individuals, we observe that the number of 
individuals involved in a preliminary reference procedure concentrates around 
certain areas of EU law.  
Just as businesses and states are subject to certain kinds of legislation, for 
individuals to become involved in a procedure before the ECJ there is the obvi-
ous but necessary precondition of an EU rule to which they or their situation is 
subject. In other words: without a rule no dispute, without a dispute touching 
upon an EU rule no reference to the ECJ is possible. Simply stated, we would 
not expect to find preliminary references including individuals that cover for 
instance the area of the ‘Nuclear common market’. The individuals thus belong 
to specific groups that broadly change along with newly emerging or changing 
EU legislation. As shown in Figure II, the areas of EU law that were the subject 
of Dutch individuals’ cases before the ECJ were, most notably, the areas of 
‘freedom of movement for workers’, ‘agriculture’, ‘social security’, cases con-
cerning the category ‘external’ and (outside the meta-categories of Stone Sweet 
and Brunell) cases relating to the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, ‘citi-
zenship of the Union’ and ‘visas, asylum and migration’.22 We can conclude that 
the bulk of these individuals are therefore farmers (agriculture), workers (free-
dom of movement for workers, social security) and migrants and asylum seekers 
(visas, asylum and immigration).  
The category ‘external’, while in fact a combination of areas of law (all EC 
economic policies affecting the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), food aid, and special agreements with 
non-EC states), in this selection consist solely of cases pertaining to the Associa-
tion Agreement of the EU with Turkey. These cases involve individuals with 
Turkish nationality with rights derived from the Association Agreement. These 
Turkish nationals can be added to the group of migrants. Together with the areas 
of ‘border control’, ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, ‘fundamental’ and 
‘human rights’ as well as ‘right of entry and residence’ and ‘citizenship’, that are 
all cases involving non EU migrants, the cases involving migrants (excluding 
                                                        
ference between the number of selected cases and the total number of subject matters in-
voked in references. 
22  The category of ‘asylum policy’ appears separate in the Courts administration as of 2010. 
For the sake of comparability I have added cases with this label to the general category of 
‘visa, asylum and immigration’ as used by Stone Sweet & Brunell. 
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double scorings) amount to a little over 25%, making it the largest category in 
this selection.  
When comparing these numbers with the remaining cases not involving in-
dividuals there are some striking contrasts. The area of taxation is among the 
lowest in individuals’ cases but among the highest in the totality of cases. Other 
areas that score high when it comes to companies as litigants are: competition, 
freedom of establishment, free movement of goods, approximation of laws and 
transport. The meta-categories provided by Stone Sweet and Brunell are indeed 
very accurate in capturing the bulk (84%) of the references when it comes to 
companies. When selecting only individuals, however, these meta-categories 
account for only little over 60% of all cases. Notable areas that fall outside these 
categories are ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, ‘visas, asylum and immi-
gration’ and ‘citizenship of the union’. These areas of EU law are fairly recent 
additions to the Acquis with the introduction of the area of freedom, security and 
justice covering the harmonisation of private international law, extradition ar-
rangements between Member States, policies on internal and external border 
controls, common travel visas, immigration and asylum policies and police and 
judicial cooperation. Additionally EU law has seen a significant increase in the 
amount of (secondary) legislation in the areas of asylum and migration in the 
first decade of this century.  
4.3  Intermediate Conclusion 
The aforementioned numbers on the selection of references from the Nether-
lands between 2008 and 2012 provide us a general sense of the subjects of indi-
vidual litigation before the ECJ, what the sources of the references were and 
what the average duration of the proceedings was. Almost all cases concern 
disputes between individuals and government institutions and the relative distri-
bution of the subjects suggests three main groups of litigants – farmers, workers 
and migrants – that make up the bulk of court cases that involve an individual as 
litigant. When considering the following quote by Conant, it is striking to see 
the relative number of cases addressing issues in exactly those areas mentioned: 
“Both the need to appeal through the national judicial hierarchy and the relative 
disinclination of most courts of last instance to make references create obstacles 
to individual legal action on issues related to visas, asylum, immigration and the 
free movement of persons.”23 Essentially, Conant expects little participation by 
individuals in the EU legal system on the whole. The relative number of indi-
vidual cases, as well as the number of cases falling within areas relating to mi-
                                                        
23  Conant 2003, 248. See also Conant 2002, 85 and 235. 
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grants, as well as the free movement of workers runs counter to Conant’s expec-
tations on effective access to justice for individuals.24 Newly emerging EU legis-
lation indicates an increase in EU legislation that potentially (more) directly 
affects individuals, and these numbers suggest that this results in increasing 
participation by individuals in Euro-litigation as well. Although these findings 
do not necessarily contradict Conant’s assertion about the obstacles to individual 
legal action, it shows that these obstacles do not prevent individual participation 
altogether.  
A pertinent question this study aims to answer is the question of who in fact 
are the individual participants in the EU legal system. For that purpose it is nec-
essary to disaggregate the concept of ‘individuals’, which encompasses a wide 
range of actors with various interests as well as resources. Especially when con-
sidering litigation in the light of themes like active rights claiming, judicial re-
view of government acts, litigation as political participation and notions of em-
powerment-through-law, it is imperative to look beyond the surface of what is 
visible from court documents and statistics in order to discern what disputes and 
motives lie behind the legal action and which parties and other actors are in-
volved in the litigating effort. The next section addresses these questions and 
delves deeper into the possible explanatory factors that help understand the tra-
jectory of these cases. For the remainder of this chapter, I investigate where 
these cases originate by focusing on the litigants and looking more closely at the 
behavioural factors of the litigating parties and the motives and interests that lie 
behind these legal actions. 
4.4  On Proactive and Reactive Litigation 
The described tendency in studies on Euro-litigation to adopt an ontologically 
rationalist approach to litigant preferences results in the implicit assumption that 
preliminary references constitute legal action by parties that have an interest in 
pursuing this course of action. Only rarely does inquiry venture further than 
what can be deduced from court documents, general statistics, and into behav-
ioural aspects that play a role in the course of legal proceedings. The question is 
what role the litigating parties have in the trajectory of their case from the do-
mestic to the supranational level. Selecting cases based on their reaching the 
ECJ through a reference captures both successful attempts at harnessing the 
procedure as a judicial strategy, as well as cases where neither party was actual-
ly seeking a referral. Therefore when considering references from a litigation 
                                                        
24  See Alter & Vargas 2000 and Burley & Mattli 1993 for similar reasoning and expecta-
tions.  
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perspective, first of all, a distinction has to be made between ‘proactive’ and 
‘reactive’ litigation.25 Whether or not parties are actively pushing for a reference 
gives further insight into the meaning of a reference from the perspective of the 
litigating parties. In this respect, Chalmers and Chaves found in their study on 
the role of EU judicial politics in the UK, that the decision by the national judge 
to refer relied in large part on the actions of the litigating parties.26 They con-
cluded that in the UK national judges rarely refer questions to the ECJ without 
one of the parties in the national proceedings proactively ‘pushing for it’. The 
cases that were studied in depth in this study show considerable variation when 
it comes to the question of to whom the choice for a reference can be ascribed, 
and whether or not the reference may have been the result of the purposeful 
action of the litigants ‘pushing for it’. Of course, given that the ultimate decision 
to refer lies squarely in the hands of the national judge, establishing whether a 
judge has in fact been convinced by the litigating party to refer a question, or 
whether he or she is motivated on his or her own, is not always possible. How-
ever, from the interviews with litigants and their counsel we do have insight into 
the degree to which litigating parties have tried to pressure a judge into consid-
ering a reference.  
On the whole, in ten out of the total twenty-six cases studied in depth, re-
spondents claimed it was the explicit aim to reach the ECJ and a reference was 
thus seen as a goal that would help serve their interests. In these cases of ‘proac-
tive’ Euro-litigation, either from the outset, or developed during national pro-
ceedings, the litigants had their express wish and aim to have their case adjudi-
cated by the ECJ, and implored the national court(s) to refer their case. The 
reasons behind this aim vary. Some cases simply revolved around a question of 
EU law for which there was no clear precedent in either national or ECJ juris-
prudence and therefore the road to the ECJ was an anticipated and logical one, 
and litigants and their counsel saw the ECJ as the body best qualified to clear up 
the uncertainty. In other cases the wish to reach the ECJ was more informed by a 
deadlock in national doctrine, making the road to the ECJ a particularly viable 
opportunity to ‘outflank’ the national system. A good example of the latter is the 
case between catering employees and their employer, as described in detail in 
                                                        
25  The distinction between pro- and reactive litigation is used often in the context of legal 
mobilisation studies in order to make a distinction between strategies of pressure groups 
either proactively using the filing of lawsuits as part their strategy, or reactively employ-
ing court cases, such as criminal proceedings against, for instance, participants in pro-
tests, and incorporating them as part of their strategy. See Harlow and Rawlings 1992. 
Here, I use the distinction to draw attention to the fact that the preliminary reference pro-
cedure could be seen as a viable part of legal strategy but can also be an unexpected re-
sult of the considerations of the national judge. 
26  Chalmers & Chaves 2011.  
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Case Study A. In this case the ECJ’s interpretation of the Directive regarding the 
safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of the transfer of an undertaking 
allowed for possible protection for the employees that was different from the 
prevailing doctrine in Dutch jurisprudence. In such cases, aiming for a reference 
can prove a useful strategy where success with national judges, who are inclined 
to apply prevailing national doctrine, is unlikely. 
In seven of the twenty-six cases, the litigating parties put forward a deliber-
ate focus on EU law yet had no explicit aim of eliciting a referral to the ECJ. In 
these cases the dispute did revolve around questions of EU law, but neither liti-
gants nor their counsel had the intention of having the national judge refer their 
case to Luxembourg. They were simply aiming for, and expecting a resolution 
by national courts. Even in cases that were explicitly set up to clear up legal or 
practical questions pertaining to EU law, the aim was not necessarily to have 
these questions adjudicated by the ECJ. For example, in the Self-Employed Tax 
Deductions case, although the small tax consultancy firm behind the litigation 
explicitly used the case to ‘test the waters’ of EU law, the preliminary reference 
procedure was initially not even considered as a possible avenue. The aim and 
expectation was that the Dutch Supreme Court would give a principle ruling on 
the matter of non-discrimination according to nationality in the matter of tax 
deductions for the self-employed. The consultant explained discussing the mo-
ment preliminary questions were asked by the Dutch High Council: 
 
“At first, I hadn’t even considered that that could happen. I thought, the legal 
question is pretty clear. But given the structure, how the court of appeal had framed 
its ruling, the Supreme Court felt like, there are some nuances here that I want to 
submit to the Court of Justice.”  
 
In such cases, the choice for referral of the case to the ECJ thus lies expressly 
with the national court. Similarly, in Case Study C of the organised Working 
Group of lawyers, academics and an NGO using EU law in order to challenge 
the Dutch policy on fees for residence permits (discussed in detail later in the 
book), a reference to the ECJ was seen as an unnecessary and unwanted delay. 
Even the Working Group’s lawyer explicitly did not mention a possible refer-
ence to the ECJ and presented the matter as “clear and already decided by the 
Court”. The Dutch Council of State (Raad van State, the highest Dutch court in 
administrative law) nonetheless decided to refer the case. So, even when a case 
serves to get a judgment on principle based on EU rules, the ECJ is not always 
the intended target. In light of assumptions of purposefulness behind litigation 
before the ECJ, it is thus important to note that even when the result of a case 
may be that the ECJ provides a principle judgment, the aim of the litigating 
party can still be very much focused on the national legal system. 
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In the remaining nine out of twenty-six cases, there was no express aim on 
the part of the litigating party with regard to questions of the interpretation or 
application of EU law, and the reference came as a complete surprise to them. 
Whether or not a reference is part of a legal strategy has a bearing on the way a 
case is litigated, and especially when it is not, this has repercussions for the 
parties involved. Lawyers as well as their clients may be completely blind-sided 
by the decision of a judge to refer a case, and are forced to adapt to a course of 
action with which they (usually) have no experience.27 Also, from the perspec-
tive of the litigants a reference to the ECJ is far from always welcome because it 
amounts to further prolongation of their uncertainty, considering the average 
time of eighteen months it takes the ECJ to decide these cases. In this sense, the 
preliminary reference procedure itself may actually be considered a procedural 
obstacle in a practical sense, which can lead litigants to drop their case due to 
the extended duration of the proceedings. The fact that cases reach the ECJ and 
do receive a judgment on principle should thus not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that this was the express goal of (one of) the litigating parties. More-
over, as I will discuss below, the referral of a case to the ECJ may transform it in 
ways that were not intended (or always desired). 
4.5  Litigant Characteristics 
The court statistics have shown that the bulk of individuals involved in prelimi-
nary reference procedures are farmers, workers and migrants. Further typologies 
can be made based on the individual characteristics of litigants. In general, two 
types of litigants can be distinguished; falling into categories according to how 
active the litigants themselves were in pursuing a legal claim. The first category 
is made up of individual litigants who seek to employ every avenue possible in 
their legal claim. In such cases they play a very active personal role in their case. 
Rosenthal defined ‘active’ clients as those who express special wants to their 
lawyer, make follow-up demands for attention, provide additional information to 
aid the lawyer, seek a second legal opinion, etc.28 He found that such ‘active’ 
clients were drawn disproportionately from those of higher social status, which 
presumably provided both the confidence and the experience to conduct them-
selves in this active manner. Since in these cases the litigants’ claim includes an 
EU law element, the referral of the case to the ECJ is one possible outcome. 
Among the very active individuals, the ones taking legal action without any 
                                                        
27  This aspect of preliminary references will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, 
which will focus on the perspective of these practitioners. 
28  Rosenthal 1974.  
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legal support, and thus acting pro se, constitute a very small group; only three 
such examples were found. 29 Also included in this category of active litigants 
are the more collective actions, brought by multiple individuals sharing the same 
interests. The cases of the catering employees as well as the pensioners (Case 
Study A and Case Study B respectively) are prominent examples. Such cases, 
with truly active litigants in fact constitute a minority, and most litigants belong 
to the second, and largest category, which covers the more passive or even more 
or less completely absent litigant. Out of the twenty-six cases studied in depth 
seven included actively involved litigants, while the remaining litigants were 
either passively involved (nine) or more or less absent (ten). 
The more passive litigants, consistent with Rosenthal’s expectations, are 
found especially in asylum and migration law cases, where clients often are 
completely reliant on their lawyer, and show limited involvement in the course 
of the proceedings. The more or less completely absent litigants are found in 
cases where another actor or collective is responsible for the legal action. These 
cases include accountancy firms seeking to get a judgment on principle on mat-
ters of interest to their clientele, so-called ‘cause lawyers’ individually seeking 
to get an answer to a principle question, and the more strategically motivated 
alliances of interest groups, lawyers and academics proactively contesting na-
tional policy. Such categorisation and the relative lack of involvement of the 
individuals whose case is brought before the courts hints at an inherent difficulty 
in determining the interests that lie at the basis of legal action. As we will see 
later, it is not always straightforward to determine with any precision who the 
‘real’ litigant is.  
Building on the insight that reaching the ECJ was the aim in a minority of 
cases, I will focus on the various contexts, motives and origins of litigation and 
relate these to the assumption of interests, strategies and questions of purpose-
fulness. The next sections will deal with different litigant characteristics, ask to 
whom motives and aims behind litigation can be ascribed, and investigate the 
extent to which these aspects have explanatory value for the trajectory of these 
cases. 
4.6  The ‘Irrational’ Litigant: Dealing with Assumptions of Interest 
The majority of studies about the behaviour of litigants before the ECJ are based 
on ontologically rational approaches and assumptions of cost-benefit calcula-
tions. Whenever the role of litigants’ behaviour is taken into account it is usually 
assumed that litigation is initiated where people expect material benefit in so 
                                                        
29  For a typology of pro se litigants see Vago 2006, 391. 
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doing, and people are expected to refrain from initiating legal proceedings when 
the outcome of cost-benefit calculations is negative. When immersing ourselves 
in the world of litigation, one is immediately confronted with its complexity and 
compounded nature, and getting to grips with the varying interests and motives 
behind litigation can be a daunting task, due to the multiplicity of relevant fac-
tors, as well as the transformations that may occur during legal action. This was 
a point famously made by Felstiner et al. who argued that “[e]ven in ordinary 
understanding, disputing is a complicated process involving ambiguous behav-
ior, faulty recall, uncertain norms, conflicting objectives, inconsistent values, 
and complex institutions. It is complicated still further by attention to changes in 
disputant feelings and objectives over time.”30 
A closer look at motives behind these court cases indeed reveals a far more 
complex picture when it comes to the considerations of litigants for legal action 
than a rationalist approach suggests. Although an important incentive for legal 
action and a distinct element in the considerations of litigants, motives for legal 
action are not solely based on an assessment of the expected (financial) gain. 
The motives for engaging in legal action are neither straightforward nor always 
based on cost-benefit calculations. In fact, from both the interviews and substan-
tive analysis of these cases it is clear that in more than a third, ten out of twenty-
six cases, the cost-benefit ratio for the individual claimant was such that follow-
ing a clear-cut rational action approach we would not expect these cases to have 
resulted in litigation in the first place.31 The question then arises, what other 
considerations on the part of the litigant may serve as an explanation for these 
cases reaching the ECJ.  
4.7  Reaching for that ‘Final’ Judgment 
The different areas of law that potentially fall under the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
result in a complex combination of the types of disputes that end up before the 
Court. While many areas of EU law are concerned especially with establishing 
restrictions on governmental practice through substantive and individual rights 
(in the case of workers’ protection or asylum procedures, for example), other 
areas have the character of conferring obligations upon individuals. The area of 
                                                        
30  Felstiner, Abel & Sarat 1980, 638. 
31  Of course, this form of weighting costs and benefits is somewhat arbitrary in the sense 
that determining actual costs nor determining actual gains of a case is clear cut, especial-
ly when the possible gains are not of a financial nature. However, these conclusions are 
based on the personal judgments of litigants and their lawyers. One case, for example, re-
sulted in a difference in tax deduction from 330 euro to 253 euro annually, a difference 
of only seventy-seven euro. 
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agricultural law is a prime example in this respect. As one of the oldest areas of 
EU legislation, it has permeated much of the national legislation on agricultural 
practice. Such rules cover, among others, rural development, animal welfare, 
food safety and agricultural subsidies. As a result, a substantial portion of the 
rules and regulations to which farmers are subject are EU rules. The significant 
portion of agricultural cases dealt with by the ECJ (both in general as in the 
selection for this study) can in part be ascribed to this pervasiveness of EU law 
in this area. With regard to individuals, this also has consequences for the type 
of dispute that is the basis for litigation before the ECJ. Without exception, the 
cases of farmers that end up before the ECJ start with a purported violation by 
these farmers of EU rules and regulations, and possible related cuts in subsidies 
as a result. 
One example is the case of a farmer whose (EU) subsidies were withdrawn 
due to a purported violation of the relevant requirements for said subsidy. The 
amount of money he lost as a result of the withdrawal did not weigh up to even-
tual costs, financial as well as personal, of the litigation effort. Yet he chose to 
fight the decision for a full eleven years. When asked about the financial aspect 
of this case he emphatically states: 
 
“When we started, the opposition asked whether the money was that important to 
me. I said no, it’s the principle that matters to me. It came down to about 1,100 euro 
reduction, and an 875 euro fine. And money is nice of course, but I thought that was 
more an afterthought. It became a matter of principle. I felt I was being treated un-
fairly. And in the end it took me eleven years to address that.” 
 
This farmer’s story is a case of individual persistence. His motive for litigating 
lay in a personal sense of being wronged. In his quest for justice, he became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the result of the legal procedures and how in his 
view the whole process was riddled with unfairness, resistance and even corrup-
tion. He was considerably disadvantaged by a relative lack of knowledge about 
the proceedings, especially in the preliminary stage. Asked whether he was 
aware of the ECJ, he answers: 
 
“I did not know it. I had thought there would be some kind of umbrella organization, 
but I was not aware there was a court, no. I imaged it more like an official adminis-
trative organisation in Brussels. But I didn’t know about the Court. I had never even 
heard the word preliminary reference before.” 
 
The fact that his case ended up before the ECJ can be ascribed more to the dili-
gent national judge that saw a need for the ECJ to answer a question as to the 
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right interpretation of the related EU Regulation.32 Not knowing the ECJ, for the 
farmer, the Court had in no way been a target but simply became a step on the 
way towards personal vindication. Although he lost his case before the ECJ, he 
subsequently went on to start several national civil proceedings. Eventually, 
after eleven years and several thousands of euros of legal expenses, he reluctant-
ly struck a deal with authorities, which ended the legal quarrel. 
4.8  ‘Frivolous’ Litigation 
Another example, with a clearly negative cost-benefit result, is the Tethered or 
Chained? case of a farmer who was fined 500 euro for not complying with an 
animal welfare regulation based on EU Directives. This farmer, who was well 
known locally for his organic breeding style, received a fine for not keeping his 
young calves in accordance with the rules laid down in a Directive on the mini-
mum standards for the protection of calves.33 The fine, in his view was meant to 
set an example explicitly using a well-known local farmer like himself. His sub-
sequent unwavering stance was his way of highlighting the absurdity of the 
strictness in the application of these rules by the agency that initially fined him. 
In his words: 
 
“Look, everything is filled with regulation these days, a lot of legislation that makes 
no sense. Rome perished due to its decadence and we are going to perish in 
regulations.” 
 
His reasons for litigation were a deliberately light-hearted response to the, in his 
view, bureaucratic stubbornness of the Dutch food and consumer goods authori-
ty. Never expecting to win, this farmer decided to make a point and play it out 
until the end. In response to the question whether he felt he had accomplished 
anything with his litigating efforts he responds: 
 
“Well, I’ve learned a lot. That’s the point. I did not do it to gain something. But I did 
it just to know how it all works. An ordinary person just does not know, really. So I 
thought I’ll take it. I told my wife, I'm going to drink this whole cup. I want to ex-
perience the whole circus. That joke, I just wanted to have.” 
                                                        
32  In many respects the ECJ has been working on ways to temper such diligence, by en-
couraging self-restraint by national judges in referring too many questions to the Court. 
See Advocate General Jacobs’ Opinion in case C-338/95 Wiener S.I. GmbH v Hauptzoll-
amt Emmerich (para. 17) in which he discusses the limited value of some questions that 
are put before the Court. 
33  Council Directive 91/629/EEC. 
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As an active board member of several livestock farming related associations, he 
was not unfamiliar with bureaucratic and rule related quarrels. Moreover, he was 
well aware of his chances of winning, or the lack thereof. The financial aspect of 
this case is striking. The costs of going to court far outweighed what winning the 
case was worth. He explains the costs of the whole proceedings: 
 
“I have not summed it all up, I don’t know. It took a lot of money, yes. I should have 
just paid that fine. [Laughs] That would have been only 200 euro, and this has cost 
thousands. No, you do not have to try achieving justice in the Netherlands, that 
usually costs more than you get.” 
 
Considering that he expected beforehand that he was not going to win, his mo-
tives for legal action can hardly be designated as a form of cost-benefit consid-
eration. He even had to convince his own lawyer, who did not deem it neces-
sary, to attend the hearing in Luxembourg, a trip that most lawyers in this study 
were more than willing to make and that was often described in terms of ‘privi-
lege’ and ‘once in a lifetime experience’. His lawyer, who had decided in anoth-
er one of his cases that was referred to the ECJ to refrain from travelling to Lux-
embourg, confirms: 
 
“My experience with pleading before the Court of Justice is in large part thanks to 
my client’s character and way of thinking and working. Nine out of ten people 
would not have done what he did, at least nine out of ten. Any other would have just 
paid the fine. But he is stubborn, so it is thanks to him that we have this judgment.” 
 
The unwavering disposition of the authorities is an important reason why his 
case went as far as it did. He himself described the point he wanted to make 
using the German proverb ‘Jede Konsequenz führt zum Teufel’, which translates 
freely into ‘consistent into hell’.  One can debate the noteworthiness of the 
rights or obligations that were put before the ECJ to adjudicate in these cases. In 
the latter case, the central question to be answered by the Court was whether or 
not his practice of farming was in accordance with animal welfare regulations. 
Ultimately this boiled down to the interpretation of the word ‘tethered’ vis-à-vis 
the Dutch translation ‘aangebonden’ in the respective texts of the Directive 
upon which the initial fine was based. Although the question of the proper way 
of binding one’s calves is one that could probably have been dealt with without 
the help of the ECJ, as a result of both these parties ‘sticking to their guns’ it is 
now settled case law that “where there is a divergence between the various lan-
guage versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be inter-
preted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it 
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forms part”.34 So, with his stubbornness this farmer gave the ECJ an opportunity 
to add another building block, the proper way of settling language divergence in 
EU legislation, to the Acquis. In the end the farmer was convicted, but without 
punishment by the national criminal judge, who considered that it was ‘thanks to 
his efforts that we now have an answer to this important question’. He did not 
have to pay the 500 euro fine. 
Disputes like these illustrate some of the more mundane questions the ECJ 
is asked to answer with some regularity. Similarly, two more cases on agricul-
ture-related matters (Breeding or Fattening? and Suckler Cow Premiums) were 
at least in part about the accuracy and applicability of certain terminology in EU 
legislation. In this regard, Schepel & Blankenburg refer to former ECJ judge 
Mancini who somewhat mockingly concluded, “if the Court ever acquires the 
power to indulge in agenda-setting, the customs classification of shoes and san-
dals will not be high on the agenda”.35 At the same time, they highlight the diffi-
culties of constructing any type of cross-European or Euro-profile of litigation 
or considering litigation from a rationalist perspective. Rather than references all 
being ‘demands for integration’ or an attempt to profit from the acquired Euro-
pean freedoms for individual citizens, in fact, cases like these are more easily 
understood as examples of resistance against the application of EU rules than 
anything else. 
4.9  Individual Persistence: Surviving the Legal System 
Undoubtedly, the aforementioned case of ‘frivolous’ litigation is somewhat of 
an anomaly. Especially when considering the duration of the proceedings, the 
additional costs of the trip to Luxembourg, and the fact that this litigant continu-
ally described the affair in terms of ‘a joke’, it is unlikely that cases like this are 
widespread. However, what these examples highlight is how motives for litiga-
tion are not always as easily understood as being the result of cost-benefit calcu-
lations on the part of the litigating party. Since the potential benefit of winning 
their case did not weigh up to the cost of the proceedings, the trajectory of these 
disputes can in large part be ascribed to the unwillingness of these farmers to 
give in and their desire to take a stand. The main personal trait of the litigants to 
which the course of these cases can be ascribed is their persistence, often against 
the odds; a recurring theme among the active litigants in the case selection.   
Similarly, the story of the catering employees (Case Study A) illustrates how 
such persistence by one individual can indeed be essential to litigation efforts. In 
                                                        
34  Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston referring to this case in Ĉ554/13. 
35  As quoted in Schepel & Blankenburg 2001, 40. 
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the case of their prolonged battle with their current and former employers, the 
employee leading the charge was advised on multiple occasions, by his lawyer 
and the workers union supporting them, to take a deal proposed by his former 
employer and discontinue the legal action. Despite this, he continued his quest 
and therefore became the main champion of the collective interests that were 
served by the eventual successful ECJ judgment. In part thanks to the financial 
and organisational capacity offered to him by the workers union, but also thanks 
to his own persistence, he became responsible for limiting the possibilities to 
circumvent worker protection under EU law, in the case of the transfer of an 
undertaking. 
Especially the length of most of these legal actions underscores the require-
ment of personal perseverance. Two other illustrative examples, cases where the 
litigants acted pro se, help to underscore this point. These cases were both 
brought by individuals with considerable personal legal agency. One (Mortgage 
Interest Deduction) was a legal expert working as a public servant, and the other 
(Proportional Tax Deduction) a tax consultant who decided to start proceedings 
in his own name to address a Dutch VAT regulation that he saw as incorrectly 
implemented in light of European rules. While such a matter could have been 
addressed in any one of his clients’ cases, he explains that his case would never 
be part of his regular practice, since the possible gains would not weigh up to the 
costs of his services: 
 
“For a client, you will never start such a procedure, because it costs them too much, 
and doesn’t get you much in the end. So for me it was really more of a point of 
principle.” 
 
The ECJ eventually ruled in his favour, contrary to prevailing views among 
Dutch VAT specialists. Illustrative in this respect is that it took a legal profes-
sional to bring up a matter that through the ordinary course of legal practice 
would never have been addressed. Since he was able to act as his own consultant 
he incurred no extra costs. In the other case, the individual did in fact consider 
hiring a lawyer but was dissuaded by the high cost: 
 
“I have considered taking on a specialized lawyer. And I did find one who was very 
willing to help, because in the literature at the moment, professors left and right 
were debating my case. Everyone thought something else, so they were interested in 
my case. But then you’re told beforehand that if they have to catch up completely on 
my case, after all those years, then just preparations will cost 8,000 euro. And then 
they haven’t been to Luxembourg yet. That would run into tens of thousands of 
euros before you have a ruling. That’s obviously not possible. For any ordinary citi-
zen like me, that threshold to find your way to justice is terribly high. The financial 
interest I had did not outweigh the cost of a lawyer.” 
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Ultimately he was able, through his own legal background and a lot of effort, to 
win his case. Although in many respects examples of an individual successfully 
employing EU law to further his or her interests before the national judge, these 
cases particularly illustrate the amount of effort needed to do so. Such examples 
suggest that we should not expect too many cases of this sort. Firstly, these liti-
gants are legal professionals, thus able to draw from their own expertise and 
work a case without assistance. Therefore, both were aware of the role of EU 
law and the ECJ. And secondly, the duration of these cases (seven and eleven 
years in total) requires considerable persistence, especially in light of the rela-
tively small financial stakes. 
4.10  Stakes and Impact: Perspectives on Success 
When considering the impact of the proceedings on individual motives for liti-
gation, it is important to note the differences in potential personal impact of 
government decisions that are being disputed. These differences largely coincide 
with the different areas of law; for example, when we compare fiscal law cases 
to migration law cases. As explained by an asylum lawyer: 
 
“In immigration law it is black and white, you do or do not get a residence permit, 
whether that is regular or asylum. There are no consolation prizes, half-residence 
permits or the like, so typically there the cases will be brought to court.” 
 
In comparison, a tax advisor compared the general impact of fiscal cases to that 
of asylum cases, when asked for the involvement of her client in the case: 
 
“Not really excessively. But with tax law, that’s always the case. The joy you’ll get 
with an asylum seeker for example, whose life is completely changed, that is of an 
entirely different order. With us it is mostly just a nice bonus.” 
 
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine that often the interests in migration and 
asylum law cases are of a different personal magnitude and the incentives for 
starting a case differ accordingly. In most cases concerning migrants, the gov-
ernment refused or revoked the residence permit of the individual, for reasons 
ranging from the non-payment of the accompanying administrative fees to peo-
ple who were declared undesirable due to being convicted of a crime. During 
proceedings contesting the governmental decisions, these people lose most of 
their rights related to residence; the right to work, the right to social security and 
health insurance as well all forms of subsidies and/or fiscal returns. The migra-
tion lawyer in Double Nationality, where his client faced expatriation due to 
being convicted of a crime, discusses the toll such cases can take on his clients:  
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“You have to imagine that in this case my client was glad he wasn’t expelled from 
the country when he came out of prison. But we also had to sue again in order to get 
that preliminary injunction to prevent expulsion. He was lucky that he could go 
home to his wife and children. But in the meantime you have no entitlements, no 
health insurance or anything. The fees for the children, benefits, healthcare, etc., 
everything is affected. He could not work, so it also has a negative psychological ef-
fect on people. And that’s the other side of the story of these kinds of issues that are 
challenged before the Court. And ultimately, in practice you have to litigate to the 
highest instance nationally, and then you also must await the judgment by the Court 
of Justice. That takes its toll on the lives of people.” 
 
For the individuals and their families the consequences of a government deci-
sion as well as the following legal proceedings can thus be enormous; having to 
choose between accepting the decision and leaving the country and thus their 
family and livelihood, or contesting the decision and enduring the loss of rights 
with all its consequences, including living in constant uncertainty over the out-
come of one’s case. For most this does not feel like a choice at all, and leaves 
these people between the proverbial Scylla and Charybdis. In such cases the 
efforts of the lawyer play a large role in assisting his or her clients both legally 
as well as psychologically. As one other lawyer specialized in migration law 
explains: 
 
“I really have to take them in tow. You have to consider it from the psychology of 
that one person. Because it eventually ends up at the Council of State, he lives for 
four years in a position you really do not wish on your enemies. Because you do not 
know what will happen, whether he can stay here? Because he is not allowed to 
work anymore. So those people are penniless, and they cannot claim benefits.” 
 
Such pressures are not reserved for cases of migrants and questions of residence, 
but are relevant in social security matters as well. In Compulsory Insurance, a 
labour union supported a litigant, who had been employed on an oilrig on the 
Dutch part of the continental shelf, in his effort to fight a cut in his disability 
allowance. The judgment in his case had repercussions for the treatment of peo-
ple in similar situations, and stipulated that Dutch social insurance should not 
exclude employees from other Member States operating on the Dutch part of the 
continental shelf. Although the eventual ECJ judgment was in his favour, and 
his allowance was subsequently paid retroactively, he reflects on the impact the 
dispute had on his situation: 
 
“The whole situation has cost me a lot. I was stuck in social isolation and it was 
difficult to get out. My wife left me and suddenly I had to make do with much less 
money. At the beginning, I went into debt because I could not adjust to the fact that I 
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suddenly had less than a third of my income. So, I still have to see what it all means 
for me. In any case, it is good for all those who do the same work as I did.” 
 
As such, the reference to the ECJ itself can become a prolongation of the dire 
situation in which litigants find themselves. Even in cases where the personal 
impact of the proceedings is not as high, lawyers often state that referral to the 
ECJ, from their perspective, is not always desirable due to the additional length 
of the procedure and the extra work involved. When neither litigant nor lawyer 
has an interest in getting a judgment on principle from the ECJ the prolongation 
of the proceedings is not met with great enthusiasm. Especially when a case, by 
reference to the ECJ may serve the interests of more than a single client, lawyers 
must make trade-offs between the interests of the client and the interest in an-
swering the legal question. In asylum cases for example, the procedures have 
large consequences for those involved, they often not only have an interest in a 
positive ruling but sometimes also in a quick decision. As one asylum lawyer 
explains: 
 
“Well, it would have been great if the Council of State had decided in our favour 
without a reference. But you have no control over the court’s decision. Of course, 
you can suggest questions, but that's always a bit awkward. Because you know it 
will take a lot of time so that your client has to wait a long time. And, of course, that 
is not in their favour because they can have a residence permit much faster. But if 
the court thinks that a reference is absolutely necessary, you cannot stop them.” 
 
When it comes to legal proceedings then, the notion of interest is usually con-
nected more or less directly to the outcome of court decisions. It is not in all 
cases that the result of a case for the individuals involved is as easy to determine 
based simply on a court’s judgment. A reference to the ECJ is not always strictly 
in the litigants’ interest. When looking at the results of a case, it matters greatly 
whose perspective and what parameters for success one applies.  
Illustrative is Case Study C (included later in the book), which describes the 
legal battle against unlawful increases in fees for residence permits. When view-
ing the ECJ case in isolation and based on the consequences of the Court’s 
judgment for the Dutch policy only, it indeed suggests that an individual citizen 
was able to enforce his rights with the help of the ECJ, being in a sense empow-
ered vis-à-vis his government.36 It seems that here the ECJ in that sense fulfilled 
its role as a true ‘people’s court’, curtailing Member States’ trespasses.37 The 
context reveals, however, that since this case was part of a conscious and collec-
tive effort with a number of central and more powerful actors, the actual role of 
                                                        
36  Cf. Cichowski 2007.  
37  Wernicke 2007.  
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the individual involved in such a case is very limited. And with changing the 
perspective from the aims and experiences of the Working Group to those of the 
individuals involved, the parameters for success also change. The story of this 
individual’s case is described mostly from the perspective of the parties behind 
the scenes who employed it for the purposes of challenging the Dutch policy on 
administrative fees. Telling that same story from the individual’s perspective 
reveals the personal impact such proceedings can have, eventual success not-
withstanding. In fact, from interviewing him and his wife, I found that they had 
little understanding of the procedure, or of the role of the ECJ and they appeared 
unaware of the collective interests that were being served by their case.38 Their 
interests lay with simply obtaining a permit and ending the uncertainty. He had 
been in possession of a residence permit, which ran until November 2002, and 
had asked for an extension before it expired. However, the Dutch authorities 
maintained that this request was never received. In February 2003, when his stay 
had expired by two months, he submitted another extension request for which he 
received a payment slip for a fee of 169 euro. Due to a transfer problem, this 
payment was completed a week too late. The fact that these fees weren’t paid in 
time meant that the request would not be considered, resulting in him receiving 
an order to leave the country. At this point he and his wife sought help from 
their lawyer. The lawyer recalls that it took three years before his case was even-
tually referred to the ECJ:  
 
“Well, the objection was deemed unfounded. We filed for appeal, which was grant-
ed in Court. That was very easy because I had relied on Association law arguments. 
Since the Immigration and Naturalisation Services (IND) in the decision on appeal 
had not addressed them that was just not a reasoned decision on that point. So then 
the case went back to the IND. Then the objection was declared unfounded again, 
this time with a tailored decision on the Association Agreement. We then filed a sec-
ond appeal and then the Court of Rotterdam said that the action was justified be-
cause it was indeed contrary to the Association Agreement. To that decision the 
Minister of Justice appealed, and then in May 2006 the Council of State finally re-
ferred questions to the Court of Justice.” 
 
During the appeal process, his loss of residence was not suspended, and the 
reference to the ECJ added another three years and three months to his already 
lengthy endeavour. For him and his family the proceedings meant a prolonged 
period of substantial uncertainty and a loss of his work permit, his social securi-
                                                        
38  Their already limited understanding of the procedure was in all likelihood not helped by 
the fact that he spoke no Dutch at all and his wife, also not a native speaker had to func-
tion as a translator between her husband and their lawyer. 
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ty and his health insurance. In response to the question whether they had ex-
pected it to take this long his wife, acting as his translator responds: 
 
“No, not really. For as long as seven years, he could not go abroad. He had no 
insurance, he could not work, so I had to do everything. So, seven years we were 
waiting, from 2002 to 2009. And I had just had my first child in 2002, so it was 
tough for me, and for him, too.” 
 
Apart from a loss of work, income and a social network, he was furthermore 
unable to leave the country, for, if he did, he would not be allowed back in. This 
meant he could not accompany his family on family visits to Turkey for over 
seven years. He described the whole period as feeling like “being imprisoned”. 
The added three years of waiting for an ECJ judgment obviously made this as-
pect even worse. The collective interests being served by his case, effectively 
being employed as a test case, were thus not necessarily those of the individual. 
Even with eventual success the consequences for those directly involved were 
not entirely positive. 
4.11  Promises and Expectations: (Mis)understanding the Court 
The relatively small number of cases that reaches the ECJ on the express wish of 
the litigants raises the question of when and why litigants have a desire to have 
their case adjudicated by the ECJ, and how those with experience with the Court 
evaluate its adjudication. While only a minority of litigants can be considered 
truly active in their pursuit of justice (not leaving their case completely in the 
hands of their lawyer), this group can be used to evaluate litigants’ expectations 
and evaluations of the ECJ in its treatment of their case. Among this small 
group, the perceptions of the Court and the way their case was handled differed 
considerably. While for many the referral to the ECJ initially felt like an im-
provement in their chances, perceiving the Court as a form of extended appeal 
beyond the national courts, attending the proceedings before the Court did not 
always serve to strengthen their belief in fair treatment. 
In general, most litigants knew little about the ECJ before their case was re-
ferred, and they had high hopes going in. Especially where the preceding proce-
dures within the national system had been particularly disappointing, the ECJ 
appeared to litigants as a promise of more neutral and expert treatment.39 The 
litigant in Mortgage Tax Deductions, acting pro se recollects: 
                                                        
39  A good example of this perceived contrast between national judges, seen as extensions of 
government, and the ECJ as more neutral can be read in the case of the pensioners, de-
scribed in Case Study B. 
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“Every time I had to read again that they concluded I was wrong, I systematically 
indicated, listen, why don’t we have this tested by the European Court. I always 
hoped that would be perceived as a kind, well threat goes too far, but as a kind of 
incentive for them to have it looked at truly objectively. I have always had a very 
good feeling about European law and the Court. I always had the feeling that in the 
Netherlands I would not be able to win, but I had good hopes that in Europe I was 
going to succeed. And that’s the reason I’ve always consistently indicated that in the 
documents.”  
 
As discussed, this litigant was, due to his own legal background quite familiar 
with the work of the ECJ, and thus had a good grasp of the opportunity that lay 
in EU law, as well as how the ECJ might deal with his case. Often, however, the 
positive expectations of litigants are based not on a full grasp of the legal merits 
of their case but on a certain idea about the Court as the ‘highest of courts’. As 
the farmer in Suckler Cow Premiums describes how he felt after his case was 
referred: 
 
“That’s when I thought it was all going to work out. If even the appeals court has its 
doubts ... That strengthened me in my conviction. Now the ‘supreme judge’ is going 
to look at it. So that’s when I thought it would turn out alright.” 
 
Thus, the mere referral of people’s cases to the ECJ can provide a sense of vali-
dation of their claim. This is further confirmed in the interviews with lawyers, 
who explained that the procedure was difficult for the clients to understand. As 
discussed by one lawyer, it was not easy to explain to clients the role and signif-
icance of a reference to the ECJ: 
 
“Of course, I’m not going to discuss with clients all the technical procedures and so 
on. But what I explain to them is that the EU is not an appeals court. And I will try 
to explain that the Dutch judge is basically asking for clarification. That is always 
difficult to get across. Clients always have the idea that the Court of Justice is a 
higher appeal body.” 
 
The perceived obscurity over these proceedings resulted in some remarkable 
misunderstandings among litigants, most notably about the intervening of the 
European Commission and other Member States. As one of the pensioners, in-
volved in the case described in Case Study B, recalls: 
 
“Some strange things happened at the Court of Justice. The Court asked the advice 
of other Member States. And which countries did they choose? Finland and the 
Czech Republic, where almost no Dutch people live, and France where there is no 
such problem. And they all disagreed with us and said we must participate in na-
tional solidarity. Because these countries, especially Finland, are very much focused 
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on solidarity. In a previous case there were Spaniards and Portuguese and they are 
much more individualistic. I think simply by choosing these countries, they can steer 
the case in a certain direction. It does not mean that the EU court did not do its job 
correctly, but I have the impression that they influence it and that we are mani-
pulated.” 
 
To be clear, the ECJ does not choose the intervening Member States; interven-
tions by Member States occur on their own initiative. However, the attendance 
and intervention of specific Member States can thus result in a sense of dispari-
ty, due to different parties giving their opinions before the Court. In the most 
extreme examples this results in the perception by litigants that there has been 
evident foul play. One of the farmers discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
remained frustrated after his experience with the ECJ. Since he had chosen not 
to consult a lawyer, his general lack of knowledge about the ECJ, and the pecu-
liarities that come with a preliminary reference, weren’t ameliorated. His lack of 
understanding is illustrated by the fact that he remembered that, apart from 
France, there was “a European commission that had been created for my case,” 
that had also given its opinion in the case. This was of course the European 
Commission filing observations. He did not request a hearing before the ECJ 
and was unaware that this had been a possibility, although in hindsight he would 
have liked one. While he in many respects found the European Commission on 
his side, arguing in favour of his position, the Court nonetheless reached a dif-
ferent conclusion. This unexpected turn left him disillusioned and with the sus-
picion that something malicious had taken place: 
 
I: “So you had expected, following the views of France and the Commission, that it 
would turn out in your favour?” 
R: “Yes, and that’s my conclusion, what I think about the Court. It’s a totally un-
predictable, and, yes, what word should I use for it, it’s corrupt, that such a thing can 
happen. Through influencing by the opposition, while there was no formal possi-
bility. They have been lobbying behind the scenes. And well, it worked. The beauty 
of that European commission was that they reviewed the facts very well, and came 
to a favourable conclusion. Apparently, that did not sit well with the Dutch Govern-
ment. It is very corrupt, how that all went down.” 
 
Especially in such cases, where litigants are not assisted by legal counsel, the 
preliminary reference procedure can create significant confusion about the na-
ture and purpose of the proceedings, particularly with other parties joining in the 
proceedings. 
While litigants may have high expectations of the Court when it comes to 
neutrality and expertise, the ways of the Court do not always serve to strengthen 
their perceptions of fair treatment. Although the Court itself presents these pro-
ceedings clearly as a form of ‘judicial cooperation’, it can be questioned how the 
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procedure impacts the original dispute from the perspective of the litigant. In 
line with the ‘judicial cooperation’ image of the procedure, the actual role for 
the individual in the proceedings before the ECJ is very limited. All communica-
tions between the Court and the parties are channelled through the lawyers, and 
during a hearing before the Court the individuals, unless they attend while repre-
senting themselves, have no role to play in the actual proceedings. Where law-
yers are received at the Court, introduced to the judges and instructed about the 
procedures during the hearing, the litigants themselves are delegated to the pub-
lic gallery. Although only a minority of litigants actually express an interest in 
attending the Court’s proceedings, this raises questions about the nature of the 
procedure and the possible impact of this experience on the perceived (proce-
dural) justice of the parties. The technical nature of the proceedings, with little 
to no role for the individual litigant left some with the feeling of being a specta-
tor to their own dispute. As the coffee shop owner in Free Movement of Canna-
bis laments: 
 
“To begin with, as a party in a case I expect that I get the chance to be heard. And 
secondly, that I’m taken seriously and I can sit in the front. At the Court of Justice, I 
had to sit in the audience. The attorney of the Netherlands was allowed to speak, and 
my lawyer too, but I had to sit in the public gallery, and not show my disapproval. 
The usher had to urge me several times to remain calm.” 
 
This litigant was one of the few with a reasonably good grasp of the function of 
the preliminary reference procedure. More generally, only rarely did litigants, 
whether they had travelled to Luxembourg or not, have a good understanding of 
the reason for, and function of referral of their case to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling. Asked what she thought of the fact that the ECJ would rule in her case, 
one litigant responds: 
 
“Yes, it is a nice feeling. Especially that other countries found our story interesting 
enough and wanted to say something about it. They were behind us, I think.” 
 
In fact, in this case, none of the intervening Member States were on the side of 
the litigant, and the assumption about their opinions is illustrative of a general 
lack of understanding by litigants about the purpose and practice of the prelimi-
nary reference procedure. 
When looking at the preliminary reference procedure from an institutional 
perspective, there thus appears to be a discrepancy between the function of the 
procedure – the interpretation of EU legislation in order for EU law to be uni-
formly applied in all Member States – and the occasion on or form in which this 
function is performed – namely in the resolution of an actual dispute. This dis-
crepancy could be a partial explanation for a mismatch in perception of the 
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ECJ’s practice and the experiences and aspirations of litigants. For those liti-
gants who are ‘confronted’ with the ECJ’s authority, its mere existence consti-
tutes the ‘promise’ of another form of high court. Expectations are thus usually 
quite high. Litigants generally expect the ‘highest court of Europe’ to provide 
significant expertise and authority. The misunderstanding of the role of the 
Court and of the preliminary reference procedure contribute to either a sense of 
respect and support for the Court, in the case of a decidedly favourable outcome, 
or dismissal and distrust, in the case of a resulting loss. 
4.12  Conclusion 
From the subjects of the cases brought before the ECJ we can conclude that the 
largest share of individual litigants with cases before the ECJ is made up of 
migrants, workers and farmers, coinciding with some of the most salient EU 
policy areas: the Common Agricultural Policy, created in 1962 and covering a 
wide range of agricultural practices and a system of subsidies, as one of the 
oldest policies of the EU affecting farmers, free movement of workers and relat-
edly affected European and national social policies affecting workers throughout 
the EU, and the Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey as well as 
the more recent efforts creating a Common European Asylum System affecting 
migrants and asylum seekers. These areas thus form the bulk of individual cases 
that reach the ECJ. However, the counting of cases only gets us so far in under-
standing litigation before the ECJ, and gives little insight into the how and why 
of litigation through the preliminary reference procedure. The variation in the 
types of cases that reach the ECJ shows the complexity of litigation and should 
lead to an increased sensitivity in our analysis of developments and dynamics in 
litigation. Chalmers and Chaves rightfully conclude in this respect that “such 
heterogeneity makes it impossible to point to a single dynamic pushing forward 
the preliminary reference process”.40 While all these cases contribute in one way 
or another to the shaping and steering of the impact of EU legislation on a local 
and sometimes international level, post hoc conclusions as to the intentionality 
of these outcomes need to be based on an understanding of the goals and inter-
ests of the parties involved, which cannot readily be surmised by solely looking 
at the legal outcomes.   
To add a new dimension to our understanding of the practice of preliminary 
references, I investigated the role of underlying motives and the background of 
litigants in explaining the trajectory of cases that end up before the ECJ. Behavi-
oural aspects may influence the trajectories of cases that may or may not result 
                                                        
40  Chalmers & Chaves 2011, 35. 
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in European arbitration, depending not only on the willingness of the national 
judiciary to refer but also on the persistence of the parties involved. When taking 
into account that cases including references to the ECJ can take up to eleven 
years, it is not a stretch to assume that, from the point of view of the litigant, 
whenever the costs outweigh the possible benefits, motivation for continued 
legal efforts with accompanying costs (financial and other) originate somewhere 
other than in an assessment of possible (financial) gains. Indeed, the relatively 
small number of cases with active litigants, combined with the predominance of 
a particularly resilient stance by these litigants hints at the requirement of persis-
tence by litigating parties in these, often lengthy, legal proceedings. In general, 
as Dehousse concluded in this respect, since litigation before the ECJ is usually 
a ‘lengthy and cumbersome’ affair, it favours large corporations and interest 
groups.41  
We have seen that the degree to which cases are referred to the ECJ at the 
express wish of the litigants, or their counsel, is limited. The extent to which this 
is the case has repercussions for the practice of, as well as the way we view, the 
procedure; whether the procedure is considered merely a resource for national 
judges in deciding upon cases with an element of uncertainty with regard to EU 
law, or on the other end of the scale, we view the procedure as a legal resource 
for litigants, lawyers and interest organisations. Chalmers and Chaves concluded 
that British judges rely largely on litigating parties pushing for reference.42 
Based on data presented in this chapter we have to conclude that this is only 
partly the case. Not only is there a significant portion of cases without any such 
effort by the litigating parties, but even in cases with a focus on EU law ‘push-
ing’ may be formulating it too strongly. From the perspective of litigants and 
even their counsel, sometimes these references come as a complete – and in 
those cases often unwelcome – surprise. The purposefulness behind references 
to the ECJ should thus not be taken as self-evident.  
 
                                                        
41  Dehousse 1998. 
42  Chalmers & Chaves 2011, 33.  
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Case Study A. Catering Employees 
A.1  Introduction: Gaul v. the Romans 
This case study focuses on the only case in the selection for this study that re-
volves around a conflict between two private parties. This case is a story of how 
EU legislation on the protection of workers’ rights prevented large corporations 
in the Netherlands bypassing workers’ protection granted under Directive 
2001/23/EC in the event of a transfer of undertaking. A group of catering em-
ployees together with a Dutch labour union took a large catering company to 
court in connection with an outsourcing by their former employer, a large brew-
ery and beer company. At issue was the use within the corporation of a so-called 
special purpose vehicle as the formal contracting party for all brewery employ-
ees and a social plan between the company and the labour unions stipulating that 
the outsourcing model used by the brewery did not qualify as a transfer of un-
dertaking. After a long battle, which was ultimately brought before the ECJ, the 
employees were vindicated and their rights as employees under EU law con-
firmed. The case made headlines in the Dutch press as a victory for the little 
guy, and it is therefore also the story of the perseverance of one catering em-
ployee.1 
A.2  The Dispute 
At the time the dispute started, the catering employee who would lead the efforts 
against the brewery and the catering company had been working in the brew-
ery’s catering department for over twenty years. He and his colleagues were 
informed in 2002 that the company was planning to reorganise its activities in 
order to cut costs. One of the first measures was the outsourcing of catering 
activities. This stirred the pot among the employees who had been working at 
the company for a long time, felt part of ‘the family’ and were less than happy 
about the prospect of being outsourced to a different company. In 2003, their 
employer agreed with trade unions on a Social Assistance Scheme (SAS) that 
determined that employees had two choices with regard to the outsourcing. One 
of the two choices was resignation by mutual consent with payment of a fee by 
                                                        
1  ‘Europees Hof steekt stokje voor truc van werkgevers’, de Volkskrant, 22 October 2010; 
‘Volgend jaar doceren ze dit op de universiteit’, De Gooi- en Eemlander, 23 October 
2010; ‘Troebel brouwsel’, de Volkskrant, 23 October 2010; ‘Het wordt smullen voor de 
advocaten’, Misset Catering, 11 November 2010. 
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the employer. The other choice was employment with the transferee, the cater-
ing company. In the latter case the new employer would add a temporary transi-
tion fee to the workers’ lower income. Even though this would temporarily keep 
the workers’ income at a comparable level, in reality this meant their loss of 
income was only postponed for a few years. 
With the transfer of the catering activities it was arranged that everyone who 
had worked for the brewery could enter into the service of the catering company. 
However, as agreed in the SAS, this was without retaining their working condi-
tions. The terms of employment that were offered to the staff were significantly 
less favourable than the relatively good benefits package they had enjoyed pre-
viously. Their new employer used the collective bargaining agreement (CAO) 
for the catering sector, which was at a significantly lower level. The employees 
could take up employment at the catering company, albeit, in the most extreme 
case, at 48% of their former salary.2 On average, these employees lost approxi-
mately 35% of their wages. The transfer of catering operations and staff thus left 
the employees in a situation of significant deterioration in their working condi-
tions. This was the result of a special construction the brewery employed in 
which catering activities were placed in one company, while the catering staff 
was placed in a personnel carrier, a so-called special purpose vehicle. The staff 
was seconded permanently to the various operating companies of the executive 
company. In 2005, the brewery transferred its catering activities, by virtue of an 
agreement, to the catering company. At the same time the staff was transferred 
from the personnel carrier to the catering company. Personnel and activities 
were thus transferred from two different companies. The brewery assumed that 
the existing contracts would have to be terminated and new contracts had to be 
signed with the new employer, so that the usual protection of workers’ rights in 
the case of a transfer of undertaking, falling within the scope of Directive 
2001/23/EG, would be essentially sidelined.  
In response to the brewery’s declared intentions to outsource the catering ac-
tivities, one of the supervisors in the catering department went to the manage-
ment of the company on behalf of the staff to discuss the situation of the work-
ers. He proposed a die-out construction to at least help the long-term employees 
reach retirement age. However, the familial atmosphere and consultation culture 
had been under pressure in recent years, and the supervisor was well aware of 
the change in course of the management:  
                                                        
2  The huge difference in terms of employment was partly explained by the history of the 
company. According to the labour union, the brewery was ‘a traditional company with 
traditional views and traditional workers’. Many employees working in the catering de-
partment of the company had ended up there at the end of their career, often because they 
could no longer cope with the work in the production department due to physical reasons. 
This way the company made sure its staff stayed employed. 
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“It was a social company, but since the former owner died it was just restructured 
hard and cool. They had those plans ready. You felt it, the management was 
replaced, and directors were replaced. Directors of other companies were brought in. 
Well, if you Googled, you saw what they had done with other companies in the 
ports, they were substantially reorganized. So they were no ‘gentle healers’,3 they 
were guys with a certain background. So we very quickly realized, they are looking 
for an entry into the catering, and once the Central Workers Council agrees, you can 
do the same within the rest of the company.” 
 
Indeed, his efforts to dissuade management from the chosen path did not yield 
any results. His concerns fell on deaf ears and he was told that ‘all lawyers in the 
Netherlands agreed’ that this construction was legally sound. This estimation, 
most likely corroborated by in-house lawyers, was correct according to settled 
Dutch case law at the time. Furthermore with, according to the supervisor, a 
‘callous tone’ that would characterize the relationship that was to follow, he was 
told that the workers should be happy they went ‘from work to work’.4  
The supervisor, however, was not the type to sit down and be quiet. He was 
a member of the labour union and had taken up a position within the Central 
Workers Council within the company in order to at least be able to keep track of 
all the proposed reorganizations. He actively opposed the planned outsourcing. 
After his efforts to negotiate an alternative solution with the management of the 
company failed, he took the lead in organizing opposition and taking legal ac-
tion. 
A.3  Organizing Legal Opposition 
The disquiet among the employees soon turned into anger when all attempts at 
negotiation and accommodation failed. The supervisor decided to find out 
whether or not there was a chance of fighting the transfer by legal means. As 
luck would have it, some of the temporary holiday workers in the catering de-
partment were students studying for a degree in labour law. The supervisor re-
calls: 
 
“We just hired them. We did the dishwashing and other things, so they could then 
figure it out for us with their law books. And they found it totally amazing, because 
they did not have to work. So then we found out fairly quickly that we would lose a 
                                                        
3  Original Dutch quote: “zachte heelmeesters”. 
4  A somewhat derisive reference to a policy adopted by the Dutch government to ensure 
civil servants would find new employment after reorganizations in a period of drastic 
cuts in government spending. 
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case in the Netherlands, but then you would get the European Court. So the labour 
law student told us: well, I consider it very likely that you could win this.”  
 
Before legal action was actually taken, he went on to find as many employees as 
possible willing to go along and litigate together. In order to convince his col-
leagues (some of whom had already taken up their own legal counsel) he sought 
an independent expert opinion to corroborate this assessment of eventual suc-
cess. For this purpose, he aimed high and called ‘the best employment lawyer in 
the Netherlands’5 at a leading international law firm.6 However, because this law 
firm did not take on cases for individuals, he was referred to a smaller law firm 
in The Hague. The labour law specialist there presented them with an estimation 
of what they could expect legally: 
 
“He said, within Dutch law you won’t win this. But when I think about it, you’ll first 
have Dutch law, but then you go to Europe, because that’s where you will end up, 
but it will take years. But when you get to Europe, I’ll bet you a good bottle of wine 
that you will win. And he said, then ‘your name will resound throughout Europe,’ 
because that is going to change labour law [in the Netherlands].” 
 
Furthermore, the lawyer advised that the labour union should litigate the matter, 
since they had good in-house lawyers, and also because the costs at an individu-
al level would be immense.7 Partly due to this helping hand, the supervisor stat-
ed that he was always “110% confident”8 that they would eventually win the 
case. This conviction was important as the supervisor was in for an uphill battle 
and because he took the lead in an endeavour that was not without risk for those 
involved. About this responsibility, he says: 
 
“Basically, if it did not work out… Everyone went along [to work for Albron], so 
everyone lost a large part of his or her income. And people started going into debt, 
expecting money in the end. So everyone took a risk. So your sense of responsibility 
                                                        
5  An interesting detail, which the supervisor found out later, is that the lawyer he was 
trying to contact, was one of the lawyers who had advised the brewery on the personnel 
carrier construction. However, this was not the reason he was denied service, he never 
actually spoke to the lawyer himself, but was redirected by his secretary.  
6  A high-end law firm that provides legal services mainly in business and finance transac-
tions and commercial litigation. Their clients include among others: financial services in-
stitutions, logistics and transport companies, and supervisory boards. 
7  For the same reason he declined taking up the case himself, explaining he would be too 
expensive for individuals to hire. 
8  An ironic nod to the former director of the brewery who was said to be “110% certain” 
that this construction was legally possible, and that they did not stand a chance of win-
ning. 
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is like, well if this goes wrong… And I must honestly say that I have never doubted 
it. I’ve obviously thought about it, but I have never doubted it.” 
 
His motivation lay also in that, apart from the impact on his colleagues in the 
catering department, he felt that the planned outsourcing of catering activities 
would only be the first of a series of reorganisations within the company.   
Of the seventy-three affected catering employees, forty either did not want 
to join the fight (not everyone was hit as hard in their working conditions) or, 
when employees were fifty-five years or older, they were seconded elsewhere 
and effectively could stay with the company.9 Of the forty-seven employees who 
went on to work for the catering company, a group of thirty employees teamed 
up with the labour union and joined the legal proceedings. The union asked 
everyone to become a member so that their claims could all be litigated in one 
lawsuit. 
A.4  The Legal Battle  
As the law students and expert advice had assessed, the case revolved around the 
claim that in this situation the catering workers were protected by Directive 
2001/23/EC (from here on: the Transfer of undertakings Directive) on the safe-
guarding of employees’ rights in the event of a transfer of undertaking. This 
interpretation was contrary to the hitherto prevailing doctrine among Dutch 
labour law jurists, which did not consider the Transfer of undertakings Di-
rective’s protection applicable in the case of a construction as employed by the 
brewery. About this, the labour union affiliated lawyer10 states:  
 
“The brewer and the catering company assumed this construction was perfectly 
legal, like everyone in the Netherlands really, except – and I always think of Asterix 
and Obelix, I do not know if you know those books: ‘There is one village that 
stubbornly persists’ – except a few people within the union, and yours truly.” 
 
                                                        
9  About this distinction based on age, the group subsequently filed a complaint with the 
national Equal Treatment Commission (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling) because no ac-
count was taken of the length of employment of certain employees. Someone who had 
worked at the brewery for only a year, but was fifty-five years of age or older could stay, 
while someone aged fifty-four with thirty-five years of service was fired. The Equal 
Treatment Commission found that a distinction based on age was justified, provided that 
person was a long-term employee. 
10  The lawyer in the case was not permanent staff but was regularly hired by the union at a 
reduced fee.  
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This conclusion was, in light of the prevailing doctrine, far from self-evident. 
The legal expert of the labour union who was on the case from the outset con-
sidered this a principle matter with little or no precedent in Dutch jurisprudence. 
She estimated that there was a possibility based on the ECJ’s interpretation of 
the Transfer of undertakings Directive, but she still had to convince their lawyer 
it had a good chance of success:  
 
“I then just went around probing people I knew. Someone I know was professor of 
labour law and European law. I said, ‘Well, I see it this way, am I crazy?’ And he 
said, ‘No, no, I agree with you’. The funny thing is, I remember when I came to our 
lawyer with the case, he said: ‘No, I don’t see any merit in this’. And I really had to 
use my powers of persuasion11 to convince him we should do it.” 
 
The opening the labour union’s legal expert saw, lay in the ECJ’s interpretation 
of the Directive with regard to the transfer of undertakings and the safeguarding 
of employees’ rights. The legal essence of the case was as follows: Article 3 of 
the Directive states: ‘The transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a con-
tract of employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of 
a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee’. This 
part of the Directive has been implemented in Dutch law by means of Article 
663 of Book 7 of the Dutch Civil Code stating: ‘By virtue of the transfer of an 
undertaking, the employer’s rights and obligations, at the time of the transfer, 
under an employment contract concluded between the latter and an employee in 
that undertaking are automatically transferred to the transferee’. The text is 
slightly different. Where the Directive speaks of an obligation arising from a 
contract of employment or from an employment relationship, this latter part of 
the formulation does not appear in the Dutch implementation text. In the Dutch 
explanatory memorandum of 1980 to, among others, Article 7:663 of the Civil 
Code, the choice to omit the term employment relationship is explains as fol-
lows: 
 
“The directive refers to ‘contract of employment or employment relationship’ to tie 
in with the different legal systems in the Member States. Substantively it aims at 
only one thing. For Dutch law the use of the term ‘employment relationship’ is not 
necessary. From the wording of the directive it should not be concluded that there is 
an obligation to adopt further provisions in addition to the measures in respect of 
employment.”12 
 
                                                        
11  Original quote: “ik moest praten als Brugman”. 
12  Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 940, nr. 3-4. 
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Apparently, the Dutch legislator decided to apply the Directive only to those 
working under an employment contract, interpreting the scope of the Directive 
in a narrow sense. It was further decided not to adopt the term used in the Di-
rective: transferor, but instead went with employer. This choice of terminology 
gets to the heart of the case. In the dispute at hand, considering the construction 
used by the brewery, wherein activities and employees were essentially trans-
ferred from two different companies, the question was who could be deemed the 
transferor in terms of the Directive, and by extension, what this meant for the 
protection of the workers in the event of a change of employer. 
Court Proceedings 
Before initiating substantive proceedings, the employees unsuccessfully tried to 
stop the transfer by way of interim relief. Entirely in line with the prevailing 
Dutch doctrine, the judge decided to reject the claim of the labour union and the 
employees.13 The interim judge considered that for their claim to be valid a for-
mal contract must exist between the transferor and the employees, which was 
not the case. The labour union subsequently brought an action, on behalf of the 
employees, before the sub-district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
transfer of the catering business in fact constituted the transfer of an undertaking 
within the meaning of the Directive, and that the catering employees were there-
fore entitled to retention of their employment terms. They sought payment of 
unpaid wages and statutory interest from March 2005 onwards, to be increased 
by a statutory fine of 50%. The group was, in view of the prevailing opinion 
among Dutch labour law jurists, quite unexpectedly vindicated and the sub-
district court upheld their claim. The court found clues in the Botzen judgment 
and the D'Urso judgment of the ECJ to assume that the employees were certain-
ly entitled to the rights as laid down in the Directive. It reasoned (controversial-
ly) in the first place that the Court of Justice in its Botzen judgment had dis-
cussed transfer of undertaking within the context of concerns, or ‘group’ com-
panies. The judge considered that although this judgment was not directly appli-
cable, it indeed gave an indication as to how the ECJ could be expected to re-
view the matter at hand. According to the court, it was conceivable that the ECJ 
would actually associate the term ‘material employer’ with ‘employment rela-
tionship’, of which the latter was essentially characterized by the link between 
the employee and the part of the business where he or she was employed. This 
would, according to the judge, have as a result that the role of the formal em-
ployer (by contract) could be marginalized. Thus, in the court’s view, this 
                                                        
13  Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage 22 February 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AS7198, par. 3.3-
3.5. 
CASE STUDY A 
 
96 
should be considered an acte éclairé. The judge decided therefore, despite the 
employees and the labour union pressing for a preliminary reference to the ECJ, 
to consider the question as asked and answered. 
This was an important and promising victory for the employees. However, 
because the court, recognizing that this case still had a long way to go, declared 
its judgment ‘not automatically enforceable’, it yielded no direct results for 
those involved. The judge reasoned that, if it would declare the ruling immedi-
ately enforceable, those concerned would be entitled to the wages they had pre-
viously enjoyed, something that could result in great personal problems in case 
of loss in the long run. As expected, the catering company appealed against this 
ruling before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
subsequently considered that the hitherto prevailing Dutch (Heidemij) doctrine 
on the transfer of undertakings could constitute a circumvention of the rights 
conferred on workers by the Directive. The workers were in fact employed by 
the brewery and not by another company. The court thus posited that within this 
doctrinal understanding, workers lost their protection because of the structure 
within the company, and it felt compelled to bring the matter before the ECJ. 
The Amsterdam Court then, in consultation with all parties, formulated ques-
tions that were referred to the ECJ. On whether a reference to the ECJ had been 
the actual goal, the lawyer states: 
 
“Well, I have always thought that, given the fact that it was a principled explanation 
of a European directive… I had actually already suggested to the sub-district judge 
that this case perhaps lent itself for the submission of questions to the ECJ. But he 
never addressed this, I do not know why. But he did suggest in his judgment that it 
would be a possibility at some point. And in the plea at the Amsterdam Court I have 
vehemently suggested it, even in the comments. Since it concerns the interpretation 
of a European directive, we have to let the ones who are the experts decide. And 
they indeed referred the case. The opposition was not very happy with this. Because 
the case was submitted to the ECJ it was more likely that they would lose. So they 
were not very happy with it, and with good reason, as it turns out. So yes, I've 
always had in mind and suggested it in all instances.”  
 
Oddly enough, after the formulation of the questions, the Amsterdam Court 
waited for almost a full year before sending the questions to Luxembourg in July 
2009. A very unwelcome development, of course, for those involved whose 
adverse situation was not helped at all by more delays. 
The ECJ Judgment 
Luckily for the supervisor and his colleagues, the judgment of the ECJ followed 
relatively quickly, in October 2010, bringing an end to the uncertainty. In its 
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answer the Court held that, in the context as was the case at the brewery, the 
Directive’s protection of workers’ rights also applied. The Court concluded that 
a company belonging to a group in which workers were permanently employed 
could be considered as a transferor within the meaning of the Directive. The 
judgment thus implied that the catering workers, even though they had no em-
ployment contract with the operating company to which they were permanently 
seconded, were to be transferred along with the catering operations, while re-
taining their work benefits. The Court also concluded that the effect of the 
judgment was not limited in time to the future, stating that it did not do more 
than explain the Directive and that this interpretation also applied to matters that 
had already occurred before the date of this judgment. In summary, the Court 
stated: “Transferor is he who loses his contractual or non-contractual employer 
status. So even a non-contractual employer can be transferor”. This judgment 
caused much uproar in labour law circles in the Netherlands, since it effectively 
put a stop to constructions like that of the brewery, and essentially went directly 
against Dutch doctrine.14  
Returning from the ECJ 
After this European law question was answered by the ECJ, the question that 
remained before the Amsterdam Court was whether the Dutch legal text, in line 
with this ECJ judgment, could be interpreted in conformity with the Directive. 
The catering company (or actually the brewery) unsuccessfully appealed against 
it and, after the Amsterdam Court judgment, appealed to the Supreme Court. If 
the Supreme Court concluded that Dutch legislation was not in conformity with 
the Directive, this would have led to the conclusion that the Dutch government 
had not implemented the Directive correctly, and thus the Dutch State (and not 
the catering company) would have been liable to the employees. From the per-
                                                        
14  The ensuing debate focused especially on the impact of the judgment on other construc-
tions like pay rolling. A selection: Grapperhaus, A. ‘Annotatie bij de uitspraak van de 
Kantonrechter Utrecht’, Ondernemingsrecht 2006-7, 87; Knipschild, E. ‘Permanente de-
tachering in concernverband en overgang van onderneming’, Arbeidsrecht 2008-12, 63; 
Wiersma, K. ‘Enkele recente ontwikkelingen inzake overgang van een onderneming’, 
O&F 2009-4, 65-85; Rutgers, D.J. & Noordoven, T.L.C.W. ‘Hof van Justitie: permanent 
gedetacheerde werknemers worden beschermd bij overgang van onderneming’, Be-
drijfsjuridische berichten 2010-53, 197-201; Verburg, L.G. ‘Europese invloeden op het 
Nederlands arbeidsrecht: de overgang van onderneming’, ArbeidsRecht 2010-53, 33-37; 
Kote, C.J.M.W. ‘Permanent gedetacheerde werknemer in concernverhoudingen niet meer 
vogelvrij bij overgang van onderneming, Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht 
2011-1, 20-26; Zwemmer, J.P.H. ‘Het Albron-arrest, de contractuele werkgever versus 
de niet-contractuele werkgever en de mogelijke gevolgen voor andere uitzendvarianten’, 
Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid 2011-4, 16-20; Witteveen, A.P.P. ‘Annotatie bij: Hof Am-
sterdam 25 oktober 2011, LJN BU1290’, JAR Geannoteerd 2011-8, 219-221. 
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spective of the brewery and the catering company, it was, therefore, understand-
able that they advocated in this direction in order to lay the blame on the legisla-
ture, since, based on Dutch law (and prevailing doctrine at the time), they had 
acted in good faith. However, from the perspective of the employees, this was 
not desirable, as this would then mean that the procedure would again be ex-
tended. As the lawyer states: 
 
“Well, fortunately it did not come to that, because then we would have spent another 
eight years in court. Then I would have made it to my retirement [laughs].”  
 
The Supreme Court did not follow the catering company’s reasoning and ruled 
on April 5th 2013 that the Dutch implementation was in fact correct. Its judg-
ment finally established definitively, after eight years, that the catering employ-
ees, who until March 1st 2005 had been employed by the brewery and then by 
the catering company, were retroactively to that date entitled to the benefits they 
had previously enjoyed. 
A.5  Effects of the Ruling 
The ECJ judgment effectively closed the door on the construction that would 
have made it relatively easy for larger companies to outsource certain activities 
while effectively bypassing workers’ rights. On the effects of the ECJ ruling the 
union’s legal expert states: 
 
“Awaiting this verdict, several large corporations were in the starting blocks to 
implement the same construction. By the ruling of the ECJ they are now prevented 
from doing this.”  
 
That the brewery was not the first company to go down this road was underlined 
by the fact that former employees of other companies, workers who had been in 
a similar situation, contacted the supervisor to congratulate him on his victory. 
The many responses showed that several companies had used such a construc-
tion, but the workers affected had never had the means, confidence or courage to 
litigate the matter. This was the result of an important and illustrative theme in 
the case of the catering employees that concerned the employment relationship 
which, in comparison with the other cases, made the situation for those directly 
affected that much more complex and trying. The supervisor and his colleagues 
were probably not the first to be confronted with the detrimental effect of these 
constructions, but taking one’s employer to court is an arduous task that not 
many will choose. As the supervisor recalls: 
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“Later on, I also got people from other companies who wanted to know how to fight 
reorganizations. I got a lot of comments on the internet of people who said, we were 
outsourced in the past, and that was a dirty trick, and I am glad you’re doing what 
you are doing. They had never dared to take that step. That felt good. The same with 
journalists, who were kicked out at media companies, who said, it is good that you 
have raised this because I haven’t. So you noticed that there were more people with 
the same problem, but no one dared to take that step. Because it was a fight that was 
going to last for years.” 
 
Taking legal action against one’s (former) employer creates complications, es-
pecially when workers still remain with the company with which they have a 
dispute. The supervisor indicated that, as a result of the transfer, his colleagues 
had all sorts of personal troubles: some had to sell their homes because they 
were no longer able to afford their mortgage on their new wage, the wife of one 
of the employees had to return to her country of birth because her husband, with 
his lower income, no longer met the income requirements in migration law and 
several employees were on sick leave for extended periods due to psychological 
problems. Partly because of this, many workers were willing to accept the set-
tlement proposals by the brewery made before as well as after the ECJ deci-
sion.15  
A.6  Deductions from a ‘Victory for the Little Guy’ 
The eventual success of the supervisor and his colleagues was described in the 
Dutch press as ‘a victory for the little guy’. In this story however, that little guy 
was in fact a man with remarkable resilience and stamina. The interests involved 
in this legal battle were significant. The catering company had undoubtedly 
offered highly attractive commercial terms in order to win the brewery’s cater-
ing contract. Since labour was one of the major cost components for catering, 
the wage factor would weigh heavily. Taking into account that the average dif-
ference in compensation between the brewery and the catering company was 
35%, the savings the catering company could offer the brewery were substantial. 
But even more significant was that such constructions, if left unchecked, could 
be rolled out on a much larger scale. The employees’ claim thus stood in the 
way of a potentially very profitable construction.   
The fact that at the time of writing (four years after the ECJ judgment) the 
supervisor and the brewery were still trying to work out the details of his settle-
                                                        
15  Of the thirty claimants eventually twenty-three reached a settlement, so in the final stage 
before the Supreme Court only seven employees were left, most of who still worked at 
the catering company. 
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ment exemplifies the pressure exerted on him and his colleagues, as evidenced 
by how few were eventually left and the acrimonious relationship between the 
supervisor and his former employer. The relevance of the individual persistence 
of the supervisor cannot be overstated. He took on the role of champion of 
workers’ rights in the face of significant opposition. Not only did he face finan-
cial challenges, he also took it upon himself to take the lead on behalf of his 
colleagues. His leading role and uncompromising stance made him the target of 
extra-legal pressures as well. He often found himself in staunch opposition to 
both the catering company and the brewery’s leadership. At one point he was 
even put on leave because of statements he had made in the press, something 
that was eventually reversed by the intervention of a judge. Subsequently, the 
catering company tried to fire him, which again was prevented by a court ruling.  
A.7  ECJ to the Rescue 
Another important element in this case is that the interpretation of EU law was 
clearly the ‘redeeming’ element. The prevailing view among labour lawyers, as 
well as in Dutch judicial doctrine, was that such constructions were legally pos-
sible. The ECJ ruled that such a construction could not mean that the workers 
and their working conditions did not fall under the protection of the Transfer of 
undertakings Directive. It took an ECJ judgment to break this deadlock in the 
interpretation of EU law by the Dutch legislature, and the companies, as well as 
the Dutch judiciary. That this was a typical Dutch matter is illustrated by the fact 
that no other Member State joined in the proceedings before the ECJ. The Dutch 
government and the representatives of Luxembourg had a position less obvious 
than in most other cases where the Netherlands to a great extent was the defend-
ant. This case therefore had a rather different dynamic in Luxembourg than the 
more common administrative issues. It is the only case in the selection for this 
study in which the Dutch representation before the ECJ did not take an opposi-
tional stance to that of the individual litigant. During the hearing in Luxem-
bourg, the Dutch agents did call for an exception to the application of the Di-
rective for temporary workers because it would have serious consequences for 
the Dutch labour market. The European Commission was clearly on the side of 
the employees and expressed gratitude to the supervisor for bringing a case that 
allowed a gap in EU legislation to be filled. As the supervisor describes the 
stance of the Commission before the Court: 
 
“There was a lawyer, a Belgian, on behalf of the European Commission. That said, 
I'm thankful to the claimant for bringing this matter before the court. It is a gap in 
the European legislation. And it is difficult to raise such an issue, because it takes 
years. And no one has done it yet, so we are very happy. But if this is what happens 
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with employees, then tomorrow I am attorney again with a private law firm and I’ll 
advise all multinational companies in Europe to adopt such a construction. I will be 
rich overnight. And after the hearing they came to me, to congratulate me. On behalf 
of the European Union and all Member States, I thank you for this case, he said. So 
we were like, what is going on? He says, no, no, I am being serious. This was a gap 
in the legislation, which will be fixed. And I'm going to congratulate you that you 
have won this case.” 
A.8  Collective versus Collective 
The supervisor’s victory for himself and many of his direct colleagues was also 
a victory for the larger collective of workers in the Netherlands, who in these 
corporate constructions would be left outside the protection of the Directive. The 
legal expert of the union concludes in this regard: 
 
“It is really by virtue of his determination that we were able to win this. Even with 
all the opposition and hassle, he still continued. Which is his Achilles’ heel as well 
sometimes, because he is still litigating at the moment, and I wonder how happy that 
makes you. But we succeeded by the grace of his perseverance.” 
 
Obviously the support of the employees by the labour union that took care of the 
costs of the lawsuit was indispensable. Although on paper the catering company 
was their opponent, in fact the battle was waged against the brewery that was 
planning to apply this construction more frequently. The costs for the labour 
union ran into hundreds of thousands of euros and, according to the union’s 
legal expert “possibly up to a million on the other side”. There were rumours 
from people higher up at the brewery that employers’ organisations were help-
ing them pay for it. The fight thus became employers against workers. As the 
supervisor realised: 
 
“At some point you just felt that we did not matter. It was at one point just to the 
principle they were fighting for, and large corporations, like as the ‘Unilevers’ and 
the ‘Shells’ of this world, and all major European companies work this way.” 
 
Without the support of the union, both financially as well as legally, his battle 
would have likely ended prematurely. This is evidenced by the fact that most of 
his colleagues did not wish to sit out the entire battle and somewhere along the 
way accepted settlement offers by the brewery. In all likelihood he would have 
been forced to accept the offers made to him on several occasions during the 
proceedings. This would have meant that the ECJ’s ruling would not have exist-
ed to make clear that Dutch implementation of workers’ protections based on 
EU law in fact left the door open for companies to circumvent the Directive’s 
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stipulations. Even though previously the supervisor would have been willing to 
come to a settlement, after the increased tension and the realization that his case 
was in fact a chance to put a stop to the practices that undermined workers’ 
rights, he refused to give up before a final judgment by the Dutch court: 
 
“After the ECJ ruling they wanted to reach a compromise. So I said, you can buy me 
out, but I want everything I am entitled to. If I get a dime from you, and it costs a 
euro, I'll be coming for that euro. So I wanted that final judgment. I want this to 
never be done again. And they offered large sums. But it’s not about the money. It is 
of course important, but at some point it goes beyond that. I just wanted it to stop. 
And once that judgment is there, they can no longer do to anyone in the Netherlands 
what they did to us, then it’s done.”  
 
Indeed, the ECJ’s judgment and subsequent Supreme Court ruling effectively 
closed the door on devices that could circumvent the aim of the Directive. It did 
not address the ways in which the Directive and the ECJ’s interpretation affects 
other constructions such as pay rolling, and clarification on this is likely to re-
quire new litigation. 
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5 A Collection of Interests 
5.1  Introduction 
The analysis in Chapter 4 has highlighted how the preliminary reference proce-
dure is a unique legal procedure, with specific consequences for litigation dy-
namics. And while it is often an interesting experience for the lawyers con-
cerned, it is usually difficult for the litigants to comprehend. Even if substantive-
ly individuals’ interests can be served with a reference to the ECJ in a strict 
sense, when it comes to the duration, cost and uncertainty related to the proce-
dure, a reference in itself does not always serve litigants’ interests in a broader 
sense. Especially due to the extended duration of the procedure, there is there-
fore a tension between the structural consequences a reference may have (in-
cluding sometimes full revision of national laws or policies) and the costs to the 
parties involved. The lack of explanatory value of cost-benefit considerations, as 
well as the detrimental impact of the procedures themselves in some cases, rais-
es the question of how and why these cases reach the ECJ.  
Due to their reference to the ECJ, individual cases may serve the interests of 
larger collectives beyond the individual litigant. This has made the procedure of 
particular significance to both interest groups seeking strategic litigation as well 
as scholars studying such a form of legal mobilisation. As such, individual cases 
may be the means by which collective interests are championed, both actively 
and more unwittingly. This, however, also has repercussions for litigation dy-
namics. When the ‘nominal’ and the ‘real’ litigant have different motives for 
participating in the same process, this could result in a different experience of 
the process of law and sense of justice; resulting in a discrepancy between the 
evaluation of the judicial process by lawyers and the valuation by the litigants. 
The procedure can thus at the same time be an opportunity for championing the 
rights of a larger collective, and a further burden on those seeking the applica-
tion of those rights. This chapter will further address how individual litigation 
may be a ‘front’ for more hidden interests, as well as the tensions that may arise 
between different interested parties.  
5.2  Real and Nominal Litigants 
As we have established, the motivation of an individual litigant can be an im-
portant factor and take on various forms, from the resilient to the frivolous. 
However, another explanation for why some cases, in which at a first glance the 
possible individual benefits do not outweigh the costs of the proceedings, reach 
the ECJ lies in the fact that an individual may act merely as the ‘nominal’ liti-
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gant in the legal action. One aspect that is particularly hard to determine when 
investigating litigation based on court documents or statistics alone is the type of 
litigant behind the legal action, giving rise to the complicated question of the 
identity of the ‘real’ litigant. While there may be an individual name at the basis 
of legal action, other parties may be responsible for initiating and continuing 
litigation. In the following examples of firms and interest groups pushing legal 
action, the litigant may act only as a ‘straw man’, or as a ‘nominal’ litigant, 
where the ‘real’ litigant is the wider collective of similar individuals (like asy-
lum seekers or transnational workers) or the interests behind litigation lie with 
different parties not directly apparent from the substance of the case. 
A good example of what court documents, case files, and jurisprudence do 
not show is whether or not the case is a result of a real life dispute, or in fact a 
fabricated ‘test case’ aimed at setting a precedent or obtaining a judicial answer 
to a practical question. Harlow and Rawlings distinguish two types of test cases, 
or test case strategies.1 The first type includes cases that are brought explicitly to 
test the meaning of the law in a given context. The second covers the class- lead- 
or representative action in which one case among many disputes is put forward 
to establish how the law affects all those cases. In its purest form, test cases are 
not only aimed at testing the meaning of the law, but the dispute is also actually 
created with the explicit purpose of testing a legal proposition before the courts. 
Instead of the legal question being part of a dispute, the question itself lies at the 
basis of the legal action and the cases themselves are set up to invoke a judicial 
decision.  
European Support Schemes 
An example of the first type distinguished by Harlow and Rawlings, Lessee 
Entitlements was a ‘dispute’ between a Dutch municipality and a farmer and 
lessee of municipal land, regarding the nature and extent of the obligations re-
sulting from an agricultural lease. For a number of years the farmer had re-
ceived, on the basis of two European Regulations,2 compensatory payments 
under the supported scheme for producers, which was linked to the production 
of certain crops. Following the entry into force of a new EU Regulation3 he was 
granted entitlement to payment as a producer based on the amount of land used. 
The question being litigated was whether EU law required a lessee, on the expi-
ry of the lease, to deliver to the lessor the leased land along with the payment 
                                                        
1  Harlow & Rawlings 1992, 282-5. 
2  Council Regulations 1765/92 and 1251/1999. 
3  Council Regulation 1782/2003. 
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entitlements accumulated thereon or relating thereto, or to pay him compensa-
tion. 
Judging merely from the court documents this was a case concerning a dis-
pute between a lessee and the leasing party, regarding the nature and the extent 
of the obligations under the lease. In reality, both the lessor and the lessee were 
so-called dummies, and an association of lessors (including private as well as 
public landowners) in collaboration with the Dutch Federation of Agriculture 
and Horticulture (an entrepreneurial and employers’ organization, from here: 
LTO), orchestrated the dispute. As the lawyer on the side of the lessee explains: 
 
“The association of landowners represented the lessors who chose a lawyer. On the 
farmers’ side stood LTO, who also chose a lawyer and who came to me. And then 
both went looking for a ‘guinea pig’. And that organization came up with a town, 
and a tenant of that municipality. I already knew him from something else, and he 
was willing to play along with the whole charade. And then we clearly agreed, 
remember, this is a test case, it should not lead to a real conflict.”  
 
The question arose as to whether these farmers were in fact the personal ad-
dressees of these entitlements and allowed to sell them, as they had been al-
lowed with comparable entitlements in the past, particularly if they were in fact 
not the owner but merely a lessee of the land on which these entitlements were 
(partly) based. Such cases, that on paper entail a dispute between two parties – 
in this case a municipality as the lessor and a farmer as the lessee, and their re-
spective legal counsel – in reality are initiated based on far greater interests than 
those of merely one of the two, or even both parties to the proceedings. As the 
aforementioned lawyer explains: 
 
“I think there is up to a billion euro of these entitlements distributed across the Neth-
erlands. And then say a quarter of the land is leased. So then the recipient of the en-
titlement is not the owner of the land he uses, but someone else, for example an in-
stitutional investor. So suppose you have leased a quarter of a billion euro per year, 
that was what the dispute was actually about. On an individual level you’re talking 
about maybe 1,000 euro. But all those people in the Netherlands added together, it 
was not about a triviality. An individual farmer who sells his entitlements and who 
loses a few euros, those are not amounts on which you’re going to litigate. But if 
you add all farmers together, it runs in the millions.” 
 
The interest in resolving this question thus lay not with the individual lessee, for 
whom in fact the potential gain did not measure up to the cost of a judicial pro-
cedure, but with the lessors, who were the owners of significant amounts of 
land. The costs incurred for the legal proceedings were covered by, on the one 
hand, LTO championing the rights of individual lessees through collective ac-
tion, and on the other the association of lessors. These organisations both repre-
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sented the interests of large collectives and both collectives stood to gain con-
siderably from a favourable judicial decision. Eventually this case was resolved 
in favour of the farmers.  
Soft Drugs and Free Movement 
A similar example of such a test case is the Free Movement of Cannabis case.4 
Here the Dutch Ministry of Justice collaborated with a municipality and a coffee 
shop owner to see whether municipal rules could refuse non-residents access to 
so-called ‘coffee shops’ in light of free movement and non-discrimination prin-
ciples of EU law. The marketing of narcotic drugs is prohibited in the Nether-
lands as in all the Member States. However, the Netherlands applies a policy of 
tolerance with regard to cannabis, which may be sold and consumed in these 
coffee shops, subject to conditions set by the local authorities. To combat the 
phenomenon of ‘drug tourism’, a border town adopted a municipal regulation in 
December 2005 forbidding the proprietors of coffee shops from admitting per-
sons not resident in the Netherlands from their establishments. What was not 
clear was whether or not the residence criterion introduced by the municipal 
regulation at issue was contrary to Union law. 
This question was a pertinent one to both the Dutch authorities (local and 
national) and indeed the coffee shop owners in the border areas who stood to 
lose significant portions of their clientele. The litigant, and chairman of an As-
sociation of Official Coffee Shops (VOCM), explains how he became part of an 
effort to clear up the matter by means of a test case: 
 
“In 2006 the municipality was approached by the Minister of Justice, asking if we 
could start a test case to look if it is possible for us coffee shop owners to refuse 
non-residents access to the coffee shop. To this end the local ordinance was altered 
stating that a non-resident should be denied access to the coffee shop. In that period 
two supposed violations had been established in my business and an official report 
was made. Also, my establishment was supposedly closed for three months. How-
ever, this is not true. It was just a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the municipality 
and me. Until the time the court issued a ruling, the authorities would no longer 
enforce the ordinance. We started this process to see what exactly is possible under 
EU law.” 
 
This case shows how EU law becomes part of the practice of local governance, 
possibly restricting authorities’ room for regulating local matters. Instead of the 
coffee shop owners invoking the principles of non-discrimination, free move-
ment of goods and freedom to provide services in order to defend their interests, 
                                                        
4  For a review see Van Harten & Van Eijken 2011.  
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the parties on both sides agreed to ‘test the water’ as to the applicability of these 
principles to the Dutch software policy. 
Both aforementioned cases involved organised interests employing a legal 
strategy when it came to the applicability and interpretation of EU law. In both 
cases the affair supposedly leading up to the legal proceedings was staged in 
agreement with the opposing side and never actually took place. In the first case 
this happened in the form of a letter from the farmer addressed to the munici-
pality informing them of his intention to resell his entitlements and in the second 
case in the form of two fictional contested violations. In these cases both sides 
were thus in full agreement. What is interesting about such cases is that the ECJ 
had explicitly resisted “turning the [reference] procedure into a continuous de-
liberative assembly of lawyers, judges, and litigants”5 with its (second) Foglia 
decision in the early 1980s.6 In that decision, the Court considered its task in 
preliminary references to be “not that of delivering opinions on general or hypo-
thetical questions but of assisting the administration of justice in the Member 
States”.7 In its judgment it insisted on a ‘genuine dispute’ and declined jurisdic-
tion in replying to questions ‘posed within the framework of procedural devices 
arranged by the parties’. In Foglia the Court indeed sniffed out the orchestrated 
nature of the dispute. The abovementioned cases, however, reveal that such 
vigilance for ‘questions without a genuine dispute’ is not failsafe. 
5.3  Employing an Individual Case 
One requirement for the orchestration of a test case is the collaboration between 
both parties. In many instances such collaboration lies beyond the possibilities, 
especially if one of the sides to a potential dispute does not have an interest in 
resolving the question. Since many questions about the interpretation of EU law 
are about national law or policy in light of certain EU law provisions, the state 
often has a vested interest in existing policy, and therefore collaborations be-
tween litigants and the government are not obvious. For those aiming to test the 
interpretation of the law within such a context, the setting up of a test case thus 
requires a genuine dispute. Such cases fall under what Harlow and Rawlings 
consider the class- lead- or representative action in which one case among many 
disputes is put forward to establish how the law affects all those cases. 
                                                        
5  Schepel & Blankenburg 2001, 39. 
6  Foglia Case 244/80. 
7  Foglia Case 244/80, point 18. 
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Tax Consultancy on a European Level 
Two examples show how a third party can be responsible for initiating proceed-
ings. These cases, aimed at clearing up a specific (practical) question, originated 
not with one of the parties involved but with their counsel or third parties. These 
cases both involved tax consultancy firms that used individual cases to address a 
practical question, in which one case among many was put forward to establish 
how the law affected all those cases. 
The first example (Concealed Foreign Savings) revolved around a question 
regarding the statutory recovery period in the voluntary disclosure scheme for 
taxpayers with undisclosed foreign financial assets, which was litigated by a 
large consultancy firm. In the second case (Self-Employed Tax Deductions) a 
small regional tax consultancy firm used an individual case to address a question 
of cross-border taxation in light of non-discrimination principles in EU law. 
Both cases were actively selected from among the firms’ clientele after the ques-
tion was brought up among the firms’ advisors. One of the consultants elabo-
rates:  
 
“We had debated internally whether this constitutes discrimination based on 
nationality. In the sense that, a Dutch national who has a permanent establishment in 
Germany, to keep it simple, he may count his hours, but a German with a permanent 
establishment in the Netherlands cannot count the hours made in his German 
establishment for the Dutch self-employed deduction. The tax forms weren’t even 
designed for this. You could not put that down. Since we had some German 
customers with a permanent establishment in the Netherlands, we said, well, let’s 
look at how the tax office, and probably the court looks at this.”  
 
The individual case was thus selected from among their clientele, which allowed 
these firms, who for these principle cases often employed dedicated teams of 
advisors, to commit to one specific case while serving a larger group of clients. 
The individual case thus served as a vehicle:  
 
“This case was the first procedure that was turned down by the tax authorities. For 
that matter it could have been anyone else. But these clients supported the 
procedure. That is also important. They must agree that the proceedings are done on 
their behalf. We came to an agreement, for that price, we go all the way. They have 
to agree with the fact that you litigate on their behalf, because ultimately, the 
deduction value was fairly limited on an annual basis.” 
 
With this last remark the advisor pointed to the fact that in order to reach a prin-
ciple judgment, and to be able to continue a case, the lawyers or advisors litigat-
ing on someone’s behalf needed explicit consent and continued support, not 
least because their consecutive tax returns would be stayed for the duration of 
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the proceedings. In this case the costs of the proceedings were divided between a 
number of clients in order to make the whole action possible, so that the advi-
sors did not work for nothing and the amount of money paid individually made 
the effort worthwhile for the clients. While the one principle case was being 
decided, these other clients all had their cases stayed until a final judgment had 
been given. Both cases show how the actual initial motive for engaging in the 
judicial action lay not directly with the individual litigants but with the interests 
of the consultancy firms, which were informed by their commercial aim and 
service provision. 
 
“Yes, it really must have a certain added value for our office. In smaller offices it is 
perhaps the lawyer who is vain, but we as a firm want to present ourselves more as a 
brand. Because [this judgment] is now associated with [our office]. So that’s why 
we do it too. We seek publicity when it turns out well for us. So that we as an office 
have something to gain from it.” 
 
The common thread in these test cases is that the initial effort did not come from 
the parties to the proceedings. The tax consultancy firms were able, through 
their clientele, to select cases based on which they sought an answer to the rele-
vant questions. The ability to divide costs among different clients was an im-
portant advantage in such test case litigation. The motives for litigation thus also 
lay with actors other than these individuals, and were informed by interests be-
yond the individual litigant. The involvement of the litigants in these cases con-
sequently differed substantially, and the role of the individuals on whose behalf 
these cases were litigated was marginal.  
Test cases, in the strictest sense, concern cases that are set up explicitly to 
test a certain interpretation of the law. Such cases have a strong connection be-
tween the matter that is addressed in court and the original context of the (ficti-
tious) dispute, thus there is little ambiguity when it comes to the interests of 
those litigants directly involved, who agreed to this set-up. The advantage of 
such a structured design is that there is no ambiguity for the parties, and thus it 
is easy to estimate costs and benefits. There will be no disagreement about the 
appropriate approach and no risk of anyone pulling out. Other examples show 
how an individual case may be employed to test a certain legal question, not by 
creating a dispute, but by latching a particular legal strategy onto an existing 
individual case. 
A good example of the latter is the case against increases in fees for resi-
dence permits (Case Study C). The individual case responsible for (eventually 
successfully) challenging the validity of the policy of increasing fees for resi-
dence permits initially was merely an appeal against the decision of non-
consideration of the request for prolongation of the residence and worker’s per-
mit of a Turkish national, who was subsequently threatened with expulsion. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
110 
While the interest of the individual involved was obviously the retaining of his 
residence status, the question that was actually addressed before the ECJ was 
whether this policy of treating Turkish citizens differently from EU citizens in 
this respect was allowed in light of the ‘standstill clause’ in the Association 
Agreement between the EU and Turkey.8 A Working Group made up of law-
yers, academics and an interest group searched for a suitable case to serve as a 
procedural solution for the fact that previous attempts at addressing the same 
matter by means of a civil lawsuit had stranded in the Dutch Supreme Court on 
account of the inadmissibility of the interest organizations that had pressed the 
claim. 
This case shows how the legal question that was addressed before the ECJ 
pre-existed before a case was initiated, and how individual cases may be co-
opted for the purposes of addressing certain legal questions. The individual cas-
es were used specifically for this purpose; however, references to the ECJ may 
in themselves turn otherwise unremarkable cases into cases with potentially 
greater impact. The next section will therefore focus on how along the way cases 
may turn into principle cases and how interests are transformed or augmented by 
the fact that a case is (potentially) referred to the ECJ. 
5.4  The Transformation: How Individual Interests Become Collective 
Because an ECJ judgment has a de facto impact beyond the individual case, 
since it resolves questions for all cases regarding similar situations, referral to 
the ECJ means a case increases its scope. As we have seen above, this transfor-
mation of a case due to a reference may occur apart from any deliberate effort 
on the part of either the litigant or the lawyer. The interests that are being pro-
moted by a single case can thus transform from merely individual to including 
more collective interests. This combination of interests that come together in one 
case is a dynamic especially prevalent in this study in the cases concerning mi-
grants and asylum seekers. Cases may thus evolve to become principle cases 
that have an impact beyond the individual dispute. This is rarely the explicit aim 
of the individual litigant. In fact, when asked directly about the possible, and 
often real political effects or collective interests, very few litigants themselves 
were, especially initially, interested in such broader impact, nor were they al-
ways aware of the further collective interests that were associated with their 
case. After a decision by the ECJ, litigants may become aware of the bigger 
impact their case can have, as one litigant recalls: 
                                                        
8  See Case Study C for a description of the standstill clauses in EU-Turkey Association 
law. 
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“What I thought was very interesting at that time, when the judgment was there, was 
that at one point, I read that my case had consequences for Germans who bought a 
house in Mallorca. Only then did I realize what far-reaching consequences 
something like this can have.” 
 
It is then often the lawyers, and possible third parties, who employ a certain case 
in order to elicit a judgment on principle (for instance to challenge national poli-
cy). These cases are comparable to the test cases that were described before, but 
differ in that they were not explicitly set up as such and a real dispute lies at its 
origin. This last aspect has repercussions for the interests that are at stake, possi-
bly leading to conflicts between individual interests and the more collective 
interests a case may serve. As described by Bruinsma, especially at the higher 
judicial levels motives behind litigation may change.9 Here, individuals who are 
seeking justice without interest in the external effect of a judgment are faced 
with actors ‘that are playing for the rules’. Even their own lawyers may fall 
within this category. With respect to litigation up to the higher judicial levels, 
starting motives are rarely a sufficient explanation. At this level, litigation is 
largely dependent upon the efforts of the lawyer in question or the other support-
ing parties involved. The motives for lawyers in doing so are, like those of liti-
gants, very diverse, and the fervour with which they pursue this strategy differs; 
yet all are aimed at furthering some form of collective interest. The next section 
deals with lawyers that aim to employ cases to this end and the possible conflict-
ing interests this may cause. 
5.5  The Art of Soliciting a Reference  
The cases that were studied show a large number of lawyers who are more or 
less unexpectedly confronted with a reference, which will be explored in more 
detail in Chapter 6. A small number of lawyers, however, actively aim to use the 
preliminary reference procedure as a means to an end, especially in areas where 
collective interests may be served. As discussed, the willingness of the national 
judge to refer forms an important obstacle to those aiming for a preliminary 
reference. In order to implore the national judge to refer a certain question, law-
yers have to convince him or her of the salience of the question. Multiple studies 
point to a general reluctance among the national judiciary to refer questions to 
the ECJ.10 The interviews with lawyers that aim to bring certain matters before 
the ECJ give insight into how ‘the art of’ soliciting a reference works in prac-
tice. It shows how practitioners go about pushing judges towards the decision to 
                                                        
9  Bruinsma 2010.  
10  Chalmers 2000; Nowak et al. 2012.  
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refer a case. Some lawyers attest to systematically putting in a lot of work when 
trying to convince national judges of the necessity for a reference: 
 
“You obviously have to find a national court willing to submit such a case to the 
Court, which is a major obstacle. And you have to pay attention as a lawyer, which I 
always do consistently. If we find that this is a matter in which the court could have 
doubt, we always write a detailed justification in the case before the court, on paper, 
motivated, substantiated, why we would eventually like to have submitted a question 
to the Court of Justice. So, not only casually mentioning it to the Court during 
hearings, no, really supported by well-grounded arguments.” 
 
Part of such a strategy, being well aware of the reluctance of (especially lower) 
courts to refer cases, is taking as much work out of the hands of the judge as 
possible and presenting their case for the necessity of a referral, including for-
mulating the questions. The lawyer continues: 
 
“What I always do is to formulate the questions in advance. I think judges do appre-
ciate that, because otherwise they have to start from scratch themselves, and they 
still find it difficult I think. If you as a lawyer do the work for them, I think that 
helps a lot in convincing them.” 
 
Another lawyer adjusted his strategy from steering a case towards a question, 
with which he had experienced little success in convincing the judges, towards 
focusing on creating uncertainty as to the interpretation of certain EU legisla-
tion: 
 
“Ultimately the question is whether the judge is in doubt about the interpretation. 
And as a lawyer, you present your position as: This is how EU law is to be 
interpreted. And the mere fact that one party has a different interpretation of EU law 
than the other may cast doubt in the mind of the judge, so you can direct the judge 
towards doubt.” 
 
A tried-and-true method for some lawyers is using the inconsistency in national 
jurisprudence among courts to convince especially the highest courts of the ne-
cessity to create clarity. The developments in ECJ jurisprudence may also help 
in getting this point across, as explained by one tax lawyer: 
 
“I had a case before, exactly the same case as this one. And the Council of State 
rejected that one based on European law. But you also have to look at the case law 
of the European Court of Justice, which may give a different interpretation of 
European law. And by then there had been new decisions, and so I raised those in 
the proceedings. Because, what was the ruling then, could not apply anymore. And I 
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was able to convince them that it changed a bit, and that it was unclear now. And so 
they asked the Court of Justice how it should be interpreted.” 
 
This lawyer was one of the few practitioners that actively followed and then 
used new ECJ jurisprudence in order to challenge national policies. This practice 
does not appear to be widespread among the practitioners interviewed for this 
study. 
In such strategies, playing different national courts against each other may 
also prove effective. Lower courts may go against the prevailing doctrine and 
use the preliminary reference procedure to outflank the higher courts in pursuit 
of a different interpretation of the law.11 In one of the cases in this study (Double 
Nationality), the lower court chose not to refer the question to the ECJ. Instead, 
it considered the matter an acte clair, clear enough to give its own ruling, and 
went against prevailing doctrine without consulting the ECJ. Following the ap-
peal by the Dutch immigration authorities against this decision, the Council of 
State was in essence forced to ask these questions, where in an earlier judgment 
it had found no reason to do so. A judgment by a lower court that runs counter to 
such interpretation in effect puts pressure on a higher court because it under-
scores that there is indeed uncertainty as to the interpretation of relevant EU law. 
Attentive lawyers are able to respond to such inconsistencies by arguing that 
there ‘apparently’ exists uncertainty regarding the interpretation of EU law, and 
that therefore referral is necessary. Instead of conflicting explanations, the ab-
sence of jurisprudence at the supranational level can also be a fruitful argument:  
 
“We advocated that what some judges in the Netherlands had so far decided, under 
pressure of the Council of State, was wrong. That EU law must be interpreted other-
wise. And if they did not agree, then they should just ask the Court of Justice, 
because they could not say on their own, we know it ourselves because the case law 
is clear, because it clearly was not. There was no jurisprudence yet.” 
 
These strategies only sporadically succeed and the lawyers interviewed, without 
exception, expressed their struggles. A related strategy for convincing especially 
the higher courts, that are responsible for ensuring legal uniformity, is to bring 
the same arguments in multiple cases before multiple courts. By serially stress-
ing the need for referral, lawyers can emphasise the recurrent nature of the ques-
tion and influence the national judges’ inclinations: 
 
“Normally, if it is a decision I can follow, I will not try again with another case. You 
can jump high or low, but you don’t give your clients hope if there is none. But in 
                                                        
11  Alter 1998; 2000; 2001; Burley & Mattli 1993: 64.  
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that one case I thought, this is just not right. So, now this time I filed appeal, because 
they should at least refer to the Court of Justice. Of course they didn’t. Well, I have 
more cases, and I'm just going to continue until these questions are asked. Maybe I 
am annoying them, because this is already the 20th case, well fine. But this simply is 
not right, and I think they realise that.” 
 
A higher occurrence rate of the same or similar claims may persuade the judges 
that the matter is salient enough to refer one or more cases to the ECJ, a ‘num-
bers game’ according to another lawyer: 
 
“Ultimately, I think that you can only win the debate by bringing forward a lot of 
cases, to bring the same kind of argument in big numbers. I mean, it really is a 
‘numbers game’. You can go and cry foul in one case, but that one case will not get 
it done.” 
 
Lawyers that recognise the opportunity or indeed the necessity to have a matter 
decided by the ECJ thus develop coping strategies to deal with the perceived and 
sometimes confirmed reluctance of national judges to refer cases to Luxem-
bourg. Such forms of cause lawyering are especially prevalent in areas of EU 
law where the interests of a larger group of lawyers’ clientele can be served by 
principle judgments by the ECJ. 
5.6  Cause Lawyering and the Balancing of Interests 
Sarat and Scheingold describe how cause lawyering differs from conventional 
conceptions of lawyering, according to which lawyers are expected to ‘provide 
case-by-case, transaction-by-transaction service to particular clients’ without a 
further focus on specific policy preferences. 12 However, these two ideal types of 
lawyering overlap in significant ways and cause lawyering in itself can be con-
sidered a moving target with individual lawyers crossing lines back and forth 
between conventional practice and cause lawyering. Boundaries between the 
two are therefore fluid, particularly if we look at the perspective of individual 
lawyers. We see this illustrated by cases that are referred to the ECJ, where law-
yers may recognize the collective interests that such cases represent. Lawyers in 
such cases may cross the line between conventional lawyering for a particular 
client to advocating the interests of an entire group of clients.  
The act of serving general interests through European proceedings is not al-
ways a preconceived plan. Lawyers who may have an inclination towards cause 
lawyering with a small ‘c’ may find themselves in the position of being intro-
                                                        
12  Sarat & Scheingold 1998.  
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duced to the European stage merely by serving the interests of a nominal client 
(who at that point is still the real client as well). Since preliminary referrals 
prolong proceedings that in many cases have been going on for many years at 
the national stage anyway, there are cases that are continued even after the nom-
inal client has in fact given up, when the lawyer in question has lost all contact 
or even when the client has passed away.13 In these cases, it is the lawyer that 
continues the case because he or she recognises the general interest (and the 
interests of other clients) that is being served by adjudication on the matter at the 
European level. In such cases the personal dedication of a practitioner to a case 
is an essential factor.  
References to the ECJ often carry in them the possibility of addressing legal 
questions that potentially benefit a larger group of individuals. Whether or not a 
reference was part of an active legal strategy, or came more or less as a surprise, 
for lawyers this provides the opportunity to serve the interests of not only their 
direct client but also those of a larger section of their clientele, or a larger collec-
tive more generally. For lawyers with such goals in mind, the so-called ‘cause 
lawyers’ an ECJ judgment can provide a way to correct purported wrong politi-
cal choices by the government. As one migration lawyer explains:  
 
“I see the law, especially in these times of a truly different political climate, really as 
a safety valve. Seeing the judge in general is already a safety valve against 
outlandish policy, or illegal policy, that is of course one of the pillars of our rule of 
law. And in the Netherlands we do not have a constitutional court so there is no 
constitutional review. But there is the ECHR and EU law. So that’s such an 
important guarantee. I think that preliminary questions, European Union law and the 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg are a good tool in order to make a legal correction 
for illegal policies.” 
 
The opportunity to influence jurisprudence allows lawyers to ‘play for the rules’ 
and serve a greater cause than the interests of their client alone. With a reference 
to the ECJ, the goals of a procedure can thus be transformed from winning the 
case in the interests of one client to serving the greater cause of legal protection 
for many. While a great opportunity, not all lawyers are particularly prepared to 
take on this role. As one social security lawyer explains: 
 
“At that moment you really can create jurisprudence, but you have to explain why a 
rule is different from how it is applied. Then it really becomes a question of general 
interest. That is very strange in such a preliminary procedure, because in fact, you 
have become a bit of a lawyer of the general interest. Formally, I really have to go 
                                                        
13  One example of this was in Export of Benefits regarding the export of social benefits, the 
interests of which were then transferred to the inheritors. 
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for my client, so those interests have to be balanced. But pleading for the general 
interest, that takes some getting used to.”  
 
As stressed by Galanter, the differences between so-called repeat players and 
one-shotters not only exist between different types of litigants but also between 
litigants and legal professionals. The employment of a single client’s case to 
further more general interests has repercussions for the way a case is dealt with. 
Tamanaha describes this as follows: “In ordinary cases, the lawyer is the instru-
ment to advance the client’s interests; in cause litigation, the named client is 
mainly an accoutrement to advance the lawyer’s goals. In these cases, the real 
‘client’ is the cause the lawyer aims to promote; sometimes this greater objective 
is inconsistent with what might be best for the named client, raising significant 
ethical concerns”.14 For a lawyer, this requires a balancing of (collective versus 
individual) interests, and it is not hard to imagine how this may put pressure on 
the relationship between lawyer and client. For a lawyer that recognizes the 
more collective interest in a potentially favourable judgment by the ECJ, this 
can be a dilemma, and result in tensions between lawyer and client, as one mi-
gration lawyer describes:  
 
“It will take a lot of time, that’s always the first thing you have to explain to your 
client. At first, you have a good relationship with your client and they trust you as a 
lawyer. But a year further in, you’ll get tensions. Then you will get phone calls, 
asking when I expect a judgment. And of course you cannot give a good indication. 
These are always tricky conversations. So at first if you say it’s going to take a long 
time they are fine with it, then they do not really have a good idea. But if it lasts 
really long then those tensions will rise, and that’s something you have to deal with 
as a lawyer.”  
 
Such tensions arise especially when the prolonged proceedings put people in a 
particularly dire situation. The risk of clients giving up and pulling their claim 
can be a dilemma: 
 
“It breaks people. And those people, and I can understand that, say listen, I cannot 
take it anymore, psychologically. Because, I cannot afford that my family is 
supported by only the work of my wife, or my children. Because, I'm sitting here 
alone all day, doing nothing. People suffer from it. And then I really have to take the 
lead. Like, let’s continue, give me the power so to speak, the authorization to 
proceed with your case.” 
 
                                                        
14  Tamanaha 2006, 157. 
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Sometimes, these lawyers thus choose to continue with cases even after the cli-
ent has in fact given up and, for instance, returned to his or her country of origin. 
In one case, a lawyer recognising the potential impact of the ECJ judgment, 
went so far as to carry on the case although he had lost contact with his client 
altogether.  
A difference in the individual interests and this legal reality may be further 
exacerbated by the different (e)valuation of lawyer and client of what is relevant 
to the dispute, as is clear from this next remark by one of the lawyers:  
 
“Personally, I hate client relations. Generally, the whole on-going debate is about a 
legal question, not whether someone is nice or not nice, a man or a woman, that does 
not matter, it is a completely legal issue and that’s what I like best. And I think it’s 
generally quite annoying when, especially in cases that have become so juridified, it 
is so abstract that the client really does not matter anymore, and then the client really 
only can become a hindrance of what you as a lawyer are trying to bring forward.”  
 
Not all lawyers who are put in a position to promote the interests of a larger 
collective feel as comfortable with this opportunity. One asylum lawyer stressed 
the stark contrast he noticed between the academic discussion about EU or in-
ternational law and the practice of where and when that law was applied: 
 
“What puts me off in a lot of those human rights discussions. When you get in one 
of those meetings and there is a discussion of one of these judgments, with 
professors who find it all terribly interesting. Saying, ah, it's all terribly interesting 
what the Court is doing here and blah blah blah. And as such, I understand that, but 
when I have to explain it to my client, I think, this doesn’t help him one iota. I mean, 
it is all very nice to have an academic discussion on a comma somewhere in a piece 
of legislation, but the client is the one it is ultimately about. And they do not 
understand it. And if they do understand, it becomes a kind of weird abstract 
discussion. ‘Yes, very interesting. It’s a beautiful judgment, but I am expelled.’” 
 
This tension between the interests of a litigant as real and as nominal interests 
also has important ramifications for the ability to focus interests. Felstiner et al. 
point to this problem, that may arise particularly when a case involves individu-
als: “A party may change his objectives in two ways: what he seeks or is willing 
to concede and how much. Stakes go up or down as new information comes 
available, a party’s needs change, rules are adjusted, and costs are incurred. 
Delay, frustration, and despair may produce a change in objectives”.15 Thus, 
having a truly interested party at the root of litigation provides its own challeng-
es, and relies to a great extent on the resilience of litigants. 
                                                        
15  Felstiner, Abel & Sarat 1980, 638. 
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The significance of such personal characteristics is prominently illustrated in 
the aforementioned case of the catering employees against their (former) em-
ployer (Case Study A). Primarily, because in this case those affected were in the 
precarious situation of being in a dependent employment relationship with the 
opponent and the arduous task of fighting a former and current employer can 
easily dissuade one from taking legal action. Nonetheless, one employee took it 
upon himself to represent and fight for the interests of a larger group of affected 
employees all whilst still working at one of their former employer’s sites. The 
transformation of their claim into a legal dispute could have been forestalled 
with successful settlement negotiations. And were it not for this one employee’s 
personal tenacity in combating the brewery’s policy the matter would likely 
have died a premature death, either because the employees would have been 
dissuaded from undertaking action at all, or because they would have accepted 
the proposed agreements or the later settlement agreements, which, eventually, 
many of his colleagues did. 
The trajectory of the case and the fact that it reached the ECJ at all can in 
very large part be ascribed to this employee who was able to mobilise the rele-
vant support and, moreover, to stay the course and not to be swayed by settle-
ment proposals or deterred by personal attacks. Of course, all the employee’s 
efforts would have been impossible, had he not found the willing support of the 
labour union that took care of the financial burden, which amounted to several 
hundreds of thousands of euros. Unlike the case of the pensioners (Case Study 
B) whose potential interested constituency consisted of several thousand affect-
ed pensioners living abroad, the catering employee’s potential allies were, at 
least directly, only his small group of affected colleagues. This makes it very 
unlikely that he would have been able to solicit the necessary funds by collective 
contributions. Such dependence, however, works both ways, as the labour union 
for their part, in trying to serve the interests of their constituency via legal 
means, were dependent upon individuals like this employee who were willing to 
battle with their employers with possibly dire personal consequences. As the 
legal expert for the labour union states:@ 
 “I have seen lots of cases fail, because that happens often. I see that a lot in my 
practice, when you have a principle matter, then you should often have to play it 
through an individual, you have to have something concrete to start a case. And 
when that starts to take off, then the company or employer or whatever, who 
have an interest in that it is not more widely known or that there won’t be any 
more claims ... then someone is approached, made a proposal and a declaration 
of secrecy and you are gone. And we as a union are gone as well. And I do not 
blame those people, because I know very well, because I've been a lawyer, what 
you ask of people. However, for the general interest it is a pity sometimes.” 
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From this perspective, not having a truly interested party at the root of the litiga-
tion may increase the chances of success since the litigation effort is not de-
pendent upon the spurious nature of individual objectives and may provide a 
shield against opposition interference, particularly in the form of settlements.  
5.7  Conclusion 
While Chapter 4 has tempered the tendency in research to ascribe to litigants 
motivations and intentions absent in fact, this chapter on the other hand, has 
revealed that preliminary references may conceal more test cases, cause lawyer-
ing and overall strategic legal action than may be deduced from a glance at the 
legal documentation. As we have seen, a significant portion of the cases (over 
half) studied show actors other than the ‘real’ litigant involved in, or even re-
sponsible for the litigation. To the outside observer, individual cases may thus 
be hiding a third party initiative and the championing of collective interests. In 
some cases this third party initiative may be responsible for the legal action in 
the first place, for instance by setting up legal action as a test case. Yet, even 
cases that were not set up to serve as test cases, may transform into a case that 
serves a similar purpose. It is often the lawyers in such cases that are the drivers 
behind litigation, and therefore, when examining the motives of different actors 
behind litigation we have to take into account that different motives behind liti-
gation may exist simultaneously, and may even contradict each other. However, 
such insights are also a mixed bag since cases that may end up championing 
collective interests do not always result from strategic action. They are thus a 
reminder for researchers to be attentive to the way superficial investigation of 
court proceedings could leave us with an incomplete picture, which clouds our 
understanding of who is able to profit from opportunities in legal structures. The 
significant share of cases where the litigation involves more than a mere client 
with (or even without) legal support directs our attention to the opportunities 
that are available, and recognised, by those with the resources and legal capital 
to pursue them, as well as underscores the cost of accessing this form of justice.  
The challenges lawyers face in balancing the interests of their clients with 
the more collective interests, highlight the downside of individual rights-based 
litigation strategies. The combination of these insights with the characterisation 
of litigants as particularly persistent individuals, helps to further understand the 
pressure such prolonged legal contest puts on those affected. Considering that 
the EU legal system is dependent to a significant degree upon legal contestation 
and EU law mobilisation, an individual rights-based legal structure thus puts 
significant pressure on those affected by possible rights violations and non-
compliance by Member States. Where no willing and able individual claimants 
CHAPTER 5 
 
120 
are available to contest such violations, EU law mobilisation depends signifi-
cantly upon the ability of those affected to mobilise collectively, or on those 
with the resources and legal capital to pursue such legal strategies for them. 
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Case Study B. Pensioners Abroad 
B.1  Introduction: Between Social Rights and Free Movement 
This case describes the story of Dutch pensioners living outside the Nether-
lands fighting changes in Dutch policies on health insurance by legal means all 
the way to the ECJ. Theirs is a story of European citizens using their right to 
free movement but becoming the subjects of the complex European efforts at 
coordinating social rights and benefits for people using that fundamental free-
dom. All European Union citizens, including those who have ended their 
working careers and have become entitled to an old age or other pension, enjoy 
the right to freedom of movement. Pensioners who have previously exercised 
their economic free movement rights may decide to remain in the former state 
of employment, to return to their Member State of origin or choose to live in 
another Member State. In addition, EU citizens may decide to move to another 
Member State only after their retirement. The group of pensioners residing 
abroad, often nationals of one of the ‘northern’ Member States who move to 
one of the southern Member States after their retirement, face many questions 
in the fields of social security and tax law. In which Member State do they 
have to pay income tax? Which social security rules apply to them? From 
which Member State(s) do they receive a statutory and/or supplementary pen-
sion? In which Member State are they entitled to health care and who bears the 
costs of treatment? In which Member State do they have to pay health insur-
ance premiums?  
Subsequently, this group is confronted with EU rules or national policy af-
fected by those rules, since they are the embodiment of a ‘transnational’ group 
using their right of free movement. Because this group is disproportionally 
dependent on care, changes in this context can have a significant impact on 
their living situation. Their insurance situation is usually much more complex 
than the usual Dutch cases having to do not only with the Dutch health care 
legislation, but also complicated Treaty law and the legal rules of the country 
of residence. The contest for the group of pensioners central to this case study 
started when Dutch legislation was changed, effectively bringing their health 
care arrangements within the scope of European Regulations. The problems 
arising from the perspective of these pensioners can be ascribed to relevant 
European Regulations that only provide for a coordination regime.1 Since they 
do not provide for harmonisation, it is inherent in such a scheme that cross-
                                                        
1  Van de Mei 2011.  
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border movement may work out favourably or unfavourably for individuals or 
groups because such movement is not financially neutral. In the case of the 
pensioners, ‘free movement’ combined with a ‘social Europe’ did not have a 
positive outcome. This effectively created a situation in which pensioners had 
a ‘right’, the right to health care in their country of residence, that they did not 
actually want. 
B.2  The Contested Policy 
On January 1st 2006, a new Health Insurance Act was introduced in the Neth-
erlands. This law replaced the previously applicable Health Care Act 
(Ziekenfondswet). Under the old rules, employees and pensioners with incomes 
below a certain threshold were publicly insured. Individuals who were not 
covered by this law due to their high income, at least as regards ordinary med-
ical expenses, had to rely on private insurance. The Health Insurance Act, 
introduced in 2006, put an end to this distinction. The new law attracted early 
attention publicly and politically mainly because of the health care privatiza-
tion it entailed in practice, and the abolishment of the fairly popular public 
option. Everyone who lived or worked in Netherlands was now legally re-
quired to take out private health care insurance. This change in Dutch legisla-
tion, however, also meant an expansion of the scope of EU Regulation 
1408/71, a Regulation containing rules determining the social security systems 
to which people moving within the EU were subject, from which Member 
State(s) one could receive pension(s), where they could obtain health care and 
which Member State or institution was responsible for bearing the costs.  
The expansion of the scope of this Regulation within the new Dutch law 
impacted in particular the group of old age pensioners who were long-term 
residents in another Member State and who, because of their income level had 
never – or only very long ago – been insured under the old public option 
scheme. This group had for a long time relied on private insurance. They were 
generally very satisfied with their private insurance contracts and the resulting 
quality of the covered health care services, which were often tailored to their 
needs and requirements.2 By amending the Dutch legislation these people 
were, as far as their health care concerns, confronted with Regulation 1408/71 
(as well as the new Regulation 883/2004), in particular the provisions relating 
to the right to care for persons residing in one Member State but receiving a 
                                                        
2  In some southern European countries, hospitals and other services appeared with the 
purpose of providing care specifically to this group of privately insured foreign pen-
sioners. Gehring 2016. 
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pension from another Member State. These Regulations were meant to grant 
health care rights to people that made use of their right to freely move and 
reside within the EU. Based on these Regulations, individuals had a right to 
care in their state of residence similar to care they would have received in the 
pension paying Member State, had they lived in that state. Based on provisions 
contained in Regulation 1408/71, Article 69 of the new Dutch Health Care 
Insurance Act stated that people living abroad who fell within the scope of EU 
Regulations and were entitled to residence care in case of need, had to sign up 
as ‘treaty entitled’ (verdragsgerechtigde) with the Dutch Health Care Insur-
ance Board (CVZ)3 and with it became liable for contributions.4 This had some 
profound financial implications for pensioners living abroad and registered as 
resident in another Member State. Instead of having a private insurance con-
tract, these pensioners now had to pay contributions for general Dutch health 
insurance and contributions under the Emergency Medical Expenses Act 
(AWBZ), which were to be subtracted from their pensions and/or benefits. The 
Health Insurance Act thus expanded the statutory health insurance scheme to 
all residents of the Netherlands.  
However, the provisions based on the EU Regulations meant that the retir-
ees were suddenly, due to Regulation 1408/71, entitled to health care in their 
state of residence. The retirees did not appreciate this new right at all. This had 
to do with a provision in Regulation 1408/71 (Article 33), which meant that 
the Member State bearing the costs was entitled to collect health insurance 
premiums from their pensions and benefits. But the main reason for their op-
position was that the Regulation entitled them to medical care under the law 
and standards of the state of residence, which in many cases was different from 
the care they had enjoyed previously, and often at considerably higher costs. 
They considered this a decline in rights because they were accustomed to care 
in accordance with the standards of their private insurance contracts.5 The 
pensioners concerned did not wish to fall under the mandatory scheme and did 
                                                        
3  The CVZ (now Het Zorginstituut) is a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisa-
tion that takes an independent position between the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport (VWS), health insurers, health care providers and patients (organizations). After 
the introduction of the ZVW in 2006 the CVZ was also responsible for the implementa-
tion of Article 69 of the Insurance Act and collecting contributions from people who 
fell under EU regulations, the so-called ‘treaty entitled’.  
4  Non-registration would be met with a fine of 130% of the contributions. 
5  One of the contributors to an online discussion forum formulated it as if they received a 
letter stating: “Congratulations, you have won a prize (the right to care). Though, if you 
place your signature for acceptance, soon we will send you the bill for that prize.” 
http://www.vngsint.com/ [last accessed 15 February 2016], the website is no longer 
available and has been replaced by https://vbngb.eu/ [last accessed 2 November 2017]. 
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not want to pay these contributions. Their preference was to keep the private 
insurance they had had for years.  
B.3  Consequences for Pensioners Living Abroad 
Under the new health care system, formerly privately insured people living 
abroad became dependent on the legal system of health care in their country of 
residence.6 In the new system, the hitherto privately insured lost the right to go 
to their own, local Dutch private physician or the fully equipped private clin-
ics.7 As of 2006, they were forced to go to the public hospitals within the na-
tional health insurance scheme. Many experienced this as an erosion of their 
insurance position because the quality of care in the country of residence, ac-
cording to them, was significantly lower than in the (private) facilities to 
which they were previously entitled. For people who relied on health care (not 
uncommon among pensioners) this meant that they were forced to take out 
additional private insurance to extend their coverage back to the level they had 
previously enjoyed. Due to their age, however, premiums generally rose to 
several times the amount they had been paying before.  
Additionally, these people were at the time either voluntarily insured, or in 
many cases not at all,8 under the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ), 
which funded long-term home care and elderly care. With the new Act the 
AWBZ premium became obligatory and would also be deducted from their 
pension or benefits. However, due to differences in welfare state systems, in 
some countries this type of care was not available under the public health care 
system. An estimated thirty-five thousand people living abroad who received a 
Dutch pension or benefits, now had to pay premiums for care that was some-
times not available in their countries of residence. Nevertheless, the majority 
had significant cuts in their benefits/pension because of the required contribu-
tions based on the level of the health care in the Netherlands, even though the 
level of health care they would actually receive in their country of residence 
was lower or non-existent. They were essentially paying for care they did not 
receive. 
                                                        
6  Incidentally, the new regime had implications not only for Dutch nationals living in 
another European country, but also for Moroccans, Turks, Cape Verdeans, Tunisians 
and residents of the former Yugoslavia who received benefits or a state pension from 
the Netherlands. 
7  For a discussion of additional practical problems, like the need for a translator when 
visiting a doctor in the public health care system, see Gehring 2016.  
8  According to the chairman of the French wing of the Pensioners Association at the time 
approximately 2,000 out of 35,000 pensioners had chosen to insure additionally for ex-
ceptional medical expenses. 
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Figure III: Fictional Example of contribution to be paid by pensioners abroad 
The contribution consists of: 
a. A non-income-related contribution, equal to the average ‘regular’ non-income-
related contribution to the Health Insurance Act, amounting in 2006 to € 1,106,- per 
year. 
b. An income-related contribution equal to the ‘regular’ income-related contribution 
to the Health Insurance Act, which in 2006 for state pension recipients with an addi-
tional pension is equivalent to a premium of 6.5% over the statutory pension and 
4.4% for the supplementary pension, to be calculated over a ‘contribution income’ up 
to € 30,000,- 
c. An income-related contribution of 70% of the premium for the Exceptional Medi-
cal Expenses Act (AWBZ), amounting in 2006 to approximately 8.8% to be calculat-
ed over a ‘premium income’ up to € 30,000,-  
 
For example: a retired Dutch couple living in Spain, both with a state pension of € 
10,000, and both with a € 20,000,- supplementary pension from a pension fund 
(thereby enjoying a statutory pension from the Netherlands), and no additional in-
come. Total income and assessed income for care allowance: € 60,000,- as far as they 
would be taxable in the Netherlands. Furthermore, suppose they have (Spanish) pri-
vate health insurance for which they pay € 3,000,- premium per year to a package of 
their choice. They are not at present compulsory or optionally AWBZ insured. 
 
Their yearly contribution to CVZ would be: 
a) Annual nominal premium:   
2*1,106 = € 2,200,-  
b) Income-related HIA contribution:  
2*6.5%*10,000 = € 1,300,- & 
2*4,4%*20,000 = € 1,760,- 
c) AWBZ-premium:  
2*8.8%*30,000 = € 5,280,-  
d) Health care benefits:  
None 
Total: € 10,540,-  
Amounting to over 17.5% of their total income and 350% of their former premium.  
 
However, the issue was not only about the increasing financial burden but also 
about people who were in hospital and were suddenly no longer insured – 
people who were receiving medical treatment in the Netherlands were affect-
ed, since it had also been possible for them to receive treatment in the Nether-
lands while privately insured. The new rules meant that they now had to ask 
permission from their local public health insurance abroad whether or not the 
treatment was covered. With the introduction of the new Health Insurance Act, 
these people were effectively excluded from the regular Dutch health insur-
ance system. Although they were legally included in the new Insurance Act, 
they experienced it as follows: They had throughout their life contributed to 
the Dutch solidarity based health care system (by paying taxes), but as of 
2006, while still contributing an income-dependent premium, they could no 
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longer benefit from this solidarity because the interpretation of EU Regulations 
effectively placed them outside the Dutch system. 
B.4  Organizing Opposition 
Immediately after the announcement of the new Health Insurance Act, unrest 
emerged among the large group of expatriate pensioners who were unsure of 
what this change would mean for their situation.9 The real effect of the new 
law became clear when in response virtually all private health insurers unilat-
erally terminated the private insurance policies of people living abroad or re-
placed them with new policies with much higher premiums, leading to unrest 
among the pensioners. 10 The Dutch Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ), 
which had circulated more than 200,000 (different) information leaflets in-
forming people of the upcoming changes, was flooded with phone calls and 
emails from angry pensioners.11 
From this collective outrage grew the idea to unite with the aim of bring-
ing the issue to court. The Association for Representation of Dutch Pensioners 
Abroad (the VBNGB, from here on: the Pensioners Association) “established 
to represent those groups of Dutch pensioners in combating the unlawful con-
sequences of the introduction of the Health Insurance Act, including in legal 
cases against insurance companies and the Dutch government, insofar as they 
cannot be resolved by other means,” became the umbrella organisation for a 
                                                        
9  Evidenced by a stream of questions and comments on the online discussion forum 
launched especially for people living abroad confronted with issues surrounding the 
new Insurance Act.  
http://www.vngsint.com/ [last accessed 15 February 2016], the website is no longer 
available and has been replaced by https://vbngb.eu/ [last accessed 2 November 2017].  
The original forum thread can be found on http://www.zorgwet.info/buitennl/ (the web-
site is no longer updated) [last accessed 2 November 2017] 
10  While some insurers changed existing premiums or offered new ones, some insurers 
cancelled existing contracts outright. However, after pressure from the media and par-
liament most insurers started to offer new insurance policies, often at significantly 
higher premiums. After the first summary process started by the Pensioners Associa-
tion at the end of 2005 – at the direction of the judge – some of these premiums were 
lowered to more reasonable rates. 
11  Even before the administration was well underway 50,000 letters and e-mails from 
concerned Dutch living abroad (especially retirees) were already waiting for a response 
from the CVZ. Two months after the entry into force of the law between 2,800 and 
4,000 appeals were received, later rising to 5,000. The CVZ became overloaded and in 
tens of thousands of cases lagged behind with the timely processing of annual accounts. 
Rapport Ombudsman 2006/300, Zorg(en) in het buitenland, 22 and 30. Available at:  
https://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/onderzoeken/2006/300 [last accessed 2 Novem-
ber 2017]. 
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collection of smaller groups from different countries.12 However, the group of 
people affected by the change in the law was substantial and not everyone 
involved agreed on the most effective approach. Not only were there differ-
ences of opinion on whether the new law should be challenged by lobbying or 
through the courts, even after it was decided to proceed with legal action, there 
were different opinions on the arguments and strategy. Thus several localised 
organisations of pensioners arose, including the Pensioners Association and 
another group, aptly named ‘Second Front’. The Pensioners Association de-
manded, firstly, a right of option to arrange an insurance policy in the country 
of residence or through a custom policy from a Dutch or local insurer, and 
secondly, the abolition of the compulsory AWBZ premium and restoration of 
the ability to insure voluntarily for AWBZ care. The Pensioners Association 
enlisted supporters, and collected money in order to be able to bring the matter 
to court. Supporters were asked to contribute 100 euro to the cause. Due to the 
size of the affected group as well as the general outrage and concern among 
the pensioners, the Pensioners Association was able to muster a significant 
amount of support and resources. 
B.5  Extra-Legal Opposition 
The pensioners were effectively fighting two battles. Firstly, they opposed the 
unilateral termination of their private insurance policies by the insurers and 
objected directly to these insurers. “We are trying to settle the matter amicably, 
but that has not paid off yet”, the president of the Pensioners Association stat-
ed in an interview for a Dutch newspaper.13 Some insurers did not respond to 
complaints by the pensioners at all. One insurer offered a transitional contract 
to continue the policy until the retiree was accepted into the local public health 
insurance scheme. Another offered to continue the insurance at a premium of 
400 euro per month.14 For a pensioner, however, that would have been in addi-
tion to the income-dependent contribution and nominal premiums of the com-
pulsory basic insurance scheme. Financially, this was in no way a solution for 
the pensioners. 
                                                        
12  From the website of the Pensioners Association: http://www.vngsint.com/ [last ac-
cessed 15 February 2016], the website is no longer available and has been replaced by  
https:// vbngb.eu/ [last accessed 2 November 2017]. 
13  ‘Pensionados Dagen hun Zorgverzekeraars’, Het Financieele dagblad, 13 December 
2005. 
14  Amounting to approximately three or four times the amount of the old premiums. 
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The insurers pointed to the new law to justify their actions, relying on the 
Implementing and Adjustment Act15 of the new health care legislation that 
stated that as of January 1st 2006 all Dutch private insurance policies for peo-
ple living abroad would become void. A spokesman for one of the insurance 
companies referred the pensioners to the legislator, considering that the rules 
had changed with the introduction of the new health care system: “It is very 
frustrating for the insured, but we do not feel we are a player here. And we 
think the judge will agree”.16 However, the lawyer for the Pensioners Associa-
tion at that time believed that a lawsuit was more likely to succeed against the 
insurers than against the Ministry of Health. “[The Minister] is not a policy-
holder” and “he has no power over the insurers” he explained his belief that 
liability lay with those holding the pensioners’ insurance policies. Therefore, 
with a lack of acceptable response from the insurers and no expected political 
intervention, a court case was deemed the only option. 
The second fight was against (the effects of) the new legislation altogether, 
with a focus on two elements: first, the so-called ‘treaty entitlement’ that was 
responsible for the main changes in the pensioners’ situation, and second, the 
mandatory premium for the AWBZ. Before and during the legal actions the 
Pensioners Association worked to lobby the political arena in order to repeal, 
delay or amend the new legislation. By putting pressure on both parliament 
and the ministry, they were able to solicit parliamentary questions to the Min-
ister of Health by several MPs. However, the Minister provided few clear an-
swers and left them none the wiser. He did not appear very willing to accom-
modate the pensioners’ concerns. The Minister’s apparent disinterest may in 
part have been a result of the negative image of the pensioners. In the public 
mind, they were generally considered rich retirees enjoying the sun in a coun-
try were life was cheaper, and therefore they had little right to complain. As 
the director of the Pensioners Association states: 
 
“We have a bad image in the Netherlands, people think we’re calculating tax 
evaders. People who want to have it both ways. If reports are made here, you 
always see a shot of two old people in Benidorm and then a white villa and Cava 
drinking people on the edge of a pool. The image in Calvinist Netherlands is that 
we just want to take advantage of the system.”17 
                                                        
15  Article 2.5.2 of the Implementing- and Adjustment Act. 
16  Boom, H. ‘Pensionados Slijpen de Messen’, Het Financieele dagblad, 14 January 
2006. 
17  Pensioners living abroad had become known as ‘Pensionados’, a somewhat derogatory 
nickname for the group of people moving from one (typically Northern) Member State 
to live out their retirement in another (Southern) Member State while receiving statuto-
ry pensions from the former. Within the EU this includes an estimated 100,000 people. 
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The Pensioners Association, together with hundreds of individual complain-
ants, brought the matter to the attention of the Dutch Ombudsman. After inves-
tigation into the implementation of the law, the Ombudsman established that 
the government had failed to foresee the impact the new legislation would 
have for, in particular, the group of formerly privately insured pensioners liv-
ing abroad.18 The report contained descriptions of some striking examples of 
difficult situations in which the pensioners found themselves as a result.19 
B.6  Legal Contestation: From Pillar to Post 
Part of the problem from the outset was the question of who to blame. Health 
insurers terminated private insurance policies but pointed to the new law. The 
responsible Minister had no control over private contracts. Pension funds and 
the Social Security Office (SVB)20 were charged with collecting the contribu-
tions, yet pointed to the CVZ as the responsible agency.21 The CVZ was over-
loaded with complaints due to late and imprecise information and was unable 
to cope with the myriad problems caused by the new Regulations. Because of 
the ambiguity of who was to be held accountable legally, the stream of litiga-
tion followed a somewhat staggered pattern. To be clear, the Pensioners Asso-
ciation was not the only one responsible for court cases. Multiple individual 
cases were started, and as discussed, apart from the Pensioners Association 
there was a second group of pensioners, the ‘Second Front’, who had a differ-
                                                        
18  A conclusion that was later confirmed by an answer of the director of the CVZ to one 
of the complainants, confessing that due to their former focus on the group of people 
that were publicly insured, the CVZ had not been prepared for the problems that would 
occur with the privately insured. Letter published on the Pensioners Association online 
forum: http://www.vngsint.com/ [last accessed 15 February 2016], the website is no 
longer available and has been replaced by https://vbngb.eu/ [last accessed 2 November 
2017]. 
19  Rapport Ombudsman 2006/300, Zorg(en) in het buitenland. Available at:  
https://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/onderzoeken/2006/300 [last accessed 2 Novem-
ber 2017]. 
20  The Social Insurance Bank (SVB) is an independent administrative body in the field of 
social security in the Netherlands. The SVB is responsible for the implementation of 
the state pension AOW, the survivors pension ANW, child benefits and other provi-
sions. 
21  An open letter (dated June 9th 2006) by several pension funds to Minister Hoogervorst 
is testament to the similar discontent with the chaotic state of affairs resulting from the 
new Act among these organizations that were effectively tasked with the implementa-
tion of the new legislation. Letter published on the Pensioners Association online fo-
rum: http://www. vngsint.com/ [last accessed 15 February 2016], the website is no 
longer available and has been replaced by https://vbngb.eu/ [last accessed 2 November 
2017]. 
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ent legal approach to the claims. The focus of this analysis is on the actions 
taken by the Pensioners Association, and where relevant I will mention the 
other litigants.  
Pensioners v. Private Insurers 
Even before the new law went into effect the first summary proceedings were 
started in December 2005 against the insurance companies’ decision to unilat-
erally cancel existing insurance policies. On behalf of thousands of pensioners 
in Spain, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus, 
with the aim of continuing the current insurance, it was claimed that insurers 
could not unilaterally terminate private policies, and that it was unfair for the 
insurers to charge exorbitant new premiums while coverage remained the 
same. The relief judge ruled in favour of the insurers stating that because the 
new Insurance Act contained a provision which stipulated that all existing 
contracts had been terminated, the insurers’ hands were in effect tied. Howev-
er, the new premiums offered by the insurers were considered to be indeed 
exorbitant, and the judge instructed the insurers to offer more reasonable pre-
miums.22 
Pensioners v. Ministry of Health 
Early in 2006, the Pensioners Association initiated summary proceedings 
against the state, represented by the Ministry of Health, with the aim of getting 
the new Health Insurance Act declared void. In order to achieve this aim, they 
hired two new lawyers, a former employee of the legal department of the Eu-
ropean Commission and specialist in tax law and free movement, and a repeat 
player before the ECJ, a lawyer specialised in EU and Dutch competition law 
and EU law who had pleaded before the ECJ in over fifty preliminary refer-
ence procedure cases and over thirty direct actions.  
They claimed firstly, a right of option to arrange an insurance policy in the 
country of residence or through a special policy from a Dutch insurer, and not 
the required registration with the CVZ and local public health system in the 
country of residence. Secondly, they demanded an exemption from AWBZ 
premiums because in a majority of countries no such AWBZ care existed. The 
Pensioners Association argued inter alia that Articles 18 and 39 of the EC 
Treaty (now 21 and 45 TFEU) on the freedom of movement of people and 
workers had been violated, by charging all pensioners residing outside the 
Netherlands a premium that did not in any way reflect the (lower) cost of 
                                                        
22  Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage 30 December 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AU8874. 
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health care in the state of residence. This created a disparity between the con-
tributions charged to the pensioners and the amounts to be paid by the Dutch 
State to the other Member States for the care provided. 
On March 31st 2006, the relief judge of the District Court in The Hague 
gave a verdict.23 Their first claim, the right of option to voluntary insurance, 
was rejected. However, according to the judge the general principle of equality 
in conjunction with Articles 18 and 39 EC had been violated with a ‘high de-
gree of likelihood’. Therefore, it was not justified to levy the same contribu-
tions from all Dutch pensioners resident abroad separate from the lump sums 
their resident countries charged the Netherlands. The law thus infringed the 
general principle of equality because different situations were treated equal-
ly.24 With regard to the AWBZ, the court held that the contributions of the 
pensioners should not exceed what the Netherlands had to pay the country of 
residence. The judge instructed the Minister to change the implementation 
regulation accordingly. On April 27th 2006, the Minister informed parliament 
that the Act had been changed retroactively from January 1st 2006 onwards. 
The most important change was that the contribution was now based on the 
average cost of care for the social health insurance in the country of residence, 
in relation to the average health care costs of health insurance in the Nether-
lands. This was also known as the ‘state of residence factor’.25 This differentia-
tion was introduced in the contribution. In general, this would mean that most 
of the insured would pay a lower contribution.26 Since this judgment was only 
preliminary in that these were summary proceedings27 one prerequisite the 
relief judge added to the judgment was that the Pensioners Association submit 
an application for court proceedings to be brought regarding the main action.  
                                                        
23  Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage 31 March 2006, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2006:AV7778. 
24  According to the Ministry’s own calculations the amounts paid to different Member 
States differed considerably: Belgium € 3,450,- per person annually; France € 3,667,-; 
Latvia € 179,-; Luxembourg € 4,510,-; Spain € 2,586,-. 
25  The Pensioners Association concurred with the principle of ‘country of residence fac-
tor’ but not the calculation method, which compared the average cost of care for the en-
tire population in the country of residence to those costs in the Netherlands. According 
to the Pensioners Association the comparison should have been made for the group 
over sixty-five years of age. 
26  The already overburdened CVZ was tasked with refunding the excessively charged 
contributions. The monitor reports of 12 and 30 June 2006 contain a detailed descrip-
tion of the problems that the CVZ received with respect to the deductions at the SVB, 
UWV and private pension funds. 
27  Formally, a judgment in summary proceedings is only an interim order, for which the 
court has mainly considered the immediate interests of the parties and to a lesser degree 
the legal subtleties of the law at issue. 
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Pensioners v. CVZ 
The Social Insurance Bank (SVB), charged with levying the contributions, 
began deducting them from state pensions in January 2006 and announced that 
any objections should be directed to the CVZ. The SVB itself received over 
5,000 such objections. After several unsuccessful complaints to both the SVB 
and CVZ, two groups of plaintiffs ended up before the Council of State.28 
Apart from the Pensioners Association there was also the aforementioned ‘Se-
cond Front’. As mentioned, the Pensioners Association and the Second Front 
had differing legal approaches. The former based its claim mainly on a viola-
tion of the basic principles of Community law (non-discrimination and free-
dom of movement), the latter particularly on the national texts underlying the 
levied contributions. 
Following consultations between the lawyers, the CVZ and Council of 
State a number of cases were selected and test proceedings were initiated for 
the entire group. In a controversial ruling on April 25th 2007, the Council of 
State declared29 that all concerns were understood as being directed towards a 
letter, sent in December of 2005, in which the CVZ had informed stakeholders 
that they had the right to care in accordance with European rules, that the 
Netherlands was liable for the costs and that the pensioners therefore had to 
pay contributions. The relevant provisions of Regulation 1408/71, according to 
the Council of State, were derived directly from the Regulation and therefore 
the letter from the CVZ had no legal effect. That meant that all (seven) cases 
were deemed inadmissible. Simply stated, they should have waited for the first 
payment claim in order to be able to appeal, an understandably frustrating 
result for the pensioners after six months of waiting. 
In response to this judgment, the SVB sent letters to the pensioners stating, 
“your objection is unfounded because this is not a decision”. New appeals 
were lodged, this time at the Amsterdam District Court. Contrary to the deci-
sion by the Council of State, this court ruled that these letters were in fact deci-
sions with legal effect and that the appeals were grounded, therefore the SVB 
was ordered to make new decisions, which it did, stating that the pensioners 
had no right of option and that the new system was compulsory. As expected, 
new appeals were lodged against this decision. 
                                                        
28  Under the Health Insurance Act at that time, derogating from the General Administra-
tive Law (AWB), appeal could only be lodged with the Administrative Jurisdiction Di-
vision of the Council of State.  
29  Raad van State 25 April 2007, ECLI:NL:RVS:2007:BA3743. 
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The Road to the ECJ 
By now, faith in the Dutch legal system had diminished significantly among 
the pensioners and the Pensioners Association chose to start administrative 
proceedings against the CVZ,30 with the aim of possibly getting the case re-
ferred to the ECJ. As the chairman of the Pensioners Association concluded: 
“The Dutch administrative court is only there to give citizens the idea that they 
have access to justice, but in reality has to make sure that the government is 
always vindicated.” The hope was that the ECJ would be less lenient towards 
the Dutch legislature and would give a more objective and therefore favoura-
ble judgment. The Pensioners Association, together with their lawyer, had 
selected several suitable cases on which to litigate. They chose appellants that 
most clearly showed what the consequences of the new law were in the various 
countries and who could serve as prototypes of how people had been affect-
ed.31 
The claimants, all Dutch nationals resident in other EU Member States 
(Belgium, Spain, France and Malta), were entitled to either a pension under the 
state pension scheme or benefits under the Dutch Disability Insurance (WAO). 
Prior to January 1st 2006, they had insurance contracts with private insurance 
companies established in the Netherlands or in other Member States. On the 
same January 1st 2006, these contracts with providers in the Netherlands had 
been terminated in accordance with the New Insurance Act. Of those among 
them who had concluded such an agreement with a provider established in 
another Member State, however, the agreement remained intact. The appeal by 
the claimants was based on the argument that Articles 28 and 28bis of Regula-
tion No 1408/71 did not contain binding rules for determining the applicable 
legislation on the basis of which they were automatically subject to the system 
of benefits of the Member State of residence. They considered, rather, that 
they could choose either to register with the competent institution of the state 
of residence, in order to receive benefits in that state, or, if they did not register 
with that institution, to take out private insurance. In the latter case, since the 
cost of the benefits had not been borne by an institution of that state, the Mem-
                                                        
30  Because of the large number of complaints and appeals that were filed against the 
actions taken by the CVZ, the SVB and also by private pension funds (who were or-
dered by the CVZ to deduct the contributions from pensions and benefits) an amend-
ment to the new legislation was made (August 2008) that formally considered all these 
actions a decision by the CVZ against which appeal was possible before the adminis-
trative courts. Wijziging van de Zorgverzekeringswet in verband met de rechtsgang bij 
inhouding van de bijdrage van verdragsgerechtigden (rechtsgang bronheffing ver-
dragsgerechtigden), Kamerstukken 2007/2008, 31377, 1-9. 
31  The eventual reference to the ECJ would include other individual litigants that had 
filed a similar appeal. 
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ber State responsible for payment of the pension could not deduct a contribu-
tion under Article 33 of that Regulation. Three appellants had registered at the 
CVZ (‘under protest’ as one of them stated). The three others had refused to 
register. By decisions taken during 2006 and 2007, the CVZ nonetheless de-
ducted contributions from their pensions. In judgments of January 31st and 
December 17th 2008, the Amsterdam District Court had dismissed the actions 
brought by the appellants. They appealed their case before the Central Appeals 
Tribunal (CRvB), which in late August 2009 (almost four years after the im-
plementation of the new legislation) decided to refer two questions to the ECJ 
about the compatibility of the Dutch scheme with the European rules.32 This 
was a welcome development for the Pensioners Association that had pressed 
for a referral, since they felt, after the many attempts and disappointments they 
had had up until then, that the Dutch system was not in their favour. 
Substantively, the Court was asked to consider whether the new Dutch leg-
islation was compatible with Regulation 1408/71 (on the application of social 
security schemes), the point stressed by the ‘Second Front’, and with Article 
21 TFEU (freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens).33 In its judg-
ment of October 2010, the Court ruled that the European rules (Regulation 
1408/71) must be interpreted as meaning that the Dutch legislation did not 
violate its terms. On Article 21 TFEU, the point stressed by the Pensioners 
Association, it decided, however, that it must it be interpreted as “precluding 
such national legislation in so far as it induces or provides for […] an unjusti-
fied difference of treatment between residents and non-residents as regards 
ensuring the continuity of the overall protection against the risk of sickness 
enjoyed by them under insurance contracts concluded before the entry into 
force of that legislation”. This unjustified difference in treatment was for the 
national court to establish. In its judgment, the ECJ instructed the CRvB on the 
relevant elements it had to take into account:  
 
1.  Were private insurance contracts by residents, on the basis of the law of 
2006, also terminated?; 
2.  Has that termination had the same effect for residents and non-residents?; 
                                                        
32  The Pensioners Association argued for priority treatment given the vulnerability of the 
complainants due to their old age and, at the request of the CRvB, the Court decided to 
treat the matter as a priority case, which resulted in a relatively quick judgment in Oc-
tober 2010. 
33  The argument brought forward by appellants, that their situation also fell within the 
scope of Article 45 TFEU on the freedom of movement for workers, was thrown out by 
the Court. It considered that since the appellants in question had migrated to another 
Member State after they had reached retirement age the freedom of movement for 
workers could not apply.  
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3.  Were the insurance companies obligated to accept non-residents?; 
4.  Have the insurance companies undertaken actions, at the request of the 
Dutch government, to ensure that the overall coverage was maintained af-
ter 2006, and if so applied that commitment only to residents or also to 
non-residents?  
Returning from the ECJ 
Although the ECJ wasn’t the competent court to give a final verdict on this 
matter, the pensioners and their lawyer considered it clear that the ECJ had 
concluded that they had been discriminated against. They were supported in 
their conviction by the fact that the representative of the Netherlands before 
the ECJ, in response to questions by the judges had admitted that “at no point 
had the Dutch government considered the consequences of the introduction of 
the new Dutch Health Insurance Act would have for the so-called ‘treaty-
entitled’”. In anticipation of the CRvB’s concurring conclusion, their lawyer 
had therefore already sent a letter holding the Minister accountable and thus 
liable for any damages the pensioners had suffered due to the introduction of 
the Health Insurance Act. An offer was made to reach a settlement. After a 
negative response by the Minister, the Dutch Ombudsman was requested to 
intervene in the matter. The Ombudsman subsequently, in a detailed letter to 
the Minister (March 4th 2011) once again reiterated his concern for the pen-
sioners’ problems and implored the Minister to consult with the Pensioners 
Association in order to resolve the matter.  
The crux of the subsequent oral argument of the attorney before the CRvB 
was, therefore, that the discrimination was uncontested and that the only ques-
tion remaining was the consequence of this determination for the contested 
decisions by the CVZ. The answer to this question was, according to the law-
yer, that the contested decisions must be annulled, despite the fact that the 
Court had held that the deductions of contributions by the CVZ were in them-
selves not contrary to EU law. However, in its judgment of December 13th 
2011, the CRvB decided that the alleged difference in treatment between resi-
dents and non-residents – constituting discrimination – did not exist. First, it 
established that under Dutch legislation no difference in treatment arose since 
both residents and non-residents retained minimum coverage. Neither did it 
see a demonstrable difference in treatment between residents and non-residents 
triggered by the Dutch government or, with its cooperation, by the Dutch-
based insurance companies. In its judgment the CRvB included the phrase:  
 
“That in hindsight perhaps there has been a degree of administrative naivety, does 
not mean that the Court finds that it has been the deliberate intention of the Dutch 
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government to treat residents and non-resident treaty beneficiaries (unjustifiably) 
different.” 
 
These final considerations in this, in the words of their lawyer, “inexplicable” 
verdict led to understandable agitation among the pensioners. According to the 
chairman of the Pensioners Association this left them feeling like:  
 
“Don Quichote fighting against the Dutch windmills. This means that if the Dutch 
state is doing something bad to its citizens, one can say, ‘This has been naive and 
as long as you cannot prove that there was intent, they did not act against the 
law’.” 
 
After losing their battles, the Pensioners Association turned to the European 
Court of Human Rights, contesting the final decision by the CRvB and arguing 
inter alia that the termination of their insurance contracts in 2006 constituted a 
violation of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under 
Article 1 Protocol Nr. 1 of the ECHR. The Court did not concur and, moreo-
ver, confirmed in part the conclusion by the CRvB that residents and non-
residents were not in a similar situation and that therefore this was not a case 
of discrimination.34 
B.7  Effects of the Legal Contest 
After an extended struggle, numerous courts, and even after activation of the 
ECJ, the Dutch Ombudsman and the ECtHR, the endeavour left the pensioners 
with a bitter sense of injustice. As summarised in a fact sheet for their mem-
bers entitled ‘the lawsuit that could not be won’:  
 
“The government’s so-called naivety liberated the Netherlands from all those ex-
pensive retirees, and donated the tens of millions reserved for us on the balance 
sheets of the insurance companies to those same companies. […] The court’s 
judgment completely undermines confidence in administrative law that should 
give the citizen the opportunity to subject government wrongdoing to judicial 
scrutiny. In this way it translates into an institute that intends to convince the 
citizen that the state is always right.”  
 
One small success the pensioners did manage to obtain was the establishment, 
also through court interference, of the so-called ‘country of residence factor’ 
                                                        
34  ECHR Decision of 23 October 2012 in Ramaer and van Willigen v the Netherlands, 
Application Nr. 34880/12, at 80. 
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within the health insurance scheme. This led to premium reductions for most 
of the pensioners living abroad. The residence factor affects the basic monthly 
premium that is deducted in the Netherlands on the pensions paid. This ad-
justment is based on the care package that the pensioner is receiving in the 
public provision of care in his or her country of residence. A calculation by the 
Pensioners Association shows that over the period 2006 to 2013 individual 
savings were achieved for their constituents of up to 31,000 euro for the ‘treaty 
entitled’ with a maximum deduction and 9,000 euro in savings for the married 
retirement beneficiary. In addition, they obtained the so-called ‘country of 
pension care’ whereby ‘treaty entitled’ pensioners remained entitled at all 
times to access to the basic service of the Dutch health care system. Although 
these partial victories alleviated the financial burden, it did not change the fact 
that most pensioners were no longer able to enjoy the health care of their 
choice. They lost the ability to go to their own, local, Dutch private physician 
or the fully equipped private clinics and were forced to go to the local public 
hospitals.  
Through its efforts fighting the new Dutch health care system, the Pen-
sioners Association developed to become a central source of information, sup-
port and representation for pensioners living abroad. It established itself as a 
permanent interlocutor of the Care Institute Netherlands (formerly CVZ), and 
therefore acquired a permanent voice to advocate the interests of all its mem-
bers at earlier stages of political development. Their legal efforts also contin-
ued against other Dutch policies that affected their members. In subsequent 
proceedings, the Pensioners Association was successful with litigation against 
the withholding of the purchasing power allowance (KOB), which included 
complaints to the European Commission resulting in infringement proceedings 
being lodged against the Netherlands. While the Netherlands appealed in na-
tional proceedings, it decided to reverse the decision when the European 
Commission announced infringement proceedings.35 This resulted in a full 
refund, including interest of all withheld payments.36  
B.8  Collective Mobilisation 
The pensioners (unlike the group of migrants affected by the fees increase: 
Case Study C) were able to self-organise and raise the needed financial capital 
within their own group, although they did have the challenge of mobilising in 
                                                        
35  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-140_en.htm [last accessed 2 November 
2017]. 
36  As of February 2015 this compensation has been abolished altogether. 
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an ad hoc fashion. The effect of the amendment to the Dutch Insurance Act 
was directly and for all, and the consternation it brought about made the mobi-
lisation and organization of the interests of this group of people easier by ef-
fectively creating a constituency around the issue. The size of the group sup-
porting the legal battle meant that they had a substantial number of members 
with legal expertise and organizational skills, as well as considerable potential 
for financial support from their members. The large group of affected pension-
ers also meant that they had a pool of cases to select from and litigate on. Test 
cases were chosen on the basis of the best context. The group made use of the 
social and financial capital that existed among their members. In contrast to 
the migrants who were represented by the IOT, members of this group were 
generally more affluent, as evidenced by the amount of capital that they man-
aged to collect and individuals with social capital who were present among this 
group; including a former Minister of Finance and former vice-president of the 
European Commission. This social capital helped them in mobilising other 
institutional actors like the European Commission and the Dutch Ombudsman. 
Among the members that got involved in the discussions on the Pensioners 
Association’s online forum were trained lawyers, former tax advisors and no-
taries. This available capital contributed to their ability to organize opposition 
to the policy themselves. 
However, the size of the group of affected pensioners also opened the door 
for dissenting opinions about the legal approach and splinter groups who took 
their own approach. These findings corroborate conclusions in legal mobilisa-
tion research that a larger constituency and mandate of any interest group in-
creases the difficulty of reaching the necessary consensus over a relatively 
specific set of preferred policy outcomes for longer periods of time.37 While 
mobilising the group around the issue was relatively easy, reaching consensus 
on the strategy to be followed proved to be more difficult, as was illustrated by 
the aforementioned ‘Second Front’, and some individuals who chose to litigate 
on their own.  
B.9  Assigning Blame and Finding The Right Forum 
The staggered nature of the trajectory of the pensioners’ efforts to fight the 
new health care policies through the courts can be explained by the complex 
collection of applicable national and European rules and regulations. The sit-
uation was further complicated by the interposition of insurance companies 
and the problem of assigning blame. Insurers were effectively ‘burdened’ with 
                                                        
37  Bouwen & McCown 2007, 429.  
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the difficulties resulting from the implementation of the new Dutch health care 
law, and were therefore not very indulgent, invariably pointing to the govern-
ment. The ‘administrative naivety’ in the design and implementation of the 
new law meant that for a long time it remained unclear to whom the pensioners 
should turn with their grievances, both in terms of complaints and legal contes-
tation. This resulted in a long line of failed litigation efforts, increasing the 
need for organisation. After the unsatisfactory trials within the Dutch legal 
system, the desire for review by the ECJ grew among the pensioners, with the 
expectation of a more independent, and therefore positive, judgment. Although 
the pensioners felt the ECJ judgment vindicated their claim, it left the real 
determination up to the Dutch court, which eventually left them empty-handed. 
The long road and perseverance of the pensioners is illustrated by the fact 
that the Pensioners Association, after the disappointing ruling of the CRvB 
also undertook another attempt at the ECtHR, again without success. That the 
pensioners were earnest in their battle is also evident from their legal assis-
tance. Despite the considerable ‘in-house’ expertise, for the legal part they 
chose the ‘hired gun’ and opted for the help of a well-regarded lawyer with 
significant experience in litigating before the ECJ. This did, of course, increase 
the costs incurred by the group since in this case it was not a matter of pro 
bono work. The total costs for the Pensioners Association was estimated to be 
up to 600,000 euro. All this taken together meant a steep hill and long contest 
for the pensioners, of whom many did not see the end of it. As one of the liti-
gants involved concluded cynically: “Old people tend to die out.” 
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6 Lawyering Eurolaw 
6.1  Introduction 
The European legal system, which combines both centralised enforcement by 
the vigilance and supervision of the European Commission with a decentralised 
form of enforcement through national courts, relies to a significant extent on the 
responsiveness of the European polity. The effective application of EU law can-
not be ensured by the European Union and the ECJ alone. It depends strongly on 
domestic courts and citizens that initiate proceedings before these courts to en-
force their rights. When it comes to signalling possible infringements and stimu-
lating the application of EU rules and principles, a large part of this responsibil-
ity falls into the hands of legal practitioners that use and invoke these rules in 
assisting their clients in national legal proceedings. The previous chapters have 
given first indications of the characteristics that are inherent in preliminary ref-
erences from the perspective of the litigant, and how individual cases may con-
ceal more collective interests behind litigation. These observations give rise to 
further investigation into other actors involved in the mobilisation of EU law 
through preliminary references. Effective advocacy, an element that can ‘make 
or break’ a case is important for the application of law, especially in the creation 
of new jurisprudence. The perspective of legal practitioners in preliminary refer-
ence cases is therefore the focus of this chapter.  
The litigants that fall within the ‘individual’ category are, with the exception 
of those acting as a ‘straw man’ for organised third parties, prototypical one-
shotters. Galanter described the legal service provider as a possible remedy to 
the structurally disadvantaged position of the individual one-shotter: “The exist-
ence of a specialized bar on the one-shotter side should overcome the gap in 
expertise, allow some economies of scale, provide for bargaining commitment 
and personal familiarity. But,” he adds, “this is short of overcoming the funda-
mental strategic advantages of repeat players – their capacity to structure the 
transaction, play the odds, and influence rule-development and enforcement 
policy.”1 Lawyers, themselves in many respects repeat players in the legal sys-
tem, can compensate for the individual litigant’s lack of legal capital and their 
presence in legal proceedings may influence judicial outcomes.2 Lawyers with 
their professional experience and expertise can make up for the disadvantages 
one-shotters have, especially in having only episodic encounters with the legal 
system. By knowing their way around the court and court procedures, legal aid 
                                                        
1  Galanter 1974, 308. 
2  McGuire 1995. 
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providers may provide a counterbalance to the structural disadvantage of one-
shotters. As one of the advantages of lawyers as repeat players, McGuire has 
pointed to their closeness to the judiciary and their familiarity with the prefer-
ences and ‘modus operandi’ of courts and judges.3 When we look at individuals 
in the European legal system, it is thus important to look at the extent to which 
their relatively disadvantaged position is offset by the presence of a lawyer or 
other form of legal support.    
Based on interviews with lawyers that have assisted litigants in preliminary 
reference procedures, the next section focuses on the ways in which practition-
ers4 deal with preliminary references and analyses the challenges of a procedure 
most of them encounter for the very first time. The aim of this chapter is to give 
insight into the context within which legal practitioners have to work on prelim-
inary reference cases, the kinds of issues that arise from peculiarities of the pro-
cedure, the options lawyers have for dealing with these matters and the consid-
erations that play a role in this respect. Where Chapter 5 focused on lawyers 
actively aiming to employ preliminary references, the following paragraphs will 
zoom in specifically on the preliminary references from the perspective of prac-
titioners who were not pushing for, but instead were confronted with a reference 
to the ECJ.  
6.2  Lawyers and References: Allocating Effects in Eurolaw Expertise 
From a judicial review perspective, the preliminary reference procedure can 
have far-reaching consequences for legal dynamics both nationally and in the 
EU. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the fact that such influ-
ence is being exerted strategically and with the deliberate aim of changing poli-
cies is not self-evident. In a significant portion of the cases, a reference to the 
ECJ comes as a surprise, regardless of whether or not EU law arguments have 
been used. Earlier research has focused on familiarity with and experience of the 
procedure among national judges, with differing but overall not all too promis-
ing results. National judges seem to lack the necessary knowledge of EU law or 
they appear simply unwilling to refer.5 This study provides the opportunity to 
see how this plays out among lawyers and their clients. 
As concluded in Chapter 4, when it comes to preliminary references, there is 
an important distinction to be made between proactive and reactive litigation. In 
over 60% of the cases studied, the parties made no active effort to push for a 
                                                        
3  McGuire 1995. 
4  The practitioners that are discussed in this chapter include both lawyers and non-lawyers, 
like tax advisors; therefore I use the term practitioner to cover both groups. 
5  Jaremba 2013; European Parliament 2007b.  
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reference. This is in itself an important observation about the (non-)purpose-
fulness behind references to the ECJ, but it also has important repercussions for 
the way legal practitioners (can) work a case once it is referred. When the deci-
sion to refer cannot be ascribed to pressure from the litigating party, it is less 
likely that the lawyer in question has any particular expertise in either EU law or 
preliminary references. Legal practitioners that have worked on a case that has 
reached the ECJ through a preliminary reference belong to a very select group. 
When considering that judges in the Netherlands – a country with a total case-
load in the tens of thousands and one of the Member States with the highest 
number of references to the ECJ every year6 – still only make some thirty refer-
ences annually,7 participating in this procedure is a rare experience.8 For many it 
will happen only once in their entire career. By the very nature of preliminary 
ruling proceedings, the uncertainty of referrals and the multiplicity of subjects 
and legal disciplines, the collection of legal practitioners in the cases at hand can 
therefore hardly be considered homogeneous. In many respects these practition-
ers share only the fact that they have participated in these proceedings. The prac-
titioners interviewed thus include both lawyers from larger legal firms (especial-
ly in tax law) as well as many one-man offices. The one striking general charac-
teristic among them is that the vast majority is not specialised in EU law.  
Some lawyers do advertise their experience with litigating before the ECJ, 
but for most this is a form of post hoc advertisement of broadened expertise after 
they have had one case before the Court, rather than actually profiling them-
selves as experienced ‘Eurolawyers’. The main exceptions are law firms that 
specifically profile themselves as Eurolawyers, even for individual claimants, 
specifically targeting their services at certain societal groups or professions with 
distinct (usually cross-border) characteristics. Such groups are likely to come 
into contact with EU law in ways that might lead to judicial procedures, e.g. 
cross-border workers or migrating pensioners. Of the lawyers directly assisting 
clients in preliminary references, only one had a record of acting before the ECJ. 
This particular lawyer had acted, among others, on behalf of larger associations 
of farmers, but mainly on behalf of government agencies9 in over fifty prelimi-
                                                        
6  See Appendix B for numbers of references according to Member State. 
7  On average twenty-eight references were made annually by the Dutch judiciary in the 
period between 2003-2012. Statistics available at:  
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-04/192685_2012_6020_cdj 
_ra_2012_en_proof_01.pdf. [last accessed 10 September 2017]. 
8  According to statistics from the Dutch Bar Association, the Netherlands has over 17,000 
active lawyers. This number does not include the legal practitioners like tax advisors 
(over 11,000) who may also act as counsel in preliminary reference cases. 
9  In particular de Sociale Verzekeringsbank (the agency responsible for national insurance 
schemes in the Netherlands).  
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nary reference procedure cases and over thirty direct actions (of which over ten 
were appealed before the ECJ) over the course of twenty-five years.  
The majority of lawyers in this study admitted to having no previous experi-
ence in EU law beyond a general familiarity, before their case was referred to 
the ECJ. This included all cases where the referral was not the aim of the liti-
gants or their counsel; but even in cases where lawyers were pressing for a ref-
erence some of them underlined their relative inexperience going in. On the 
micro level, an unexpected referral to the ECJ can create different challenges for 
lawyers, especially since they are not prepared for a reference, nor do they gen-
erally possess the expertise or experience to work a case at the level of the ECJ. 
The next sections deal with the practical aspects of a reference that may hamper 
practitioners in their effective advocacy. 
6.3  Allocating Resources 
One of the major challenges for lawyers related to preliminary references is the 
extra time that is involved when working a case after reference to the ECJ. The 
amount of time spent by a lawyer on the reference part of any single case varies 
considerably, ranging from no additional work done up to many work days. The 
extra hours involved in preparation of a reference does not fall within a lawyer’s 
regular day-to-day practice. Initially, the time consumption can increase by the 
simple fact that the procedure is different from what they are used to. Apart 
from the substantive legal work, a reference comes with its own timeline, its 
own rules of procedure and requirements. Even before dealing with the intrica-
cies of EU law, these practitioners are thus confronted with procedural require-
ments with which they are unfamiliar. One lawyer specialised in social security 
describes the extra time involved in the minutiae related to a reference case: 
 
“Whether it’s all really efficient working hours, I don’t know. The procedural 
documents, with the gathering of attachments on a Sunday afternoon, and copying 
six-fold so that it can be at the Court in time. And then discover that formal deadline 
is on Monday and then think, shit, I need someone today that makes sure it’s there 
tomorrow. Well, and then you are here all day. Coming in the office early in the 
morning and leaving in the evening at about eight or nine. Simply because, you 
don’t know it, it’s all new, a new kind of stress. It all just takes more time.” 
 
If part of their network, lawyers turn to colleagues with previous experience 
with preliminary references for help. However, with the scarcity of references 
this is not a large pool from which to choose. Some, being unfamiliar with the 
preliminary reference procedure, unaware of the way such cases are dealt with 
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and without help from their network decide to simply await the answers by the 
ECJ: 
 
“At the time we wondered whether anyone in our office had litigated before the 
ECJ. Well, that was not the case. So we did not know how that works. And so, if 
you do not know, we do know how to go to the Supreme Court, in tax cases. Where 
the Supreme Court just considers whether the Appeals Court erred in law. And if so, 
then it’ll be referred back. And if not so then you’re finished. And now we have 
questions that go to the ECJ. So we did, not knowing how to react, decide to act as if 
we went to the Supreme Court. So in that sense to do nothing and wait for how the 
Court would answer the questions.” 
 
The difference in the amount of time lawyers spend on references is in large part 
dependent upon the complexity of the case as well as the nature of the questions 
that are referred to the ECJ. The preliminary questions can be the result of ar-
guments presented in the national court that cast doubt on the interpretation of 
certain EU legislation. The substantive argumentation that is built before the 
national court then in large part coincides with the way in which a case is advo-
cated before the ECJ. In these cases, practitioners choose to do little more than 
adjust their main written arguments to the format of the ECJ, and possibly ex-
pand on certain arguments brought forward in national proceedings. In other 
cases, the central questions that lie at the basis of a referral involve much more 
complex combinations of national rules, EU legislation, ECJ jurisprudence, as 
well as written observations by the European Commission and possibly multiple 
Member States. In such a case, a lawyer may wish to respond to these observa-
tions during the oral stage of a case. This can require a whole new line of argu-
ments aimed at taking a position on the specific matter dealt with in the refer-
ence, which may be a significant side-track from the arguments brought forth in 
the main proceedings. In such cases lawyers spend several full working weeks 
merely preparing the written part of the proceedings, and more hours on the 
remainder of the procedure. Especially for the one-man offices that do not have 
as much flexibility in allocating their resources this creates a challenge. As one 
lawyer states: 
 
“You don’t want to know how many hours I put into this case, it really is a lot. [...] 
Especially on appeal, I have spent a lot of time. It really became a matter of 
principle. That’s when I really wanted the case to go on. I think I’ve put 700 hours 
into in. Do I exaggerate? If you look at the whole process, definitely not.” 
 
A preliminary reference thus adds an element of complexity that forces practi-
tioners to spend more time on a case than they in many instances had anticipat-
ed. Since most clients in the individual cases are not financially capable of pay-
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ing such an increase in cost, the extra time lawyers put into it often occurs essen-
tially pro bono. Litigants in that respect are significantly dependent upon the 
goodwill of their lawyer for pleading their case before the ECJ. And due to the 
limited financial resources of most litigants, soliciting expertise from a lawyer 
specialised in EU law and experienced in pleading before the ECJ is not an op-
tion. 
There is only one exception, which in many respects proves the rule that for 
most litigants switching to specialised counsel after referral to the ECJ is largely 
financially unfeasible. A specialist, with twenty-five years of experience in liti-
gating before the ECJ (as described above), was hired by the association that 
acted on behalf of a large group of pensioners that opposed a change in the 
Dutch health insurance regime (Case Study B). The association was able to mo-
bilise significant support and financial contributions from their members, which 
made it possible for them to cover the accompanying costs of specialised coun-
sel. The majority of litigants did not enjoy such an advantage and were therefore 
not in a position to consider switching counsel or hiring experts.  
6.4  Going to Luxembourg 
All preliminary cases include a written stage, in which parties to the proceed-
ings, as well as privileged actors like the European Commission and Member 
States, may submit their written observations. Within the written procedure there 
is no opportunity to respond to the observations filed by other parties. The only 
opportunity for parties to react to these positions is during the oral proceedings, 
requiring the counsellors to make a trip to Luxembourg.10 The extra costs in-
volved in a preliminary procedure thus includes both the additional work that 
goes into the reference part of the proceedings, as well as the cost involved with 
a trip to Luxembourg if the parties choose to participate in the oral proceedings. 
Participation in the oral proceedings as such thus becomes a financial considera-
tion. In a regular private practice the financial burden of the added hours, and 
additional expenses, will be charged to the client. These cases involve individual 
litigants, and unless third parties financially back them, such additional costs are 
not easily covered. In such cases, lawyers have to come to an agreement with 
their client about the amount they will charge. This generally results in two pos-
sible outcomes. Either the decision is made to stick with the written observations 
                                                        
10  Not every case includes an oral stage. The rules of procedure of the ECJ allow the oral 
procedure to be dispensed with unless one of the litigants or, an interested party taking 
part in the procedure has lodged a request for a hearing to be held, giving the reasons for 
which that litigant or interested party wishes to be heard. Article 59 of the Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. 
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and forego the possibility of participating in the oral proceedings, or the lawyers 
charge only a minor amount or even none of the costs related to the trip to Lux-
embourg and pick up the bill themselves. In only one instance the client insisted 
on going to Luxembourg and was willing and/or able to pay the additional 
costs.11 Where these costs are considered too high, clients and their counsel may 
choose to forego their chance to plead their case before the ECJ, and with it the 
chance to respond to the observations of both the opposing party as well as other 
intervening parties.  
A similar dilemma occurred for one litigant who had chosen to represent 
himself in court. Due to procedural rules he would have required a lawyer in 
order to be able to plead his case in Luxembourg: 
 
“As a citizen you can basically do tax cases by yourself, so you don’t have to have a 
lawyer. [But] if you want to plead before the Supreme Court, to plead orally, you 
need a lawyer. You are not allowed to do that yourself. European law says that when 
it comes to pleading the treatment in the European Court always depends on how it 
is regulated in the Netherlands. So when you need a lawyer at the Supreme Court, 
you also need a lawyer to plead before the European Court. I thought that was also 
very frustrating and unfortunate.”  
 
The frustration was such that he reconsidered hiring a lawyer. However, after 
consulting a law firm on the estimated cost of getting someone up to speed on 
the details of his case and the additional costs of the trip to Luxembourg ran in 
the tens of thousands of euros, he abandoned the idea, foregoing the possibility 
of pleading his case in Luxembourg. 
When individuals are backed by third parties with more financial means this 
is, of course, less of an obstacle. As the selection for this study included only 
individual litigants, a large number of them were eligible for subsidized legal 
aid. In cases financed through legal aid, similar but also different financial con-
siderations play a role. The next section deals with the importance as well as 
difficulties of legal aid schemes with respect to preliminary references. 
6.5  Legal Aid and References 
A large portion of the legal practitioners, especially those working in the areas 
of asylum, migration and social security, practice so-called social advocacy, 
assisting people who cannot afford a lawyer. They help clients who receive sup-
                                                        
11  In other cases, where clients insisted on attending the hearing, third parties, like a union 
or an interest group, covered the costs and the individuals themselves did thus not incur 
additional costs. 
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port from the government for financing their legal actions, the so-called subsi-
dized legal aid. The importance of legal aid increases when one’s case is re-
ferred to the ECJ. References in general mean more work than planned. And as 
previously discussed, the relative complexity of such cases in comparison to 
practitioners’ day-to-day practice provides lawyers with a substantial amount of 
extra hours to charge. Without the possibility of legal aid, the costs would be 
difficult for low-income individuals to cover. As most lawyers in the areas of 
asylum and migration law confirm:  
 
“Imagine that this would be settled on the basis of the hourly rate, then it really is 
not funny anymore. Look, the stakes for a client are huge. But for someone to do it 
on the basis of the hourly rate, it really is an impossible investment.” 
 
Subsidized legal aid thus for the most part relieves litigants of such a burden. 
The Dutch system is based on the granting of an amount of ‘points’ for provid-
ing legal aid at a certain stage in the procedure. One point equals 106 euro and 
reflects approximately one hour of work. 12 However, since subsidized legal aid 
only provides for a fixed fee based on the stage of proceedings, there is a limit to 
the number of hours of work for which a lawyer can be reimbursed: 
 
“The procedure before the Court of Justice was equivalent to eleven points. That is 
1,100 euro or thereabouts. And you’ll just have to manage with that. And then write 
twenty-five pages, and do all the research. So yeah, it was a little like volunteer 
work. Those proceedings before the Court, that is not in proportion to the hours we 
put into it.” 
 
In very complicated and thus time-consuming cases, officially called ‘laborious 
cases’, a lawyer can request reimbursement of extra hours on top of the compen-
sation granted by the fixed fee system. Every hour above the fixed fee is com-
pensated with one point, that is, if the request (including a budget estimating the 
hours needed) is authorised by the Legal Aid Board in advance.13 The Board can 
accept the request and award additional remuneration when there is substantial 
                                                        
12  Previously this hourly wage was indexed every year. However, because of government 
budget cuts, this amount has been reduced several times in recent years. Since 2012, the 
hourly wage is around € 106. Even with subsidized legal aid, clients have to contribute 
an income dependent contribution varying from € 143 to € 823. Article 3 Remuneration 
Legal Aid Decree 2000 (Besluit vergoedingen rechtsbijstand 2000). Available at:  
http://maxius.nl/besluit-vergoedingen-rechtsbijstand-2000/hoofdstuk1 [last accessed 2 
November 2017]. 
13  Article 5a (6) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000.  
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factual complexity that is legally relevant or when the case is legally complex.14 
However, even when considering the extra remuneration, there is no compensa-
tion for the expenses of the trip to Luxembourg. And even when the extra hours 
are granted it may still not completely cover the effective time put into such a 
case: 
 
“When the case was referred to Luxembourg I asked the legal aid board for extra 
hours. Because it was in fact a legally complex case and I made more than three 
times the required number of points in hours. An appeal is five points, and then they 
say three times, so if you've spent more than fifteen hours, then you may request 
additional hours. I do not even know exactly how many hours I wrote. I finally got 
something like seventy extra hours. Well, I think I've worked a multitude of that.” 
 
It is up to the lawyer to decide whether or not he or she is willing to bear this 
additional expenditure. Advocating the client’s interests in these cases thus de-
pends to a large extent on his or her lawyer’s personal investment in a case. As 
explained by one lawyer specialised in migration law: 
 
“We have a bit of a strange profession in the social advocacy. We just get a fixed 
amount for a case, and it does not pay to actually do your job too well. That sounds 
really weird, and I will not say that my work is by definition not done well. But you 
know, you get paid eight hours. And cases like these just take a lot more time, but 
the chances that you will get paid more is simply extremely small. So when you 
come to about twenty hours, then you start thinking how far you are willing to dive 
in it. And that means that sometimes you cannot get everything out of it, because it 
simply is not commercially viable.”  
 
Preliminary references put an added strain on the legal aid provided by these 
lawyers. Where it is the explicit aim of the lawyer to get a judgment on principle 
(either specifically from the ECJ or the national High Court), these considera-
tions can of course be made beforehand, and some form of agreement can be 
reached with the client or several interested parties, as we have seen in the test 
cases. In the case of multiple interested clients, or other parties like interest 
groups and unions, these costs can more easily be covered. For individual clients 
such options are not available, and financial aspects thus impact individual liti-
gants to a greater extent.  
                                                        
14  Legal Aid Board’s Complex Cases Guide (Leidraad Bewerkelijke Zaken). Available at: 
https://www.recht.nl/doc/kst31753-3-bijlage.pdf. [last accessed 2 November 2017]. 
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6.6  Lawyers’ Motivation 
Regardless of the costs involved with references, many lawyers choose to invest 
in these cases and make the trip to Luxembourg anyway. Lawyers give several 
(non-exclusionary) motivations for their decision to do so. The motivation for 
such a trip often comes from both personal interest and professional ethics with 
regard to representing the interests of one’s client. Some consider the opportuni-
ty to plead a case before the ECJ an honour or feel it is their professional duty to 
work a case to the fullest of their ability: 
 
“If you look at the hours and time, and the research as well, then it is totally 
disproportionate. I think I haven’t even claimed expenses for that case. I just do not 
want to dig through that entire file and figure out all those hours, because you get so 
little compensation for it. If you consider the time and energy you put in such a case, 
then it’s really absurd what you would get from the legal aid board. But you do it for 
the substantive legal side, and the honour of it.”  
 
Cases like these are, due to their legal complexity as well as the possibility of 
creating a precedent at the ECJ level, appealing to work on. The professional 
interest of lawyers plays a role. As one migration lawyer clarifies his own moti-
vations: 
 
“This whole case, the appeal and the Court of Justice, is done with [subsidized legal 
aid]. And if you really look at the hours and time, and the studying as well, yes, that 
really far outweighs compensation. But when you see it legally is an interesting 
case. Really a matter of principle, with interesting jurisprudence, and you see the 
difficult financial situation of those people, you do not want to lose such a case. 
Then you won’t say, I will not do it based on [subsidized legal aid], find another 
lawyer. No, you want to do it yourself.” 
 
Part of that motivation and interest is usually also of a more personal nature in it 
simply being a once in a lifetime opportunity to plead a case before the highest 
court in the EU. As explained by a lawyer working in the area of social security: 
 
“I have explicitly requested a hearing in Luxembourg. Because, as a lawyer, it is 
firstly important that you really grab every opportunity, and that you should never 
abandon a hearing beforehand. The moment you do that, you know that there is a 
judgment coming on which you have had no influence. So if you have the 
opportunity then at least keep your options open. At the last minute you can always 
say, look I’ve motivated enough and then you can say yes, I won’t go. But I would 
never say that with the European Court because when you can make it, it is a 
fantastic experience.” 
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Professional consideration and a personal interest in the ‘Luxembourg experi-
ence’ are not mutually exclusive. When it comes to representing the interests of 
one’s client, even when neither the client nor subsidised legal aid covers the 
costs, professional ethics implore lawyers to at least try to make the most of 
what for some is a significant investment. However, not all lawyers are willing 
to do so. This becomes clear from cases that are joined (either by the referring 
court or by the ECJ) and where lawyers testify to the lack of involvement (either 
written or at the ECJ hearing, or both) from lawyers of one of the other parties. 
One of the lawyers comments on the other party’s counsel’s lack of involve-
ment:  
 
“The third party did not submit anything. Look, regardless of whether you do this 
because you like it as a lawyer, and that’s how it is for me. I found it exciting and 
also nice to have experienced this in my law career, you've been there and have done 
your thing, that’s a lot of fun. But regardless of your own ambitions and whether 
you like it or not, and whether you feel like putting in the extra time. I do find it 
troubling when you as a lawyer assist someone, but not at that stage, that you then 
still proceed with representing your client. Like one of those other lawyers, no 
observations, did not do anything at all. Then I think you are lacking as a lawyer. I 
think that's bad, almost worthy of complaint.” 
 
This lack of involvement could be due to the fact that this lawyer was aware that 
a team of academics was assisting the lawyer quoted above, and thus chose to 
leave it to them. The same lawyer discusses the actions of the lawyer in the other 
of the two cases that were joined with his before reference to the ECJ: 
 
“One of the other lawyers did submit observations. Which was mainly bashing the 
Council of State, and further reference to my observations. And that was while my 
piece was not even ready yet [laughs]. I was in contact with them, and they knew in 
which direction my observations went.” 
 
As we have seen, however, in some cases, counsel refrain from filing any obser-
vations based on their general unfamiliarity (and possible misunderstanding) of 
the nature of these proceedings. 
Lawyers can thus play a key role in the dynamics of these cases and in bal-
ancing collective and individual interests, taking on cases that in and of them-
selves, from a commercial point of view, are not viable. This especially applies 
to cases pertaining to migrants and asylum seekers. Asylum and migration law 
are areas of law where practitioners can be found to have a certain professional 
engagement specific to these types of legal action, which is directly related to 
the stakes in these cases. One lawyer describes his personal and professional 
motivations: 
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“That’s a big difference with, for example, the legal issues businesses have. I must 
say that it really motivates me as a lawyer to act for these people. Because it is not 
just a sum of 10,000 euro. It really is about people’s lives. Like in criminal law, 
immigration law has a real impact on the course of people’s lives. You really make a 
difference. And that’s what matters, I think.” 
 
There is a general professional interest among the lawyers in the ‘Luxembourg 
experience’, which is seen as a once in a lifetime opportunity, even by those 
who do not consider the hearings of any practical use in their legal strategy. 
Lawyers are forced to make decisions on the amount of (over) time they are 
willing to spend on a case, which will thus effectively be truly pro bono. More-
over, since these lawyers have no certainty as to the chances of a case actually 
being referred to the ECJ – as we have seen in several cases it came as a com-
plete surprise – they have no way of preparing for this additional expenditure 
and thus have to make ad hoc decisions on whether or not they are willing to 
spend additional time, and/or if the client can be asked to cover those costs. 
6.7  Eurolaw Expertise  
The ‘Language’ of EU law 
Apart from structural obstacles, like time and financial considerations, there is 
also the added challenge of a general lack of expertise in working cases within 
the context of EU law, supranational jurisprudence and possible conflicts be-
tween EU and national law. EU law has its own structure and logic and ECJ 
jurisprudence its own language. Scholars and lawyers that deal with EU law 
regularly are very much familiar with its logic, and have been acculturated into 
this language. They share the argot of EU law and are familiar with the legal 
grammar of both EU principles as well as the reasoning style in ECJ jurispru-
dence.15 Regular practitioners, who only occasionally deal with EU law, let 
alone have their case referred to the ECJ, do not share this trait. Once a case gets 
referred to the ECJ, both the venue and the context of the case change, which 
means lawyers have to adapt both their ‘language’ and strategy accordingly. 
Practitioners are thus confronted with a situation where they have to argue a 
                                                        
15  ECJ jurisprudence is particularly structured along very specific, almost syntax-like, lines 
due to the need for uniformity. As analyzed by Lasser, who states “ECJ decisions are ra-
ther short, terse, and magisterial decisions that offer condensed factual descriptions, im-
personally clipped and collegial legal reasoning, and ritualized stylistic forms.” Lasser 
2004, 16.  
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matter within the framework of an unfamiliar legal sphere, in a different lan-
guage so to speak, that of European law and ECJ jurisprudence.   
Suggesting that their actual knowledge of EU law was not adequate for im-
migration and asylum lawyers to work with in any meaningful way in their daily 
practice, one asylum lawyer states: 
 
“I do think the majority [of lawyers] know what’s in those directives. Most can 
recite what is in Article 33 or whatever. But I feel we really lack knowledge about 
how the principles of effectiveness, proportionality, defence, how you work with 
those kinds of principles.” 
 
Many lawyers are not in any way experts in the field of Euro-litigation, at least 
not beyond the point of bringing up possible infringements of EU law in nation-
al proceedings. Only six of the twenty-three lawyers interviewed in the case 
selection for this research claimed to have more than a basic knowledge of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ relevant to their case. Moreover, the expertise lawyers 
did claim to have was usually post hoc, gained while working on ‘that one par-
ticular case’:  
 
“I have learned a lot from this one case, and really internalised it. What was really 
important in this one case was the ‘effect utile’. That’s what you learn when you 
start to think in a European way, you always have to say: if you do it like this, that 
will go against the effect utile.” 
 
Depending on the complexity of the questions referred to the court, references 
are something outside of the daily expertise of many lawyers. The following 
quote is an illustration of how many lawyers feel ill-equipped to work on the 
complexities in EU law, and also hints at a lack of knowledge of EU law among 
legal practitioners in general, including national judges: 
 
“That’s when you realise that many of those fundamentals and how they are 
enshrined in European law, that those are really unknown with those who have to 
work with them. I did not know either. [...] I’ve uttered more than once that there 
should be a course on EU law principles for immigration lawyers, in which you 
think about how the principle of effectiveness in, let's say, the Definition Directive, 
how that principle works with that directive, or how you can work with it in your 
practice. I think everyone knows a bit about the effectiveness principle, but no one 
has really mastered it, to really work with it. That’s basically what has to happen, 
because the judges do not understand either. [Laughs]” 
 
This lack of knowledge and expertise in the field of EU law influences practi-
tioners’ capacity for effective advocacy at different stages in the preliminary 
reference proceedings, from the formulation of the questions that are referred to 
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the ECJ, the writing of observations as well as participating effectively in the 
oral stage before the ECJ.  
The Significance of the Hearing 
The technical legal nature of procedures before the ECJ leads some lawyers to 
conclude that the oral proceedings do not matter a great deal to the outcome of a 
case. And even among insiders the idea is that the hearing is more a sign of 
goodwill from the judges, of which the practical importance for the conclusion 
of a case is seen as auxiliary to the written proceedings. The idea of its relatively 
diminished usefulness can play a role in practitioners’ decision not to attend the 
hearing in Luxembourg. As one lawyer specialised in social security and labour 
law concludes: 
 
“The hearing, with all due respect to everyone who participates in it, is nothing more 
than a ritual, I think. All documents have been filed; the opinion of the Advocate 
General is already there.16 You also only get twenty minutes. With a little goodwill 
can you double it to forty minutes. But it would be very bad, showing poor quality 
as a lawyer, if you in that brief plea bring things forward that were not put in the 
written observation. That would be bad. [Laughs]” 
 
However, the oral stage of the proceedings provides parties with the only possi-
bility to respond to observations filed by both the European Commission and 
intervening Member States. And there are a number of examples that show that 
these proceedings can and do matter, and that the parties involved have an inter-
est in pleading their case both in the written and in the oral stage of the proceed-
ings. 
Firstly, the fact that Member States choose to intervene and provide their 
view on the matter at hand shows that they acknowledge the importance of 
pleading a case before the ECJ. Secondly, the Advocate General’s opinion17 is 
formulated after the written and (if applicable) oral proceedings, giving him or 
her the chance to ask questions that may help in formulating a stance. Thus, 
written and oral observations and the possibility of answering questions on the 
matter may influence the Advocate General’s stance. And thirdly, an advocate 
has the opportunity at a hearing especially to provide and clarify ‘pure facts or 
                                                        
16  This erroneous conclusion about the Advocate General’s opinion, which in fact is com-
pleted after the hearing takes place, is indicative of some of the misunderstandings practi-
tioners may have about the course of action before the ECJ. 
17  The Court may choose to deal with cases without an opinion of the appointed Advocate 
General. 
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aspects of national law’.18 Broberg and Fenger describe how “[o]ften the judges 
or the Advocate General will ask more argumentative questions in order to test 
the strength of a legal argument”.19 The questions asked by the Advocate Gen-
eral and the judges can play an important role in the framing of the issue before 
the ECJ and allow for elaboration on the way national policies work out in prac-
tice, details that may matter greatly for the conclusion of the case.  
As Edward states: “The court relies heavily on the Commission, to fill in the 
factual and legal background”.20 Cases are examined by the Court on the basis 
of the observations by the parties, and being present gives an opportunity to fill 
in and clarify certain points, as well as respond to the representation of the facts 
by the other parties. Member States, where they have an interest in a certain 
outcome of a case, intervene in order to provide their viewpoint. The fact that 
the Court relies on these pleadings for its judgment, and thus the significance of 
providing one’s viewpoint, is confirmed by lawyers who attended the hearing 
and claim this was crucial in their case: 
 
R: “Well, you don’t have to go. But I really think we won our case there.  
I: What makes you think that? 
R: Well look, they have only limited insight in how Dutch law works out in practise 
within the national context. And in this case my colleague, who is very up to date on 
both social security and the association agreement [with Turkey]. And I am not 
specialised in immigration law so even when I read all the jurisprudence, that is 
probably the same when you read it, then you have a lack in your capability to 
convert that into arguments. You know what it says but you miss all the nuances. 
[…] And at one point you just felt the penny drop. And that had to do with the fact 
that [the representative for the Netherlands] said that these people were able to come 
back, that that was according to the law. But one of the oldest [ECJ] jurisprudence 
issues related to that was actually a case my colleague had done, which had a 
contrary conclusion. And that, no matter how good you are, I had not been able to 
make that connection right then and there.” 
 
We find another example in Self-Employed Tax Deductions where we see a 
significant moment in the hearing actually return in the opinion of the Advocate 
General. In his opinion, Advocate General Colomer considered that the matter 
addressed in the preliminary questions boiled down to whether the discrimina-
tion was justified on the grounds that the non-resident taxpayer could have opted 
voluntarily for the residents’ tax regime. The Advocate General considered that 
this question was not just a matter of the ‘legal fiction’ of an option, but that it 
                                                        
18  Edward 1995, 545. See also Vaughan & Grey 2007. 
19  Broberg & Fenger 2010, 382. 
20  Edward 1995. 
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mattered whether or not this option posed a practical barrier, which could be 
taken as a difference in treatment, thus violating the freedom of establishment. 
Therefore the language in which one was able to file his or her tax return might 
create an obstacle. One of the lawyers in the case specifically remembered when 
this subject was brought up in the hearing and describes it as follows: 
 
“That’s quite an unusual story. That hearing was fun. Because the point was, if you 
want to opt in as a resident taxpayer, that of course brings a lot of red tape with it. 
You must fill in a tax return in Dutch for example. So the Advocate General said: I 
have a question for the representative of the Dutch government. Okay, well if he 
files his taxes, can he call the tax authorities in German. So the Dutch agent 
responds: yes, yes, absolutely, simply in German, everyone speaks German. And he 
can also fill his declaration in German? Yes he can! [laughs] So, that is an example 
of, I think, well, that is borderline dishonest. And then he also said, I would also like 
to have the opinion of the party concerned. And my colleague answered: Well, I 
have been a tax advisor for more than fifteen years and that which is being stated 
here, I've never seen that. Then the Advocate General said: Yeah, thought so, I have 
no further questions. [laughs]” 
 
In his opinion, the Advocate General came to the conclusion that this practical 
difference had as a result that a taxpayer who did not live in the Netherlands was 
not in the same situation as someone who paid taxes and resided in that state. In 
footnote 29 of his opinion Advocate General Colomer describes how he came to 
his conclusion on the matter: 
 
“On the subject of language, the agent of the Netherlands Government 
acknowledged at the hearing that the Dutch tax authority will accept documents and 
communications in ‘commonly used languages’ other than Dutch, albeit on an 
informal basis and without any legal guarantee. In that connection, the agent did not 
provide any details about the actual situation of someone who needs to deal with the 
Netherlands authorities in a language other than Dutch. However, [the lawyers] told 
the Court that, in the Netherlands, anyone who contacts the tax authorities must do 
so in the official language of the State, which, to my mind, is more plausible.” 
 
Choosing to plead one’s case before the ECJ may thus prove to be worthwhile. 
The example provided above underscores how important such advocacy can be 
in providing the ECJ judges with the necessary facts and context to a case. The 
general lack of experience in this arena diminishes lawyers’ effectiveness once 
their case is brought before the ECJ, where they find themselves up against (of-
ten several) representatives of Member States who litigate before the ECJ on a 
regular basis. Thus, the ‘distance’ to the Court and the rarity of having hands-on 
experience can significantly reduce this type of advantage in preliminary refer-
ence procedure cases. Especially when compared to the legal professionals that 
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represent the genuine repeat players before the ECJ – i.e. the representatives of 
Member States and the European Commission, who work on ECJ cases on a 
daily basis and are able to build up significant familiarity with the Court’s mo-
dus operandi and culture – this can be an important disadvantage.   
The Language of the Court 
Language and translation play an immense part in the day-to-day practice of the 
ECJ. Almost 1,000 posts and over 45% of the ECJ’s staff consist of language 
and translation related services. These include over 600 lawyer linguists and 
over seventy interpreters that translate all the work done at the ECJ into the 
twenty-four official languages in 552 language combinations, and over one mil-
lion pages are translated each year.21 The multi-linguistic nature of the EU also 
plays an important role during the oral proceedings. While the written observa-
tions are meticulously translated, and often discussed in detail in the judgment 
itself, the oral observations are subject to simultaneous interpretation, with the 
consequent risk of communication problems, translation mistakes and failure of 
judges to understand immediately the points that a party is trying to get across. 
Lawyers are therefore implored to speak slowly and clearly, and where possible, 
provide their plea notes beforehand to the relevant interpreters.  
When it comes to pleading one’s case before the Court, language also mat-
ters in a different sense. Lawyers acting more often before the ECJ know how to 
address the Court. Repeat players, and this is certainly the case for the European 
Commission’s representatives and the agents of the Member States, and also for 
specialised lawyers that are hired to appear before the ECJ, know its ‘language’ 
and style. Where most Member States have an experienced array of lawyers at 
their disposal who attend hearings and deal with cases before the ECJ on a regu-
lar basis, the average litigant does not have such representation at his or her 
disposal. This applies to his or her knowledge of EU law, and also to the 
knowledge of procedural requirements, accurate knowledge of the possibilities 
and importance of the written and oral stages in the proceedings as well as to the 
‘ways of the Court’. As a long-standing member of the ECJ bench has said, 
“[t]he basic rules of advocacy apply as much in pleading before the European 
Court of Justice as before any court or tribunal […]: know your court; know 
your procedure; and know what you are trying to achieve”.22 One of the inter-
viewed lawyers, who appears before the Court on a regular basis, discussed how 
experience with the Court’s ways may help one make his case, and possibly 
                                                        
21  The Court of Justice in figures: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_80908/en/ [last ac-
cessed 2 November 2017]. 
22  Edward 1998, 28.  
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influence the Court’s decision. To the question whether it was worth attending 
the hearing, he answers: 
 
“In my experience, I once had the feeling that it was decided in advance, so I could 
have said anything. But there are other occasions where you can make the 
difference. So you have to prepare. You should know your judge, Google him or her 
and try and go through the case law of that judge. It can help you to avoid major 
gaffes. Don’t criticise case law written by a certain judge. So, you better know the 
case law. The hearing can make a huge difference. The solution of a case is not the 
difficult part, it’s the reasoning, and the hearing can influence this a lot.” 
 
This respondent (who was not among the lawyers in the case selection for this 
research) belongs to a small group of lawyers that represent (corporate) clients 
with cases before the ECJ on a regular basis. The bulk of his work is concentrat-
ed in the areas of antitrust, cartels, merger control and state aid control, in which 
large economic interests are at stake. Such lawyers, together with the representa-
tives of the Member States and the European Commission, make up the inner 
circle of the Court. Their amount of experience in litigating before the ECJ con-
trasts enormously with the one-shot lawyer who only occasionally, or most often 
just once, has a case referred. In this respect, lawyers of one-shotters are unable 
to counteract the differences in arms that exist between litigating parties before 
the courts, since in the case of a referral to the ECJ lawyers are themselves in 
many respects one-shotters. 
The inexperience of these one-shot lawyers starts simply with the proceed-
ings and a general unfamiliarity with the Court’s ways. Like this lawyer who left 
the Grand Chamber of the Court quite disappointed with the amount of help he 
received once at the ECJ: 
 
“I was not happy with the guidance. No one could tell me where the lawyers’ 
chambers were. And I still had to prepare. The best information I got from the 
interpreter, who came up to me to ask whether I had plead notes, so he could prepare 
in advance. But at the hearing there were, for instance, controls for translation, 
which were not explained to me. During the session I found out that if you pressed a 
button you could hear what was said in Dutch. Well, luckily the discussion was only 
in English and French, which I can understand. And where did you have to leave 
your coat? I just placed it against the wall.” 
 
Of course, such practicalities will not fundamentally make or break a case, but 
they serve as an illustration of the unfamiliarity of lawyers with a court, and 
proceedings they see for the first time. This extends to the question of how to 
argue their case before a Court with which they are unfamiliar, as a criminal law 
lawyer explains: 
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R: “At some point they said, this case is going to Luxembourg. Then I thought, I 
really have no business there. I mean what the hell am I going to do there? But then 
the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, and then I thought, yeah, you know, I 
may have another sixty years as a lawyer, but the chances that I’m going to go 
before the Grand Chamber ever again are so negligible that I have to go. 
I: And you also pleaded?  
R: Yeah, of course. If you go, then you have to plead... Totally pointless! [Laughs].  
I: What was that like?  
R: Yeah, well, ‘nice to be here, I want to say hello to my mother’, something like 
that. [Laughing]” 
 
Apart from preparing the way one will address the Court, it also proves useful to 
be aware of the way proceedings are conducted, as well as the preferences of the 
judges. Discussing the second round, in which one is permitted to speak and 
respond to arguments put forward by other parties, the experienced ‘Euro-
lawyer’ explains how it helped to understand the judges’ preferences: 
 
“What they call ‘reply and rejoinder’ is a bit false; it’s more a conclusion. You have 
the time to respond to questions but you also have to come to a conclusion. Judges 
hate repetitions, and they will cut you off.” 
 
For the inexperienced lawyer such preferences and unwritten rules may result in 
a frustrating experience, especially in contrast to national proceedings where 
there is generally much more time for a back and forth between sides, and ample 
opportunity to make one’s case: 
 
“In general, I have experienced that hearing as something very strange. You get 
fifteen minutes to hurry through your plea and then you have to respond to those 
Member States in the second term. And then you’re insulted by the president with 
the comment that I should focus on the questions and come to conclusion. But yeah, 
that Member State said all kinds of nonsense; I simply want to straighten that out. I 
was really quite flabbergasted. So, you pick yourself up as best you can and respond 
a little, and then you sit down again. And if nobody wants to respond then, well, 
session closed, and then you walk out again. And I was like, huh? Was this it? Wait 
... what!?” 
 
Lawyers try to make the best of the opportunity but are generally not very opti-
mistic about the room the hearing provides for making one’s case and especially 
in responding to the observations by other parties, including the opposing party, 
the European Commission as well as other Member States: 
 
“Well, you try, but that is very difficult. You have fifteen minutes time for your 
position at the hearing, or what you think is necessary to touch upon. What took 
thirty pages to write. But you cannot respond to all of these seven countries, that in 
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part say the same thing, but in nuances have very different positions. So you cannot 
respond well to that, in my opinion.” 
 
Lawyers who only occasionally appear before the Court will be in a sense ad-
dressing the Court in another language, in another argot. He or she may be very 
blunt in making certain points or simply speaking in the legal language of their 
national jurisdiction, possibly causing difficulty in communication. It is then for 
the Court to find out whether the one-shotter really has a good point, even 
though he or she is not as capable of making this point à la communautaire. At 
times however, this may require the Court to go beyond the arguments that are 
presented to it. It remains an open question to what extent the judges and Advo-
cate General of the ECJ are willing to do so, and therefore how effective these 
lawyers can be. 
6.8  Coping Strategies 
The aforementioned lack of experience and expertise among lawyers confronted 
with a reference to the ECJ prompts many of them to seek outside assistance. 
Turning to experts, usually EU law scholars, helps them work their case at the 
ECJ level. On the question of whether one of the lawyers saw a lack of expertise 
as influencing the course and result of a case, he answers: 
 
“It all depends on how active you are. And if you seek help, which you should 
definitely do, because it is very theoretical and you’re on new ground. You can try 
to think up everything yourself, but that is just unfeasible. You have to realize that 
you can just not do it alone.” 
 
For many lawyers, the first time they are called on to deal with matters beyond 
their daily practice is the moment a national judge decides to refer questions to 
the ECJ. The questions that the national judge will ask the ECJ are sometimes 
formulated in cooperation with the parties to the proceedings and usually pro-
vided to them for comments, revision or reformulation. Debating the formula-
tion of questions with the aim of steering them in a desired direction again re-
quires at least some expertise in the field of EU law. On this issue, one lawyer 
states the following: 
 
“Well look, at some point the cogs start turning, and then there are three parties who 
formulate those questions. The court just said, and now we will all think of questions 
together. Well, who am I? That’s hilarious of course, because the matter is ridicu-
lously complicated. And well, I have other things to do in my life, so I cannot spend 
an indefinite amount of time studying on this.” 
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Since the opposing party called in the help of experts to make sure the questions 
were formulated to their satisfaction, like most lawyers, he too decided to seek 
the help of experts. The natural source of expertise came from local scholars 
commenting on the draft questions:  
 
“When the court suggested they were going to refer questions to the Court of 
Justice, I sat down with a professor of criminal law from the university here. [...] 
When I called him, and said, you know, they are saying all kinds of clever things, so 
I also need some smart feedback. [...] So I visited him a few times, simply to spar 
with him and exchange views. And he explained what direction it went in and what I 
should say. And that is all very enlightening and helpful.” 
 
The formulation of the questions that are referred to the ECJ can have an im-
portant bearing on not only the focus of what will be discussed before the Court 
but also on the scope of the eventual judgment. Where questions are formulated 
very narrowly and focused on very specific circumstances, the impact of the 
ECJ’s answers will potentially be smaller than when the questions are formulat-
ed more broadly. The understanding of these nuances as well as signalling pos-
sible opportunities and suggesting other formulations to the national court also 
requires expertise.  
After the questions are referred to the ECJ, the parties are requested to send 
in their observations and formulate their stance on how the questions are sup-
posed to be answered. This is the next stage where lawyers may feel under-
equipped to be effective. Over half of the lawyers interviewed decided to reach 
out to experts in academic circles for help, as this asylum lawyer did: 
 
“The questions were referred and I was like, oh god. It cannot be true that I am now 
going to discuss this difficult matter at the highest stage of Europe. I still find it 
really shocking. But it suddenly becomes very big and you have never done that 
before and you’re really just not sure how to proceed, how it all works there. So I 
sent out emails to a whole host of people like, help me. Because, I do not know. And 
of the about twenty I had sent, ultimately a small group remained, a core of four, 
five people. My former colleague, who is now writing a dissertation, wrote a 
substantial part of the introduction. And she could just recite all the relevant 
jurisprudence, which was really fantastic. That’s when you see the difference 
between scholars and practitioners like me. Because, as a practitioner you sort of 
know what the law is, but how it is worded exactly and where to find it you don’t 
know. And that alone will take you three days just to work out.” 
 
His reaction to his own lack of expertise, and soliciting help from external ex-
perts, not only underscores a general lack of expertise among those ‘confronted’ 
with a reference, it also reveals where the expertise is to be found. Academia is 
the obvious choice for most lawyers when seeking help with working on the 
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complexities of EU law questions. Experts with a good understanding of particu-
lar fields of EU law, with knowledge of the relevant ECJ jurisprudence are usu-
ally found among scholars. While their expertise helps lawyers formulate their 
arguments and include relevant case law, their knowledge of the practice of ECJ 
proceedings is usually also limited. Therefore the amount of help they can pro-
vide in this area is limited.  
6.9  Macro Effects of the Allocation of Eurolaw Expertise 
The previous paragraphs have laid out a general lack of experience and expertise 
among lawyers that are confronted with a reference to the ECJ. The unpredicta-
bility of preliminary references is an important aspect to these procedures and 
the related possibility for litigants to solicit expert services. In comparison, in 
direct actions before the ECJ the dispute clearly unfolds within the sphere of EU 
law since it is addressed at one of the EU institutions. In the preliminary refer-
ence procedure, however, a dispute may in the course of proceedings gradually 
turn into a matter of EU law, which makes it unlikely that litigants have EU law 
expertise at their disposal then and there. The unpredictability of a reference 
thus forms an inherent obstacle to the efficient advocacy of preliminary cases at 
the ECJ level. 
Given the inherent obstacles to hiring expertise, when looking at the lawyers 
involved in these proceedings it is all the more striking to see some names oc-
curring more than once. Considering that only a few dozen references are made 
each year, as well as the fact that the case selection in this study only spans a 
period of five years, being involved in more than one case suggests something 
more than coincidence. This could lead to the conclusion that these lawyers 
must have some form of expertise in EU law and are actively approached by 
parties (litigants or other interested actors involved in litigation) because of that. 
However, this could only be confirmed in four cases. Only in two cases however 
did the litigant or litigants themselves hire them before their case was referred to 
the ECJ. In the other cases, others were responsible for involving these lawyers 
in the proceedings. In two cases, lawyers were approached by colleagues to 
assist in a preliminary reference case based on their (albeit single) previous ex-
perience with the procedure. Another lawyer, who had no significant expertise 
in EU law, considered it a complete coincidence that he had participated in two 
preliminary reference cases, especially given the fact that the two cases he had 
were in two completely unrelated fields of law. These lawyers, although they 
have some repeated experiences with the ECJ cannot be considered true repeat 
players. 
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There are, however small in number, repeat players before the ECJ among 
lawyers in individuals’ cases. Of all the legal counsel in the total of selected 
cases that could be identified a small minority was specialized in EU law specif-
ically. Among them, professors of (European) fiscal law, lawyers with a special-
isation in the Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey, and lawyers 
working in the area of labour law and social security specifically for cross-
border workers. It can easily be reasoned that the individual one-shotter will not 
be among those able to solicit the services of these professionals with extensive 
Euro-litigation expertise. This is why in preliminary reference procedure cases, 
experienced Euro-lawyers show up mainly in support of larger (repeat) players, 
both private and (semi)public. His acting on behalf of individual claimants can 
be explained by the fact that these individuals had mobilised collectively. As 
described in depth in Case Study B, the group of pensioners was able to accrue 
enough funds from among their members. The total number of procedures, of 
which this particular case was only one, are said to have cost the Pensioners 
Association over half a million euro. Funded by the contributions, they were 
thus able to afford a specialist in order to increase their chances of success at the 
ECJ level.23  
This is a striking example of what Galanter called the ‘allocating effects’ of 
lawyer expertise, meaning that some lawyers may specialize and build up expe-
rience with Euro-litigation, but that we can expect these lawyers to take up posi-
tions litigating on behalf of the more affluent parties, i.e. the larger companies, 
Member States and institutions, NGOs, interest groups, etc. As we have seen, 
this is also why these ‘Euro-litigation one-shotters’ – litigants as well as lawyers 
– often reach out to academics with expertise in the field of EU law, who subse-
quently act pro bono in support of these parties. For these one-shotters soliciting 
the expertise of scholars who are willing to lend their services free of charge 
may be the only option of getting help. 
6.10  Conclusion 
This chapter set out to give insight into the context in which legal practitioners 
have to work on preliminary reference cases, the kinds of issues that arise from 
peculiarities of the procedure, the options lawyers have for dealing with these 
matters and the considerations that play a role in this respect. I have identified 
several aspects of the preliminary procedure that significantly diminish the ef-
fectiveness of lawyers in working a case at the ECJ level.  
                                                        
23  Ultimately without success, see Case Study B. 
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Due to the highly infrequent nature of referrals, the more general build-up of 
expertise of lawyers in this area becomes less likely. For a practitioner, having a 
case referred to the ECJ is a very unlikely event and often a once in a lifetime 
experience. For most lawyers therefore the ECJ remains an improbable destina-
tion, both in result as well as in objectives. This makes it difficult to find and 
solicit lawyers specialized in Euro-litigation. For the bulk of the individual liti-
gants in these cases, hiring specialized Eurolaw experts does not always prove to 
be an option, considering the fact that these lawyers will usually be more expen-
sive as compared to any generalist practitioner. Therefore, cost considerations 
often fall on the lawyers themselves who have to decide how much unpaid extra 
work they are willing to put into a case. Furthermore, in the case of the ECJ and 
preliminary references, it is well-nigh impossible for a lawyer with a general 
practice to build up any significant amount of experience with Euro-litigation 
and thus with the European judiciary. Therefore the ability of lawyers to miti-
gate a disadvantaged position in Euro-litigation based on closeness to the judici-
ary is significantly limited, especially when compared to the legal services 
Member States’ governments are able to solicit. On the macro level, this means 
that these references do not automatically fall into the hands of the lawyers best 
equipped to work such a case. Furthermore, the additional cost involved in hir-
ing experts after referral makes it unlikely that the litigants will decide to switch 
lawyers or hire additional experts. This causes practitioners, who consider them-
selves unapt to effectively advocate a case at the ECJ level, to seek help among 
experts willing to assist free of charge. Usually these are sought and found 
among academics. Effective advocacy at the ECJ level then becomes dependent 
to a large degree on the willingness of lawyers to put in unpaid overtime, and on 
the availability of expert legal support that is willing to act pro bono.  
Galanter saw lawyers as repeat players in themselves, able to offset some of 
the disadvantages of their one-shotter clients. In the case of Euro-litigation, 
however, the extent to which practitioners can perform this function decreases 
significantly. The insights presented in this chapter show how the preliminary 
reference procedure in itself undermines the capacity of lawyers to make up for 
the disadvantage of the one-shotters, and diminishes lawyers’ effectiveness 
when it comes to advocacy at the ECJ level. This raises questions about the 
effectiveness of legal protection at the individual level and the effectiveness of 
the review function of the preliminary procedure at the macro level. Where a 
preliminary question fulfils the latter function, the differences in legal represen-
tation between different parties are striking and important. The sporadic activa-
tion of the procedure and its often unexpected character means that private par-
ties and their counsel are generally at a disadvantage when it comes to the exper-
tise that is brought before the ECJ, as compared to the better equipped Member 
State that is usually the opposition. A reference to the ECJ may thus not only 
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provide an obstacle to inexperienced lawyers, but may also actually exacerbate 
the differences between individual litigants as one-shotters and Member States 
as repeat players at the supranational level. 
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Case Study C. Fees in Migration Law 
C.1  Introduction: Championing the Rights of Migrants 
Where some preliminary references may be the result of national judges seeking 
clarification on certain EU legislation without the explicit wish of the litigating 
parties, others may be part of strategic efforts by political actors seeking to uti-
lise EU law in order to put pressure on national policy. As part of wider political 
action preliminary references may prove to be a useful tool in the hands of those 
that seek to effect political change. This case study illustrates how actors may 
mobilise EU law in order to contest national policy, and by extension contribute 
to the enforcement of EU law, with transnational consequences. In this case, the 
combination of allying with the Commission and concerted legal efforts by a 
small group of lawyers, academics and interest groups was successful in forcing 
compliance by the Dutch government. EU law offered the framework within 
which to question the legality of national increases in fees for residence permits 
at the European level. It became an obvious step after the fight was lost at the 
national level. This case provides a particularly effective example of a well-
organised group of actors proactively employing EU law in order to change 
national policy. Analysing the actors and their litigation strategies, as well as the 
conditions for success in employing the channels offered by the EU legal sys-
tem, shows the role of private actors in contesting national policy by employing 
EU law. This case study provides us with a number of important elements that 
help us to understand the dynamics behind such litigation efforts, and adds to an 
understanding of how local conflicts are channelled through the courts and how 
local private interests serve to enforce EU policy at the national level. 
C.2  The Contested Policy  
In 2002, by means of ministerial decree, the administrative fees for the applica-
tion for or the renewal of residence permits were increased. As of 1965 and up 
until 1994, there had been no additional fees payable on an application for the 
grant or renewal of a residence permit. An earlier attempt by the Dutch govern-
ment to increase these fees in 1994 had resulted in significant, and successful, 
opposition. An amendment to the Aliens Act of 1993 applied an additional fee 
for the application for a residence permit. For example 1,000 guilders for the 
application for a residence permit for migrant workers (employed and self-
employed), compared to Dutch passport costs of 35 guilders. This change in 
policy was met with swift opposition by large companies. Representing the in-
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terests of their workers, these companies challenged the additional fees because 
in many cases it was the employers who paid these costs. This opposition result-
ed in a retroactive withdrawal within months and refunds of the fees charged in 
excess.1 As of 2002 and again in 2003 similar amendments were made, with fee 
increases ranging from 290% to 1150% in some cases. 
 
Figure IV: Changes in fees before and after 2003 (in euros)  
 Before 1/5/02 1/1/03 Increase 
Application 
and/or change 
temporary 
residence per-
mit 
56.72 258 430 660% 
Application 
and/or change 
temporary 
residence per-
mit 
(12 years and 
younger) 
22.69 169 285 1150% 
Permanent 
residence per-
mit 
226,89 539 890 290% 
Extension 
temporary 
residence per-
mit 
0 169 285 - 
 
The numbers in Figure IV show the dramatic increase in costs for a request or 
renewal of a residence permit. A calculation example (Figure V) sets out the 
costs for a family with three children when applying for residence permits over 
the course of five years. Moreover, an amendment to the ministerial decree stat-
ed that non-payment of these additional fees would mean that the application 
would not be processed.2 Given that a substantial number of migrant families 
belonged to the lower classes of society, and had a net minimum annual income 
of 12,324 euro at the time, these fees had significant financial impact on migrant 
families and the threat of non-consideration, and thus the risk of losing one’s 
residence permit, left migrants little choice but to pay.  
                                                        
1  Groenendijk & Kortmann 2003. 
2  Article 24(2) Vw 2000. 
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Figure V: Calculation example residence permits of a family with three children 
(in euros)3 
 Application 
temporary 
residence 
permit 
2nd year 
Extension 
3rd year 
Extension 
4th year 
Extension 
Application  
regular 
residence 
permit 
Total 
Father 430 285 285 285 890 2,175 
Mother 430 285 285 285 890 2,175 
Child 10 yr. 285 285 285 285 890 2,030 
Child 12 yr. 430 285 285 285 890 2,175 
Child 14 yr. 430 285 285 285 890 2,175 
 10,730 
 
Although the officially stated reason for these increases was to make the pro-
cessing of residence applications cost-effective, these measures arguably had 
another dual purpose: Firstly, it raised the budget of the Ministry of Justice4 (by 
an approximate amount of twenty million euro annually).5 The increases were 
justified with reference to an increased financial target, which had been imposed 
on the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the Dutch government 
agency responsible for handling the applications, by the ministry.6 Secondly, the 
strong suspicion arose that the Dutch government was using the fees as an in-
tended brake on the influx of immigrants.7 Although it was never officially con-
firmed, one remark by then Minister Nawijn seemed to confirm these suspi-
cions. Questioned on the financial impact of these increases on migrant families 
he answered: “If we want to allow foreigners in more restrictively, we should 
have stricter entry requirements. This is one of the groups that we can allow less, 
simply because there are loads coming in”.8 However, this statement was never 
                                                        
3  Inspraak Orgaan Turken in Nederland, Jaarverslag 2007, 2007, 7. Retrieved from:  
http:// www.iot.nl/?page=sayfa&sayfa_id=43 [last accessed 2 November 2017]. Further 
costs: Legalization and verification of documents (€ 136.13 per document), DNA test 
(€ 199.66), Provisional residence permit (€ 50 p/p), Integration courses (€ 6.000 p/p) and 
examination (€ 350). The first years after immigration are very costly.  
4  Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) grew more and more 
dependent upon the revenues of these fees; from 2.4% in 2001, and 15.4% in 2005 to 
20.4% of its total budget in 2010. These budgetary shifts seem to explain at least in part 
the reluctant attitude of the ministers in their willingness to give in to social, political and 
legal opposition.  
5  Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 600 VI, nr. 2, p. 39. 
6  See Groenendijk & Kortmann 2003.  
7  These suspicions were voiced by several political parties in deliberations on the budget 
statement of the Ministry of Justice in 2004. See Verslag schriftelijk overleg vaste com-
missie voor Justitie 13 december 2004 (29 800 VI). 
8  Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 600 VI, nr. 18, p. 39. 
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seized upon by other MPs and it remained unclear whether this was a slip of the 
tongue, or whether the Minister spoke in a personal capacity. Yet, this policy 
was one among more changes in Dutch politics in a trend towards more restric-
tive migration politics since the turn of the century.9  
As before in 1994, these policy changes in 2003 met opposition, this time in 
the form of (among other organized actions) legal proceedings, several of which 
reached the ECJ.10 The next section will cover how these legal proceedings 
emerged and the ways in which opposition was organized. 
C.3  Organizing Opposition: Introducing the IOT 
The central actor that mobilised opposition to this policy was the Consultative 
Council of Turkish Migrants in the Netherlands (Stichting Inspraak Orgaan 
Turken in Nederland, from here on: IOT).11 The IOT was founded in 1985 by 
four existing Turkish organizations. Its aim is to represent the interests of the 
Turkish community in the Netherlands and is committed to improving its posi-
tion in society. Its operations have long been part of the National Advisory and 
Consultative Structure for Minorities (Landelijk Advies en Overlegstructuur 
voor Minderheden, LAO), which was established in 1984. As part of this struc-
ture the IOT, as well as seven other consultative bodies, was funded by a grant 
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1997, this structure was reinforced by 
the adaptation of the Minority Policy Consultation Act (Wet Overleg Minder-
heden, WOM12) which stipulated that these bodies had consultations with Minis-
ters or Secretaries at least three times a year to discuss policy regarding the inte-
gration of minorities and developments of interest to minorities within the con-
text of integration. As an organization the IOT has a small office – consisting 
only of a director, a policy officer, secretarial support and one or more trainees – 
but a large and active body of supporters, the Turkish migrants. Its monthly 
newsletter Sözhakki is sent out on paper to 3,000, digitally to 4,000 addresses 
and its website was visited more than a million times in 2012. At the time of 
writing, nearly 300 local organizations operate under its aegis.13 
                                                        
9  Bonjour 2011, 100. 
10  Total number of cases concerning administrative fees in the Dutch legal system. From 
1990-1999: 1, after 2002: 450+ national judgments on fees. As found through a search in 
the Dutch online judgment database rechtspraak.nl, search term: leges. 
11  Dutch universities also contested the policy, with some success. The increase in fees for 
students was postponed for a year. 
12  On June 18th 2013 this law was repealed; consequently as of 1st January 2015 all fund-
ing for these organizations has stopped. 
13  www.iot.nl. 
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C.4  Extra-Legal Opposition to the Policy 
For a long time, legal actions were not a specific part of the IOT’s strategy.14 
Before the decision was made to employ legal proceedings in the matter, the 
IOT had already employed all kinds of lobbying activities and deliberations with 
other actors and organizations. Before initiating a civil suit and other legal pro-
ceedings, the IOT tried to raise the matters, on which these later proceedings 
were conducted, in the political arena by attempting to mobilise politicians,15 
and other societal actors.16 They organized consultations with political bodies, 
deliberations with other interest groups and they obtained expert advice from 
outsiders. 
Prior to the implementation of the contested policy, the IOT repeatedly but 
unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with the responsible Minister. Various organi-
zations protested the announcement of the policy to parliament and after the 
implementation successively to Minister Nawijn (LPF: Fortuynist/populist par-
ty) and his successor Verdonk (VVD: Conservative liberals). Also, several com-
plaints had been brought to the attention of members of parliament who put the 
matter on the agenda for parliamentary debate.17 With its large backing, the IOT 
was able to mobilise its supporters for demonstrations and other actions. Among 
others, the IOT mobilised its supporters to sign a petition against the fee increase 
that was launched after its implementation in 2003, resulting in over 30,000 
signatures that were presented to members of the Standing Committee for Secu-
rity and Justice (Vaste Kamercommissie voor Veiligheid en Justitie) of the 
House of Representatives. 
Despite all these efforts they had no success in the political arena. The re-
peated protests revealed that this issue yielded hardly any parliamentary atten-
tion or mobilisation. The lack of political response against the high fees finally 
stimulated the IOT to set up ongoing consultations of IOT insiders and outsiders 
in a working group, specifically dedicated to attacking this policy in early 2003 
– the Working Group Against the Increases of the Fees for Residence Permits 
                                                        
14  For a good overview of the evolution of the IOT’s political and legal strategies see 
Groenendijk, Rondhuis & Strik 2015. 
15  Some of which in periodic consultations that the IOT held with Ministers lawfully pre-
scribed under the aforementioned WOM.  
16  Among other things, deliberations with the VSNU (Association of Universities in the 
Netherlands), since international students are also among those impacted by the policy. 
17  Before the policy was implemented a letter was sent [5 November 2002] to members of 
the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Justice urging them ‘to do everything in your 
power to stop this disastrous increase’. After its implementation a letter [2 February 
2003] was sent to Minister Nawijn in which multiple organizations, based on the argu-
ments from the article by Groenendijk and Kortmann (2003, footnote 17), opposed the 
increases of January 1st 2003. 
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(Werkgroep tegen de legesverhoging, from here on: Working Group).18 The core 
of the Working Group included lawyers, representatives of various social organ-
izations and academics.19 This course of action was a tried method for the IOT 
that had encountered a similar situation a few years earlier when protesting the 
reduction in the export of supplementary disability benefits, which impacted 
Turkish beneficiaries who had moved back to Turkey.20 The previous Working 
Group Social Security – consisting of IOT staffers, the labour union, social 
workers, lawyers and academics – had been established to take (legal) action 
against the policy.21 Several members of this Working Group also featured in 
the Working Group against the fees policy, most notably one lawyer (from here 
on: the leading lawyer) who would become responsible for most of the legal 
work in multiple court proceedings. 
During the legal proceedings that followed, the Working Group remained 
active in the political realm. The interim court rulings in the various procedures, 
and the complaints and negotiations with the European Commission were struc-
turally linked back to the Minister, by means of the mobilisation of MPs, in 
order to keep up the pressure. On several occasions, MPs were implored to raise 
these matters during deliberations in parliament. During their first meeting in 
early 2003, the Working Group also discussed a media strategy, planning the 
peak of their publicity around the announcement of their legal action. Members 
of the European Parliament were mobilised; two Dutch Members of the Europe-
an Parliament submitted written questions to then Commissioner Vitorino to 
question whether the legal fees for residence permits constituted a new re-
striction within the meaning of the Association Agreement between the EEC and 
Turkey.22 This question on the possible violation of the so-called ‘standstill 
clause’23 in the Association Agreement, would become a central legal question.  
                                                        
18  The declared aim of the Werkgroep tegen de Legesverhogingen was ‘to achieve by polit-
ical and/or legal means that the government reduces the excessive fees for applying for 
residence permits to a reasonable amount’.  
From http://www.inlia.nl/werkgroepleges.html. [last accessed 8 November 2017]. 
19  Including, but not limited to, representatives of the Dutch Council for Refugees (Ver-
eniging Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland) and the Association of Moroccan-Dutch in the 
Netherlands (Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkanen in Nederland: SMN). 
20  The Export Restrictions on Benefits Act (Wet Beperking Export Uitkeringen). 
21  The Working Group featured different lawyers and other external experts at different 
times during the course of its activity, all of whom acted pro bono public, save for its 
chairman and central lawyer.  
22  Written question E-2752/03, PB C 65 E of 13/03/2004, 207-8. 
23  As part of the Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey Decision No 1/80 
EEC-Turkey Association Council stipulates the measures ‘for the revitalization and de-
velopment of the Association between the Community and Turkey’. The standstill claus-
es in Association law between the EU and Turkey intend to freeze in time existing re-
strictions (if any) and ban the introduction of new restrictions that hamper the economic 
→ 
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C.5  The Decision to Take Legal Action 
In 2003, after the policy had come into effect, the Working Group decided – 
after repeated, unsuccessful attempts to mobilise the responsible Minister, and 
because of a lack of meaningful alternatives – to attack the policy by legal 
means. Choosing this legal path was motivated in large part by an article in a 
leading law journal by Groenendijk and Kortman24 (two law professors special-
ized in (European) migration law and constitutional law respectively) on the 
unlawfulness of the fee increases, of which the former had been involved in the 
Working Group Social Security and would become an important consultant for 
this Working Group during the subsequent legal actions. In letters addressing 
possible co-claimants and financial supporters the Working Group cited a list of 
further reasons for legal action: 
 
–  By litigating with a large number of organizations counter pressure could be 
mobilised; 
–  It was made clear that organizations of ethnic minorities did not simply 
accept anything; 
–  Further increases, which were planned by the Ministry of Justice, would be 
counteracted; 
–  It was not fair to ask an individual migrant to act in person, because he or 
she would be deported; 
–  Based on the article by Groenendijk and Kortmann the chances of success 
seemed reasonably high. 
Additionally, an evaluation of the parliament’s attitude, and explanation for its 
inactivity was given:  
 
“Members of Parliament realize perfectly well that these increases are objectionable, 
but the House of Parliament so far yields to the argument that the Ministry of Justice 
needs the money to pay for the IND’s budget. The House will probably use the 
result of the [legal] procedure [of the Working Group] to move Verdonk [the 
responsible Minister at the time] towards more reasonable rates.”  
 
                                                        
activities of EU- and Turkish nationals. The Association contains two such clauses: one 
for Turkish nationals who want to take up self-employment (Article 41(1) of the Addi-
tional Protocol) and one for Turkish workers (Article 13 of Decision 1/80 of the EU-
Turkey Association Council). They entered into force in 1973, respectively 1980, for the 
nine oldest Member States and for the other EU Member States upon the date of their ac-
cession to the EU. In addition, the Working Group focused on diplomatic representation 
and appeal to other countries by, for example, mobilising contacts within the Turkish 
embassy, in order to apply pressure from multiple angles. 
24  Groenendijk & Kortmann 2003. 
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Due to the restrictive political climate towards migration at the time, further 
political mobilisation was not expected, therefore at this point legal action was 
deemed the only viable way forward. The Working Group chose to employ sev-
eral legal strategies simultaneously. Firstly, a civil suit was initiated on behalf of 
twenty-five different migrant organizations. Secondly, the administrative law 
route was employed to contest the policy on an individual case basis. And third-
ly, the European Commission was mobilised through complaints addressing the 
Netherlands’ failure to comply with EU law. In the next section these cases will 
be discussed successively and in more detail. 
C.6  Legal Contestations 
The Civil Lawsuit 
In 2003, a civil suit was initiated on behalf of twenty-five different migrant or-
ganizations.25 This group included a diverse range of organizations that champi-
oned the interests of certain societal (migrant) groups, including Turks, Moroc-
cans, Tunisians and southern Europeans, and also organizations that supported 
more general migration-related causes like the legal aid foundations for asylum 
seekers, the Dutch Council for Refugees (Vereniging Vluchtelingenwerk Neder-
land) and supporting associations for foreigners in general.26 The inclusion of 
multiple parties in the case served to make the endeavour financially feasible by 
spreading the cost over a significant number of collaborators as well as spread-
ing the bets with regard to the standing of the different organizations in court. 
Additionally, it helped to increase the societal impact and raise awareness of the 
matter. The civil proceedings started in 2003 with the aim of getting the ministe-
rial regulation declared non-binding because it was inconsistent with Dutch 
(constitutional) laws and several international Treaties.27 
                                                        
25  Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage 16 February 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AS7584. 
26  Several more organizations, which were not a party to the proceedings, did provide fi-
nancial or other more general support. For example the group got endorsements from the 
Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange (NACEE, as of 2004 the 
Fulbright Center) serving the interests of students from the USA. and also more general 
human rights NGOs like the Netherlands Helsinki Committee (NHC).  
27  The EU law argument on which the matter would ultimately be decided by the ECJ – the 
violation of the standstill clause of the Association Agreement – was only one of the ar-
guments put forward. Following in large part the article by Groenendijk & Kortmann, the 
policy was also argued to be in violation of Art. 104 the Dutch Constitution, Art. 8 and 
Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 26 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Social Charter and the European Con-
vention on Establishment. At a later stage, in second instance, the Family Reunification 
→ 
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The legal strategy included bringing forward multiple legal challenges to the 
policy based on different national and international laws. As the lawyer in the 
case confirmed, this was firstly a matter of spreading your bets and “trying to 
collect as many arguments as possible”, however this strategy also made sure 
that the interests of different societal groups were covered, in order to tie the 
different migrant organizations to the cause. For instance, the argument of a 
conflict with the provisions in the Association Agreement applied only to Turks, 
for other groups other arguments were needed. For Moroccans for instance: 
Constitution and Article 26 ICCPR (anti-discrimination), and for refugees: Arti-
cle 8 ECHR (right to family life). The argument thus had to be built differently 
for the different groups represented in the civil proceedings.  
One of the two main problems that had to be overcome was the standing of 
the plaintiffs, who had to have a demonstrable interest in the disputed legisla-
tion. The second issue was the question of whether or not the civil suit would be 
deemed justified by the judges, based on the prerequisite of having no remedy 
under administrative law.28 In the first two instances, most of the migrant organ-
izations were ruled to be inadmissible based on the aforementioned requirement 
of demonstrable interest, and all legal arguments were rejected except for the 
arguments based on the Association Agreement and a possible infringement of 
Article 8 ECHR.29 Both the plaintiffs and the state appealed the decision in se-
cond instance and finally the case was brought before the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands (Hoge Raad, the highest Dutch court in civil, criminal and tax law). 
As a result, the Working Group had to increase their already significant fund-
raising efforts, because this procedure meant that they had to hire a qualified 
cassation attorney. Despite the fact that this lawyer submitted a pleading of 118 
points spread over forty pages, which was incidentally also reviewed by the 
academic involved, the case was dismissed in its entirety. All the plaintiffs were 
                                                        
Directive 2003/86, which had entered into force in 2005, was also included by the Work-
ing Group.  
28  Under Dutch established case law one requirement for civil redress against a public body 
is that no remedy exists under administrative law. 
29  During the legal proceedings contact was also made with members or committees of the 
parliament. The Parliamentary Committee on Justice was moved to ask parliamentary 
questions, especially in order to get a response to the court ruling, with some success: As 
a result of the first judgment in the civil proceedings and the resulting debate in the 
House, Art. 3.34f Voorschrift Vreemdelingen 2000 was introduced into Dutch law, which 
grants exemption from charges if “the foreigner makes justified use of Article 8 ECHR 
and proves not to have the means to meet the obligatory fees.” At least in one case, of a 
Moroccan father who could not pay the total fee of EUR 2,290 for his four children, this 
claim was brought to court. On which the professor states critically: “The fact that the 
Dutch government left it to the courts to decide the matter, is illustrative for the adamant 
stance of the current Minister and the IND. Respect for human rights has to be enforced 
through the courts.” 
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deemed inadmissible because of their lack of demonstrable personal interest. 
Moreover, as was initially feared, and following the position of the Dutch gov-
ernment in the case, the Supreme Court ruled the claim to be a matter that could 
be appealed before the administrative courts and therefore inadmissible in the 
civil courts.30 The court upheld the argument of the Dutch State that the admin-
istrative courts provided sufficient safeguards for individual residence permit 
applicants. Thus, after seven years and three instances the case was dismissed 
and left the Working Group empty-handed, save for a total bill of over 57,000 
euro. Moreover, they were ordered to bear the additional costs of around 10,000 
euro incurred by the state. The resulting expenses thus amounted to approxi-
mately 70,000 euro.  
Administrative Law 
As a second strategy, simultaneously with the civil suit, cases were being sought 
among possible individual claimants whose situation would lend itself to being 
litigated upon in order to attack the policy through administrative law. The ar-
gument for employing this strategy was put forward in one of the earlier meet-
ings of the Working Group by the lawyer in the case (and coincidentally the 
lawyer in the civil suit as well) that civil judges might argue that the administra-
tive remedy had not been pursued – an assessment that, as we have seen, would 
later prove to be correct. He initially advocated starting administrative proce-
dures by letting people file for refunds of the excessive fees. In order to do this, 
a sample request was drawn up and used by the IOT and associated lawyers to 
provide to members and lawyers’ clients. Several cases were brought to the 
courts this way by the IOT for some of their Turkish followers, and also by affil-
iated lawyers on behalf of other groups such as Polish and Romanian clients. 
However, the case that would later end up at the ECJ, landed on the lawyer’s 
desk fortuitously through his general practice.   
The client, a Turkish national who had obtained a residence permit in the 
Netherlands to live with his Dutch wife, applied for an extension of his permit. 
Due to the fact that he was too late paying the administrative fee for this applica-
tion (which amounted to 169 euro) his application was not considered, and the 
client received notification ordering him to leave the country. In 2003, the law-
yer filed a complaint on his behalf against the refusal and the case was eventual-
ly brought before the court in Rotterdam in 2004. As it turned out, this case lent 
itself perfectly to the Working Group’s intended goal. The lawyer, who was the 
leading lawyer in the Working Group, explains that he largely used the same 
                                                        
30  Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage 16 February 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AS7584. 
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arguments in the administrative law case as were formulated for the purpose of 
the civil suit. 
 
“We were looking for individual cases to fight the battle on two fronts. They came 
to me mainly because their request for a permit was denied. However, the case of 
my client allowed us to address the issue by means of administrative law as well.”  
 
In May 2005, the court in Rotterdam, like the courts in the first two instances of 
the civil suit, judged in favour of his client and confirmed that the standstill 
clause in the Association Agreement prohibited the introduction of new re-
strictions on the conditions of access for Turkish nationals.31 The introduced 
increase in fees was indeed considered a ‘new restriction’ as prohibited by the 
provision and thus in breach of the standstill clause. The state appealed this 
decision before the Council of State, which in May 2006, referred several ques-
tions to the Court of Justice regarding the legality of the Dutch policy in light of 
the Association Agreement.  
After over three years, in September 2009, the ECJ confirmed the implica-
tions of the standstill clause in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80, pointing out that 
this Article had direct effect. The Article thus prohibited Member States from 
introducing new restrictions on the conditions of access to employment applica-
ble to Turkish workers and members of their families who had fulfilled the legal 
requirements. The Court held that Member States could introduce new re-
strictions on Turkish citizens where these same restrictions also applied to 
Community nationals; however, Member States could not subject Turkish na-
tionals to new obligations which were disproportionate compared with those 
established for Community nationals. It was thus considered to be dispropor-
tionate to charge Turkish nationals administrative expenses amounting to 169 
euro on submission of their application for a residence permit (or extension 
thereof), when this charge was only thirty euro for Community nationals.32 Six 
months later, in March 2010, the Council of State followed the ECJ’s judgment 
and declared the increase in administrative fees to be in violation of the stand-
still clause, and so the appeal was upheld. It was an individual victory for the 
client who was granted his application, yet only a partial victory from the per-
spective of the Working Group, whose aim was to challenge the legality of the 
                                                        
31  The court referred to the earlier judgment by the District Court of The Hague, which had 
decided on the matter in the civil suit, and adopted its reasoning. 
32  Who also receive residence permits with a longer period of validity, so that they do not 
have to apply for the renewal of residence permits as often. In this respect raising the fees 
for all applicants, including Community nationals, would have made the increase legally 
sound. However, the political backlash from such a decision could have been much 
greater. 
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fees policy in its entirety, irrespective of the origin of the applicant, and not only 
for Turkish nationals. 
Complaints to the European Commission 
A third strategy employed by the Working Group entailed complaining to the 
European Commission. One of the lawyers involved in the Working Group 
pleaded for such a strategy in order to provoke infringement proceedings against 
the Netherlands for not complying with EU law. This lawyer, himself special-
ized in the Association Agreement, filed the complaint on behalf of his Turkish 
partner, who was personally confronted with the increased administrative fees 
while filing for a renewal of her permit. The IOT had previous experience with 
complaints to the Commission. The earlier ‘Working Group Social Security’ had 
also applied this strategy. In that instance, however, the Commission did not 
start proceedings against the Netherlands, and urged the IOT to try and elicit 
preliminary questions in a court case.33 In the case of the administrative fees, the 
Commission turned out to be more willing and started the informal phase of the 
infringement procedure in early 2005, informing the Netherlands that it consid-
ered the administrative fees system to be in violation of the standstill clause in 
the Association Agreement. In 2007, after an unsuccessful informal phase, (and 
significantly after the preliminary reference by the Dutch Council of State) the 
Commission started infringement proceedings against the Netherlands.34 The 
ECJ stayed these proceedings in expectation of its own judgment in the prelimi-
nary reference case that had been on the docket since 2006. In its final judgment, 
in April 2010, the Court confirmed its conclusions in that case, stating that the 
Netherlands had indeed failed to fulfil its obligations based on Article 9 of the 
Association Agreement, Article 41 of the Additional Protocol and Articles 10(1) 
and 13 of Decision No 1/80.  
C.7  Effects of the Various Cases for Dutch Policy  
Taken together, these proceedings show that the Working Group was quite suc-
cessful in mobilising strong opposition and putting pressure on the Dutch gov-
ernment from multiple angles to get it to change its policy. As a direct result of 
the ECJ judgment, fees for the applications (extension or permanent) by Turks 
were reduced to the fees paid by EU citizens – from 200 euro or 400 euro re-
                                                        
33  Groenendijk, Rondhuis & Strik 2015. 
34  C-92/07 European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
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spectively to forty euro.35 Similarly, as a result of the infringement proceedings, 
fees for the applications by Turkish nationals for residence with their (working) 
partner were lowered to sixty euro.36 The combination of these two ECJ judg-
ments thus resulted in helping to bring down the fees for Turkish applicants to 
the level of the fees for EU citizens.  
However, the impact of these judgments was not limited to these conse-
quences but had significant follow-up effects. The wording of the two judgments 
was later also codified in a new EU Directive on the permits of migrant workers, 
stating that the fee for the permit must be proportionate.37 Furthermore, the 
judgment in the infringement proceedings played an important role in subse-
quent proceedings on the legality of the integration requirement for Turkish 
citizens.38 Additionally, these judgments also sparked discussion about the legal-
ity of the high fees for residence permits that were granted under the Family 
Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC and Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents. At the beginning of the 
legal action, negotiations on these two relevant new Directives had just been 
completed. It was clear that about two years later (when they came into force) 
the rules in the Directives could also be used as arguments. The duration of the 
cases in the Netherlands meant that the substantive law changed along with the 
relevant actors. Where opportunities at supranational level were at first limited 
to the Association Agreement, these Directives provided more opportunities and 
other actors became involved, including the European Commission, the Europe-
an Parliament and eventually the ECJ. These arguments were brought forward in 
second instance in the civil suit as well as in the administrative law case. How-
ever, since that preliminary reference was decided with regard to Turkish na-
tionals only and the arguments in the civil suit were thrown out altogether, a 
complaint to the Commission was chosen as an alternative, again resulting in 
infringement proceedings in 2010.39 
The judgment in the infringement case initially led to a reduction in the fees 
for the residence permit for long-term resident third country nationals from 400 
euro to 130 euro. The latter amount was increased shortly afterwards to 152 
euro, but since then also applies to long-term resident third country nationals 
                                                        
35  Estimated cost Dutch treasury: € 250,000 for the purpose of restitution, four million loss 
on an annual basis. Kamerstukken II 20092010, 30 573, nr. 48. 
36  Estimated cost Dutch treasury: € 140,000 for the purpose of restitution, two million loss 
on an annual basis. Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 30 573, nr. 56. 
37  Council Directive 2011/98/EU, Article 10. 
38  The EC declared, in a reaction arising from subsequent complaints about the integration 
policy, that they saw the judgments on the fees as a support for critical monitoring of the 
Dutch policy on other issues. Groenendijk, Rondhuis & Strik 2015. 
39  C-508/10, European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
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from another Member State (as a student, as family and as a working or eco-
nomically inactive person) in the Netherlands.40 A few months later, the Dutch 
Council of State declared that the ECJ’s judgment also applied to the fees for 
family reunification. These fees were subsequently reduced from 1,250 euro 
plus 250 euro per accompanying family member to 225 euro per family mem-
ber. Furthermore, the Council of State decided in mid-2014, again citing the 
judgment of the ECJ that the amount for large families could lead to an obstruc-
tion to integration. The fees for minors were therefore reduced to fifty-two euro 
per child. After the judgment of the Council of State on the analogous applica-
tion of that judgment to family reunification, the Department of Justice also 
halved the fees for students and researchers from 600 euro to 300 euro.41  
We can conclude that the effects of the Working Group’s efforts via the 
courts, including the ECJ judgments, were significant. The reduction in fees 
increasingly applied not only to Turkish citizens but also to all third country 
nationals, regardless of nationality. They were thus quite successful in contest-
ing Dutch policy by invoking EU law and soliciting ECJ judgments. Moreover, 
the outcome of these cases also had beneficial effects for Turkish citizens and 
third country nationals living in other countries.42 Following the judgments of 
the Court of Justice in both infringement proceedings on the fees, new EU Di-
rectives for all other groups of third country nationals (including workers and 
students) included the rule that the fees could not be ‘disproportionate or exces-
sive’.43 These judgments by the Court on this point, therefore, were also mean-
ingful for large groups of immigrants from countries outside the EU in all Mem-
ber States.44 The judgments of the Court of Justice about the fees were also a 
major incentive for lawyers to litigate against other measures in migration law, 
because they were a strong argument that new restrictive policies were probably 
also at odds with the standstill clause. Furthermore, the European Commission 
considered the rulings on the fees a support in its debate with the Dutch gov-
                                                        
40  These people had to pay between € 430 and € 830 before the judgment. 
41  At the time of writing the high fees for labour migrants are still under litigation. 
42  Shortly after Bart De Wever of the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) was elected in 2013 as 
mayor of Antwerp, the City Council decided to charge a fee of € 250 for the registration 
of any “new residents of foreign origin”. That decision was overruled by the Governor of 
the Province of Antwerp with reference to the decisions of the ECJ. The German Federal 
Administrative Court also stated that the fees for residence permits of Turkish citizens 
and long-term residents, considering all three judgments of the ECJ on the Dutch fees, 
should be the same as for EU citizens. Schaap 2014, 432. 
43  The Single Permit Directive 2011/98 Article 10, the Seasonal Workers Directive 2014/36 
Article 19, the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive 2014/66 Article 16 and the pro-
posed formulation of Article 31 of the revision of the Visa Directive 2004/114. 
44  With the exception of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, who had opted out of Directives 
2003/86 and 2003/109. 
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ernment on other immigration measures. The judgments thus had, as a side ef-
fect, the mobilisation of other actors: Turks complaining to the IOT about re-
jected refunds (which eventually resulted through the mobilisation of the IOT in 
new lawsuits and a follow-up complaint to the EC), lawyers who brought cases 
based on the judgments, as well as the European Commission which felt sup-
ported by the ECJ in its debate with the Dutch government on other immigration 
measures. 
C.8  Deductions From a Long Contest: Credentials of the Working Group  
The Working Group consisted of an informal collaboration of people who al-
ready knew each other from previous endeavours. Of course it was not a random 
group of individuals. The collective expertise was significant and in addition a 
number of those involved had previous experience with legal mobilisation strat-
egies. It was a small club with sufficient relevant expertise in many different 
areas, including EU law, procedural and national rules, a network of strategic 
partners and the activation of the grassroots of the IOT. The group, that was on 
occasion accompanied by other lawyers and representatives from other interest 
groups, in all those years, came together approximately only ten times as most 
contact was via email. Outside this limited organization, this also emphasised 
that long-term commitment to the group was needed. As the IOT coordinator 
stressed: “What you mainly need is perseverance and a lot of patience”.  
The trajectory of the IOT cases did not come about coincidentally but was 
the result of a thoroughly planned strategy (albeit of course with significant 
uncertainties and contingencies) by some key expert players. The support (fi-
nancial or otherwise) of certain experts was an important element in the decision 
to litigate as well as the potential success of legal action. Apart from the fact that 
the initial legal strategy was in large part inspired by the article on the unlawful-
ness of the fee increases,45 the expertise of one of the authors, a European migra-
tion law professor was also of great value during the proceedings. His role, not 
only in close cooperation with the leading IOT lawyer (commenting on all draft 
documents) but also in activating his own network by passing on information 
strategically to other possible key players, had been significant. For example, the 
documentation shows the professor sending information to a befriended official 
in the European Commission and to the Advisory Committee on Migration Af-
fairs (ACVZ).46 Additionally, the Working Group chairman (along with the 
                                                        
45  Groenendijk & Kortmann 2003. 
46  The ACVZ was at that time working on a report on the fees for the Ministry, which was 
later used in court cases as supporting evidence. 
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professor) was a member of the Standing Committee of Experts on International 
Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law (Commissie Meijers), a group of pro-
fessors, judges, attorneys and academics in Europe who “systematically assess 
European legislative proposals in the areas of criminal law, migration law, pri-
vacy, and discrimination on their conformity with the requirements of a demo-
cratic constitutional state” and with close connection to the (inter)national politi-
cal arena “informing both houses of the Netherlands parliament about significant 
developments in negotiations between the Member States on directives and 
regulations”.47 The Working Group of the IOT thus featured some heavyweights 
in the field of EU law as well as European civil society, joining forces with sev-
eral other lawyers with their own relevant specialization who all (except for the 
leading lawyer) acted pro bono. Incidentally, this also points to the vulnerability 
of such organized advocacy; being very much dependent upon the expertise and 
willingness of a small group of people. A significant Achilles’ heel when com-
pared to the ability to employ specialists, the so-called ‘hired guns’, by the more 
affluent actors. 
C.9  The ECJ as an Unintended Target 
Importantly, despite the organised efforts behind litigation in this case, and de-
spite the far-reaching consequences of the different ECJ judgments, it was never 
the explicit aim of the Working Group to reach the ECJ. The fact that in first and 
second instances the Working Group’s claims based on the Association Agree-
ment had been vindicated showed the potential for success based on EU law at 
the national level. Bringing the cases to the ECJ via preliminary questions was 
never an explicit part of their strategy. In fact, in internal communications to the 
leading lawyer on the strategy before the Council of State, the academic in-
volved, well aware of the ECJ’s production time, closed with:  
 
“Incidentally, I fear, however, that the Council of State will have the tendency to 
refer the case to the Court of Justice. And then we will be in the waiting room for 
two years. Therefore, don’t mention it and present everything as clear and already 
decided by the Court.” 
 
Next to general concerns of a prolonged process, since their case involved an 
actual individual litigant, the interests of the client were considered as well. As 
the lawyer explained, for the individual involved, it is not a most welcome de-
velopment when their case gets extended by, in Case Study C, another three and 
                                                        
47  http://www.commissie-meijers.nl/en [last accessed 10 November 2017]. 
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a half years, due to a reference to the ECJ. Therefore the preference was for a 
national judgment with the same effect. In this respect, it is striking that the 
outcome of the final judgment of the ECJ on conflict with the Association 
Agreement had been confirmed both in first instance in the administrative law 
case and in the civil proceedings by successively the Court and the Court of 
Appeal. The ECJ arguably served as a supreme court in finalizing this interpre-
tation. 
Although the ECJ judgment served as a vindication of the Working Group’s 
efforts, their success was thus already evident at earlier stages. As the professor 
explains:  
 
“The importance of that court ruling, the first judgment on the administrative fees is 
that they had said that a) it is in breach of the standstill provision, and b) in 
circumstances can also lead to conflict with Art. 8 ECHR. That judgement supported 
the action and legitimized it to the group itself and to the outside. So, towards 
lawyers and other relevant people it showed we had a point. And at the same time it 
delegitimised the government and the policy. So the Ministry of Justice from that 
moment on was on the defensive. I think that court ruling was ten times if not 100 
times more important than that of the Supreme Court. The first blow is actually half 
the battle in this case.” 
 
Part of the effort was convincing other lawyers to file similar claims. As the 
leading lawyer describes: 
 
“For me, the administrative fees had become somewhat of a private hobby. I have 
asked other lawyers, why do you never bring up those fees in court? And when they 
reply, well my clients never asked me to. Of course, that was rare for me as well. 
Because people came to you because their application has been refused.”  
 
The eventual Supreme Court ruling in the civil suit was disappointing to the 
Working Group, but meanwhile, the administrative procedure was already well 
on its way and the earlier case and judgment had already had their effect. Such 
lower rulings thus can have a major impact. Why it eventually had to be fought 
all the way to the ECJ can largely be attributed to the attitude of the Dutch gov-
ernment. 
C.10  Government Stance as Push Factor 
The uncompromising stance of the Dutch government served as a push factor in 
the direction of legal action, essentially channelling all opposition through the 
courts. The Working Group’s decision to litigate came after political lobbying 
yielded little result. Illustrative in this respect, next to the unsuccessful attempts 
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for political pressure by the IOT in the early stages, is the way the administra-
tion dealt with restitution claims subsequent to the ECJ ruling. The then Secre-
tary of State Albayrak herself explicitly showed the IOT the way to court. In 
early 2010, in consultation with the State Secretary on the refund of previously 
unlawfully levied fees, the IOT was told that the initiated legal process would be 
completed and that no restitution would be made on the basis of the ECJ judg-
ment. ‘If you believe that the arrangements made by the government are in con-
flict with European law, then you should submit your claim to the court’ she 
added.48 Moreover, with the delay in the court proceedings the costs could be 
passed on to a new administration. The number of court cases related to the fees 
illustrates the active legal opposition to the policy and also the rigidity of the 
national system. The prolonged duration of all the different court cases with 
distinct but limited effects served the Dutch government in that in the meantime 
it was able to rely on the continued income from the higher fees for other cate-
gories of migrants that had yet to be contested successfully.49  
Relatedly, as previously hinted at by Broberg and Fenger, the stance of the 
authorities (or other opposing party in the case of civil proceedings) plays an 
important part as well, and persistence thus goes for both the individuals as well 
as their opposition. In this respect, multiple (migration and social security) law-
yers point to the tendency on the part of the Dutch government to keep litigat-
ing, regardless of context or expected outcome. For such cases to reach the ECJ, 
then, depends in large part on the willingness of litigants to go up against the 
state. On the consequences of their efforts against the Dutch policy the leading 
lawyer concludes:  
 
“Because the legal battle over the fees has taken so long, the Dutch government has 
been able to continue for a long time to unlawfully levy these fees. In the case of 
Turkish nationals, a refund scheme existed for some time, although the disclosure of 
this arrangement also immediately meant the end of it.50 Thus, a large number of 
Turkish nationals have never been able to make use of this so-called transitional 
arrangement.” 
                                                        
48  Inspraak Orgaan Turken in Nederland, Jaarverslag 2010, 2010, 9. Retrieved from: 
http://www.iot.nl/?page=sayfa&sayfa_id=43 [last Accessed 2 November 2017]. 
49  In the end, the Ministry paid a refund to only a very small proportion of the Turkish 
citizens who had paid the unlawfully high fees since 2003. A ruling by the Council of 
State in September 2011 stated that the government was required to refund the overpay-
ment only to Turkish citizens who opposed the fees from the outset, even when those 
procedures were then hopeless in a national legal context. Restitution requests cost up to 
€ 300,- per person, therefore the number of people actually applying would be slim, and 
for the state the restitution of these few complaints would still be significantly lower than 
any collective scheme. 
50  ABRvS 2 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BR6949. 
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The unlawfulness of the Dutch policy has thus gone largely unpunished and 
unlawfully levied fees, adding up to millions of euros of additional income for 
the ministry on an annual basis, have been largely retained.51  
C.11  Advantages of Organised Opposition 
The IOT was able to serve the interests of a large and relatively homogeneous 
group with similar interests, which, next to resources and lack of success in the 
political sphere, served as an explanation for their choice to litigate. The Work-
ing Group effectively created a constituency around the issue of the new Dutch 
administrative fees policy. The direct constituency of the IOT, Turks living in 
the Netherlands, was additionally, though separately, protected by the Associa-
tion Agreement EEC/Turkey. However, this case shows how the development of 
a precedent can subsequently also result in legal developments that affect other 
groups. The strategy of the Working Group was exactly this, as explained by the 
lawyer:  
 
“The scope of this case did not go beyond the Turks. But when the judge in the 
administrative proceedings ruled that the fees are an additional restriction given the 
Association Agreement, a lot was gained. If this falls, everything falls was the idea.”  
 
This strategy, extending beyond the single case and for the interests of multiple 
stakeholders, indicates explicitly repeat player behaviour in the sense of ‘playing 
for the rules’. Although well organised, the effort saw its fair share of obstacles, 
among which were the eventual costs of around 70,000 euro in total. From the 
broader perspective, this amount was a relatively small investment when com-
pared to the many millions the state would lose as a result, and how much ex-
penditure the immigrants would save. Nevertheless, it was an amount that was 
not easily brought up, even for a well-organised group like this one. In the end 
they were unable to cover the total amount from the contributions of the various 
supporting organizations. As the academic involved recalled: “We had mis-
judged a bit how expensive of a hobby it would turn out to be”. Eventually, it 
was thanks to one private donor and a test cases fund that the Working Group 
was able to cover all the expenses. 
 
                                                        
51  See Case Study C paragraph 7. 
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7 Challenges and Opportunities 
7.1  Introduction 
Social movement scholarship has documented a general increase over the past 
decades in social movements’ tendency to turn to the law and pursue litigation 
strategies in their efforts to bring about social change.1 In the study of European 
integration the role of social movement activists in mobilising EU law and acti-
vating the preliminary reference mechanism, and with it feeding integration 
dynamics, has been an important focus of research.2 Several studies have re-
vealed the involvement and at times significant successes of interest groups and 
strategic litigation in different areas of EU law.3 While the European system has 
been described as a particularly viable opportunity for politicised litigation, with 
the opportunity of using EU law and the preliminary reference procedure to put 
pressure on national policy, social movement and legal activism scholarship has 
yet to engage fully with the European legal system as a potentially rich area for 
inquiry.4 On the other hand, European integration scholarship has hardly ven-
tured beyond reiterating classic examples of the use of EU law and the ECJ for 
political ends in the past,5 and has paid little attention to analysing what legal 
mobilisation in an EU law context entails, when it occurs and under what condi-
tions it can be an effective avenue for social change. Where neofunctionalist 
literature hypothesizes that litigants will draw on EU law to promote their inter-
ests whenever there is a potential benefit to doing so,6 others have concluded 
that, despite the numerous situations in which a litigation strategy could have 
been profitably employed, EU law litigation strategies are used relatively infre-
quently.7 Empirical analysis of strategic EU law mobilisation is as yet sparse 
and inconclusive. 
Where the previous chapters mainly showed how the reference procedure 
can be an obstacle to those who are confronted with it, this chapter focuses on 
                                                        
1  McCammon & McGrath 2015.  
2  Alter & Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994; Alter & Vargas 2000; Börzel 2006; Cichowski 1998 
and 2006; Conant 2002 and 2003; Kelemen 2006.  
3  Alter & Vargas 2000; Börzel 2006; Cichowski 1998 and 2006; Conant 2002 and 2003; 
Harlow & Rawlings 1992; Kelemen 2006; Micklitz 2005; Micklitz & Reich 1996. 
4  Scholars point to a more general gap between social movement research and sociolegal 
studies, see McCann 2006; Rubin 2001.  
5  As described in more detail in Chapter 2 a few ‘token cases’ play an important part in the 
discourses on empowerment-through-law and participation-through-law-enforcement. 
6  Such reasoning can be found in Burley & Mattli 1993; Mattli & Slaughter 1998; Stone 
Sweet & Brunell 1998. 
7  Alter & Vargas 2000. 
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the question of who is most likely to make use of the opportunities in EU law 
and which legal strategies are effective. We have seen how practitioners play an 
integral part in preliminary reference cases when it comes to effective advocacy, 
when references to the ECJ more or less come as a surprise. Other references are 
the result (at least in part) of parties and especially their counsel ‘pushing for’ a 
reference, or strategic players may interpose in a case after reference to the ECJ. 
The forms of EU law mobilisation and the activation of the preliminary refer-
ence procedure are thus manifold, and by no means always a manifestation of a 
supranational legal strategy, or a ‘demand for integration’ as some have defined 
it.8 The question of successful mobilisation of EU law is a pertinent one since 
strategic litigation is one of the ways in which both supranational as well as 
domestic legal and political developments are shaped. The reverse question, 
when and why EU law is not mobilised, may be important, since this may reveal 
structural obstacles and inequalities inherent in the European legal system. In 
this chapter, I will therefore focus on the mobilisation of EU law and the activa-
tion of the preliminary reference procedure as part of strategic litigation, analyse 
obstacles to using the procedure as a legal tool, as well as the coping strategies 
strategic actors have developed to navigate the European legal system. 
7.2  Opportunities in EU Law 
Litigation has long been recognised among political scientists, as one of the 
methods employed by interest groups in fighting for political change. In 1992, 
Harlow and Rawlings published their extensive work on the strategic use of 
courts and the legal system by pressure groups in the United Kingdom.9 Their 
book is an exposé on what they bring under the general header of ‘pressure 
through law’, or “the use of law and legal techniques as an instrument for ob-
taining wider collective objectives”.10 They set out to analyse the use of law by 
organised interests or ‘pressure groups’ and ‘cause groups’ in terms of collective 
interest representation and cause lawyering in both a historic as well as contem-
porary perspective. Harlow and Rawlings show how, by looking at the case of 
the UK, the use of courts for political ends is not exclusively an American phe-
nomenon11 and can be identified as a practice in the UK as far back as the 18th 
                                                        
8  Wind, Martinsen & Potger 2013; Broberg & Fenger 2013; Carrubba and Murrah 2005; 
Golub 1996. 
9  Harlow & Rawlings 1992. 
10  Harlow & Rawlings 1992, 1.  
11  This (typically American, as Vauchez (2008a, 449) argues) political science perspective 
may be in part responsible for the focus on ‘pressure through EU law’ by political scien-
tists when approaching the EU legal system.  
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century. They point to a fairly recent shift towards litigation as a method of 
campaigning by British interest organisations that saw their chances of gaining 
entry by lobbying diminish due to changes in governmental attitudes in the 
1980s. They furthermore cite the rise of the EU together with increasingly legal-
istic frameworks in governmental systems as creating new ‘windows of oppor-
tunity’ for pressure through law.12 It has generally been understood that litiga-
tion, a court’s resolution of societal questions or disputes, can lead to the clarifi-
cation and expansion of existing laws and to the construction of new rules, and 
in that sense provides opportunities for strategic actors.13 Here, I use the term 
strategic litigation as a generic denotation of all forms of the use of law and 
legal techniques as an instrument for obtaining wider collective objectives. With 
the term cause lawyers I mean those practitioners who are disposed to the usage 
of law for the promotion of social change, especially in order to empower the 
weaker members of society. 
The idea that the legal system can be a potent tool for political influence is 
hardly novel, yet EU law mobilisation differs from traditional litigation strate-
gies, in that it provides a unique way for groups to influence national policy. The 
EU legal system, which includes private parties as subjects, has changed the 
field opportunities for such forms of ‘pressure through law’.14 As Chalmers & 
Chaves conclude, “as a preliminary ruling resettles the legal settlement it attracts 
those who litigate to change the law to meet ideological preferences. Litigation 
offers high returns here, as it does not require litigants to negotiate with other 
constituencies. Judgments of the Court of Justice are almost never overturned, 
and, in terms of profile for the litigants and entrenching particular belief-
systems, rulings govern a large territory of nearly half a billion people”.15  
Using EU law has advantages that a domestic legal strategy does not offer. 
In its most influential form, the preliminary reference procedure serves as a form 
of judicial review of domestic legislation by invoking (higher order) EU law. 
Alter and Vargas describe the effect the European legal system has had on poli-
tics within the Member States, by providing domestic groups with a tool that can 
be used to impose new costs on their government.16 They posit that the possibil-
ity of mobilising EU law has transformed previously weak organizations with 
little leverage in domestic politics into veritable political players capable of 
directly influencing national policy. The EU legal system creates the means to 
circumvent the domestic system, allowing a litigation strategy to succeed with 
                                                        
12  Cf. Kelemen 2011. 
13  Shapiro 1981.  
14  Kelemen 2011. 
15  Chalmers & Chaves 2012, 35.  
16  Alter & Vargas 2000. 
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the support of only a few (lower level) members of the national judiciary. Fur-
thermore, a change in policy based on EU law is much harder for national gov-
ernments to reverse than a legal victory based on domestic law, because such a 
reversal would require legislating at the European level.  
From a rule of law perspective – the idea that law, the legal system and es-
pecially judicial review provide the means for the public to call their govern-
ment to account – EU law and the preliminary reference procedure provide 
means of review of government acts that were previously unavailable. The mo-
bilisation of EU law in the national courtroom thus provides the public with new 
means of addressing possible government trespasses as well as bypassing the 
domestic system by invoking the powers of the ECJ. While the vast majority of 
EU law claims are still dealt with within the national courtrooms, the prelimi-
nary reference procedure provides a form of supranational judicial review, and 
judgments on principle by the ECJ have the capacity to halt certain national 
policies and set precedents that have an effect beyond the nation-state. In this 
sense, the shield and sword analogy, as borrowed from Dworkin, has been used 
to describe the use of EU law and preliminary reference procedure as a strategic 
tool in the hands of litigants and civil society.17  
7.3  The EU Legal System Reviewed 
Before going further it is useful to characterise the preliminary reference system, 
and scrutinise this idea of EU law and the preliminary reference procedure as a 
potential tool in the hands of domestic groups aiming to influence national poli-
cy. Although the idea of the legal system as a potent tool for influencing nation-
al policy is not new, the EU legal system has a distinct nature compared to more 
traditional forms of litigation strategies. A useful way of assessing the oppor-
tunity structure in legal systems focuses on the nature of legal opportunities and 
amount of access available to actors who aim to use the law as a strategic tool. 
In this respect, Harlow and Rawlings distinguish between three ideal types of 
judicial review. The first of these models, the ‘drainpipe’, is described as ‘a 
narrow tube barred at intervals by valves’. This inflexible system is thus charac-
terised by significant procedural barriers at different stages of legal action. Only 
when the threshold requirements of one of these stages have been met, is a case 
deemed eligible for a next stage in the pathway to judicial review. Access to 
courts in such a system is very limited. At the opposite end of the spectrum we 
find what they call the ‘freeway’ model. This ideal type of a system of judicial 
review is characterised by permeability at every stage of the action. “While the 
                                                        
17  European Parliament 2007a. 
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drainpipe treats judicial review largely as a mechanism for the protection of 
individual and private rights and is therefore relatively difficult for non-parties 
to permeate, the freeway is especially favourable to permeation by non-parties, 
including groups.” Finally, Harlow and Rawlings provide a third model, ‘the 
funnel’, which takes a compromise position between the other two. 18 For the 
purposes of clarifying the EU preliminary reference system, the two models at 
the extremes serve as a benchmark.  
Looking at the setup of the EU legal system it is not hard to discount the 
‘freeway’ model as an apt description for the nature of the judicial review by the 
ECJ. For private parties, direct access to the ECJ is limited to contesting the 
validity of measures adopted by EU institutions. Furthermore, the strict interpre-
tation of standing rules by the ECJ means that such EU measures can only be 
contested if and when they directly affect a party. In practice, this means that 
only a very small minority of private parties may be eligible to access the ECJ 
via this route and access is arguably even more restricted if not impossible for 
pressure groups that are unlikely to fulfil these standing requirements. Further-
more, the opportunity for third party interventions in ECJ cases in general is as 
of yet very limited.19 The remaining access points to the ECJ are characterised 
by limited control over whether or not one is able to reach the Court. Private 
parties thus have no direct way of challenging Member States’ policies for non-
compliance with EU law before the ECJ. The EU system, that combines both 
centralised and decentralised EU law enforcement, provides private parties with 
two alternatives for reaching the ECJ. The first is the possibility of petitioning 
the European Commission to start infringement proceedings against a Member 
State by lodging a complaint. From the perspective of strategic actors, this ave-
nue, although in effect a potent legal measure against Member States, does not 
give any control over whether or not a case is brought, or over the substance of 
the subsequent legal action. Because of their judicial review character and their 
high impact, potential preliminary references are therefore the theoretically most 
auspicious option.20 
Legal strategies are influenced to a great extent by the procedural context of 
the legal action, and this EU law avenue comes with its own peculiarities that 
shape the ways in which strategic legal action may be practised. Legal strategies 
that aim to invoke EU law and the authority of the ECJ have to navigate a pro-
cedural context that is unique to the European legal system. Alter and Vargas 
have used the case of the British Equal Opportunities Commission – which was 
                                                        
18  Harlow & Rawlings 1992, 310.  
19  Carrera & Petkova 2013. 
20  See Rasmussen 1986, who shows how, in its early days, the Court made efforts to chan-
nel questions of judicial review through the preliminary reference procedure. 
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successful in shifting the domestic balance of power through Euro-litigation and 
the creation of ECJ jurisprudence – to identify the structural factors that contrib-
ute to successful use of EU law litigation strategies.21 They discern four separate 
steps in EU litigation strategies that determine whether EU law can successfully 
be invoked. The first is the precondition of the existence of relevant EU legisla-
tion, and the ECJ’s interpretation of this law, on which domestic actors can 
draw. Second, is the active usage of EU legal arguments in national court cases. 
Third, is the requirement of support of the national judiciary by reference to the 
ECJ through the preliminary reference procedure or by applying ECJ jurispru-
dence instead of conflicting national legislation. And the fourth and final step is 
the active follow-up of a legal victory by drawing on or creating more legal 
precedents to increase political and material costs for government non-
compliance. 
Alter and Vargas stress that, with the exception of the first, all these steps 
require significant actor agency. The notion of agency plays a significant part in 
legal proceedings in general, but is essential when considering law as a strategic 
tool. Similarly, recent studies on EU law mobilisation in the area of environmen-
tal protection have directed our attention to the significant role, next to structural 
and contextual factors, played by the actors involved in strategic legal action. 
Vanhala, who studied the mobilisation of EU law and strategic litigation among 
environmental groups, concludes, “there is not one overarching theoretical 
branch that can account for legal mobilization dynamics both across and within 
countries”, and she directs future research towards the development of a more 
synthetic theoretical framework “that takes both contextual factors and agent-
level characteristics seriously and explores the interaction between them”.22  
Before strategic action of any sort is channelled through the courts, the issue 
has to be framed and a legal opportunity has to be identified. As is evident from 
the different case studies presented throughout this book, the decision to proceed 
by legal means is often the result of a complex combination of factors. For such 
legal action to be framed as a matter of EU law, it is necessary for the parties to 
identify an opportunity in existing legislation or jurisprudence. After an oppor-
tunity in EU law has been identified, there is a need for a case based on which a 
litigation strategy can be employed. Once a case has been brought before a na-
tional court, the parties need to convince the national judge of the need for a 
referral to the ECJ. And depending on the aims of the legal strategy, there is a 
need for further action. In some cases, an ECJ judgment is decisive for the in-
tended aim; in others further (legal) action is needed. The setup of the EU legal 
system significantly discourages the strategic use of EU law and the preliminary 
                                                        
21  Alter & Vargas 2000. 
22  Vanhala 2017, 34. 
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references system. Yet, strategic litigation is not completely absent among cases 
that reach the ECJ. The next paragraphs will first focus on the requirements for 
strategic action, and subsequently on how strategic actors cope within this con-
text. 
7.4  Awareness, Opportunity and the Litigability of EU Rules 
Scholarship on the interplay between social movements and the legal system has 
distilled some of the strategies that are employed by social movements that em-
ploy litigation as a means to an end. The main strategies that are discerned are 
the strategic choosing of legal areas as well as particular cases, the strategic 
legal framing and the mobilisation of networks of support.23 While the first two 
strategies are aimed particularly at making the most effective use of opportunity 
structures in the legal system as well as trying to steer legal developments dis-
cursively, the last strategy deals more with the broader mobilisation of support 
and media attention for certain cases in order to put additional pressure on gov-
ernment agents. Litigation activism in many respects lacks full control over 
choices regarding issue areas and specific cases and legal strategies are to a 
large extent determined by the legal opportunity structures that are available. 
The EU legal system presents its own opportunities and constraints, and making 
use of the preliminary references system as a means to an end presents its own 
puzzles for those who aim to use it.  
Where in general a legal strategy entails the subsequent steps for identifying 
the issue, finding the right narrative and filing the claim, using EU law and pre-
liminary references as part of a legal strategy is a decidedly more arduous task. 
For example, in the case of direct actions at the ECJ level, legal action entails 
the challenging of a decision by an EU institution. Such legal action is relatively 
straightforward, to the extent that it is clear from the outset what the target is, 
both in terms of the contested act, and the relevant EU legislation, as well as the 
intended court (the ECJ) that will deal with the case. In contrast, using the pre-
liminary reference procedure to challenge national policy based on EU law is 
less straightforward and implies identifying in the national legal system an EU 
principle on which to build an EU law case. This can be relatively more straight-
forward when a national measure flows directly from EU rules. In that case, one 
identifies the EU provision underlying the national measure and challenges the 
national interpretation of that provision. It becomes especially challenging when 
it entails invoking more general principles of EU law, which requires legal ex-
pertise and craft to identify and frame the issue. 
                                                        
23  Vanhala 2012. 
CHAPTER 7 
 
196 
Needless to say, EU law does not affect all policy areas equally,24 and not 
all aspects of European law can be invoked in national courts. In order for EU 
law and the ECJ to become part of a litigation strategy, there has to be an EU 
law or principle on which parties can rely. Whether this is the case is determined 
by the context within which an issue is situated.25 Additionally, opportunities for 
mobilising EU law and the ECJ exist in areas where the interpretation of EU 
legislation is still open-ended. Especially where new EU legislation enters into 
force, the interpretation and application of new EU rules in specific contexts and 
circumstances is often still quite unclear, and new legislation can provide strate-
gic actors with new ammunition to take on national policy. As discussed, the 
relatively high number of references in the areas of migration and asylum law 
can at least partly be attributed to the more recent entry into force of EU Direc-
tives in these particular areas, providing new potential ‘points of contact’ be-
tween EU law and national policy and legislation. In other instances, existing 
EU legislation can become a relevant source of legal contestation when national 
policies change in a way that encroaches on (administrative) boundaries set by 
EU law. We find a prime example of this in Case Study C in which the decades 
old standstill clause in the Association Agreement with Turkey was successfully 
invoked to roll back the new Dutch policy that increased administrative fees for 
residence permits.  
Whether a legal strategy entails invoking new ECJ jurisprudence, focusing 
on more open-ended interpretations of EU law or using existing EU legislation 
and jurisprudence against new national policies, all require an awareness of 
legislative and jurisprudential developments at the EU level as well as the know-
how to signal possible discrepancies between EU law or jurisprudence and na-
tional policy. Such awareness is an important part of what Galanter refers to as 
‘legal competence’ – “the capacity for optimal use of the legal process to pursue 
one’s interests, which includes information, access, judgment, psychic readiness 
and so on”.26 Apart from a general form of agency, such competence also in-
                                                        
24  Research by the Asser Institute in 2007 shows that the size of the Europeanisation of 
national law varies considerably by sector. On environmental protection, for instance, the 
researchers conclude that 66% of all legislation is influenced by the EU. With regard to 
education this amounts to only 6%. Asser Institute, Pilot-Monitor EU Invloed, 2007. 
https://www.recht.nl/exit.html?id=59078&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.asser.nl%2Feurla 
w%2Fdocuments%2Fcms_eurlaw_id52_1_EINDRAPPORT%2520dd%2520061206%2 
520def.pdf [last accessed 9 November 2017]. 
25  Alter & Vargas 2000, show in this respect how the existence of EU law in the area of 
gender equality, the direct effect and supremacy of these laws in the national context, as 
well as the favourable interpretations of these laws by the ECJ, granting more protection 
than existing British legislation, were all important preconditions for domestic groups us-
ing an EU law litigation strategy to challenge national policy.  
26  Galanter 1976. See also Carlin & Howard 1965 and Nonet 1969. 
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cludes a specific form of ‘legal consciousness’. Not to be confused with the 
more anthropological use of the term, I use the term ‘legal consciousness’ as it 
relates to the legal profession, as described by Kennedy: “The main peculiarity 
of this consciousness is that it contains a vast number of legal rules, arguments, 
and theories, a great deal of information about the institutional workings of the 
legal process, and the constellation of ideals and goals current in the profession 
at a given moment.”27 With respect to Euro-litigation strategies, such conscious-
ness thus includes attention to EU rules, ECJ jurisprudence and a general 
knowledge of the European legal process.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, among practitioners and legal advisors such ex-
pertise for signalling opportunities in EU law is not widespread. Differences not 
only occur based on the existence or absence of EU law specialization of any 
lawyer or legal office, but looking at the lawyers in the cases studied reveals 
there is also a clear differentiation among lawyers in different areas of law. 
Where lawyers working in the area of agricultural law, as one of the oldest areas 
of law subject to EU legislation, show more general awareness of EU law, other 
areas of law, where the existence of relevant EU law is still more embryonic, 
show substantially less attention to possible European aspects of legislation and 
ECJ jurisprudence development. Similarly, the relative complexity of the EU 
legal framework, and the related possibilities for using EU law arguments 
against policy or legislation have a bearing on the ease with which such claims 
are brought forward. Among tax consultants, for instance, the applicable EU law 
provides a relatively clear framework for assessing the legality of new national 
measures. In particular, the prohibition of discriminatory restrictions on the 
freedom of persons, services and goods provides an important restriction on new 
national tax policies. As one tax advisor, employed by one of the larger tax firms 
explains:  
 
“Nowadays, the nature of EU law is such that every change in national legislation 
automatically raises the question of whether there is a difference in treatment based 
on nationality. Well then, the legislature of course says, it’s fine. And we often say, 
it’s not fine. And that is what the Court then has to decide.” 
 
Similarly, the standstill clauses in the Association Agreement between the EU 
and Turkey and the Association Council’s decision 1/80, both responsible for a 
significant number of preliminary references,28 provided a clear and simple limit 
                                                        
27  Kennedy 1980, 27.  
28  Since its first judgment in the Demirel case in 1987, the ECJ has handed down over 
sixty-five judgments on EU-Turkey association law. The standstill clauses require that, in 
the event that a Turkish citizen seeks to enter an EU country to make use of his or her 
economic rights, the regulation that applies is the most lenient regulation passed since the 
→ 
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to the measures that were allowed with respect to the rights of Turkish nationals. 
As one of the academics involved in references to the ECJ regarding the Agree-
ment states: 
 
“The advantage of the standstill clause was that it is a relatively clear rule. Other 
legal rules are often far more ambiguous, and one judge may interpret it different 
from another. But the standstill clause simply stipulates that there may be ‘no new 
restriction’, and that that was the case here was obvious.”  
 
The ‘litigability’, an EU rule’s suitability for being used in litigation strategies, 
is thus an important factor in whether or not parties will choose to invoke EU 
law in opposition to national policy. Some rules, such as the mentioned standstill 
clause allow for a fairly straightforward challenge to, in this case, new and 
stricter migration policies in the Netherlands. The litigability of the standstill 
clause has over the years resulted in a significant portion of cases being brought 
before the ECJ in order to shed light on its applicability to various national poli-
cies, most notably in the Netherlands and Germany.29  
In other areas, the signalling of opportunities in EU law requires more com-
plex expertise, both in the sense of awareness as well as in putting such claims 
into practice. Especially, when it comes to signalling the aforementioned con-
flicts between national and EU law, which requires intricate knowledge of both. 
EU law awareness and expertise is not particularly widespread among legal 
practitioners and may be reserved for a minority of legal professionals. Even 
among those who were successful in employing an EU law strategy, such 
awareness was considered limited. For example, the trade union legal expert 
assisting the catering employees (Case Study A) who successfully invoked pro-
tections for employees as laid down in the Transfer of Undertakings Directive in 
court,30 describes the difficulty in identifying such opportunities: 
 
“I think that a lot of opportunities in EU law simply go unseen. We are simply stuck 
thinking in a national framework. And I really think still that there are many cases 
where you can denounce certain issues or policy using an EU directive or whatever. 
Look, whether or not you will be able to make it work practically is another thing. 
But you’ve got to come up with it first.” 
                                                        
Additional Protocol came into effect and the Association Council’s decision was passed. 
Groenendijk 2015. 
29  In the five-year selection period of Dutch references for this study, six out of forty cases 
including individual litigants dealt with Association law, of which three directly with the 
standstill clauses therein. 
30  Council Directive 2001/23/EC. 
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The focus on the domestic legal system in the day-to-day practice of legal pro-
fessionals might thus result in a neglect of opportunities in EU legislation and 
ECJ jurisprudence. 
7.5  Standing Rules and Strategically Choosing Cases 
The mere existence of legislation and opportunities in law, and legal conscious-
ness among litigants and lawyers alone are unlikely to single-handedly produce 
strategic legal action. Law is not self-executing and needs mobilisation by indi-
viduals or groups. Apart from the prerequisite of existing legislation on which a 
claim can be built, the using of EU law arguments in national courts obviously 
requires a court case in which to invoke such arguments. National standing rules 
matter significantly in this respect, and can have a limiting effect on legal oppor-
tunities. Unless generous standing rules are available to interest groups, issues 
have to be addressed based on a party affected by the contested national policy, 
which requires access to potential litigants. As discussed in Chapter 2, EU law 
channels many interests through individual rights language, and therefore legal 
strategies are steered towards employing individual cases.  
Finding such a suitable case is not always as straightforward as one may 
wish, especially when there is the need for cooperation by an individual for 
whom a prolonged legal battle, as described in Chapter 3, can have a significant 
negative personal impact. As explained by the lawyer in Case Study D on pre-
entry integration requirements, after the Dutch government had prevented the 
ECJ judgment by providing a residence permit, he sought another case in which 
he could address the same issue: 
 
“When it comes to preliminary questions, you are talking about three to four years 
that you are completely engaged. And you never know what the outcome is. I can 
say I have strong arguments, but you do not know what the Court is going to say. 
There are strong indications that the Dutch system is not lawful, but there are no 
guarantees. I cannot give my client any certainty. Well, if you tell them that it will 
take five years and I do not know what the outcome will be, then my clients will opt 
out.” 
 
The tensions that arise between the interests of the individual litigant and the 
collective interests that may be served by a single referral to the ECJ, as de-
scribed at the end of Chapter 3, thus have a limiting effect on the pursuit of such 
a strategy. Even if it is fairly certain what the procedural outcome is going to be, 
because no interpretation exists yet on the subject and therefore in all likelihood 
a case will be sent to the ECJ, lawyers have to cope with the tension between the 
wider interests that may be served with a case and the direct interests of the 
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client that may be better served by other means. The outcome is, of course, al-
ways uncertain, so it is an investment that few people are willing to make, unless 
they have no other options.31 As described for instance in Case Study C regard-
ing the legality of integration tests as a requirement for entry into the Nether-
lands, it is simply cheaper as well as faster for applicants to try and pass the test, 
instead of taking on the entire national policy in court. 
Strategic actors like interest groups may aim to use the law and legal tech-
niques as an instrument for obtaining wider collective objectives through solicit-
ing a judgment on principle that sets a favourable precedent. In order to maxim-
ise the impact of one case, in both nationally focused litigation strategies as well 
as strategic litigation aimed at the ECJ, the aim is to provide a case with the best 
‘fit’ for the purpose of the action.32 Having a case with the right context and 
relevant characteristics can significantly increase one’s chances of steering the 
final ECJ decision in a desirable direction. The opposite is also true; when the 
wrong case is referred within the context of the same principle matter, this may 
lead to undesirable outcomes.33 Trying to get the right case referred is therefore 
an important part of strategic litigation. For this reason, strategic actors employ 
the strategy of selecting cases based on their specific characteristics and contex-
tual facts, for if a case is void of any circumstances that may ‘cloud’ a decision 
or result in an unclear ruling due to too many circumstantial facts, it may not 
result in the intended objective. As one tax consultant explained, finding some-
one willing to be the subject of a litigation strategy is further complicated by the 
fact that such a subject also has to have a case with the right context: 
 
“We can only litigate based on someone’s tax returns, so someone must be found 
willing. With this case we really had to search for someone who wanted to do that, 
who also had a good case. You should always find a clean case, without a lot of 
noise. And that is difficult.” 
 
Of course, the fact that these cases reach the Court by way of preliminary ques-
tions, formulated by national judges, further narrows down the applicable area 
                                                        
31  Going back to the Defrenne cases as described in Chapter 2, cause lawyer Vogel-Polsky 
too had trouble in finding an individual willing to lend their case to her goals. Although 
her aim was clear, to revive Article 119, it took Vogel-Polsky a long time to find a case 
on which to apply her strategy, underscoring one of the main difficulties in gaining stra-
tegic access to the ECJ in practice. Havinga & Hoevenaars 2015. 
32  Harlow & Rawlings (1992, 10 and 307) also use the notion of a ‘good fit’, but do so in a 
more general sense of pressure through law campaigns having a good (or bad) fit with 
the legal process based on subject matter, means and objectives.  
33  Member States may apply opposite strategies, in the sense of preventing the wrong case 
from reaching the ECJ. Unlike private parties, the Member State government in most sit-
uations does have some ‘bottom-up docked control’. See Chapter 8. 
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of law to which the judgment will be applicable.34 As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
framing of preliminary questions can significantly broaden or narrow the scope 
of the eventual ECJ judgment. When actors aim at using a case to address a 
principle question, the strategic need for a case with a ‘good fit’, devoid of any 
complicating characteristics, is augmented. A lawyer from a large tax firm ex-
plained their wish in Foreign Savings for an ‘honest client’ who had voluntarily 
disclosed foreign funds, in order for them to test the legality of an extended 
recovery period for foreign savings. The question was whether the tax authori-
ties would be allowed, under EU rules, to use a different recovery period for 
people with foreign assets than the period used for all domestic assets:  
 
“This was a question our office really wanted to litigate. So we were kind of looking 
for a victim. Usually it’s the other way around. Typically someone comes to us with 
a problem. But here we were actively looking for a case, because this is a matter that 
is not lucrative enough for any one client to litigate on. And there were enough 
clients who wanted to cooperate. But we specifically wanted someone who had 
voluntarily disclosed his funds, because that worked better for the question.” 
 
The ‘good fit’ of a case does not necessarily have to revolve around the substan-
tive or factual characteristics of a case but can also lie in its context. As illustrat-
ed in Case Study D the individual case in many respects was perfectly suited for 
the aim of attacking the legality of the Dutch policy on requiring prospective 
immigrants to pass an integration test abroad. The circumstances were clearly 
making it in every respect impossible for her to meet the requirements for pass-
ing the examination. Apart from her illiteracy and the fact that she only spoke 
Pashtu, that her eight children were separated from their mother (who had raised 
them for the past seven years) and were staying with their father (whom they 
had not seen for the same period of time) added a layer of both poignancy and 
urgency. As the lawyer in that case explained: 
 
“The awkward part is, you hope bad things happen with your client because you get 
a better case. Child protective services became involved and began to threaten with 
[state guardianship] and other such things. So it was very easy to make the case for 
those kids. Because I can say the children are not doing well, the children are 
pitiable. But at the moment the Council for Child Protection says it; that weighs very 
heavy before a court.” 
 
                                                        
34  The fact notwithstanding that the judges at the ECJ on occasion reformulate the prelimi-
nary questions, sometimes significantly narrowing down or broadening the context to 
which the eventual judgment will be applicable. 
CHAPTER 7 
 
202 
This reasoning, and the search for a good case with as little ‘static’ as possible, 
is comparable to considerations in test cases, as discussed in Chapter 3, with the 
significant difference that in some of these test cases the ‘conflict’ underlying 
the legal action is in fact orchestrated, allowing for more control over the ‘fit’ of 
the chosen case. With ‘noise’ respondents refer to case-specific circumstances 
that may unnecessarily complicate the context of a case and thus may result in a 
too specific judgment, a judgment that focuses on the wrong aspects, or an all-
out negative judgment. In the latter case, this could actually run counter to the 
aims because such a negative judgment may definitively ‘close the door’ on a 
certain question.  
The uncertainty of referrals thus makes strategic use of the procedure more 
problematic. Due to the nature of the preliminary reference procedure, even 
when a suitable case has been found (or created in some instances) litigating 
parties have only limited influence on whether or not, as well as which case is 
referred to the ECJ. This uncertainty of the preliminary reference system makes 
what can best be described as a form of ‘bottom-up docket control’ decidedly 
more difficult.35 In that sense this setup is closer to a ‘drainpipe model’ as de-
scribed by Harlow and Rawlings, with the reference to the ECJ constituting an 
important ‘valve’. Strategies that focus on getting one specific case referred to 
the ECJ, may find their investment nullified by being unable to find a national 
judge willing to refer the case. Therefore, when strategic litigation efforts aim to 
have one specific case referred to the ECJ, convincing the national judge to refer 
the case is a decisive step that can make or break a legal strategy.  
7.6  The National Court: Before and After Referral 
Apart from forming a barrier, by being the sole competent actor to decide 
whether or not a case is referred, national courts can play another important role 
in strategic action. While ECJ judgments in themselves can have important ram-
ifications in the legal sphere, by creating a precedent, and in the political sphere, 
by delimiting the room national governments have in stipulating certain policies, 
the use of the preliminary reference to this end has an important drawback. 
Since the ECJ only deals with matters of interpretation of EU law, and does not 
deal with the legality of national rules and policies, the direct effects of ECJ 
rulings depend significantly on what transpires after an ECJ judgment and after 
a referred case returns to the national court. After the ECJ has given its judg-
ment on the interpretation of EU law, it is still up to the national judge to apply 
                                                        
35  Not unlike the US Supreme Court system, although there it is the Court itself that has 
control over which cases are adjudicated. 
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the conclusions of the Court in the case at hand. National courts can have an 
important impact on the effective strategic use of preliminary references. Firstly, 
the formulation of the questions that are referred to the ECJ can greatly deter-
mine the scope of the subsequent ECJ judgment. While strategic actors may 
wish to address the legality of a certain national law or entire policy, the ques-
tions referred to the ECJ often revolve around the interpretation of EU law in 
very specific contexts. A narrower formulation of the referred questions, essen-
tially narrowing down the applicability of the answers to very specific condi-
tions, can thus limit the impact of an ECJ judgment, potentially leaving the 
broader policy intact. Secondly, after a case returns from the ECJ to the national 
setting, the national court has to give effect to the judgment and apply it to the 
case at hand. The ECJ does not always give a straightforward conclusion as to 
how its judgment is to be applied in the case at hand, as the judgment is often 
related to the way in which the preliminary questions have been formulated. The 
subsequent interpretation of the ECJ judgment by the referring court may then 
turn out to temper (in the case of a broadly formulated judgment), or even be a 
complete reversal, of a perceived win at the ECJ (especially where the ECJ 
leaves some questions for the national court to answer: for instance in Case 
Study B on the pensioners). Thirdly, especially if an ECJ judgment has repercus-
sions for existing national law or policy, the effect of its judgment requires gov-
ernment response. As Greer & Iniesta have reminded us, such a response does 
not always occur automatically, and Member States may move to contain an 
ECJ judgment and “balance the costs of knowledge and compliance against the 
risks of ignorance and lost cases”.36 Subsequent (non-)action by national bu-
reaucracies can limit the impact of the ECJ judgment and thus enhance the need 
for follow-up action. It goes without saying that not every actor is capable of 
applying subsequent pressure, and strategic action thus requires the resources to 
follow up on litigation. 
7.7  Lessons from the Netherlands: Recipes for Getting Access 
The aforementioned structural characteristics of the preliminary reference sys-
tem, the indirect access to the Court necessitating an individual case to work 
with, the need to convince a national court to refer (the right) questions to the 
ECJ as well as the potential of using preliminary references as part of a wider 
strategy, together form the opportunity structure within which strategic actors 
may employ their litigation strategies. The cases studied for this research allow 
for a focus on how strategic actors have dealt with this structure and have used 
                                                        
36  Greer & Martín de Almagro Iniesta 2014, 22. 
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EU law and the preliminary reference as part of a litigation strategy. The next 
section deals with how strategic actors have made use of the legal system for the 
purpose of wider political objectives. Discussing several cases as examples, the 
next sections outline the different strategies that are employed and analyses 
them in light of the opportunity structures in EU law. 
The cases selected for this research reveal a significant portion of Dutch ref-
erence cases in the area of migration and asylum law. As mentioned, this rela-
tively high number of references in this particular area can be explained in part 
by new EU legislation in the wake of the efforts to develop a common immigra-
tion policy for Europe.37 However, the in-depth study of these cases and inter-
views with those active behind the scenes reveal instances of EU law scholars 
teaming up with lawyers and interest groups in order to work cases at the ECJ 
level. Therefore, this chapter focuses for the most part on cases that in one way 
or another were part of more strategic efforts at legal mobilisation predominant-
ly in the areas of migration and asylum. With few exceptions, other cases will 
largely be left aside.  
Post Hoc strategies 
The potential high impact of reference cases before the ECJ expectedly attracts 
the interest of third parties that seek to challenge certain national policies. How-
ever, while the involvement of interest groups in direct litigation before the 
Court of Justice of the EU may not be very surprising – similar to lawsuits chal-
lenging government actions in national court cases – the involvement of these 
groups in the preliminary reference procedure is not as self-evident. Due to the 
differences in procedure – a direct access to the ECJ versus indirect access 
through a national court – the involvement of interest groups, similarly to that of 
expert lawyers, in cases that reach the ECJ indirectly is impeded by the fact that 
there is no assurance of actually reaching the ECJ due to dependence on the 
national judge.  
From a strategic litigation perspective, working a case to serve a particular 
strategic goal from the outset significantly increases one’s options to frame the 
dispute in the right terms and anticipate a favourable interpretation of the matter 
at hand. This is why test cases are a tried method for pressure groups aiming to 
use the legal system to serve a general interest. As discussed, in the case of ref-
erences to the ECJ this is a more problematic strategy. Due to the uncertainty of 
referral, third parties often get involved only after the national court has decided 
                                                        
37  Among others the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) and the Directive on the 
Status of Third-Country Nationals Who are Long-Term Residents (2003/109), which 
went into force in 2005.  
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to refer the case to the ECJ, or has expressed an intention to do so. Usually this 
occurs at the request of the lawyer involved. As described in Chapter 6, lawyers, 
in response to an unexpected referral, set out to find either formal or informal 
help from others with more expertise in the area of both preliminary references 
and EU law. Usually these are sought, and found, in academic circles. In over 
half of the cases studied, the parties and/or their lawyers chose to consult or hire 
academic experts before a reference to the ECJ, after indications by the national 
judge of his or her intention to refer, or after a reference was made, allowing for 
more strategic players to get involved. 
Some references to the ECJ can contain questions that may require clearing 
up, which scholars have identified as a relevant matter even before it is referred 
to the ECJ. In the case of more activist academics, the moment such questions 
are referred to the ECJ may provide the opportunity to influence the way in 
which this question is then addressed, albeit in an ad hoc fashion. As an exam-
ple, one of the first and quite famous preliminary reference cases in the area of 
asylum law (Subsidiary protection) revolved around two Iraqi nationals whose 
request for asylum in the Netherlands was denied. In Iraq, they had received a 
threatening letter after militia had killed their uncle. The couple had found a note 
on their door in late 2006, which read “Death to Collaborators!”. They had 
made their way to the Netherlands, where they applied for a temporary residence 
permit based on the dangers they faced from indiscriminate violence in Iraq. The 
Dutch immigration authorities rejected their application, and a series of appeals 
brought their case to the Dutch Council of State, which referred the case to the 
ECJ seeking an interpretation of the new EU Qualification Directive on asylum, 
in particular on Article 15c, stipulating the qualification for subsidiary protec-
tion in cases of “serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed 
conflict”.38 The Council of State asked the question whether, especially in com-
parison with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, this provi-
sion offered supplementary or other protection. This referral potentially broad-
ened the scope of the protection asylum seekers enjoyed under EU law, and was 
therefore an interesting target for champions of the rights of asylum seekers.  
After the referral, the couple’s lawyer, inexperienced in litigating at the Eu-
ropean level and for whom the referral came unexpectedly, solicited the help of 
three EU (migration) law scholars, a representative of UNHCR and a representa-
tive of Amnesty International. Together this group worked on the case, arguing 
for an interpretation of Article 15c that gave additional protection under Article 
3 ECHR to asylum seekers. In 2009, the ECJ ruled, as the group had argued, that 
proof of indiscriminate violence could warrant asylum under EU law. The ECJ 
                                                        
38  Council Directive 2004/83/EC. 
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effectively created a ‘sliding scale test’ for national authorities to assess individ-
ual applications in order to determine whether or not one qualified for protec-
tion. According to this test, the more an applicant is able to show that he or she 
is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his or her personal cir-
cumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required. 
However, the explanation by the ECJ was formulated broadly enough for 
the Dutch Council of State to give its own interpretation. The lawyer explains:  
 
“I found the ECJ’s answer way too vague. And, of course I can interpret it to my 
advantage, but the IND can unfortunately do that too, so we draw the short straw 
because the Council of State usually sides with the IND.” 
 
Indeed, in his letter to parliament regarding the ECJ judgment, the Dutch Secre-
tary of Justice stated: “I am of the opinion that the wording of the judgment 
shows that this will involve a very limited number of situations.”39 The sliding 
scale test leaves it to national determining authorities and appellate bodies to 
assess whether the degree of indiscriminate violence is sufficiently high to pose 
a risk to the individual. The Court did not explain how intense the indiscriminate 
violence must be to reach the threshold of a ‘real risk’, or how to assess the level 
of indiscriminate violence.40 In a report on the consequences of the ECJ judg-
ment on the practice in the Netherlands, UNHCR concluded: “Both the case law 
and government policy of the Netherlands reflect the view that Article 15 (c) 
Qualification Directive applies only to ‘exceptional situations’ of indiscriminate 
violence and, therefore, Article 15 (c) will rarely be applied.”41 
When compared to practitioners in general, third parties with more expertise 
can have a decidedly more accurate idea of the possible impact of an ECJ judg-
ment, and thus awareness of the opportunities in EU law, as well as the capacity 
to apply legal argumentation that might steer the ECJ in a desired direction. 
Actors like UNHCR, with considerable resources as well as structural access to 
the national and international political arena, are, moreover, capable of subse-
                                                        
39  Letter from the Ministry of Justice to the Speaker of the Lower House of the Netherlands 
Parliament, of 17 March 2009, regarding the judgment of the European Court of Justice 
of the European Communities in respect of the Qualification Directive. Available at: 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads/document?id=e282df00-c48c-49bd-8ee6-6237af 
d605b 6&title=Engelstalige%20brief%20over%20het%20arrest.pdf [last accessed 9 No-
vember 2017]. 
40  A complicating factor in this case was that meanwhile the European Court of Human 
Rights had given a judgment that significantly broadened the scope of Article 3 of the 
ECHR making the argued protection under Article 15c largely superfluous. The lawyer 
subsequently set out to try and get a judgment on the additional protection of Article 15c 
but was unable to find a suitable case. This underscores the difficulties in addressing cer-
tain issues strategically and the associated problem of finding a suitable case. 
41  UNHCR 2011, 33.  
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quently using such judgments to put further pressure on Member States and the 
European legislature, or indeed providing the ECJ with the impetus for revisiting 
the question.42 However, when their involvement comes only after a referral, 
they have neither influence on the context of the case, nor on the argumentation 
that has led to the national judge referring the case. As such, single case strate-
gies and legal framing are an issue when it comes to strategically using prelimi-
nary references. Even where questions of interpretation of new EU legislation 
are expected, the uncertainty of referral to the ECJ means that third party actors 
aiming to influence ECJ case law are often forced to ‘make do’ with a case after 
it is referred or after a national judge has expressed the intention to refer. De-
pending on the complexity of the matter being addressed, this form of post hoc 
third party involvement limits the potential of issue framing in a case to serve a 
strategic purpose. 
Strategically Employing an Individual Case 
In other instances, more coordinated legal strategies included the employment of 
a particular case for the purposes of a pre-designed legal strategy. A prime ex-
ample is Case Study C where an individual case was used to attack a Dutch poli-
cy increasing the administrative fees for residence permits. This case included 
the efforts by a select group of lawyers, legal scholars and members of a Dutch 
interest group representing the interest of Turks in the Netherlands (IOT) who 
devised a Working Group that set out the attack (by both a political campaign as 
well as legal means). The Working Group consisted of an informal collaboration 
of people that already knew each other from past collaborations. It was a small 
club, of scholars, legal experts, lawyers and political actors with sufficient ex-
pertise in many relevant areas, including EU law, procedural and national rules, 
political networks and the activation of strategic partners as well as the IOT for 
grassroots mobilisation. With this combination of skills and networks (and, of 
course, the necessary financial support), the group was able to devise a long-
term strategy for challenging the Dutch increase in administrative fees. The 
strategy included, next to political lobbying and publicity campaigns both a civil 
suit and an administrative case based on an individual’s rejected application for 
a residence permit. The group also successfully mobilised the European Com-
mission by filing complaints that eventually resulted in infringement proceed-
ings against the Netherlands.  
                                                        
42  In its report on the indiscriminate violence, UNHCR concluded in its recommendations 
that “[i]t seems clear that more guidance will be needed from the ECJ on the relevance of 
individual factors and circumstances in the interpretation of Article 15 (c), and the mean-
ing of the term ‘exceptional’ as used by that Court”. UNHCR 2011, 102. 
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This case is the most elaborate form of organised litigation to be found in 
the selection for this research. Although the inner circle of the Working Group 
was a small club of people, they were able to cover the multiple aspects needed 
for a successful strategy, as explained by the migration law professor who was 
one of the central figures in the thirteen-year strategy:  
 
“You have to know your stuff in different areas. I did, of course, know the European 
legal area, our lawyer was the man of procedural law, who knew the national rules. 
Another one of us checked at every stage whether political action could be useful. 
The political channel was obviously constantly closed. And then there was the IOT, 
which had close contact with the Turkish constituency, both through administrative 
contacts and through its newspaper and website.” 
 
Several of these actors had been involved in similar strategic actions before, 
challenging the Dutch policies on limits to the export of benefits. Among them 
was the aforementioned migration law professor, who had played an important 
part in many of the migration related references from the Netherlands. Such 
‘legal insiders’ can be essential to intricate legal strategies. Especially when it 
comes to the signalling of opportunities in EU law the expertise of some players 
is crucial in the strategic mobilisation of EU law. McCammon and McRath state 
in this respect, “[p]ursuing social change via the courts typically means relying 
on legal experts, lawyers who themselves may identify as activists and prioritize 
the movement’s reform goals, and, yet, who are also insiders to the legal profes-
sion and thus possess the necessary legal knowledge and litigation expertise”.43 
Where possibilities exist in the effet utile of EU Directives, where implementa-
tion by the Netherlands may be incorrect, or where the implications of new regu-
lations for existing or new national policies are not immediately apparent, this 
requires a focus of litigants, practitioners and/or supporting actors on the Euro-
pean level. One should thus be attentive to Dutch implementation as well as the 
underlying regulations. As we have seen, this focus is often lacking in the ‘aver-
age’ practitioner, and it is especially the academics who have the expertise, 
speak the ‘language’ of EU law and are able to signal opportunities in EU rules. 
Their help is indispensable in such strategic actions, not only by providing the 
needed expertise but also in informing and mobilising important stakeholders. 
The support (financially solicited or otherwise) of certain experts is an im-
portant element in the decision to litigate as well as the potential success of stra-
tegic legal action. In that sense, it is impossible to overestimate the centrality of 
figures like the migration law professor. He is not only the ‘go to’ expert for 
lawyers in the areas of EU migration and asylum law as well as the Association 
                                                        
43  McCammon & McGrath 2015, 128. 
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Agreement with Turkey, when the possibility of a preliminary reference arises, 
but also in generally showing organised interest organisations the ‘way to the 
Court’, by providing EU law arguments and imploring them to focus on EU 
rights for migrants and asylum seekers and actively employing legal strategies, 
thus pushing stakeholders towards adopting strategies of pressure through law 
focusing on the rights of migrants in EU law. In the case of the pre-entry inte-
gration requirements (Case Study D), the migration law professor was personal-
ly responsible for getting the Dutch Refugee Council to focus their efforts on 
helping asylum seekers not just with general support (like providing language 
courses) and legal counsel, but to also invest their efforts in advocating the 
rights of refugees. This signals the fact that for interest groups, who by all ac-
counts may be very well equipped to undertake such strategic legal action, the 
path to the court, and in particular the ECJ, may simply not be a natural proclivi-
ty.44 Additionally, the professor thus not only had a role in providing legal ex-
pertise, but also fulfilled a role in activating stakeholders and imploring them to 
focus on the possible broader social impact of preliminary reference cases; 
something that did not prove to be self-evident. He explains: 
 
“In one case, an extremely important case in hindsight, I really had to put in an 
effort to get that lawyer to go [to Luxembourg], he thought it was all just a bunch of 
nonsense. It was all too much trouble, and of course, on the commercial side it did 
not make him any money. So if I had not called him and put him under moral 
pressure, it’s unjustifiable towards your client, but also in light of more general 
interests [...] The general interest is not always obvious to lawyers.”  
 
These strategic collaborations thus feature heavyweights in the field of EU law 
as well as European civil society, joining forces with several other lawyers with 
their own relevant specialization, most of whom act pro bono. Incidentally, this 
also points to the vulnerability of such organized advocacy, being very much 
dependent upon the expertise and willingness of a small group of people. This is 
a significant Achilles’ heel when compared to the ability of more affluent actors 
to employ specialists, the so-called ‘hired guns’, although the personal invest-
ment of these cause lawyers may counterbalance this disparity to some extent. 
                                                        
44  In fact, interest groups, unless they have legal action as a distinct part of their modus 
operandi, rarely in and of themselves initiate such collaborations. As stated by Vauchez: 
“Legal expertise (lawyers’ specialized networks, amount of legal training in the field…) 
are indeed considered as an essential factor in terms of interest groups’ proclivity to take 
on the judicial route.” See also Vanhala 2017. 
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The Preliminary Reference as a Threat 
The aforementioned strategies either use a preliminary reference in a post hoc 
sense, with the interposing of strategic experts after referral, or employ a single 
case as part of wider legal and political actions. However, the impact of prelimi-
nary references is not always limited to its direct effect in that one case. As con-
cluded by Alter & Vargas: “[P]rivate litigants may reveal to groups the potential 
of EC law, and create legal precedent that is later picked up by groups to pro-
mote changes in national policy. But the issue of follow-through is crucial if 
legal decisions are to lead to policy change, and one cannot assume that there 
will be follow-through on legal victories, especially for cases raised by individu-
als”.45 ECJ cases may, for example, serve as a signal to the Dutch government 
that further restrictions on entry would likely be struck down by the ECJ’s inter-
pretation of EU legislation. As we will see in Case Study D, which features a 
reference to the ECJ but no judgment, preliminary references can have an im-
pact with or without an ECJ judgment. When strategic actors mobilise to chal-
lenge certain laws or policies, the possibility of a reference can be used as a 
source of leverage in itself, regardless of whether or not such strategy actually 
results in a judgment. While a legal strategy aimed at employing the restrictive 
qualities of EU law to curtail certain national policy may fail, an encompassing 
strategy, combining legal and political campaigns, using both the courts as well 
as lobbying the legislator, can be successful nonetheless. Such success thus 
doesn’t necessarily rely on the potential in EU law alone. The threat of EU law, 
especially where the outcome of litigation is less certain and thus the risk for 
Member States is greater, can serve as a deterring force.46 Similarly, new ECJ 
jurisprudence may serve as beacons or provide new arguments for practitioners, 
opening up new avenues for legal reasoning and possibly individual protection. 
However, such spin-off effects do not occur in a path-dependent fashion. Practi-
tioners still have to actively adopt these new arguments. A judgment by the ECJ 
may help to mobilise lawyers to start using certain legal arguments they were 
reluctant to use before. One of the EU law experts involved in more strategic 
                                                        
45  Alter & Vargas 2000. 
46  Similarly, even the ‘Sunday traders’, repeat players with almost unlimited resources, 
were not successful in having part of the British Shops Act, forbidding Sunday trading, 
declared incompatible with EU rules prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports. The 
various references that were sent to the ECJ did not result in a favourable judgment to 
that part of the traders’ cause. However, they were quite successful in their political cam-
paign for a reform of said Sunday trading legislation, managing the support of unions, the 
British Labour Party, consumers as well as previous opponents, resulting eventually in a 
new Sunday Trading Act in 1994. As Micklitz (2005) describes: “Sunday traders suc-
ceeded due to their flexibility in shifting the issue back and forth between law and poli-
tics and to some extent also between the national and the European levels.”  
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litigation describes his experience trying to convince lawyers of the relevance of 
EU law: 
 
“Whether you win or lose, judgments make your point visible, and you can use it in 
further litigation. It is also important for judges and lawyers, because they will only 
take an EU Directive seriously when there are judgments on it. One of the things I 
learned from these actions, as well as my teaching, is how unassertive lawyers can 
be. They will always have all sorts of reasons not to apply Union law. So you first 
need judgments to convince them of the relevance.”  
 
ECJ judgments can create a circular effect after being brought to the attention of 
interlocutors that are able to respond to, use and reify, or attack its results. In this 
case these interlocutors are practitioners that employ certain legal reasoning in 
new cases, and legal commentators and practitioners that use these arguments in 
publications, commentary, court proceedings as well as in imploring other actors 
to focus on them. With new ECJ (or national) judgments highlighting the im-
portance of EU legislation, more lawyers may be inclined to use certain EU law 
arguments in cases they bring before national judges and with that facilitate the 
dissemination of certain interpretations of EU law, making national courts aware 
of the issues and possibly eliciting further references to the ECJ. 
7.8  Networks and Alliances: A Learning Curve? 
The case studies in the area of migration and asylum law show how strategic 
litigation within the context of EU law takes on various forms; from the more 
post hoc forms of cause litigation, by the interposing of strategic players at a 
later stage after a more unexpected referral (Subsidiary Protection), via setting 
out to challenge national policy by using EU law within a strategy worked out in 
advance (Fees in Migration Law), to the more structural organisation of lawyers, 
experts and organisation (Integration Abroad). Yet, they also show significant 
similarities. All these initiatives greatly rely on the input from (academic) ex-
perts in the field of EU (migration) law as well as different forms of support. 
Financial support is especially relevant when devising long-term strategies and 
when expertise and input is not available on a pro bono basis. Organisations like 
the Dutch Council for Refugees and the IOT thus played an important role in 
both providing the financial means and organizing capacity for such strategic 
efforts. Unless civil law action is possible, an individual case is needed. Cases 
are not always readily available; therefore the cooperation between lawyers, 
academics and interest organisations helps to connect case potential with exper-
tise and strategic organisation. Networking, the deliberate exchange and bun-
dling of skills, information and resources are important determining factors in 
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the success of these legal strategies. Practitioners usually use the activation of 
networks as a coping strategy to deal with their lack of experience and expertise, 
while in other instances, networking is employed proactively. Bringing together 
scholars, lawyers and organisations helps to cover several bases of strategic 
legal action. 
The experience from these past examples has pressed some of these actors to 
organise more structurally to cope with the systemic obstacles to their legal 
strategies. Learning especially from their experience in the case on the legality 
of integration tests, the Dutch Council for Refugees, several asylum lawyers and 
EU legal scholars have joined forces in the Strategic Litigation Committee 
(CSP) in order to more systematically and strategically litigate and bring princi-
ple matters before the ECJ. The strategy employed by the Committee is to for-
mulate issues of EU and international law and to actively look for cases suitable 
for bringing before the European courts: the ECJ as well as the European Court 
of Human Rights. Such initiatives actively try to employ EU law and litigation 
as one of their modes of contesting national policies, by bringing together schol-
ars and practitioners. Such efforts use networks of experts and practitioners to 
try and solve the misfit in that the (often less equipped) practitioners are the ones 
who potentially have cases, and scholars usually have the expertise. One way in 
which the CSP tackles the problem of finding a suitable case is by making use of 
the network provided by the Dutch Council for Refugees. The organisation has 
for a long time provided assistance to associated practitioners by means of a 
consultation service. This way they are able to respond to the needs of asylum 
lawyers by providing them with specialised legal expertise. One important addi-
tional advantage of this practice is that the Committee can tap into most of the 
available cases that are brought before the courts and select those that are most 
suitable for the legal strategy they have devised beforehand. Additionally, this 
system allows for putting out a general call to practitioners imploring them to 
bring cases that may suit one of the devised strategies. When trying to litigate on 
principle matters, this signalling of EU law opportunities is an important aspect. 
A vantage point on multiple cases provides the opportunity to tap into the case 
law potential.47 
                                                        
47  Cf. Harlow & Rawlings who discuss the availability of lawyers and legal advice as an 
important factor in determining success, the essential link with what they call ‘control’ 
being that “in-house lawyers are able to take control of potentially good cases at an early 
stage”. Harlow & Rawlings 1992, 303. 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
213 
7.9  Conclusion 
Strategic litigation efforts can be important drivers of legal change through in-
fluencing jurisprudential development by bringing certain legal arguments and 
specific strategically chosen or framed cases. While most matters of EU law are 
dealt with by national judges, and references to the ECJ are a relatively infre-
quent phenomenon, the path to the ECJ may provide strategic actors with the 
possibility of outflanking a domestic system in deadlock. This chapter dealt with 
the question of strategic mobilisation of EU law and the preliminary reference 
procedure, and aimed to analyse who is most likely to make use of the opportu-
nities in EU law and which legal strategies are effective. It identified character-
istics specific to the preliminary reference system that provide the opportunity 
structure within which strategic actors may employ EU law. Within the context 
of EU law and the preliminary reference system, the uncertain nature of the 
preliminary references constitutes the most significant barrier to such coordinat-
ed action, since strategic actors lack control over when and how cases are 
brought before the ECJ. While the ‘shield and sword’ terminology, used by 
some to describe the potential of EU law and the preliminary reference proce-
dure, may be adequate when speaking of the invoking of EU law in the national 
courtroom,48 it is a rather optimistic characterisation when we look at the nature 
of the reference procedure and the practical way in which strategic actors are 
able to use it. From a strategic perspective the preliminary reference system is 
by no means an easy ‘sword’ to harness. Parties have limited control over 
whether or not their case actually gets a referral. This uncertainty of actually 
seizing the ECJ makes this type of strategic action more challenging. One has 
little control over which case is referred to the ECJ, with which legal and factual 
context. So the uncertainty accompanying ‘going all in’ on one case is multi-
plied by the fact that a national court may decide to refer a different case with 
different representation. One is left to approach those parties and offer one’s 
expertise and support. This obviously takes away the possibility of ‘building’ a 
case from the ground up. Having a case with the right context and relevant char-
acteristics can significantly increase one’s chances of steering the final ECJ 
decision in a desirable direction. The opposite is also true; when the wrong case 
is referred within the context of the same principle matter this may lead to unde-
sirable outcomes. 
Due to the more general requirements of financial capital, organisational ca-
pacity, expertise and economies of scale, strategies that aim to include a refer-
ence to the ECJ are likely to be reserved for a select collection of interest groups 
and specialized lawyers. Moreover, given such obstacles, using EU law for po-
                                                        
48  See for instance Tridimas & Tridimas 2004, 128. 
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litical ends in many cases may not be the most accessible avenue. However, 
given the more stringent migration policy and associated national judicial dead-
lock, for some underprivileged and politically underrepresented groups it may 
be one of the few options for truly benefiting from the rights provided by EU 
law. The existence of EU rights, the availability of resources, experts and organ-
isational capacity as well as alliances with other actors like the European Com-
mission provide the context within which EU law can be mobilised effectively. 
From this we can also infer the opposite; those with a limited capacity to (collec-
tively) mobilise their interests will be less likely to (successfully) mobilise their 
rights. 
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Case Study D. Integration Abroad 
D.1  Introduction: Investigating an Invisible Case 
One of the salient aspects of preliminary references is the fact they may threaten 
to undermine national policies whenever questions sent to the ECJ are meant to 
address the legality of national policy in light of provisions in EU law. Member 
States are confronted with this function of the preliminary reference procedure 
and may choose to contain or even ignore detrimental ECJ judgments.1 Howev-
er, Member States may also choose to move strategically in order to prevent 
certain judgments by the ECJ that could threaten certain national policy. This 
case study discusses such an event. The case under study in the following chap-
ter is a striking, yet fairly invisible preliminary reference case. As part of a string 
of ECJ cases on Dutch migration related policies, this case is well-known among 
scholars in the field of Dutch asylum and migration law, yet absent in the ECJ’s 
official jurisprudence. The story of this case illustrates how national court cases 
can, through their referral to the ECJ, become a threat to existing national policy 
by subjecting it to supranational judicial review. Here, the referral was the result 
of collaboration between academia and a Dutch NGO that champions the rights 
of asylum seekers. It also reveals the ways in which national governments may 
respond to such a threat and can move to thwart a possible detrimental ECJ 
judgment. In this case study, an ECJ judgment that would have undermined 
Dutch policy on the requirement to pass a pre-entry integration test for people 
seeking asylum in the Netherlands was successfully prevented by the Dutch 
administration. The following case description provides an overview of the ori-
gins of the case, the way the Dutch government responded, as well as the subse-
quent attempts by the protagonists to attack Dutch policy by exerting more pres-
sure through the courts.  
D.2  The Contested Policy 
In the post-2000 period, the Dutch government introduced a series of measures 
with the stated aim of better integrating its migrant population. These policies 
were adopted during a period of heightened public concern about the impact that 
migrant communities had on social cohesion. The two key measures were inte-
gration tests – one administered in the Netherlands that most foreign residents 
had to take, and another that had to be passed by prospective family migrants 
                                                        
1  Greer & Martín de Almagro Iniesta 2014. 
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from specific countries2 before they could join spouses or family members in the 
Netherlands. The Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet Inburgering Buitenland, 
from here on: WIB) came into effect on 15 March 2006. The WIB required a 
foreign national to complete a civic integration examination abroad if he or she 
was at least eighteen years old, before receiving a provisional residence permit 
(mvv) and being allowed entry into the Netherlands. An official self-study pack 
was developed, to help applicants prepare for the test, which included the requi-
site educational material to enable the applicant to speak, understand and read 
Dutch at the required level. It also included the material one needed to prepare 
for the ‘Knowledge of Dutch Society’ test; a controversial part of the test that 
was meant to assess one’s basic knowledge of Dutch society.3 The Netherlands 
was the first country in the EU to introduce such requirements. 
The WIB was in line with a shift in Dutch politics towards more restrictive 
migration policies, and a focus on the integration of migrants into society, start-
ing with the Law on the Integration of Newcomers in 1998. The tougher integra-
tion policies increasingly became a tool for restricting immigration. The legisla-
tion introduced in the early 2000s by then Minister Verdonk was controversial. 
It was changed by order of the Dutch Council of State several times, the last 
time even after its adoption by the House, after the Council of State concluded 
that immigrants with a Dutch passport were not to be discriminated against 
compared to natives with a Dutch passport. This decreased the number of people 
that eventually had to integrate to a total of 250,000. The WIB, as part of the 
larger policy on integration, was a precarious policy issue for the minority gov-
ernment that was backed by the right-wing PVV of Geert Wilders, which strong-
ly focused on issues concerning immigrants.  
D.3  Organizing Opposition 
The case, which posed a challenge to the WIB, ended up at the ECJ in an inter-
esting way. Digging into the context of the case reveals a story very similar to 
that of Case Study C. The migration law professor, who has been described as a 
central figure in the actions against the increases in administrative fees for resi-
dence permits, also takes centre stage in this story. Here, he was personally re-
sponsible for convincing the Dutch Council for Refugees (Vereniging Vluchte-
lingenwerk Nederland, from here on: the Refugee Council), a Dutch independ-
                                                        
2  Citizens of European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) states and Swit-
zerland, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States 
(US) are not required to take the test. 
3  Van Oers 2013. 
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ent, non-governmental organization that champions the interests of asylum seek-
ers, to focus their efforts on helping asylum seekers not just with general per-
sonal support (like providing language courses) and legal counsel, but to also 
invest their efforts in actually fighting for the rights of refugees. He explains: 
 
“The case started because I was angry at the Refugee Council that they never 
showed some teeth. The board had asked me if I wanted to give a presentation about 
how I saw the development of refugee law and policy in the Netherlands, and the 
role of the Refugee Council therein. I then gave a presentation in which I said that 
they were too much focused on the integration of admitted refugees. And that their 
key task is to ensure that people receive protection, because no one else does that. 
So they asked me, how can we do that. Well, if you have a good case, then 
preliminary questions should be asked whether the Integration test complies with 
EU law. I told them, if you bring me a good case, I will help guide it.” 
 
As an important part of their activities the Refugee Council has, for a long time, 
been in constant contact with associated asylum lawyers, providing them assis-
tance by means of a consultation service. In this way, they are able to respond to 
the needs of asylum lawyers by providing them with specialized legal expertise. 
One important additional advantage of this practice is that the Council can keep 
tabs on most of the cases that are brought before the courts and have an idea of 
what types of problems occur both inside and outside the courtroom. As a result, 
before long the appeal by the professor to come forward with a case got a re-
sponse. The Refugee Council contacted the professor informing him that they 
had a possible candidate for addressing the legality of the Dutch WIB. Apart 
from facilitating the collaboration between the professor and an associated law-
yer, the Refugee Council also filed a complaint with the European Commission, 
and implored the Dutch Ombudsman to look into the matter, which resulted in a 
damning report about the excessively strict application of the integration re-
quirements by the Dutch administration. 
D.4  Legal Contestation 
A Dream Case 
The husband of the client in this case, who had fled from Afghanistan in 2000, 
after initially being refused asylum, obtained a residence permit for the Nether-
lands through a general pardon in 2007. Meanwhile, he worked hard in the 
Netherlands to meet the income requirements, on the basis of which his family 
would be allowed entry under family reunification rules, and after that to sup-
port all eight of his children. After nine years, in 2009, he was finally reunited 
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with his children, who had lived with their mother in a refugee camp in Pakistan. 
The application for a provisional residence permit for his wife, however, who 
had travelled with her children to the Dutch embassy in New Delhi, was refused. 
Her application was subject to the (new) Dutch rules under the WIB, which 
required her to first pass the civic integration test in Pakistan before she would 
be allowed to travel to the Netherlands. The client, however, only spoke Pashtu 
and was also illiterate. No textbook for preparing for said test in Pashtu existed, 
nor was assistance to the illiterate available at the time. This meant that she was 
expected to learn another language before being able to take the test. Generally, 
it was almost impossible to learn the necessary level of Dutch in Pakistan, let 
alone for someone who was illiterate. Although the Dutch government claimed 
that the test was also designed for people who were illiterate, her chances of 
passing the examination were virtually non-existent. To further complicate the 
situation, it was at the time not possible to take the examination in Afghanistan 
or Pakistan.4 So, she would again have had to travel from Pakistan to the Dutch 
Embassy in New Delhi, India. A local branch of the Refugee Council that was 
assisting the husband of the client brought the case to the attention of one of the 
asylum and migration lawyers associated with the organisation. After the case 
was refused a second time in the objection stage it was brought before the Dis-
trict Court in Zwolle. At this stage the national office of the Refugee Council 
contacted the lawyer to inquire whether he would object to the involvement of 
the aforementioned professor. The lawyer, familiar with the professor’s résumé, 
unsurprisingly responded favourably: 
 
“When he had heard of the case, the national office of the Refugee Council offered 
up his assistance in the case. Well, then thank you god on your bare knees, because 
that saved me an incredible amount of time. And what is much more important, 
look, I can do two things. I can take up what he writes neatly in my appeal and 
pretend I invented it myself. But I consciously chose to write briefly on what he had 
concluded, and then to refer to an annex of his opinion. Because let’s face it, even 
with a court it is not only important what you say, but it’s also very important who’s 
talking.” 
 
The case in many respects was perfectly suited for the aim of attacking the legal-
ity of the Dutch policy on integration abroad, both at the national level, and as 
we will see later on, at the ECJ level as well. The circumstances of the client 
were clearly making it in every respect impossible for her to meet the require-
                                                        
4  The Dutch embassy in Afghanistan had been closed for some time and the closest alter-
native Dutch embassy in Islamabad at the time only dealt with minor administrative tasks 
due to threats to the embassy, following the release of the controversial anti-Islam film 
‘Fitna’ by Dutch right-wing MP Geert Wilders. 
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ments for passing the integration examination. Apart from her illiteracy and the 
fact that she only spoke Pashtu, the fact that her eight children were now sepa-
rated from their mother (who had raised them for the past seven years) and were 
now staying with their father (whom they had not seen for the same period of 
time) added a layer of both poignancy and urgency. The lawyer had already 
hinted at a conflict with European law in the initial objection stage; however 
since this stage was only dealing with the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (IND), the focus then lay in getting the authorities to make an exception 
based on humanitarian grounds. Once the case was brought before the court, the 
emphasis was put on the incompatibility of the WIB with the Directive on Fami-
ly Reunification and on soliciting a reference to the ECJ. 
The Road to the ECJ 
Among other new EU legislation in the post-2000 period, Directive 2003/86 on 
the right to family reunification (from here on: the Family Reunification Di-
rective) was an important potential source for attacking Dutch restrictive migra-
tion policies. The case focused on the compatibility of the WIB with especially 
Article 7(2) in the Family Reunification Directive. Although the Directive does 
stipulate in said Article that Member States are allowed to require third country 
nationals’ family members to comply with integration measures before being 
granted family reunification, the ECJ had, in 2010, already concluded that fami-
ly reunification was the general rule and that any condition to that rule had to be 
interpreted strictly.5 The question of whether it was allowed to require family 
members to pass a pre-entry test before being allowed into the country was still 
an unanswered one. The professor proceeded to write the opinion for the lawyer, 
arguing that the pre-entry test was indeed problematic in light of the Family 
Reunification Directive: 
 
“It was just before the summer holidays, so on vacation in a cottage I wrote a note of 
I think eight pages. To explain why the integration test was incompatible with the 
Family Reunification Directive, on which points, and that the court should refer 
questions to the ECJ. So I suggested the questions, because I think that if you want 
to convince a judge to go as far as referring a question you must provide him all the 
arguments. And then you write it in a way that the lawyer can present it to the 
court.” 
 
                                                        
5  C-578/08 Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken. 
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With this expert opinion6 in hand, the lawyer then started pushing for a prelimi-
nary reference. At the time, the possibility to refer questions to the ECJ was 
fairly new for lower courts dealing with asylum and migration matters,7 and 
even more so given the recent implementation of the Family Reunification Di-
rective. 
Because the case involved eight children who were separated from their 
mother and under the supervision of child protective services, the court put in a 
request for the case to be dealt with under the urgent procedure (PPU).8 The ECJ 
granted this request, which meant that the timeline in Luxembourg would be 
drastically shortened. Additionally, the PPU means that only the parties to the 
national proceedings, the Member State of the court making the reference and 
the EC institutions may submit written observations. Significantly, other Mem-
ber States are not allowed to intervene in the written stage of PPU cases, pre-
venting them from filing written observations. The time for filing written obser-
vations to the Court of Justice is fixed and significantly shorter than in usual 
reference cases.9 While in other cases those involved may complain about the 
lengthy proceedings before the ECJ, in this case the shorter time frame was 
perceived as a challenge. The lawyer recalls: 
 
“Yes, the hearing date was really quick. It really is very fast. In my opinion it was 
really impossibly soon. It was only because [the professor] had practically written 
the observations that it was doable. But in terms of the amount of work, I found it 
unworkable.” 
 
                                                        
6  The professor had also sent the note to Dutch online database Migratieweb.nl in order for 
other lawyers to use it to their advantage. 
7  Since 1 December 2009, the reference procedure has been open to all courts and tribu-
nals. Former Article 68 EC limited then Article 234 EC so that references in relation to 
the areas of freedom, justice and security (which included asylum) could only be made 
by national courts “against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national 
law”. However, there was a great deal of criticism of this limitation, given it fragmented 
the reference scheme, was detrimental to the rule of law and could lead to a vital area of 
Community or EU law being left outside supervision by the ECJ. See Broberg & Fenger 
2014, 99. 
8  The Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice was amended in 2008 to allow for the 
possibility of an urgent procedure in the areas covered by Title VI of the EU Treaty and 
Title IV of the EC Treaty (freedom, security and justice). The referring national court 
may request that the urgent procedure be applied or the Court of Justice may decide to 
apply it of its own motion in exceptional cases. 
9  On average the duration of the written procedure in cases dealt with under the urgent 
preliminary ruling procedure is around seventeen days. See report on the use of the ur-
gent preliminary ruling procedure, available at:  
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-07/en_rapport.pdf [last ac-
cessed 10 November 2017]. 
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This ‘true pressure cooker’, as described by ECJ judge Prechal,10 puts all of 
those involved under additional pressure, not just the parties, but also the other 
participants in the proceedings, most notably in this case the Dutch representa-
tion in Luxembourg. 
D.5  Government Intervention 
As per regular procedure, the case was brought to the attention of the agents of 
the Dutch government to inform them of the pending case and allow them time 
to prepare an observation. Agents of a national government at such a moment 
have the task, on the one hand, of analysing a case and preparing the legal ar-
guments, but on the other hand, also to make assessments of the political sali-
ence and possible (legal) consequences of an ECJ judgment.11 On the political 
sensitivity of the subject the then Dutch agent states:  
 
“The integration policy, as initiated by the Minister of Immigration and Integration 
and at the time of the case under responsibility of then Minister of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations Donner, was politically very sensitive. It was quite clear that the 
policy regarding the WIB had to remain intact.”  
 
It became clear to the Dutch agents that the context in which the WIB was now 
put under scrutiny with this reference, did not bode well for the Dutch position. 
Additionally, the fact that a case with such high political salience was dealt with 
as an urgent procedure before the ECJ further complicated the matter. Instead of 
the regular two months, now the deadline for filing written observations was 
reduced to a maximum of three weeks. In the words of a then Dutch agent for 
the Netherlands: 
 
“The fact that it was a PPU was entirely justified, because it concerned so many 
children. But the case was not only highly sensitive from a political perspective, it 
represented a complex matter from a legal point of view. It is almost impossible in 
such a short time frame to address all factual and legal aspects of the case, the 
objectives of the WIB. For the Dutch government this was simply not a good case to 
be addressed as PPU.” 
 
From the perspective of the Dutch government, and the fact that the integration 
policies were an important part of a shift towards more stringent and restrictive 
                                                        
10  During a conference call presentation at a meeting for Dutch asylum lawyers in 2015. 
11  Cf. Granger 2001, on the way (Dutch) representation before the ECJ deals with new 
references and the role they play in assessing the possible consequences of a judgment. 
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immigration policies, this preliminary reference was rather problematic. The 
context of the client’s situation was such that it was by all means a case that 
qualified for an exception to the rule; a possibility the WIB provided for by 
means of a hardship clause, giving the Minister the authority to make exceptions 
in cases with exceptional circumstances. Nowhere in the development of this 
case, however, was a decision made to apply the clause.12 By the time the case 
was brought before the ECJ it had turned into a threat to the policy as a whole, 
by providing a showcase for the extremely stringent way in which the policy 
was applied in the Netherlands.13 The Dutch agents who reviewed the case did 
realise the severity of the situation and the possible consequences of having the 
ECJ assess the legality of the policy based on a case with such an inconvenient 
factual context:  
 
“We realised that the particular circumstances of the case would make the 
integration requirements of the WIB look extremely harsh and wondered whether it 
would be possible to explain to the Court the background, objective and all the 
nuances of the legislative system. It became clear to us that this would be very 
difficult in such a pressure cooker procedure. We were worried that the question 
would be answered by the Court based on the context of a case with rather extreme 
facts. This posed a real risk to the future of the WIB.”  
 
In the role of both legal representative of as well as advisor to the government of 
possible consequences of specific cases, the agent then informed the ministry of 
the imminent threat to the Dutch policy were this case to be decided upon by the 
ECJ. The assessment was that a similar question would eventually be raised 
again and would inevitably end up before the ECJ. The Dutch representation 
saw no way that the Netherlands would be able to win the case. The agent was 
invited to the ministry to personally clarify the consequences of the case.  
 
“Your role is to occasionally just to stand back and assess what is happening here 
and what the consequences may be. You should at least inform the Ministers in 
order for them to make an informed decision.” 
                                                        
12  In reality, the clause was almost never applied, as concluded by the Dutch Ombudsman. 
Nationale Ombudsman, Rapport Inburgeren in het Buitenland, 2011/135, 2011, 36.  
13  The report by the Dutch Ombudsman (at the insistence of the Refugee Council) dealing 
with whether exemption from the civic integration requirement is granted when this re-
quirement in view of all the circumstances in a specific situation is not proportional, it 
was concluded on the application of the law by the IND: “[I]nstead of reviewing of all 
the relevant circumstances in their interrelationship, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service in its daily practice assesses all circumstances separately and concludes - without 
any real exception - that none of these circumstances justify an exception.” Nationale 
Ombudsman, Rapport Inburgeren in het Buitenland, 2011/135, 2011, 37.  
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The ministry, for the first time since the existence of the law, subsequently made 
an exception.14 As is apparent from the official order of the ECJ, the Dutch min-
istry moved very quickly to inform the Court that a permit had been granted and 
that therefore the decision against which the appeal in the proceedings was di-
rected had become inoperative. After consulting the referring national court as to 
the status of the case, the ECJ concluded that the main proceedings no longer 
had a purpose and that it was no longer necessary to give a ruling on the request 
for a preliminary ruling. Although the national court indicated that the parties 
were considering filing for damages, the ECJ reasoned this to be merely hypo-
thetical. To the disappointment of the lawyer, the professor and the Refugee 
Council, the possibility of having the ECJ shine its light on the WIB was there-
fore successfully thwarted. In the end the lawyer did file for damages, which 
was resolved, at the insistence of the court, through mediation, with a settlement 
as a result.15  
D.6  The Aftermath  
The assessment of the Dutch agent in Luxembourg, that the questions regarding 
the Dutch policy would inevitably be raised again since ‘it had now been dis-
covered by lawyers’, was accurate; however, it took longer than one might have 
expected. The lawyer, who was of course keen to bring the matter before the 
Court again, had trouble finding a new suitable case. He recalls: 
 
“After the first case, of course I had quite a lot of people who came to me, saying: I 
do not want to do my civic integration examination either. But it is then very 
practical, I just said to most clients, how much time and how much money do you 
have? Because that’s what it comes down to. And my experience is that it’s quicker 
to just do the test, and it is also cheaper than to litigate against it. And so, I only had 
one case where someone was willing to litigate it. Most people figured that someone 
else should go litigate and spend the money, and choose the safest way and just do 
the test. And that is the reason that despite the questions by [the court in Zwolle] it 
still took so very long before new questions are on the table.” 
 
The individual interest of applicants in receiving a provisional residence permit, 
effectively making passing the examination the preferable option to litigating for 
several years at increased costs, thus worked as a brake on possible cases to 
                                                        
14  The Ombudsman’s report mentions one previous case; however that case was dealt with 
at a bureaucratic level due to its urgent nature, and was therefore not coordinated with 
central staff. Nationale Ombudsman, Rapport Inburgeren in het Buitenland, 2011/135, 
2011, 29. 
15  The settlement included a non-disclosure agreement as to the terms of the settlement. 
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bring the matter to a court’s attention again. But finally, after two years, the 
lawyer found the case of a woman from Azerbaijan, who had to pass the integra-
tion examination abroad before she could join her husband in the Netherlands, 
willing to litigate on the matter. In that case, the court in Den Bosch concluded 
in first instance that passing an integration examination as a condition for family 
reunification was contrary to the Family Reunification Directive.16 The court, 
controversially, based its judgment on the European Commission’s position in 
the preliminary proceedings that never made it and the ECJ’s judgment. It had 
been put forward by the lawyer in the proceedings, a point to which I will return 
later. He had also pressed again for a preliminary reference, proposing to reap-
ply the questions posed in the earlier case; however the Dutch court concluded 
ex officio that, although Member States were allowed to require certain measures 
of integration, the requirement of passing the civics test abroad was incompati-
ble with the Directive. It thus ruled that the Minister should grant his client a 
temporary residence permit. With this highly debated judgment, the court in Den 
Bosch effectively put the Council of State on the spot, since the court’s conclu-
sion on the incompatibility of the requirement of passing the test with the Di-
rective forced the Council of State in onward appeal to either agree with the 
court or, if disagreeing or unsure, bring the matter before the ECJ. After a full 
seventeen months, joining this case with one other similar case,17 the Council of 
State chose the latter. At this point the lawyer was assisted in drafting his obser-
vations for the ECJ by the so-called Migration Law Clinic of the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam in which law students, under the supervision of EU 
migration law scholars, write custom-tailored legal advice for practising law-
yers, non-governmental organisations and other actors in the field of migration 
law. In the time between the two cases, arguably due to the dust stirred up by the 
first, some of the context surrounding the subject of integration tests had 
changed. The Commission’s Green Paper on the right to family reunification of 
third country nationals living in the European Union that was published in the 
course of the national proceedings in the second case especially had an impact 
on the direction of the ECJ’s judgment.18 Postdating the Commission’s written 
observations in the first case, which were very critical towards the Dutch policy, 
the Green Paper indicated that the Commission did not consider the pre-entry 
test to be contrary to Article 7(2) of the Directive in every case. 
                                                        
16  Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage 23 November 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BY4171. 
17  Actors on both sides of the isle speculated on why the Counsel chose to combine two 
cases. While the professor speculated whether the Counsel wanted to prevent the Minis-
try from repeating what it did in the first case, the Dutch agent argued that the aim was to 
provide the ECJ with more context by adding a second case with a different factual 
background, allowing for a more balanced judgment. 
18  European Commission 2011.  
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In July 2015, the ECJ held that the Directive, in particular Article 7(2) per-
mitted a Member State to require a third country national to pass a civics test 
abroad before granting him or her permission to enter and reside on its territory 
under family reunification.19 In addition, the Court concluded that the integra-
tion requirement for the exercise of the right to family reunification should not 
be impossible or excessively difficult and the principle of proportionality re-
quired that the integration requirement did not go beyond what was necessary to 
achieve the objective pursued. Ultimately, the ECJ thus concluded that the tests 
were, although with certain reservations, allowed because they were of a basic 
nature. The professor, however, pointed out that in the meantime the nature of 
the test in the Netherlands had changed:  
 
“It is clear that they now have made the test so difficult that even 60% of those with 
higher education do not pass the examination. But, even there we have formally lost 
the battle. And it was so unfortunate that the first judgment about the integration test 
abroad was not based on that first case.” 
D.7  The Traveling Commission Opinion 
Although the first case never made it to a conclusion at ECJ level, it stirred up a 
significant response from different actors and can be placed in a complex dy-
namic of contestations of both Dutch and German integration policies. Even 
though the case was averted from being adjudicated by the ECJ, because of the 
accelerated procedure of the PPU the European Commission had already formu-
lated and filed an opinion on the matter. This document showed a clear stance 
that the Dutch policy of structurally rejecting a provisional residence permit 
whenever the applicant had not passed the civic integration examination abroad 
undermined the aim (to promote family reunification) and the effect utile of the 
Directive. The European Commission concluded that Article 7(2) of the Di-
rective did not permit a Member State to refuse the spouse or minor child of a 
lawfully resident citizen of a third country entry and residence ‘solely on the 
ground that the family member has not passed the integration examination 
abroad prescribed by the law of that State’.  
The stance by the Commission was a clear indication of the tenability of the 
WIB, or at least its application in practice, and it went on to play an important 
role in the wake of the thwarted preliminary reference. Even though it was not 
an official public statement but a court document that is generally not available 
to the public, the Commission’s opinion found its way into the public arena. 
                                                        
19  C-153/14, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken v K and A, para. 49 and 53. 
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After the case was concluded as described above, the opinion was published on 
Migratieweb.nl, a Dutch online knowledge database for migration related issues, 
focused especially on practitioners in the field of migration and asylum law. The 
Commission’s opinion led to parliamentary questions.20 In October 2011, the 
opinion also surfaced in Germany after which the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 
going back to one of its own judgments of 2010, concluded that it had wrongful-
ly neglected to refer questions to the ECJ on the compatibility of the German 
language test with Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive. In its ear-
lier judgment the court had effectively considered the matter an acte clair.21 
Two years later, on March 19th 2013, the Berlin Verwaltungsgericht referred 
questions to the ECJ about the compatibility of the language test with the Di-
rective, resulting in the Dogan judgment of July 10th 2014.22 Dogan was howev-
er not the first; the Ayalti case referred to the ECJ by the Berlin 
Verwaltungsgericht at the end of 2012 was meant to deal with the legality of 
integration tests in Germany.23 However, similar to the dynamics described in 
this case study, this case was stricken from the ECJ’s registry after a visa was 
granted to the applicant. 
The Commission’s Green Paper, published on November 15th 2011, re-
vealed that the Netherlands had pressed for a change in the Directive, but as it 
turned out no other Member States felt this was a necessary step to take. In 
2012, the European Commission started the informal phase of infringement 
proceedings against both Germany and the Netherlands for non-compliance with 
the Directive. In April 2013, the Dutch Deputy Minister of Security and Justice 
announced a loosening of the policy on family reunification of asylum seekers 
and accepted amendments proposed by parliament to simplify the policy for 
granting a residence permit to asylum seekers’ family members.24 
D.8  Deductions from an Invisible Case 
Although the eventual success of the efforts in challenging the legality of the 
Dutch policy on integration tests was limited, this case is an exposé of how stra-
tegic actors may employ individual cases to attack national policies by invoking 
EU law. Especially important in this respect is the role of the professor in im-
ploring an interest group like the Refugee Council to focus its efforts on the 
                                                        
20  Aanh. Hand. TK 2010-2011, nr. 3334. 
21  BVerwG 25 March 2010, ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2008:160608B3B9.08.0. 
22  C-138/13 Naime Dogan v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
23  C-513/12 Aslihan Nazli Ayalti v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
24  https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/33293_herschikken_gronden_voor [last access-
ed 10 November 2017]. 
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rights and legal protection of their constituents as laid down in EU law. The 
Refugee Council, furthermore, had a tactical position in being able to bring to-
gether the expertise of the professor with a case that lent itself perfectly to the 
strategy of legally challenging Dutch policies. The organisation has for a long 
time provided assistance to associated practitioners by means of a consultation 
service. In this way they are able to respond to the needs of asylum lawyers by 
providing them with specialised legal expertise. One important additional ad-
vantage of this practice is that the Committee can tap into most of the available 
cases that are brought before the courts and select those that are most suitable 
for the legal strategy they have devised beforehand. Additionally, this system 
allows for putting out a general call to practitioners imploring them to bring 
cases that may suit one of the devised strategies. When trying to litigate on prin-
ciple matters, this signalling of EU law opportunities is an important aspect. A 
vantage point on multiple cases provides the opportunity to tap into the case law 
potential.25  
D.9  Changing Context, Same Questions? 
The limited effect of the efforts of the professor and the Refugee Council are in 
large part explained by the fact that the preliminary reference was cut short be-
fore an ECJ judgment, which allowed for further developments that would dras-
tically diminish the chances of success in subsequent cases. Political develop-
ments during the period between the first and the second round of preliminary 
questions resulted in a change in context, which arguably lessened the potential 
effect of the legal strategy. The interpretation of the relevant EU legislation at 
the time of the first case, as evidenced by the Commission’s observations in that 
case, changed into a more generous reading, which allowed Member States 
more leeway in applying ‘integration measures’. These developments also found 
their way into the questions that were put before the ECJ. In the first case the 
questions directly challenged the legality of the Dutch policy in light of the Re-
unification Directive, with the Dutch court asking: 
 
“Does Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive allow a Member State to 
refuse entry and residence to a family member, as referred to in Article 4 of that di-
rective, of a third country national lawfully residing in that Member State, exclusive-
                                                        
25  Cf. Harlow & Rawlings who discuss the availability of lawyers and legal advice as an 
important factor in determining success, the essential link with what they call ‘control’ 
being that “in-house lawyers are able to take control of potentially good cases at an early 
stage”. Harlow & Rawlings 1992, 303. 
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ly on the ground that that family member has not passed the civic integration exami-
nation abroad as prescribed in the legislation of that Member State?” 
 
After two years and with the intermediate publication of the Commission’s 
Green Paper, the questions asked in the second case were much more detailed in 
nature, and in its questions the Dutch Council of State explicitly referred to the 
Commission’s Green Paper. The Green Paper indicated that the Commission did 
not consider the requirement of a pre-entry test to be contrary to Article 7(2) of 
the Directive in every case. In this respect it might also be relevant that initially 
the questions came from a lower court, which might have been less concerned 
with the legal and political consequences of a question as compared to the 
Council of State that went into much more detail in its reference, thereby antici-
pating the possible impact of the ECJ judgment. Of these questions the lawyer 
states:  
 
“When you see these questions from the Council of State and the considerations of 
how they come to them, that really raises some eyebrows here and there. They gave 
us the question for review, but then we got the interim ruling and then we saw the 
considerations, and then you think, huh? They actually decide things in advance 
when there is a real possibility that the Court thinks otherwise, so that’s really weird. 
One of the very important points, and that played in the first case as well, is whether 
there is a translation error in the Dutch version of the Directive. The Council of State 
has already decided that it did not think that there is a translation error. Well, that’s 
very strange because in his conclusion, the Advocate General does conclude there is 
a translation error. I don’t understand why they would run the risk of embarrassing 
themselves.” 
 
Even though in the Netherlands it is quite common practice for the court to pro-
vide the preliminary questions to the parties for review, the parties are limited in 
the amount of influence they have over the framing and scope of the questions. 
Especially in light of the way in which the ECJ is relatively limited in its han-
dling of cases by the framework as provided by the referring court, this can be 
an opportunity or present itself as an obstacle to strategic actors. However, it 
must also be emphasized that the ECJ itself does sometimes reformulate the 
questions, or goes beyond the scope of the questions as formulated by the refer-
ring national court.26 
                                                        
26  Broberg & Fenger 2010, 349. 
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D.10  The Withdrawal of References 
The most interesting element in the developments in this case, the actions by the 
Dutch government, illustrate the power of Member States’ administrations to 
influence the types of cases the ECJ gets to pass judgment on. In the case of 
residence permits, the possibility of preventing a reference or a judgment are 
relatively straightforward, since the provision of a residence permit generally 
takes away the standing of litigants. In this case, the Dutch government acted 
very quickly and informed the ECJ of the permit that was provided. The Dutch 
government was very fast in its actions, and on the client’s side the response was 
not fast enough. Filing for damages in this case would have retained her legal 
interest in a resolution of the questions referred to the ECJ. However, develop-
ments happened so quickly that the request by the ECJ to the referring court 
inquiring whether or not its intention was to continue their request came before 
the lawyer was able to officially file for damages. At that stage the ECJ decided 
that the intention to bring an action for damages was merely hypothetical. This 
consideration by the ECJ contrasts with the Court’s own decision in Siemens AG 
Österreich where admissibility was considered acceptable, since the Court could 
not exclude the possibility that an answer to the question could still be of interest 
to the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings.27 
Generally, if a party withdraws or the government concerned grants a resi-
dence permit, or something similar, to the asylum applicant and a settlement is 
thereby reached in the main proceedings then the referring court or tribunal is 
expected to withdraw the reference on its own initiative in order to save the ECJ 
time and expense. In this case the ECJ decided, after being informed by the 
Dutch government of the granting of a permit and asking the Dutch referring 
court about its intention, not to answer the questions. However, the fact that the 
government gives some kind of residence permit is not necessarily a reason for 
the national court to withdraw the reference. In other cases the ECJ has taken a 
different stance. In Baumbast the Court noted that the permits had been granted 
under national law and so the question of the rights conferred under EU law on 
the persons concerned had therefore not been resolved.28 In Bernini one of the 
reasons the referring court decided to maintain the reference was that the ques-
tions were also relevant to other pending cases. 29 Therefore, although the Court 
could have decided one way or the other, the Dutch administration was success-
ful in preventing a likely disastrous decision by the ECJ with regard to its policy 
on integration tests. The examples of similar cases in Germany suggest that such 
                                                        
27  See Broberg & Fenger 2010, 165-6. 
28  C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, paras. 29-38. 
29  C-3/90 M.J.E. Bernini v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen. 
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a strategy may be more common than is visible to the outside observer and illus-
trates Member States’ ability to ‘play the Eurolaw game’ by attempting to con-
trol the ECJ’s docket. 
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8 Preliminary Reference as a Multiplier of Interests 
8.1  Introduction 
Previous chapters have illustrated how a reference to the ECJ may transform a 
single court case into a possible jurisprudential precedent in which both national 
and EU governance is fought out, with opportunities for strategic actors to chal-
lenge national policy and influence the course of European integration. One 
peculiar aspect of the EU legal system is that at the ECJ level the legal arena is 
opened up to other interested parties. After referral to the ECJ, both individual 
litigants and strategic actors with considerably more organisational capacity and 
legal agency may then find themselves in the company of other actors with their 
own agendas. A conventional view of law and litigation relies heavily on an 
adversarial view of disputes, with two parties, supported by their lawyer advo-
cates, advancing their own interests by pleading their case against that of their 
adversaries. When it comes to the preliminary reference procedure, it is im-
portant to distinguish between different adversaries (or allies for that matter). 
Even if one considers the reference part of a case as a formalistic procedure and 
not an actual part of the dispute per se, the fact that questions are asked in order 
to enable a judgment at the national level makes these procedures essential mo-
ments in any case. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the changing dynamics in the case of a 
referral to the ECJ. References to the ECJ can, and often do, transform a case 
from a localised dispute into a matter of significance for interests that may exist 
at other levels. The reference by a national court to the ECJ means that, because 
it breaks out of the confines of the national legal system, the context changes 
and the possible effects of a case become supranational. At that point a host of 
other potentially interested actors may be mobilised. Most prominently among 
them are the European Commission and (other) Member States – who have 
direct access to the proceedings before the ECJ. Theoretically, the European 
Parliament, the European Council, (and the European Central Bank for that mat-
ter) also have privileged access to ECJ proceedings and third parties may be 
introduced into proceedings by the ECJ itself. In this analysis, I exclude these 
other actors. On the one hand, because they are simply absent in all of the cases 
studied, and on the other hand, because they have a limited stake when it comes 
to the type of ‘game’ that is played with regard to the type of preliminary refer-
ences central to this study.1 This chapter will focus on the relationship between 
the litigating parties with these two most prominent actors and on the role that 
                                                        
1  Stein 1981, 8. 
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they play in the dynamics of a case before and after referral.2 The first section 
addresses the European Commission and its role in the enforcement of EU law 
before analysing some of the ways in which private parties may encounter the 
European Commission during litigation. The second section zooms in on the 
position of the Member States and the structural and practical advantages they 
enjoy as a repeat player, compared to private parties. 
8.2  The European Commission: Repeat Player Par Excellence  
The European Commission is a key player when it comes to ECJ adjudication. 
As a privileged actor it has structural access to the ECJ and acts as an amicus to 
the Court by systemic participation in every case brought before it, both in direct 
actions and preliminary reference cases. As an institutional actor the Commis-
sion provides legal expertise and policy guidance as well as contextual infor-
mation in specific court proceedings, and as a central institutional player in poli-
cy development and the drafting of legislation it plays an important part outside 
the Court as well. As an amicus of the Court the Commission has been credited 
with successfully pushing towards more legal integration in close alliance with 
the Court, as well as essentially fashioning the legal arguments that led to the 
constitutionalisation of European law. The Commission is thus involved in most 
instances of decision-making by the ECJ and is in that way the European repeat 
player par excellence.  
Empirical studies on the outcome of proceedings before the Court of Justice 
have repeatedly demonstrated a high rate of success for the Commission.3 
Börzel finds that between 1978 and 1999, the European Commission won 95% 
of the infringement cases that were adjudicated by the Court.4 In the case of 
preliminary references the Commission appears to have a similarly positive 
record. Stone Sweet and Brunell show how in situations where the Commission 
and Member States have opposed one another before the ECJ, the ECJ has ruled 
in favour of the position taken by the Commission in a majority of the cases.5 
For those seeking enforcement of their EU rights, the European Commission 
may thus be a powerful ally, given its institutionalised position as one of the 
                                                        
2  Third parties are only scarcely employed by the ECJ. See Carrera & Petkova (2013, 245-
246) on the role and the potential for future involvement of civil society in third party in-
terventions before the European Courts. 
3  Conant 2007, 53. 
4  Börzel 2006, 33. Schepel and Blankenburg have commented that, in the case of in-
fringement proceedings “its success rate is so high as to make the ECJ look like a kanga-
roo court – being the baby in the pouch of the mother, it has to follow wherever the 
Commission goes”. Schepel & Blankenburg 2001, 18. 
5  Stone Sweet 2010; Stone Sweet & Brunell 2012, 212. 
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privileged players at the ECJ. Conversely, from the perspective of the Commis-
sion, individuals seeking justice are part of the institutional setup designed to 
foster EU law enforcement and by extension Member States’ compliance with 
EU law. The next section deals with both the theoretical and practical consocia-
tion between individual claimants and the Commission. 
8.3  The Commission as Guardian of the Treaties 
Traditionally, it has been the formal role of the Commission to safeguard the 
effectiveness of EU rules and rights. Within the EU, the Commission is charged 
with the active protection and promotion of the interests of the Union and, in 
tandem with the ECJ, is responsible for ensuring that EU law is properly applied 
in all the Member States. In its 2001 White Paper on European governance, the 
Commission reiterated that the primary responsibility for the implementation of 
Union law lies with national administrations and the Member States’ courts.6 
However, as so-called guardian of the treaties the European Commission has 
the formal task of safeguarding the timely implementation of new EU legislation 
and the effective application of EU law, including the rights that individuals 
may derive from them.  
Whenever Member States are suspected of not fulfilling their obligations 
under EU law, the Commission can move to ensure compliance. Formally the 
Commission has several different instruments at its disposal in order to do this. 
The Commission enjoys powers of investigation (securing any information and 
carrying out any checks required for the performance of its duties), prevention 
(by informal meetings, opinions, recommendations or binding acts), sanction (to 
be imposed on Member States and on companies, especially in the case of com-
petition law) and authorisation (allowing for the temporary suspension of the 
application of EU law). The Treaties confer powers upon the Commission to 
institute proceedings before the Court of Justice if it considers that a Member 
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under a Treaty.7 If the Commission notes 
such failure, the state concerned is asked to submit its observations. If the Mem-
ber State is then still considered to be in violation, the Commission delivers a 
reasoned opinion, with which the state must comply within the time limit laid 
down therein. If the state in question does not comply, the Commission may 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice by means of infringement proceed-
ings. The continual supply of new legislation means that the Commission is in a 
                                                        
6  European Commission 2001.  
7  Article 258 TFEU. 
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virtually constant dialogue with Member States in order to ensure timely and 
effective EU law implementation. 
To perform its task, the Commission has the discretion to choose the instru-
ment it considers most effective, expedient and appropriate in different situa-
tions of implementation and application deficiency.8 The Commission summa-
rizes its own role as stimulating the Member States to comply with Union law as 
quickly as possible, for which it ultimately has the infringement procedure at its 
disposal. In order to keep tabs on the implementation of EU legislation at the 
national level, the Commission may start an investigation on its own initiative or 
respond to complaints or requests by other parties. Due to its limited investiga-
tive means, the Commission is very much dependent upon signals it receives 
from within Members States and information provided by national administra-
tions whenever it investigates a possible breach of EU law. The Commission 
therefore emphasizes the significant role played by the complaints it receives 
from the public, businesses and NGOs in signalling possible breaches of Union 
law. The Commission receives between 3,000 and 4,000 such complaints annu-
ally.9  
The Commission has, in both practice and policy, shown a preference for 
more cost-effective, non-litigious rule enforcement through informal resolu-
tion.10 Although informal pre-litigation actions are frequent, the Commission 
brings alleged infringements before the Court in only a minority of those cases. 
By compiling the total number of Article 258 infringement procedures since 
1978, Börzel shows that the Commission made ample use of its compliance 
powers, opening more than 20,000 proceedings against Member States.11 Yet, 
only a fraction of these cases resulted in judgments by the ECJ. In practice, both 
the Commission and Member States make efforts to resolve allegations without 
Court proceedings. Between 1978 and 1999, two-thirds of the nearly 17,000 
procedures were settled after the informal (and confidential) phase and before 
the procedure entered the formal phase. In fact, even during the formal part of 
the procedures, discussions between the Commission and Member States con-
tinued. A further two-thirds of the remaining cases were settled subsequent to 
the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission, and of the 1,619 referrals to the 
                                                        
8  It is important to point out that the Commission should by no means be considered a 
monolith in its policies and actions and many decisions are made on a case-by-case basis 
and approaches may differ considerably between different policy fields and between or 
even within the different Directorates-General. While acknowledging this nuance, for 
brevity, I will stick to denoting all actions as performed by the Commission. 
9  Additionally, petitions by citizens to the European Parliament as well as questions from 
Members of Parliament can raise perceived deficiencies in the way Member States apply 
EU law. See European Commission 2013, 6. 
10  Weatherill 2014, 86. 
11  Börzel 2003. 
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ECJ only 972 actually resulted in a Court ruling. This trend of pre-litigation 
resolution continues to this day: in 2014 only thirty-eight infringement cases 
were resolved through a Court judgment.12  
Looking further at the statistics of the ECJ (Figure VI) we can see that the 
number of infringement cases brought before the ECJ has, since peaking in 
2007, been declining steadily to below 100 annually in recent years. 
 
Figure VI: New cases brought before the Court of Justice 
 
Data retrieved from annual reports (1997-2015) of the ECJ.  
www.curia.europa.eu. 
 
Although on average the number of complaints remained constant or even in-
creased slightly in the period after 2010,13 the number of letters of formal notice 
fell by approximately half between 2011 and 2012 and the number of cases 
brought before the Court declined at an ever higher rate; from 216 in 2007 to 
only thirty-seven in 2015. This downward trend follows some major revisions to 
the Commission’s infringement management after 2007.14 The Commission set 
out to improve its operations in the areas of prevention (by increased attention to 
implementation throughout the policy cycle), efficient and effective response 
                                                        
12  In 2014, a total of 797 infringement cases were closed by the Commission before Court 
proceedings, either after the initial letter of formal notice (580 cases), after the issuing of 
a reasoned opinion by the Commission (190 cases) or the cases were withdrawn from the 
Court after being filed (11 cases). In addition, the Commission withdrew sixteen cases 
from the Court before it handed down its ruling. European Commission 2014, 15.  
13  With the lowest number of complaints at 3,115 in 2011 to the highest number of 3715 in 
2014.  
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/docs/annual_report_32/com_2015_329_en. 
pdf [last accessed 10 November 2017]. 
14 European Commission 2007. 
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(by improving the exchange of information and problem-solving), improving its 
working methods (by prioritising and accelerating infringements management) 
and enhancing dialogue and transparency (between the European institutions 
and improving information for the public). 
One important new measure in this respect was the introduction of ‘EU Pi-
lot’, a Commission initiative, supported by an online database and communica-
tion tool, aimed at ‘providing quicker and better answers to questions raised by 
citizens or businesses and solutions to those problems arising in the application 
of EU law’.15 Through the structured dialogue in the EU Pilot programme, the 
Commission and Member States are expected to solve problems more quickly 
and expedite the achievement of compliance with EU law obligations without 
having to resort to infringement proceedings. The new system was introduced in 
a number of volunteer Member States in 2008 and currently all twenty-eight 
Member States are participating in it. The new system is considered to be re-
sponsible in significant part for a reduction in the number of infringement pro-
cedures16 and eventual court cases by an increase in early resolution. According 
to the Commission: “The structured dialogue via EU Pilot has proven effective 
in the early resolution of potential infringements, to the benefit of citizens and 
business alike.”17 In addition to the reported success of the EU Pilot programme, 
according to the Commission resulting in more pre-litigation resolutions, struc-
tural factors may have also contributed to this trend. Among them is a decrease 
in new Directives that were introduced in the period 2008-2012, leading to a 
related decrease in possible late transposition infringements, which take up, on 
average, about a third of the infringement procedures.18 
8.4  Preliminary References as Alternative Enforcement 
The structured nature of the dialogue between the Commission and Member 
States creates the impression that the enforcement actions of the Commission 
are systemic and automatic. However, the Commission has full discretion to 
choose the way in which it acts on suspected infringements. In addition to the 
structural factors that largely account for the downward trend in infringement 
                                                        
15  European Commission 2010a, 8. 
16  The term ‘infringement procedure’ denotes the formal infringement phase where (at 
least) a letter of formal notice has been sent to the Member State, in most cases after in-
formal bilateral discussion between the Commission and the Member State. This does 
not yet mean that the case has been brought before the ECJ but does mean that the Com-
mission (after the informal phase) considers that there has been a violation of EU law ob-
ligations.  
17  European Commission 2013, 16. 
18  European Commission 2012, 2. 
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proceedings, there is another related development that illustrates the Commis-
sion’s freedom to choose the instruments it employs. Looking at the trend in the 
number of cases brought before the Court in its totality, we see that conversely 
to the decrease in infringement cases there has been a significant increase in the 
number of preliminary references that have been brought before the Court since 
2008. Apart from more structural factors that may explain the converse trends in 
preliminary references and infringement actions (more pre-litigation resolution 
for infringement actions and an increase in the total number of Member States 
referring preliminary cases to the ECJ since 2004), there is reason to believe that 
the Commission views the preliminary reference procedure as a viable alterna-
tive to its own efforts – either on its own initiative or based on complaints – to 
force Member States’ compliance.19 In its own analysis, the Commission linked 
the two trends: 
 
“The overall decrease of the number of infringement procedures can be put in 
relation to the important increase of preliminary rulings under Article 267 TFEU 
since 2010. […] Whilst preliminary rulings are distinct from infringement judg-
ments, this gives the Commission an additional opportunity to ensure in a more 
systematic manner that violations of Union law deriving from national legislation or 
its application are remedied.”20 
 
According to the Commission’s own reporting, conformity issues of national 
laws in regard to EU legislation took up about half of the ECJ’s judgments in 
preliminary reference cases in the period 2010-2014. This confirms the idea that 
for the Commission, from the perspective of ensuring Member States’ compli-
ance, preliminary reference cases form an alternative to the initiation of in-
fringement proceedings. Even when counting only preliminary references con-
cerning conformity issues (approximately half), preliminary reference cases 
have outnumbered infringement proceedings by approximately five-to-one on 
average over the past five years.21 The increase in references may thus be a wel-
come development for the Commission; reducing significantly the time and 
resources that it would otherwise have to spend in the run-up to infringement 
proceedings. The more EU law violations are brought before the ECJ through 
national courts, the more the Commission can focus its resources elsewhere.22 
Preliminary reference cases provide the Commission with the ability to repri-
                                                        
19  Hoffmann 2016.  
20  European Commission 2013, 16. 
21  This difference grows even larger when excluding the 25-35% late transposition in-
fringement cases. 
22  A lack of resources, of both Commission and national competition authorities, was ex-
plicitly named by the Commission as one of the advantages of private enforcement when 
it comes to competition rules and actions for damages. European Commission 2005.  
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mand a Member State while consolidating European integration through the 
Court, without having to initiate infringement proceedings. These developments 
fit with an emerging picture of general shifts in modes of regulation, towards a 
greater emphasis on private enforcement.23  
8.5  Two Pathways to Allying with the Ultimate Repeat Player 
Changing our perspective from that of the Commission to those seeking to have 
their EU rights enforced, the Commission is an attractive actor to have on one’s 
side. Once court proceedings are initiated, the Commission enjoys a privileged 
position before the Court. In infringement proceedings the Commission acts 
essentially as the prosecutor, bringing a Member State to Court, and in the case 
of preliminary references the Commission is always among those informed of 
new references and effectively acts as an amicus of the ECJ. The Commission is 
therefore potentially a powerful ally for private parties seeking to address possi-
ble violations of their EU rights by Member States, or in other ways furthering 
their interests through EU law.   
From the perspective of private actors that seek the Commission’s support in 
having their EU rights enforced, there are two pathways to doing so. Firstly, 
individuals may choose to file a complaint in order to inform the Commission of 
a possible infringement of EU law obligations and violation of their rights in the 
hope of moving it towards using its enforcement powers to ensure compliance 
by the Member State. And secondly, private parties may take their grievance to 
national courts and invoke a reference to the ECJ where they may find the 
Commission as one of the privileged parties that participate in the proceedings. 
From the perspective of strategic actors aiming for an ECJ judgment on a matter, 
both pathways essentially provide access points. Both preliminary references 
and complaints to the European Commission can end in an ECJ judgment; how-
ever, from the perspective of individuals there are a number of important differ-
ences between these two ‘pathways to compliance’. 
Complaining to the Commission has some significant drawbacks. Firstly, 
the most important issue is the uncertainty related to whether or not the Com-
mission will decide to start procedures. The Commission’s discretion gives no 
guarantee as to whether one’s complaint yields a follow-up. Secondly, assuming 
the Commission does decide to act on a complaint (and assuming it acts without 
delay) the procedure from the first informal contact between Commission and 
Member State to a potential referral to the ECJ takes around four years on aver-
                                                        
23  In environmental law: Hofmann 2016; competition law: Wigger & Nölke 2007; and con-
sumer protection: Kelemen 2011. 
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age.24 The eventual court case will add several months to years to the total dura-
tion. Although presented as a success by the Commission itself, the long pre-
litigation process of the EU Pilot Programme has been criticized for potentially 
extending the duration of the process further and undermining the claim that 
compliance through the threat of prosecution always results in a swift end to 
non-compliance. This conclusion by the Commission should be considered with 
further reservation, as there is no real way of ascertaining whether or not such 
cases were actually resolved and thus lead to compliance or whether they have a 
different result.25 Furthermore, as argued by Smith, it allows Member States to 
comply at the last possible opportunity in order to reap any financial or political 
benefits that could have been gained through non-compliance for the longest 
time possible. We have seen an example of this in Case Study C where the 
Dutch government managed to play out the contestation of the amount of admin-
istrative fees it charged for residence permits for the longest possible time. The 
legal battle over the increase in fees continued well after the ECJ judgment 
found that the Netherlands was in violation of the standstill clause in the Associ-
ation Agreement with Turkey. Subsequent claims for restitution of the unlawful-
ly levied fees resulted in a declaration by the Dutch Council of State that there 
was a refund scheme only for Turkish nationals, although the announcement of 
this scheme also immediately meant the end of it.26 Many Turkish nationals 
therefore were never able to reclaim the fees through these ‘transitional ar-
rangements’, and the Dutch government was able to retain millions of euros of 
unlawfully charged fees. 
During such a prolonged process, the individual complainant receives no in-
terim relief for his or her grievance. As the Commission itself acknowledges: 
“Only a national tribunal can apply remedies like injunctions to the administra-
tions, cancellation of national decisions, damages etc.”27 The Commission does 
not have the power to apply these kinds of measures of judicial protection. 
Thirdly, in infringement actions the complainant is not a party to the proceed-
ings and has little input compared to preliminary references, where parties have 
the ability to participate in the proceedings and provide their own legal argu-
mentation. This is, of course, especially relevant for strategic actors aiming not 
only for the enforcement of a specific right but for a judgment on principle by 
                                                        
24  Most procedures initiated by the Commission never reach the Court and will be resolved 
in the preceding phases. Smith 2010, 557. 
25  For example, the Commission has powers of authorisation and may allow for the tempo-
rary suspension of the application of EU law. Which would not resolve the right claim of 
the complaining individual. 
26  Raad van State 2 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BR6949. For a review see 
Schaap 2014, 432. 
27  European Commission 2007, 8.  
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the ECJ on a broader issue. And finally, even after the procedure has been com-
pleted and a Member State has been deemed in violation of its obligations, com-
pliance is not always effectively ensured. At the end of 2013, the Commission 
considered that 113 judgments passed under Article 258 TFEU had still not been 
fully complied with by the Member States concerned.28 
The next section deals with the relationship between the Commission and 
litigating parties and illustrates the ways in which parties may (or may not) ally 
themselves with the Commission, both inside and outside the courtroom. The 
cases in the selection for this study are used to reveal several instances where the 
Commission has played a role in the development of a case, both where the 
parties have made efforts to mobilise the Commission, as well as cases where 
the Commission has acted on its own initiative and intervened.  
8.6  Mobilising the Commission 
From the perspective of the litigating parties the Commission can be a powerful 
ally to have on their side, and thus an attractive actor to mobilise. The case of 
the Working Group together with the interest group IOT (Case Study C), and 
their experience with organized litigation as well as filing complaints to the 
Commission, reveals several ways in which the Commission may respond to 
complaints. The group of lawyers, academics and the IOT, previous to their 
efforts against the Dutch fees policy, had built up some experience with organ-
ised litigation and strategic action at the supranational level.29 The very first 
complaint this group filed to the Commission was with regard to the Dutch Ex-
port Restrictions on Benefits Act. In that effort, contact with the Commission 
played a vital role. In response to their complaint, the Commission communicat-
ed that it would not proceed with infringement proceedings, because the matter 
was deemed too politically sensitive.30 Officials of the Directorate of Social 
Affairs subsequently suggested that the IOT lawyer should try to solicit a pre-
liminary reference in the national courtroom. “The Commission’s opinion will 
be certainly much more definite and pronounced. And of course I will also be 
willing to provide informal assistance,” they informed the lawyer.31 The Com-
mission was in this instance not ready to risk the political backlash of starting 
infringement procedures on such a sensitive issue. Instead, they showed the IOT 
the way through the national courts.  
                                                        
28  European Commission 2013. 
29  For an extensive overview of the supranational efforts of the IOT, see Groenendijk, 
Rondhuis & Strik 2015. 
30  Groenendijk, Rondhuis & Strik 2015, 28. 
31  Groenendijk, Rondhuis & Strik 2015, 28. 
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At the request of the IOT’s lawyer, the Commission did write a letter that 
included its position that Article 6 (1) of Decision 3/80, which prohibits restrict-
ing the export of benefits, had direct effect and could thus be used directly in the 
national courtroom. That letter was subsequently presented by the lawyer to the 
Dutch courts, of which the Amsterdam Court followed the Commission’s inter-
pretation on the direct effect of Article 6. After appeal, the Council of State 
referred that case to the ECJ. This led to the judgment in Export of Benefits that 
had far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of the Association Agree-
ment, in line with what the IOT’s initial complaint had intended to accomplish.32 
The ECJ judgment meant that export of benefits under various Dutch laws 
couldn’t be limited or discontinued. Having built up experience with these pro-
ceedings, the IOT and the Working Group subsequently sought to use the com-
plaints procedure to implore the Commission to use its enforcement action 
against the Netherlands on several different issues.33 It became a natural step for 
the group to include a complaint to the Commission in their litigation strategies. 
The IOT eventually chose the path of the national courtroom on several occa-
sions, as we have seen, sometimes on explicit advice from the Commission, 
after it decided not to proceed with infringement proceedings.  
From the perspective of the litigating parties, making use of the Commission 
and infringement action can be an important signal to both national administra-
tions as well as to one’s constituency and the public at large. The mere fact that 
the European Commission is actively engaged in investigating a possible in-
fringement by a Member State helps to legitimise one’s claim and further mobi-
lise one’s constituency. Court judgments in infringement actions can subse-
quently be used to apply further pressure on Member States’ administrations. 
From the perspective of the Commission, such actions (the letter provided to the 
IOT lawyer) could be considered somewhat of a non-formalized ‘cousin’ to the 
formalised mechanism that was set out in Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003, 
pursuant to which courts of the Member States may contact the Commission and 
ask it to give its opinion on questions concerning the application of EU competi-
                                                        
32  Apart from the explicit advice of the Commission to the IOT to pursue a preliminary 
reference, in two other cases complaints by the IOT were deemed unfounded by the 
Commission, yet later PRP cases resulted in ECJ judgments to the same effect: C-578/08 
Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken and C-7/10 Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie v Tayfun Kahveci and Osman Inan. Both lawyers in the latter case were also in-
volved in the IOT Working Group described in Case Study C. One of them was responsi-
ble for the initial complaint to the European Commission that led to case C-92/07 Euro-
pean Commission v Netherlands.  
33  Including restrictions on the export of benefits, income requirement for family reunifica-
tion, dual nationality, administrative fees for permits, and later on the limited restitution 
for the unlawfully levied fees, integration requirements, and the country of residence 
principle. Groenendijk, Rondhuis & Strik 2015. 
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tion rules – albeit in this case on the initiative of one of the parties instead of the 
national judge. In a sense this goes against the Commission’s own reservations 
about its role in national proceedings. As it ensures with regard to its neutrality 
and objectivity in the case of such an amicus intervention in proceedings before 
the national courts: 
 
“Indeed, the Commission’s assistance to national courts is part of its duty to defend 
the public interest. It has therefore no intention to serve the private interests of the 
parties involved in the case pending before the national court. As a consequence, the 
Commission will not hear any of the parties about its assistance to the national court. 
In case the Commission has been contacted by any of the parties in the case pending 
before the court on issues which are raised before the national court, it will inform 
the national court thereof, independent of whether these contacts took place before 
or after the national court’s request for co-operation.”34 
 
This general stance by the Commission was confirmed by a Commission official 
stating that it did not wish to ‘transform into an investigator for the benefit of 
national litigation at the request of national courts’.35 Ostensibly, the Commis-
sion is cautious in its aid to private parties, for the interests of those parties often 
go against the interests of the Member States. The open support by the Commis-
sion for certain private interests is therefore a politically sensitive issue. Howev-
er, these private party interests may coincide with those of the Commission, and 
private enforcement allows for a reinforcement of the Commission’s own ef-
forts. When private interests align with its priorities, preliminary reference cases 
provide the Commission with an opportunity to fulfil its enforcement mandate. 
The Commission thus on occasion can be seen to interpret this principle of ful-
filling the role of amicus of national courts, but explicitly not of serving private 
interests, somewhat more freely than it portrays publicly. This means encourag-
ing developments outside the courtroom as well, directly or indirectly lending a 
helping hand to private parties.  
In the example given above, the Commission’s actions outside the court-
room occur as a response to attempts at mobilisation of the Commission by pri-
vate parties. However, the Commission is not only reactive in its efforts to use 
preliminary references as an alternative enforcement instrument. The next sec-
tion deals with examples where the Commission influences developments out-
side the courtroom, even without an explicit request by the parties involved. 
                                                        
34  European Commission 2004, para. 19. 
35  As reported in Komninos 2003, xxx.  
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8.7  Unsolicited Alliances: The Commission Behind the Scenes  
Although actively trying to mobilise the Commission can be a viable strategy, 
the Commission can also become an ally in an unsolicited way. This is, of 
course, the case when one’s claim in court is backed by the Commission’s inter-
pretation of EU law before the ECJ after referral. But the Commission also has 
its own policy objectives and on occasion also plays a role that is less visible to 
the outside observer. Several of the cases studied reveal instances where the 
Commission was active both in front of as well as behind the scenes. A case in 
point is the Self-Employed Tax Deductions case discussed in Chapter 5. This 
case involved a small accountancy firm in a border region of the Netherlands. In 
order to serve their clients, many of whom engaged in cross-border activities, 
the firm set out to get a judgment on principle on the question of whether or not 
tax deductions for the self-employed should apply to anyone regardless of 
whether or not they opted for treatment as a resident taxpayer.36 The firm took 
the difference in treatment of resident versus non-resident entrepreneurs to be a 
possible case of discrimination within the context of the right to freedom of 
establishment, and started a test case. The goal and expectation in this test case 
was to get a ruling from the Dutch Supreme Court, not a reference to Luxem-
bourg. After the Supreme Court unexpectedly decided to refer the case to Lux-
embourg, the accountancy firm decided, since no one in the office had any expe-
rience with preliminary references, to await the answers by the ECJ without any 
active participation in the proceedings before the Court. With this referral to the 
ECJ, the context of the case changed from an internal question to one of compli-
ance with EU tax regulations by the Dutch government, opening it up to addi-
tional interested parties. 
Since this case revolved around this central matter in the ‘European plan’ 
(uniform application of EU law, negative integration and a fundamental Europe-
an principle; non-discrimination based on nationality) once these questions were 
on the table, the Commission seized the opportunity, not only by providing a 
                                                        
36  To make the income tax ‘EU proof’, the Netherlands had introduced the so-called option 
scheme in the 2001 Income Tax Act. Non-resident taxpayers could choose to be charged 
as residents, even if less than 90% of their total income came from the Netherlands. This 
way they were entitled to tax credits, personal deductions and deductions of mortgage in-
terest for a private property located abroad. Up until the change in Dutch tax law in 2001 
non-Dutch companies with a permanent establishment in the Netherlands were excluded 
from entrepreneurial deduction, among which was a tax deduction for the self-employed. 
In order to be eligible for this deduction, entrepreneurs had to meet an annual criterion of 
1225 hours worked. Any entrepreneur could count the hours he worked for his company 
in order to be eligible for the self-employed deduction. However, entrepreneurs with a 
permanent establishment in another Member State were not allowed to count the hours 
worked across the border. 
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‘more definite and pronounced’ opinion in their role as an amicus of the Court, 
but also by intervening on the side of the parties. After the Dutch Supreme Court 
made the referral, an official of the Commission contacted the tax firm to inquire 
into their intended course of action. After revealing that they had no intention of 
providing any additional argumentation to the ECJ than had already been in-
cluded in the national proceedings, the tax advisor was asked whether or not he 
would object to the Commission soliciting the help of experts. Two EU tax law 
specialists and legal scholars, one of whom had written on the subject of a right 
of option and the foreign tax liability,37 were approached and asked to take on 
the case on a pro bono basis. Eventually, the resulting ECJ judgment made it 
clear that the Dutch choice scheme did not neutralize discrimination against 
non-residents.38 Direct recourse to freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) 
was possible without opting for domestic tax obligation. This judgment eventu-
ally contributed to the recall of the choice scheme by January 1st, 2015 in the 
Dutch Income Tax Act. 
The rationale behind the Commission’s intervention in this case seems to 
have been that after reviewing the case files it was concluded that on the part of 
the individual better EU law input was required than had been shown up until 
then. As concluded by Granger, the access to the Court or the ‘direct voice’ in 
the proceedings was restricted to the parties in the case before the national court, 
leading to a ‘variation in the quality of persons [sic] allowed in the Luxembourg 
courtroom depending on the national standing rules’.39 Although no official 
account of the Commission’s actions has been found, we can deduce the reason-
ing behind it from the subject matter of the case. The way this case fits into a 
pattern of ECJ tax law cases over the past decade reveals that it aligned with the 
Commission’s enforcement priorities; breaches of EU law ‘concerning the ap-
plication of Treaty principles and main elements of framework regulations and 
directives’.40 The Commission set out to prevent an interpretation of non-
discrimination that would allow Member States to circumvent the prohibitive 
function of then Article 43 EC, by introducing the possibility of choice for for-
                                                        
37  Engelen & Pötgens 2001. A book that according to its own summary “provides a clear 
and complete source of information for anyone who comes across situations in practice 
where foreign taxation is central”.  
38  The Schumacker doctrine included two requirements for a non-resident to be eligible for 
tax deductions in the state of employment. It required first that a worker ‘obtains his in-
come entirely or almost exclusively from the work performed in the first State’, and sec-
ondly that he or she ‘does not receive in the second State sufficient income to be subject 
to taxation there in a manner enabling his personal and family circumstances to be taken 
into account’. Thus, the wording of the operative part in C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-
Altstadt v Roland Schumacker. 
39  Granger 2001, 238-9. 
40  European Commission 2007, 9. 
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eign taxable persons. To be clear, there is no indication that the Commission 
actually provided legal arguments or other assistance to the parties, however, the 
choice for certain representation was of course not random, and the two scholars 
who were put on the case were expected to strengthen the Commission’s own 
arguments presented before the ECJ. Arguably, the Commission sought to even 
the playing field before the Court by making sure that the party to the proceed-
ings was well equipped to argue a preferred interpretation of EU law. By solicit-
ing the services of two EU tax law experts, they made sure that the Commission 
would not be the only party arguing against the Member States, four of whom 
(apart from the Netherlands) joined in the proceedings. Although there is no way 
of quantifying the times that the Commission takes this course of action, it 
shows how the Commission on occasion actively tries to influence the manner in 
which a case is argued before the ECJ, and that it considers it important how the 
case is presented by the parties. 
8.8  The Weight of Commission Involvement 
A key player like the Commission, or more specifically its stance on interpreta-
tion of EU law in specific instances, can be used as well without its active and 
deliberate involvement. Developments in both Germany and the Netherlands as 
a result of the Commission’s ‘leaked’ written observation in Case Study D are 
testament to this fact. In this case, the Dutch government prevented an ECJ deci-
sion after the Dutch court referred the case, by pre-emptively providing a provi-
sional residence permit. As described in Case Study D, the position taken by the 
Commission in that case played a role in prompting German courts to refer 
questions to the ECJ about the compatibility of the language test with the Di-
rective, resulting in the Dogan judgment.41 Congruently, in his quest to get ques-
tions referred to the ECJ in a second instance, the lawyer in Case Study D also 
brought the Commission’s position forward in a subsequent national procedure. 
The Dutch Council of State indeed referred that case to the ECJ, questioning the 
Dutch policy on integration test requirements for a second time, leading to the 
ECJ’s judgment.42 Similarly, in Export of Benefits (as described above) the law-
yer was able to obtain an officially formulated position of the Commission on 
the direct effect of the prohibition on restricting the export of benefits in Deci-
sion 3/80,43 which he subsequently used in national proceedings in support of 
his clients.   
                                                        
41  C-138/13 Naime Dogan v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
42  C-153/14 Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken v K and A. 
43  Groenendijk, Rondhuis & Strik 2015, 32. 
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These cases illustrate how, because of its authoritative institutionalized posi-
tion, the Commission’s stance (in written form) helps proliferate certain inter-
pretations of EU legislation that can be used by strategic actors to further a cer-
tain legal narrative for specific aims outside of the ECJ as well. By soliciting 
judgments and responses from institutionalized actors, as well as on occasion 
public attention, that narrative is strengthened, and further actors may be mobi-
lised by it. The Commission’s interpretation of EU law can be an important 
signal to national judges of the need for a reference to the ECJ or may push them 
to divert from existing national doctrine, and it helps to legitimise one’s claim 
and further mobilise one’s constituency. By eliciting judgments that include 
such arguments, or their relevant elements, strategic actors may thus use the 
Commission’s stance to contribute to dynamics beyond their own efforts alone. 
8.9  The Commission as an Additional Opponent  
The abovementioned could create the impression that the European Commission 
is always an important ally for individual claimants that plead their case before 
the ECJ. However, this depends greatly on whether or not one’s interests align 
with the priorities and position of the Commission. Since the Commission gen-
erally has a vested interest – even a Treaty-given obligation – to ensure the cor-
rect and uniform application of EU legislation and thus in essence to ‘defend’ 
EU policy, in the many cases where EU law is pitted against national policy, the 
Commission is indeed generally on the side of the litigant. While, with respect 
to EU rights claims, the Commission is in that sense an expected ally at the su-
pranational level, not all cases before the ECJ revolve around EU rights claims 
with those characteristics. Where these cases do not necessarily revolve around 
an individual rights claim – or where the claims themselves may be at odds with 
the application or enforcement of EU law in the way the Commission intends – 
the Commission can turn out to be an additional powerful opponent.44 Since its 
mandate is to further the correct application of EU legislation, not every indi-
vidual rights claim is necessarily in line with the Commission’s priorities and/or 
position.  
Given the nature of legislation in this area, effectively conveying various 
obligations and practical restrictions on farmers as entrepreneurs, especially with 
regard to animal welfare regulations, the area of agriculture is a case in point. In 
addition to being subject to restrictive regulations, many farmers receive EU 
                                                        
44  This is especially true when private parties bring claims challenging the legality of Euro-
pean acts using Article 23 TFEU, and proceedings or actions for damages (Article 340 
TFEU). However, these cases have not been included in this research. 
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subsidies in one form or another, effectively making them an addressee of obli-
gations and requirements tied to those subsidies and opening them up to poten-
tial sanctions. This results in a situation where farmers’ subsidies may be cut 
when they do not comply with relevant regulations. Individual agricultural cases 
therefore often revolve around individual litigants reactively defending them-
selves against such sanctions based on obligations flowing from EU legislation. 
The key point is that here EU law does not offer these litigants additional protec-
tion against national policy or government action, but the farmers’ business 
operations are subject in large part to legislation originating from the EU. The 
nature of these cases from the perspective of litigants is therefore very different 
from cases in many of the other areas of law. This distinct nature of the cases 
also has implications for the position taken by the European Commission before 
the ECJ. In these agricultural cases, the litigant is more likely to find the Com-
mission as an opponent, defending EU (animal welfare) policy. 
There are thus also situations where a private litigant invokes EU law 
against a national rule, while the Commission disagrees. It may think the liti-
gant’s interpretation goes too far, or it is in some other way misaligned with the 
Commission’s priorities and position. In the example of the case of the pension-
ers (Case Study B), at the ECJ they found no support from the European Com-
mission for their interpretation of the relevant EU legislation. They were, fur-
thermore, confronted with Finland, Luxembourg, France and the Czech Repub-
lic who all took a position supporting the Dutch interpretation of EU law. Tak-
ing on a Member State’s policy by using EU law thus does not always ensure 
support by the Commission. There are other examples of this in citizenship case 
law, where litigants challenged the discretion of national authorities to subject 
movement rights to particular conditions. Hofmann describes how, in these cas-
es, “somewhat surprisingly, the Commission did not always support an expan-
sive stance where individual litigants challenged the limitations secondary law 
had placed on the exercise of their movement rights”.45 The European Commis-
sion may thus not always be on the individual litigant’s side; however, in the 
cases studied for this research (where possible to determine) this applied in a 
small minority of cases. 
8.10  The European Commission: Concluding Remarks  
Private litigants with EU rights claims are in a clear consociation with the Euro-
pean Commission, thanks to the logic inherent in the EU’s enforcement system, 
which is dependent in large part on private claims. With respect to the applica-
                                                        
45  Hofmann 2013, 21. 
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tion of EU law and the effective enforcement of EU rights, the Commission is a 
key actor that works in a privileged field of opportunities.46 The Commission is 
able to respond well to these opportunities because it is presented with all cases 
in due time, making it possible to assess certain opportunities provided – or risks 
posed – by a case. This is also because the Commission is generally well in-
formed of local developments relating to EU law and non-compliance by Mem-
ber States, as opposed to the ECJ judges who are otherwise very much depend-
ent upon the information provided by both the referring judge and the Member 
States’ representatives. The Commission can, therefore, be an important amicus 
to the Court, providing the necessary context to a case.  
This strategic position of the Commission makes it an attractive actor for 
private parties to partner with, both in efforts at the national level as well as once 
their case has been referred to the ECJ. The examples presented in this chapter 
show the ways in which such alliances might develop and the usefulness of this 
course of action in particular cases. On paper, individuals seeking to protect the 
rights they derive from EU law have a direct way of trying to activate the cen-
tralized enforcement mechanism embodied by the complaint and infringement 
procedure of the European Commission. However, complaining to the Commis-
sion brings with it a high degree of uncertainty, particularly with respect to 
whether and when the Commission starts infraction proceedings. On the practi-
cal shortcomings of this system from the perspective of claimants, the Commis-
sion itself has concluded, with respect to the effectiveness of injunctions in ‘po-
licing the markets’, that “their impact is projected more towards the future rather 
than being useful for correcting past damage”.47 Nevertheless, the Commission 
can be a powerful actor to have on your side and the examples in this chapter 
also show various other ways in which actors may strategically activate the 
Commission to pursue their goals via different avenues. A complaint may result 
in an alliance with the Commission that may favour one’s chances of success, 
especially when these complaints are employed in conjunction with national 
court cases and preliminary references. However, this type of concerted effort is 
reserved for a particular kind of organised, strategic actor, and follow-up by the 
Commission is never guaranteed. The Commission aims to ensure effective 
application and enforcement of EU law, and sometimes employs strategies of 
‘aiding’ private interests, yet with the explicit goal of championing a specific 
interpretation of EU legislation. Successfully allying with the Commission, 
                                                        
46  Kelemen 2011. 
47  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Concerning the 
Application of Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ in-
terest. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/docs/report_inj_2012_en. 
pdf [last accessed 10 November 2017]. 
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therefore, requires private claims to align with the general interests of the EU 
law or provision on which they are based.48 Whether or not one will profit from 
this consociation between individual claimants and the Commission is, there-
fore, largely dependent on whether or not one’s interests align with the priorities 
of the Commission. 
8.11  Member States as Repeat Players Before the ECJ 
In the previous section, I have discussed the position of the European Commis-
sion that can be considered the truest of repeat players, thanks to its privileged 
access to court proceedings as well as its role as guardian of the treaties, and 
thus part-time prosecutor. Member States, although on the receiving end of the 
prosecution in infringement cases, enjoy the privilege of having access to most 
of the ECJ’s proceedings. Due to this fact, Member States enjoy many, if not all, 
of the advantages Galanter identifies for recurrent organizational players.49  
Although there are significant differences among Member States in their en-
gagement with ECJ proceedings,50 the designation of Member States as repeat 
players before the ECJ is an obvious one. Not only do Member States enjoy 
privileged access to the Court’s proceedings in most cases, most Member States 
have dedicated departments populated by EU law specialists, including perma-
nent agents that plead cases before the Court and thus have low start-up costs, 
have ample opportunity to develop facilitative informal relationships with insti-
tutional incumbents as well as representatives of other Member States, they have 
a privileged and established voice in the Court, and last but not least the Mem-
ber States are, of course, themselves (at least partly) responsible for the rules 
that are litigated before the Court. Taking examples from this study’s case selec-
tion, the next section will analyse these advantages and the role that Member 
States play in the trajectory of ECJ cases, both upstream, by intervening in court 
procedures, and downstream, in dealing with the consequences of ECJ rulings. 
Further attention is paid to how administrations are able, as a form of ‘bottom-
up docket control’, to influence the way in which matters are brought, and, more 
importantly, are not brought before the ECJ. Although certain characteristics as 
                                                        
48  From an individual perspective we can speculate about the fact that a reference to the 
ECJ could also have the opposite effect of what one is trying to achieve. One can imag-
ine that within the ‘confines’ of the national legal system individual interests could find 
more room to be expressed. In other words, once a question is referred to the ECJ, the 
matter is simplified, or narrowed down to a question of principle of EU law, and is nar-
rowed to the interpretation of EU law more generally instead of the specific application 
in an individual case. 
49  Galanter 1976.  
50  Granger 2001. 
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well as strategies of Member States can differ significantly, the findings in the 
analysis give important insight into Member States’ structural opportunities 
across the board. 
8.12  The Netherlands Before the ECJ 
The role of Member States in dynamics at the supranational level has long been 
a central issue in studies on European integration. As a response to the more 
institutionalist analyses, constructivist approaches to the position and behaviour 
of Member States in the EU system have focused on forms of representation, 
advocacy and participation at national and European level.51 Granger shows how 
Member States have very different approaches in their participation in proceed-
ings before the ECJ, with highly variable usage of their ‘participatory right’ – 
their privilege to participate in proceedings before the ECJ. The Dutch govern-
ment, she shows, follows a policy of ‘careful selection’.52 As one of the earliest 
Member States, and a state with a traditionally high number of references,53 the 
Netherlands has built up significant experience with the ECJ’s adjudication 
process. In the 1980s, Dutch participation in preliminary reference proceedings 
was considered necessary when the ‘defence of existing legislation or existing 
national situations’ was at stake or where questions were raised ‘which were of 
direct relevance to the elaboration of the Community legal order’.54 In recent 
years, the criteria for participation in defence of Dutch interests have been 
broadened significantly to include cases where the ruling may have consequenc-
es for Dutch legislation (or proposed legislation), for Dutch policies or imple-
mentation practices (or proposed policies and practices), for the discretion of 
Dutch authorities in politically sensitive areas, in cases involving general princi-
ples or doctrines of EC law, in cases where European transparency policy is 
involved, or to encourage the further development of EC law.55 This policy shift 
towards more involvement is mirrored in the number of observations submitted 
annually by the Dutch government, which increased significantly from around 
twenty in the early 1990s to around fifty at the turn of the century, outpacing the 
growth in the total number of references.56 
                                                        
51  Granger 2001. 
52  Granger 2001, 406. 
53  In the period 1952-2014 the Court dealt with a total of 909 preliminary references from 
Dutch courts. Wind, Martinsen and Rotger (2009: 66) put the Netherlands in third place 
(behind Luxembourg and Belgium) when looking at preliminary references per capita. 
See also Appendix B. 
54  Granger 2001, 406. 
55  Granger 2001, 406. 
56  Granger 2001, 426. 
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Since 1997, the Netherlands has had a dedicated department populated by 
EU law specialists, including permanent agents that plead cases before the 
Court. Dutch expertise in the area of EU law is brought together under the joint 
chair of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice in the Interdepartmental 
Committee on European Law (ICER). The ICER was set up to ‘ensure that there 
will be, in a systematic and coordinated manner, attention paid to the impact of 
European legal developments for our national Justice system’.57 The Committee 
is responsible for the interdepartmental coordination of the preparation for and 
implementation of European law in the Netherlands and for a more effective and 
efficient use of European law expertise by the various departments.58 The ICER 
provides advice, manuals and checklists on a variety of topics to multiple na-
tional institutional players, including ministries, municipalities and other gov-
ernmental bodies. The ICER includes three permanent working groups that are 
responsible for, respectively, implementation, notification and court procedures. 
The ICER-H, an inter-ministerial committee and one of the three subgroups 
of the ICER, is in charge of the court proceedings. All departments are repre-
sented in the ICER-H, and they discuss biweekly whether or not the Netherlands 
intervenes in new cases brought before the ECJ. The committee is composed of 
representatives of all ministries in order to deal with the possibility of conflict-
ing interests between two or more ministries in one case. The relevant Ministers 
are systematically informed of the course of action. After an ECJ decision, legal 
experts from the ICER also analyse and inform on the legal implications. Per-
manent agents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conduct procedures on behalf 
of the Dutch government in the EU courts. The Netherlands deploys a total of 
seven legal agents to the ECJ. The Dutch parliament is not involved systemical-
ly; however, adopted positions or outcomes may become the topic of debate 
between parliament and government. These debates will, however, rarely be 
started by the government and are usually initiated by a mobilised opposition, 
especially when ECJ judgments require adjustments to existing policies or legis-
lation. 
8.13  Preliminary References: Raising the Stakes  
The number of instances where the Netherlands sees it has an interest in partici-
pation in proceedings before the ECJ underscores the potential far-reaching 
impact of ECJ decisions. Preliminary references not only provide an attractive 
                                                        
57  ICER 2007, 3, my translation. 
58  Since late 2013, the ICER has met under the umbrella of the IOWJZ (Interdepartmental 
Consultation and Managements of Legislation and Legal Affairs). 
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tool for strategic players aiming to set a precedent, it is specifically this aspect of 
preliminary references that raises the stakes for Member States as well. A refer-
ence to the ECJ essentially upgrades a case from one decision among many at 
the national level to a (potentially) high stake supranational precedent before the 
ECJ. Whereas, theoretically, repeat players are interested in maximizing gain 
over a longer period of time and are relatively unconcerned about the outcome 
of one single case, preliminary references can upgrade a single case into a case 
of high interest by the mere fact that one decision by the ECJ can have far-
reaching consequences. This is, of course, especially the case where preliminary 
questions carry in them the potential of having consequences for national legis-
lation and policy or for the discretion of national authorities in politically sensi-
tive areas. Member States thus have an interest in participating in the ECJ pro-
ceedings, and as repeat players we can expect them to adjust their strategies to 
this context. We therefore see Member States employing specialized legal ser-
vices, like that of the Netherlands, to represent their interests in these proceed-
ings.59 
From the perspective of Member States’ interests, arguably of the highest 
significance in ECJ cases (in both infringement proceedings and preliminary 
references) are questions of compliance with EU law. These ECJ cases embody 
a potential threat to the practices of national governments and, if lost, may force 
Member States to adjust their policy or legislation, due to non-compliance with 
rules stipulated by EU law. Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib discerned four different 
reasons for Member States’ non-compliance with EU law: administrative in-
competence, misinterpretations, linking the implementation to a national devel-
opment and a deliberate choice by the government. To what extent Member 
States tend to implement European legislation that is inconsistent with national 
policy needs varies, according to Falkner et al, in part based on the political 
culture in a Member State. They distinguished three categories of political cul-
ture: the culture in which compliance is more important than national political 
preferences, the culture in which European legislation is ignored (especially as a 
result of administrative inaction and unilateral orientation) and the culture in 
which a Member State in any implementation requirement makes a cost-benefit 
analysis.60 In 2008, Falkner and Treib added a fourth category: the ‘world of 
dead letters’.61 These include the Member States that neatly transpose a Di-
                                                        
59  For an overview of the approaches by different Member States see Granger 2001. 
60  Falkner, Hartlapp & Treib 2007. The culture of a ‘world of law observance’, according to 
the authors, exists in Denmark, Finland and Sweden; the culture of a ‘world of transposi-
tion neglect’ in France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal; the culture of a ‘world of 
domestic politics’ was observed in Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. 
61  Falkner & Treib 2010. 
PRELIMINARY REFERENCE AS A MULTIPLIER OF INTERESTS 
 
253 
rective into legislation, but then proceed to not apply it. This practice is possible 
only in states where internal pressures to comply fail, due to overburdened 
courts or otherwise ineffective supervision and weak civil society. In Member 
States that conform to the third category, making cost-benefit calculations, a 
conflict between EU obligations and national political interests will more fre-
quently lead to non-compliance. The researchers put the Netherlands (as well as 
Germany) in this category. Subsequently, the Netherlands is a Member State 
that finds itself before the ECJ defending its domestic policies on a regular ba-
sis.62 Accordingly, the Netherlands is among the Member States with a long 
history of intervention in ECJ proceedings and Dutch expertise on EU law is 
well established and highly organised. 
8.14  Member State Advantages Before the Court 
Member States enjoy privileged access to the Court’s proceedings, which allows 
them to submit their observations in any request for a preliminary ruling and 
they can intervene in any direct action without having to show that they have a 
legitimate interest in the case. By setting up specialised departments that are 
responsible for working the case law of the court, Member States are able to 
deploy single-case strategies and assign the relevant expertise to cases, as well 
as have long-term strategies by assessing the possible impact of cases on ECJ 
jurisprudence and its impact on national interests. Apart from these structural 
advantages for Member States, there are aspects of the preliminary reference 
system as well as the Court’s procedures that provide relative advantages for 
Member States’ representation in practice. Bulterman and Wissels give some 
important insight into the practice of Member States’ representation before the 
court.63 As former agents of the Dutch government, they identify structures of 
intra and interstate collaboration and techniques that Member States employ in 
order to influence the judicial decision-making both upstream, by intervening in 
court procedures, and downstream, in dealing with the consequences of ECJ 
rulings. The authors reveal that “[w]hile no formal structures have been estab-
lished to coordinate the position of the Member States before the ECJ, there is 
                                                        
62  In the period 1952-2014 the Netherlands was brought before the Court in actions for 
failure to fulfil its obligations a total of 146 times, and the Court dealt with a total of 909 
preliminary references from Dutch courts during the same period. To be clear, all of the-
se references are of course not necessarily about non-compliance with EU law, however, 
according to the Commission’s own reporting, compliance issues of national laws in re-
gard to EU legislation takes up about half of the ECJ’s judgments in preliminary refer-
ence cases in recent years. 
63  Bulterman & Wissels 2013.  
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frequent contact between the agents of the different Member States”.64 The 
Netherlands has been the initiator of an informal network of national agents 
before the ECJ, organizing annual meetings to ‘share experiences and discuss 
issues of mutual interests’. Although Bulterman and Wissels maintain that these 
issues pertain to the technical and procedural aspects of litigation, not substan-
tive subjects, they state later that “[i]nformation of new cases before the ECJ, for 
example, is frequently shared via email to inform other agents of the importance 
of a specific case, or to inquire whether other Member States are considering 
intervening in a specific case. More substantive coordination as to the position 
adopted in specific cases takes place on a bilateral basis.”65 Where Member 
States have shared interests, the national agents are able to exchange views and 
align positions.66 In addition to these formal cooperation structures, informal 
networks exist between national experts, who encounter each other before the 
Court on a regular basis. Member States are thus able to work together and co-
ordinate their efforts and align their views in informal networks of their agents 
before the ECJ, in an attempt to convey their views, position and interests to the 
Court more effectively. For instance, if the Dutch authorities are aware that 
another state will submit observations along the same lines as its own, this could 
be a reason to submit observations too, in order to show the Court the political 
importance of a particular case.67 
8.15  Private Parties Versus Member States 
In the vast majority of cases in this study, the Dutch government took a position 
before the ECJ that was contrary to that of the individual party.68 This is not 
                                                        
64  Bulterman & Wissels 2013, 269. 
65  Bulterman & Wissels 2013, 269. 
66  Bulterman and Wissels give gambling, taxation and transparency as examples of areas 
where the Netherlands has cooperated in the past with likeminded Member States with 
shared interests. 
67  The coordination of Member States with regard to the arguments put forward in the oral 
stage of the proceedings are not only due to Members States strategically playing the 
‘Eurolaw game’, but are in fact encouraged by the Court. In order to streamline proceed-
ings, the Court implores Member States’ representation not to superfluously repeat simi-
lar arguments and therefore encourages counsel to take the initiative themselves, and co-
ordinate their oral submissions in order to limit the duration of the oral procedure. 
Broberg & Fenger 2010, 381. See also the ECJ’s own ‘Notes for the guidance of coun-
sel’, available at:  
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/txt9_2008-09-25_17-
37-52_275.pdf [last accessed 9 November 2017]. 
68  The position taken by the Dutch government in these cases was deduced from the ICER-
H’s own yearly reporting. Available at:  
→ 
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surprising since, in the vast majority, Dutch public bodies were the opposing 
party in the national proceedings. Only two cases show an exception to this rule; 
the case of the catering employees (Case Study A), the one case where both sides 
of the dispute were in fact private parties. In this case, the interest of the gov-
ernment was in making sure that, in the end, the transposition of the Directive 
was not deemed incorrect. This would have shifted the financial burden from the 
employers to the legislator and would have made the government liable for the 
damages suffered by the catering employees. In the second case (Lessee Enti-
tlements), a dispute between an individual and a public authority, however, the 
question was not one of administrative law. This case revolved around the ques-
tion of whether EU law requires a lessee, on the expiry of the lease, to deliver to 
the lessor the leased land along with the payment entitlements accumulated 
thereon, or to pay him compensation. And although the opposing party was in 
fact a municipality, it was only part of the proceedings as lessor of a number of 
parcels of agricultural land, and not as a public authority per se. The position 
taken by the Dutch government before the ECJ in this test case was not contrary 
to the interests of the claimant. 
The position of the Member States before the ECJ stands in stark contrast to 
that of the parties that, in all likelihood, will present their case before the Court 
for the very first time. We have already seen in Chapter 6 the difficulties practi-
tioners face more generally when having to plead a case unexpectedly before an 
unknown court. In contrast to one-shot lawyers and litigants, representatives of 
the Netherlands are obviously well versed in both EU law and the language of 
the Court. Additionally, the practice of coordination of arguments between 
Member States puts the representatives of the parties to the proceedings at a 
further disadvantage. The oral proceedings offer the only opportunity for parties 
to respond to the other parties’ arguments (either put forward in written observa-
tions or during the hearing), yet after all the parties have had a brief opportunity 
to expand on their position, each party is allotted only twenty minutes to respond 
to the comments of all the other parties. This is where Member States, when 
forming alliances, can exploit their privileged position. They can coordinate and 
jointly put forward several arguments, and also divide their time between them 
to effectively refute the party’s (or other actors’) positions. On the other hand, 
the individual party has just twenty minutes to discuss the arguments put for-
ward by several Member States, and thus has significantly less time to go into 
detail on all the different points brought forward. As one social security lawyer 
explains his experience at the ECJ hearing:  
 
                                                        
http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer/hof-van-justitie/jaarverslagen-procesvoering-nederland.html 
[last accessed 9 November 2017]. 
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“They had divided their speech into say ten pieces or so, and they had coordinated it. 
Every Member State will receive twenty minutes of talking time. So you have the 
first Member State that expands on one argument first, and then the second on 
another. It’s a long story, so they have not twenty but two hundred minutes. And we 
only had twenty minutes of our own. And so you have to respond to every argument 
in only twenty minutes, so that’s done very cleverly.” 
 
While in this case the lawyer found most of the Member States present at the 
hearing taking on a position opposed to theirs, this doesn’t mean all Member 
States are necessarily always on the same side of the argument. However, as 
concluded by Granger, Member States try to avoid risking good relations by 
challenging each other’s interests in court.69 It is therefore more likely for Mem-
ber States that choose to intervene in the court proceedings to have similar inter-
ests. 
The collaboration between Member States is especially relevant in light of 
findings like those of Kilroy, who shows how the “expression of a position by a 
simple majority, a blocking minority, or even a smaller coalition of states has a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of a particular type of ECJ rul-
ing”.70 She found that the probability of the ECJ upholding a national rule was 
only 23% when no state made an observation, but increased by 73% to 96% 
when a simple majority of states articulated support for a national rule and 56% 
in the case of support from a blocking minority. Such findings support the hy-
pothesis that the ECJ is unlikely to rule against majority preferences, and that 
Member States that coordinate their efforts have a significant advantage in try-
ing to steer the Court in one direction or the other.71 
Another way of coordination that allows Member States room to expand on 
their points is the fact that, in the case of a reference from their own jurisdiction, 
Member States often act before the Court in a double capacity. As an interven-
ing party they are present to submit observations, but they are often also repre-
sented as one of the parties to the original proceedings. Especially in cases 
where national legislation or policies are under scrutiny, one of the parties to the 
proceedings is usually a public body. In these cases, government agents coordi-
nate a position with these parties in order to ensure representation of both the 
interests of that body, as well as the more general interests of the Dutch gov-
ernment. A former agent of the Netherlands before the ECJ explains: 
                                                        
69  Based on an internal hand-out provided by a Dutch agent before the ECJ, Granger con-
cludes on the approach by the Dutch government to participation in ECJ proceedings: 
“Submissions should also be avoided where there is a risk of harming good relations with 
other Member States or where there are politically sensitive issues outside the Nether-
lands (e.g. euthanasia, coffee shops).” Granger 2001, 407. 
70  Kilroy 1999, 405-6. 
71  See also Conant 2007, 51. 
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R: “You obviously have the governing body at a lower level, which has an interest, 
because it of course has a dispute at the national level. And the Dutch Government, 
the state has an interest insofar that we want to protect that body, we want to support 
it.” 
I: “Is it possible that you do not tell the same story?” 
R: “That you do not agree at all, well. That you should avoid. The governing body 
may plead themselves. But in such a case we make every effort to ensure that they 
do not have to do that. So they do come along and provide input, but you come up 
with one and the same story.” 
 
In some cases, it is opportune to have a representative of the governing body 
plead, again in order to divide the labour. The former representative of the Neth-
erlands gave the example of a case revolving around the question of whether or 
not EU law was applicable to the Dutch soft drugs policy. The risk for the Dutch 
government in this case was that if the Court had decided that EU law was ap-
plicable the government would have been limited in the way it formulated its 
own drugs policy. She explains:  
 
“The mayor was the governing body. In that case, during the whole procedure, there 
was a lot of coordination with Justice, the Mayor, the lawyer and us, Foreign 
Affairs. We worked together very closely. And in that case they did plead. And we 
divided it up. So we say, if you guys provide the local context, we will do national 
policy.” 
 
The division of labour allowed them to cover both the specific context of the 
case at hand, as well as put an argument forward in protection of national policy. 
Moreover, the coordination allowed them to align these two stories.  
Although the oral proceedings are generally considered of less importance 
than the written stage,72 explaining the context of a case can be crucial. As ex-
plained by Broberg and Fenger: “the judge coming from the member state of the 
referring court does not sit on the case. Thus to some extent it might fall to the 
lawyers for the parties to the main proceedings to provide details on points of 
substantive law or procedure pertaining to the relevant national legal system 
which are necessary to a full understanding of the case”. Depending on the com-
plexities of a case, ECJ judges rely on the representation of the parties to clarify 
facts and arguments during the oral stage of the proceedings. This is particularly 
evident when it comes to the interpretation of national legislation and especially 
the implementation of legislation in policies. A tax lawyer explains: 
 
                                                        
72  Broberg & Fenger 2010, 384. 
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“[In this case] you also saw that the Member States, there were ten or so, were all 
against us. And they had coordinated their arguments in advance with one another. 
They know each other well. And so, they coordinate to go fully against you. And 
with no holds barred, not even lying a bit to the Court, proclaiming half-truths, 
caricatures, etc.”  
 
Whether this is an example of lack of particular knowledge of the Dutch repre-
sentatives or (as the representative of the claimant saw it) strategic insincerity, is 
up for debate. However, it illustrates the fact that the Court is in need of a con-
text in order to get a grip on the facts of the case. Neutral experts are usually not 
available and therefore the judges and the Advocate General are largely depend-
ent upon the information provided by the parties, intervening Member States and 
the European Commission. With regard to the details of national policies, the 
expertise of the lawyers of the respective states is, understandably, sought; how-
ever, this does create one more opportunity for those on this side of the argu-
ment to frame the context of a case in a more favourable way. In addition, it 
must also be taken into account that, as Broberg and Fenger describe, “all judges 
may not have studied equally thoroughly those parts of the written observations 
that are not summarised in the Report for the Hearing”.73 This underscores the 
significance of clarification during the oral proceedings. 
Although Member States thus have significant advantages when it comes to 
long-term strategies before the ECJ, their agents may, due to their focus on EU 
law, be less knowledgeable when it comes to the details of national legislation or 
policy. As one migration lawyer described events during the hearing in his case:  
 
“There was someone from the IND and a lawyer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
And she was regularly asked: Ma’am, what about such and such. And she went back 
and forth deliberating with the person from the IND, until they got a scolding at one 
point. With the chair saying: You could have authorized someone, but you chose not 
to, and now you are going to answer the questions yourself!”  
 
This speaks to the fact that Member States are, of course, not in a position of 
complete control. They too can be confronted unexpectedly with a reference. 
And they too can struggle with the combination of required EU law expertise 
and specific knowledge of the different national contexts they have to deal with 
before the Court. 
                                                        
73  Broberg & Fenger 2010, 382. 
PRELIMINARY REFERENCE AS A MULTIPLIER OF INTERESTS 
 
259 
8.16  Member States’ Control of the ECJ Docket 
Case Study D provides a telling example of the largely invisible hand a Member 
State can have in influencing the ECJ’s docket. In this case, the Dutch govern-
ment anticipated a detrimental ECJ ruling on the policy of pre-entry integration 
requirements and was able to prevent the case from continuing after it had al-
ready been brought before the ECJ, by providing the litigant with a permit after 
all. After agents of the Dutch ICER-H had studied the case that was brought 
before the ECJ as an urgent procedure, they informed the Minister of the possi-
ble consequences of the case for the Dutch policy on integration requirements. 
Recognising the threat to the policy, the Minister saw fit to revise the earlier 
decision and provide a permit, thus forestalling a potentially detrimental ECJ 
judgment. This is likely an exceptional case, in the sense that it was cut short 
only at this late stage. The interviews with lawyers indicated that the Dutch 
administration makes calculations with regard to the risk of a preliminary refer-
ence, and may intervene at earlier stages during national proceedings more regu-
larly. As one migration lawyer recalls: 
 
“Really just a few weeks ago, I received a note from the court that they were 
planning to ask questions. And asked what my view was. And what does the IND 
do? Suddenly, out of nowhere they repeal the contested decision. [...] Purely and 
simply, to ensure that the preliminary questions aren’t asked. That is their only 
objective, because there are at least two or three hundred cases like this. It is not a 
coincidence that these questions are on the table.”  
 
By taking away the litigant’s standing, the government thus essentially prevents 
requests for preliminary rulings from being made to the ECJ, in order to avert a 
judgement on principle that may undermine its policy. Although the frequency 
with which these strategies are employed are difficult to determine, this strategic 
action by the Dutch government is not limited to the field of migration and asy-
lum law. Tax lawyers indicated similar events: 
 
“In some cases they do give in suddenly. And I think that’s when they make an 
assessment that they really, really think they are going to lose. And they are willing 
to allow tax inspectors to handle the case outside of court. […] In one case the 
inspector, pending the hearing, suddenly came with the offer to just give in. And 
why? To prevent a ruling by the Court of Justice. Because, it was obvious at the 
hearing that the court tended strongly towards asking preliminary questions. You 
could tell because they asked: If we want to ask questions, what would be your 
view? They gave a shot across the bow of the possibility of a reference.” 
 
The following quote illustrates that this strategy is not always employed, even in 
cases where it may have been expected. This lawyer evaluated his case between 
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an individual and the IND regarding a negative decision on an application for a 
residence permit:  
 
“I think that if you have the same conversation with a supervisor at the IND, he will 
say it should have been dealt with differently from the side of the IND. [...] With this 
one case, they put the entire family definition at stake, and I think if you are going to 
make a cost/benefit analysis and will also delve into European law that yes, the IND 
should have come to the conclusion: the risk is too great that we’ll lose this, we’ll 
give this lady a permit. That is impossible once the Court has been asked questions. 
[...] Once the questions are asked it is a train that is unstoppable. And the IND 
should have come to their senses sooner.”  
 
This illustrates that the administrative vigilance in this respect is not fool-proof. 
However, as we learned from Case Study D, the assertion of this respondent, 
that once the questions are asked there is no way back, is not completely accu-
rate. In that case, again, no assessment of possible consequences of preliminary 
reference was made during the national proceedings. It was only after the Dutch 
representation before the court raised the alarm about the possible consequences 
of an ECJ judgment, that action was taken to prevent a ruling. However, this 
decision did result in some political backlash, with members of parliament ask-
ing questions about the grounds for this revised decision. Vigilance at earlier 
stages in such proceedings is thus a preferable situation with less risk of a criti-
cal backlash. Moreover, the recurrent application of such strategies could result 
in critical investigation at the supranational level as well, as such actions could 
be considered detrimental to the integrity of the EU legal system as a whole. 
These are examples of how sometimes the government gives in once a court 
indicates that it intends to refer questions to the ECJ. They illustrate that a con-
sideration is made on the part of the administration on the basis of the likelihood 
that the case has an unfavourable result and could have far-reaching conse-
quences through the creation of a precedent or the unfavourable interpretation of 
certain EU principles or doctrines. This constitutes a significant difference in 
power between individual or even organised litigants and the state. Because in 
such cases the litigation effort is thwarted, in many cases a complaint to the 
Commission is one of the few options left. From the individual’s perspective, 
however, the uncertainty of follow-up on a complaint combined with the lack of 
interim measures makes this avenue a less attractive one, especially when one’s 
situation is particularly dire. One other option for the parties is to try their luck 
by starting civil proceedings against the state; however, as we have seen in Case 
Study C, civil proceedings, due to their formal requirement for a lawyer, are 
particularly costly, and this is not a path that is often taken. Especially consider-
ing that from the perspective of the individual whose case is being litigated, 
usually the decision by the government to give in, implies that his or her goal 
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has been achieved. For the litigants, it means that their taxes are reduced, their 
residence permit is granted, or they otherwise get what they were litigating for.74 
This is an especially pertinent problem for those organised litigation efforts 
pursuing more collective interests, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.  
8.17  The Member States: Concluding Remarks  
Over the past decades, research in the field of compliance has focused on how 
and why Member States deal with complying with EU law obligations. En-
forcement of EU law through the courts forms an integral part of the fabric of 
the EU implementation system. Although governments actively negotiate new 
European legislation (to be adopted by Council and Parliament), their influence 
at that stage and the eventual agreement does not always guarantee compliance. 
And so, preliminary references form an important mechanism for signalling 
instances of non-compliance and, for private parties that enjoy EU law rights, 
enforcing compliance. 
Access to a higher court such as the ECJ is unquestionably an important el-
ement in order for any form of judicial review to be meaningful. However, in the 
practice of the preliminary reference procedure this is not without complica-
tions. In a lot of cases, when review is deemed inconvenient from the perspec-
tive of the Member State, there is an opportunity for the state to block the pro-
ceedings. By striking a deal or by thwarting a judgment through taking away 
one’s standing in the national proceedings, and therefore before the ECJ, the 
state is able to exert some control over which questions are adjudicated by the 
ECJ. The examples of the state ‘giving in’ in certain cases reflect a conscious 
strategy and shows that late or incorrect implementation is not necessarily linked 
to the complexity of the adjustment of national rules, and that Member States 
can be strategic in the extent to which they comply with EU legislation by ‘play-
ing the Eurolaw game’.75 Member States are able to play this game on multiple 
levels and have a privileged position in several respects. Also, open-ended 
wording of European legislation is an often chosen solution for different inter-
ests, and fosters different interpretations and applications.76 Although not always 
due to calculating behaviour or unwillingness, Member States choose the most 
desirable interpretation, that is, an interpretation that is most consistent with the 
                                                        
74  In some cases, for instance in tax cases, while successful for one or several tax returns, 
such a decision does not set a precedent. Therefore a new tax return will offer up the 
same question.  
75  Cf. Mastenbroek & Van Keulen 2006.  
76  According to Falkner, Hartlapp & Treib 2007 this is especially the case in decisions 
requiring unanimity. 
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existing national rules.77 The Netherlands, in such a twilight zone, also often 
puts preference for their political interests above strict compliance.78 Infringe-
ment proceedings or preliminary references are then necessary to arrive at uni-
form interpretation and implementation.79 Having some control over the cases 
that reach the ECJ gives Member States the room to extend their non-com-
pliance and proceed with conflicting policies. In cases where these policies have 
a clear financial incentive, as in Case Study C regarding administrative fees, or 
in particular tax matters, this is an obvious advantage. In other cases, such as 
certain migration and integration policies, such as the civic integration tests in 
Case Study D, this may be more due to political sensitivity. The possibility of 
governments to make cost-benefit calculations in essence allows for a form of 
docket control of the cases on which the ECJ gives its judgments. As such, this 
is part of what Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib have called the ‘world of domestic 
politics’, with political considerations not being limited to the political arena but 
extending into the national courtroom.80 Individuals who challenge such 
measures through the courts, and manage to have their case referred to the ECJ, 
thus become (purposefully or unwittingly) the focal point of political interests at 
the highest level. 
8.18  Conclusion 
Analysing the arena litigating parties enter when their case is referred to the 
ECJ, this chapter highlighted their relative position in relation to two of the main 
actors that operate before the Court, whom litigation parties are likely to en-
counter. Both the European Commission and the Member States are in a particu-
larly advantageous position that allows them to play ‘the Eurolaw game’ skilful-
ly. Litigating parties, with rare exceptions, are in a clearly disadvantaged posi-
tion when litigating before the ECJ. The examples presented in this chapter 
show that the Dutch government is strategic in its responses to litigation. In 
some cases it may even count on litigation, or expect no successful opposition. 
Since the vast majority of cases involving individual litigants directly or more 
indirectly concern questions of compatibility of national laws or policy with 
certain EU legislation, litigants often find themselves up against well-organised 
and experienced litigators defending the interests of the state and the integrity of 
national policy. Conversely, the European Commission may be a welcome ally 
in a litigant’s quest for justice or for strategic players attacking national policy. 
                                                        
77  Falkner, Hartlapp & Treib 2007, 405. 
78  Mastenbroek 2007, 159.  
79  Falkner et al. 2005, 463. 
80  Falkner, Hartlapp & Treib 2007, 405. 
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The Commission, tasked with safeguarding the effective implementation of EU 
rules and rights, can often be found arguing on the side of the litigants whenever 
a reference concerns the compatibility of national legislation with EU law. Ex-
amples provided in this chapter also revealed that the Commission on occasion 
goes beyond mere advocacy in the courtroom in attempts to utilise preliminary 
references as part of its political strategy and efforts to enforce compliance. The 
advantage litigants may gain from allying with the Commission is, however, 
fully dependent upon the alignment of their interests with the goals and priorities 
of the Commission. The analysis in this chapter has thus shown how these privi-
leged players are able to influence the Court’s case law both in court as well as 
in ways that are not directly visible to the outside observer. The resulting picture 
of the Eurolaw game is, therefore, one that is played on a non-level playing 
field. 
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9 Conclusions 
9.1  Euro-litigation Empowering EU Citizens? 
The role of litigation before the ECJ in European integration dynamics has been 
described extensively in academic literature. In this literature, the role of liti-
gants has, however, been described in largely passive terms, with assumptions 
about when and why litigants may have an interest in invoking EU law and us-
ing references to the ECJ as part of their litigation strategy. With the focus on 
the emancipatory effects of having a supranational system of review, capable of 
challenging national laws that contravene EU law, emphasis has been put pre-
dominantly on the opportunities that arise for those with access to these legal 
structures. This study critically approached resulting hypotheses of ‘empower-
ment-through-law’ and ‘participation-through-law-enforcement’ by looking in 
depth at the practice of Euro-litigation through preliminary references. This 
study therefore started out by asking the most basic questions: Who goes to 
court in Europe, and why? When and why do individuals invoke EU law and 
push for litigation before the ECJ? And to what extent can such litigation be 
considered empowering? By looking at litigation before the ECJ through the 
preliminary reference procedure from the ground up, this study aimed to offer a 
better understanding of the relationship between local interests, litigation and 
judicial politics from a relatively unstudied perspective, namely the micro and 
local level, connecting the EU and its legal system to its constituents.   
This final chapter reflects on the analyses in this book, which have been es-
sentially two-pronged. In Part II (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), this study focused on the 
ground level practice of the preliminary reference procedure by employing a 
broad explorative methodology to litigation before the ECJ. Two actors featured 
prominently at first: the individuals that were involved in litigation through pre-
liminary references, as well as the practitioners that had to ‘work a reference’ to 
the ECJ. Part III of the book (Chapters 7 and 8) probed deeper into the so-called 
‘Eurolaw game’, building on insights from the first section to lay out the playing 
field of Euro-litigation and the preliminary reference procedure. Here, other 
actors came into view, and the aim was to provide an estimation of who was 
(most) likely to use EU law and who was in the best position and had the most 
opportunity to do so. By looking at preliminary references from this perspective, 
I aimed to demonstrate that this playing field was not a level one, and that a 
multiplicity of interests could be at stake. I will recap the findings as presented 
in Chapters 4 to 8 and reflect on them in light of the central research question: 
To what extent can EU law in general and specifically the preliminary reference 
procedure be considered an opportunity for empowerment and who is (most) 
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likely to use it? After that I will discuss some of the open questions that remain, 
as well as provide suggestions for a future research agenda. 
9.2  Understanding Individual Litigation before the ECJ 
As a first step in looking at Euro-litigation from the bottom-up, this study 
zoomed in on the motives of the individual litigants in order to determine the 
how and why of cases that reach the ECJ through preliminary references. This 
approach allowed for a critical examination of the purported ‘use’ of the proce-
dure from the perspective of litigants. In this regard, the first important observa-
tion was the relative lack of intent behind references to the ECJ on the part of 
the litigating parties. In roughly two-thirds of the cases studied, it was neither 
the aim nor the wish of the litigants or their counsel to have their case referred to 
the ECJ. On the whole then, it was only in a minority of the cases that the litigat-
ing parties had an explicit aim to reach the ECJ and a reference was perceived as 
a goal that would help serve their interests. In these cases of ‘proactive’ Euro-
litigation, either from the outset or developed during national proceedings, the 
parties had their express wish and aim to have their case adjudicated by the ECJ, 
and implored the national court(s) to refer their case. The reasons behind this 
aim varied considerably, and preliminary references were thus a mixed bag of a 
host of different types of litigation. Some cases simply revolved around a ques-
tion of EU law for which there was no clear precedent in either national or ECJ 
jurisprudence and, therefore, the road to the ECJ was an expected and logical 
one. In other cases, the wish to reach the ECJ was indeed informed by a dead-
lock in national doctrine, making the road to the ECJ a particularly viable oppor-
tunity to ‘outflank’ the national system. But for most, whether or not EU law 
was part of the litigation strategy, the ECJ was not the intended target at all. 
Such findings should make us aware of the disparate nature of motives behind 
litigation that may end up before the ECJ. 
The sectoral concentration of references in certain areas of law (predomi-
nantly agriculture, migration and social policy) revealed which types of individ-
ual litigants were most likely to appear before the ECJ. The predominance of 
migrants, workers and farmers among the litigants reflected a distribution of the 
types of EU legislation that might be part of challenges in the national court-
rooms, including the four freedoms of EU law and rights derived by Turkish 
migrants from the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU. The 
differentiation between areas of law, however, also revealed how the notion of 
references embodying challenges to national law by employing EU rules cap-
tured all types of references that were brought before the ECJ. The area of agri-
culture especially included almost exclusively cases brought by individual farm-
CONCLUSIONS 
 
269 
ers challenging administrative decisions based directly on EU legislation. In 
these cases, the challenge was thus not to national legislation by employing 
rights derived from EU law, but to obligations flowing from EU law itself. The-
se cases contrasted significantly in character, as well as in litigation motives, 
with cases relating to migration law that conformed much more to the idea of 
EU law as an emancipatory source for challenges, to national policy. It should 
thus be clear from the presented analyses that speaking about Euro-litigation in 
any generalizing terms was particularly difficult. There were considerable dif-
ferences in actions, strategies and responses on the part of the parties, depending 
on their ultimate aims with litigation, aims that moreover might change and 
evolve according to developments both within and outside the confines of the 
legal proceedings. 
Such findings highlight the difficulties of constructing any type of cross-
European or Euro-profile of litigation. These difficulties are further exacerbated 
by the great diversity of sources from which cases come before the ECJ through 
preliminary references, and the great variation in types of litigants and types of 
referrals. This stresses the importance of differentiation when approaching the 
procedure as a legal and political mechanism. Lacking such detail runs the risk 
of oversimplification and misrepresentation. This constitutes a challenge to po-
litical scientists trying to deduce political dynamics from court decisions, and is 
a consideration that undermines the positivist tendency in European integration 
studies trying to establish strong causal links between actors’ actions and out-
comes. In this sense, correlation does not prove causation, and as Alter and Var-
gas conclude: “Even if litigants highlight a connection to transnational activities 
(to the four freedoms) to strengthen their legal case, this does not mean that 
transnational activity or a desire to capture the benefits of increased trade is the 
dominant factor mobilizing them to raise EC legal cases”.1  
9.3  Participation-Through-Law and the Assumption of Interest 
Generally speaking, Euro-litigation through preliminary references to the ECJ is 
a consequence of the uncertainty of the law. References to the ECJ are meant to 
resolve possible conflicts in law between the supranational and the national level 
and ensure uniform application of EU law across Member States. Famously, this 
uncertainty allows for challenges in the courts to national laws that appear to 
contravene EU law, and in the study of European integration, the preliminary 
reference procedure often takes centre stage as the principal legal avenue 
through which European integration has been fostered. Given the role the proce-
                                                        
1  Alter & Vargas 2000, 478. 
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dure has in the enforcement of EU law, and by extension the furthering of Euro-
pean integration, understanding the way the preliminary reference procedure is 
activated in practice is a central focus of inquiry. On the one hand, the attention 
generally goes towards the national judges and courts that are the principal deci-
sion-makers when it comes to references to the ECJ. On the other hand, when 
discussing the role of private litigants in activating the procedure, the emphasis 
generally lies on how private parties ‘employ’ the procedure in pursuit of their 
interests.  
In neofunctionalist literature, which argues that private interests that turn to 
the EU realm contribute to European integration, there is an implicit assumption 
that people invoke EU law and EU rights before a judge whenever it serves their 
interests. There is a related tendency to consider cases that end up at the ECJ as 
the result of someone actively invoking EU law, and, moreover, that the interest 
in a case can be deduced from the subject matter and end result. In that respect, 
Harlow describes how the preliminary reference procedure is the ‘principal ave-
nue by which individuals use their rights’.2 Granger even speaks in this regard of 
individuals as ‘active crusaders for the enforcement of [EU] law’.3 These ideas 
about the self-interested motives of private parties in the procedure are, apart 
from the occasional case study, largely based on speculation, often generalised, 
as in the case of the behaviour of national judges, from an ontologically rational-
ist perspective. 
This study has revealed that litigation before the ECJ has the capacity to car-
ry in it a multiplicity of interests, narratives and even results, depending on 
which, or whose, perspective is adopted. We have seen how litigation rates at 
the surface can be understood to reflect the influence of structural factors like 
the amount of EU legislation available in a certain sector, the emergence of 
newly applicable EU legislation or changes in national policy prompting re-
sistance. This study has also shown that litigation before the ECJ through the 
preliminary reference procedure cannot be understood fully without taking into 
consideration behavioural aspects of litigating parties, government administra-
tions and national judges, and factors such as agency, expertise, organisational 
capacity and networks, as well as the political context in which litigation occurs. 
Understanding litigation, therefore, requires awareness of all these aspects and 
inquiry that fails to take them into account is bound to over-emphasise the rela-
tive explanatory or predictive weight of certain aspects, possibly to the detriment 
of others. 
The results from this research show how difficult it is to determine ‘inter-
ests’ and makes us aware that it becomes problematic when such interests are 
                                                        
2  Harlow 1992, 215. 
3  Granger 2001, 238.  
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assumed, and when the behaviour of people and groups is implicitly or explicitly 
thought of in ontologically rationalist terms. The analyses in Chapter 5 reveal 
for instance that it is not always evident that individual litigants are the interest-
ed and/or active parties in the proceedings let alone the main actor behind the 
litigation. In a significant number of cases, the actual financial gains that were 
expected when ‘winning’ cases in Luxembourg (insofar as reaching the ECJ was 
their actual aim) did not weigh up to the costs of the extended litigating effort 
needed to complete the whole procedure. Furthermore, preliminary references, 
and the legal questions as well as the supranational relevance they contain, may 
or may not be aligned with the aims and interests of the ‘real’ litigant or the 
original dispute. Especially if we consider the augmented importance of some 
cases after they are sent to the ECJ, with more potentially interested parties, 
references can be, or become, an intersection of interests, legal questions and 
political strife. And so the interests that are served with a reference, a judgment 
or even a question may be refractions of the original interest and can, therefore, 
hardly be used to determine the ‘original’ meaning of litigative actions.  
A striking observation in that respect was the relatively large share of test 
cases among the preliminary reference cases selected for this study. These in-
cluded orchestrated disputes meant to ‘test the waters’ of national and EU law as 
well as strategic actors employing EU law as ‘shield and sword’, but they also 
included national judges seeking to resolve a recurrent question due to uncer-
tainty in the interpretation of EU rules. Test cases by definition involve matters 
for which there exists no clear legal interpretation. Where a matter involves 
questions as to the application or interpretation of EU law, the chances that the 
case will be referred to the ECJ increase. The preliminary reference procedure 
thus has the structural characteristic of ‘selecting’ test cases, those cases that aim 
to answer questions of interpretation regarding EU law. In that sense, prelimi-
nary references can be seen as principle questions by definition. With EU law 
creating legal uncertainty at the domestic level, a relatively large portion of the-
se cases is likely to set a precedent of sorts. The nature of the preliminary refer-
ence, as solving principle questions of interpretation and compliance, serves as 
an explanation for this relatively large number of cases that can be designated as 
test cases, as well as the presence of parties like interest groups and unions. This 
should not, however, lead to the automatic conclusion that these litigants are all 
actively engaging in supranational legal strategies. Many cases took on such a 
characteristic as a result of the reference, and third party actors became involved 
only after cases were referred to the ECJ. 
The aforementioned disconnect between results and consequences of litiga-
tion on the one hand, and the aims of the litigants on the other, highlights the 
need for researchers that study the role of Euro-litigation in shaping domestic 
and European political and legal dynamics to be wary of assumptions and wide 
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generalisations about the motives behind legal action. This study does not refute 
claims made by neofunctionalist scholars that suggest that Euro-litigation plays 
an important role in the integration of Europe or the possibility of empowering 
dynamics through litigation. The findings in this study partly mirror earlier con-
clusions like those of Conant, who summarises that “studies of the sectoral con-
centration of references and citations to ECJ case law demonstrate that commer-
cial enterprises, societal interest organizations and public enforcement agencies 
are most likely to gain access to courts to enforce EU legal norms because they 
are most likely to possess the knowledge and financing necessary for litigation”. 
However, such observations should not lead to the conclusion that litigation 
before the ECJ automatically reflects such organised interests or this type of 
legal challenge. The limited understanding of litigation that results from a top-
down perspective could misjudge ‘both’ ways: On the one hand, it can assume a 
level of intent and strategy on the part of the litigating parties which is, in fact, 
absent, ascribing to litigants certain goals and gambits based on the resulting 
legal developments. And on the other hand, it may overlook strategic action 
behind the proverbial straw man, where organised actors (including institutional 
actors like the European Commission) are actively pushing for certain legal or 
political change by employing individual court cases. 
Although we have seen in Chapter 7 that there is an important link between 
the expertise and financial capacity necessary for strategic EU law mobilisation, 
these do not play as much of a role when it comes to gaining access to the ECJ 
in general, because of the simple fact that references in numerous instances are 
not the result of parties pushing for an ECJ judgment. This suggests that the 
extent to which litigation before the ECJ occurs on the express wish of the par-
ties to the national proceedings, and can thus be considered a form of ‘societal 
mobilisation’ or even ‘demand for integration’, is therefore more limited than 
studies on litigation and judicial politics in the EU suggest. In other words, even 
where litigation before the ECJ is concentrated in a certain area of law, this 
should not automatically lead to the conclusion that there is societal mobilisation 
behind the increase in references. Although legal mobilisation and other factors, 
like changes in domestic policy, may go hand in hand, assuming the one based 
on the other thus appears unsatisfactory. Taking on the perspective of the ‘users’ 
of EU law has revealed the ways in which interests can be diffuse, contradictory 
and even change over time. As stated by Alter, “[e]ven assuming rational behav-
ior, no human error, and full information – unsustainable assumptions to be sure 
– where EU law influences national policy depends on the wording of the EU 
law, on ECJ legal doctrine and ECJ decision making, on private litigant mobili-
zation, on national court support, and on follow-through”.4  
                                                        
4  Alter 2000, 518.  
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In part, the failure to account for behavioural factors in understanding litiga-
tion before the ECJ can be explained by the predominantly supranational per-
spective in the study of Euro-litigation, implicitly assuming interest in suprana-
tional dynamics on the part of the litigating parties. As discussed, such interest 
and purposefulness is less self-evident than has been suggested. References to 
the ECJ can have a multitude of driving actors and motives that are moreover 
not mutually exclusive. Therefore, instead of approaching litigation from a su-
pranational perspective, it appears far more fruitful to shift our focus from the 
supranational to the local and domestic level. Not only to the domestic political 
context in which litigation arises, but also to national structures that influence 
opportunities in pursuing legal strategies. Such national structures, like standing 
rules, rules on class actions and legal aid schemes, not only influence the deci-
sion-making process of national actors but also influence the ways in which 
disputes find their way through the legal system. For instance, a multitude of 
asylum claim cases brought before domestic courts by lawyers supported by 
state aid schemes will increase the number of cases possibly eligible for refer-
ence. Such domestic structures and behavioural aspects are interrelated, and a 
more localised and domestic focus on analysis should, therefore, be able to more 
accurately capture the ways in which EU law is effectively invoked and to what 
end. In other words, when we keep emphasising the supranational aspect of 
Euro-litigation, we are bound to miss the localised interests at stake, and conse-
quently the local significance of legal dynamics. In fact, going forward the ques-
tion should be: how ‘Euro’ is Euro-litigation? This shift in focus would also do 
justice to the localised aims of the litigating parties and thus the litigation itself.  
9.4  The Multifarious Functions of the Preliminary Reference Procedure 
The last part of Chapter 4 focused on the subjective experiences of individuals 
with having their case referred to the ECJ and their perceptions and expectations 
of the Court. Only a minority of litigants could be considered active in their 
pursuit of justice (not leaving their case completely in the hands of their lawyer). 
Among this small group, the perceptions of the Court and the way their case was 
handled differed considerably. While for many the referral to the ECJ felt like an 
improvement in their chances, perceiving the Court as a form of extended appeal 
beyond the national courts, physically attending the proceedings before the 
Court did not always serve to strengthen their belief in equitable treatment. The 
actual role for the individual in the procedure before the ECJ is very limited. 
And although only a minority of litigants actually expressed an interest in at-
tending the Court’s proceedings, this raises questions about the nature of the 
procedure and the possible impact of this experience on the perceived (proce-
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dural) justice of the parties. Although the Court itself presents these proceedings 
clearly as a form of ‘judicial cooperation’, it can be questioned how the proce-
dure impacts the original dispute from the perspective of the litigant. The tech-
nical nature of the proceedings, with little to no role for the individual litigant, 
left some with the feeling of being a spectator to their own dispute. Relatedly, 
only rarely did litigants, whether they had travelled to Luxembourg or not, have 
a good understanding of the reason for, and function of referral of their case to 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The perceived obscurity of these proceedings 
resulted in some remarkable misunderstandings, most notably about the inter-
vening parties, the European Commission and other Member States. In the most 
extreme examples, this resulted in the perception by litigants that there had been 
evident foul play. 
When looking at the preliminary reference procedure from an ‘institutional 
perspective’,5 and thus focusing on the functions law has to perform in order to 
harmonise social life, there thus appears to be a discrepancy between the actual 
function of the procedure – the interpretation of EU legislation in order for EU 
law to be uniformly applied in all Member States – and the occasion on or form 
in which this function is performed, namely in the dispute resolution of an actual 
dispute. This discrepancy could be a partial explanation for a mismatch in per-
ception of the ECJ’s practice and the experiences and aspirations of the litigants. 
Since with EU law and the preliminary reference procedure the dispute in ques-
tion gets transformed into a dispute at supranational level, thus transcending the 
confines of national interests (of both the state as well as the national judicial 
system), the ECJ may actually function as a more neutral arbitrator. This is an 
expectation voiced by many litigants. Since the ECJ is assumed to have no stake 
in looking after the interests of Member States as such, and is supposed to en-
sure uniform application of EU law throughout the Union, it can be argued that 
the ECJ is a possible ally for individuals in disputes against national govern-
ments whenever EU law provides them more protection than national laws or 
policy.  
However, it is precisely because this task of interpretation and subsequent 
implementation (by the Member States) of these political compromises (EU 
legislation) is bestowed upon the ECJ that it could also be argued that once these 
disputes reach the ECJ they are transformed from a legal dispute between two 
parties into a political question. In this regard, the Court may very well act con-
siderably differently from traditional national high courts that may take into 
account the national political, administrative and budgetary consequences of 
their judgments. This is tentatively confirmed by the fact that Member States are 
able to intervene in the proceedings and give their opinion as to the preferred 
                                                        
5  As distinguished by Evan 1962. 
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interpretation, and regularly do so. In this sense, the preliminary reference plays 
more roles than one and has the capacity to carry in it multiple interests, narra-
tives and even results. It can simultaneously be a check on governments’ tres-
passes of EU law by individuals or interest groups, it can temporarily extend the 
stay of otherwise undocumented immigrants or be an unwanted extension of an 
already precarious situation, it can be an alternative means of EU law enforce-
ment for the European Commission, it can be an opportunity for extended nego-
tiations of new EU legislation by Member States, it can signal the unwanted 
consequences of EU legislation for Member States and prompt renegotiations, 
and it can be the mechanism through which Europeanisation extends further and 
further into domestic politics. Including in this list the perspective of litigants 
may also lead to the conclusion that the preliminary reference may simultane-
ously be a check on government trespasses of EU law as well as an increased 
and sometimes insurmountable burden on the individual litigant. 
9.5  The Enforcement Role of Litigation 
Where the enforcement of EU law, in the absence of centralised enforcement 
mechanisms, relies heavily on the ‘vigilance’ of the polity and on claims 
brought before national courts, the burden of enforcement falls on individuals 
and organisations signalling Member States’ trespasses. In practice, however, 
the larger part of this responsibility lies with the legal profession. This mecha-
nism of enforcement presupposes the ability by the profession to effectively 
monitor Member States’ implementation of rules stipulated by EU law and to be 
alert to possible infringements. The findings presented in Chapter 6 give an 
indication of how EU law and norms have (or have not) become integrated into 
the ‘legal consciousness’ of practitioners. It revealed differences in both the 
‘litigability’ of certain legal principles in EU law, as well as the practical 
knowledge among practitioners when it comes to applying EU law in a mean-
ingful way. In many instances, a reference to the ECJ comes unexpectedly and 
for many lawyers EU law in general, and the procedures before the ECJ in par-
ticular, is unknown territory and thus presents them with new challenges and 
dilemmas. There are evidently differences between different areas of law, with 
areas like agriculture with a longstanding history of EU legislation and, con-
versely, areas like migration and asylum law where EU law has only fairly re-
cently become relevant. The self-reported domestic focus and lack of EU law 
expertise of legal practitioners (of lawyers as well as national judges6) could 
result in structural neglect of implementation errors and potential breaches of 
                                                        
6  See Jaremba 2013; Blom et al. 1995. 
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EU law by Member States. Given that compliance by Member States is not self-
evident (due to administrative incompetence, misinterpretations, the linking of 
implementation to a national development or deliberate choice by the govern-
ment), domestic pressure is needed in order to ensure compliance with EU law. 
When such pressure is effectively channelled through the courts, effective advo-
cacy becomes especially salient. 
When it comes to preliminary references taking on the character of judicial 
review of national policy and compliance with EU law, the fact that such cases 
do not necessarily fall into the hands of the practitioners best equipped to argue 
such claims can, on a macro scale, further undermine the effectiveness of the 
system. Although it is not in every case that ardent advocacy is needed for the 
ECJ to find a Member State in breach of EU law, the examples presented in 
Chapters 4 and 8, illustrate that the Court is highly dependent upon the (inter-
vening) parties to the proceedings to provide the national context. Effectively 
arguing non-compliance by Member States in light of EU law provisions re-
quires significant expertise in both the domestic policy context and national law 
and EU law. In this respect, the quality of advocacy thus plays a significant role, 
especially in Member States (including the Netherlands), which falls within 
Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib’s ‘world of domestic politics’, where compliance 
with EU law is filtered through administrative cultures, implementation 
measures are based on a cost-benefit analysis and where ‘playing the Eurolaw 
game’ is part of governmental strategy. The existence of well-organised civil 
society groups with the necessary legal expertise at their disposal is then an 
important and sometimes necessary counter force.  
9.6  Cause Lawyering and Pressure Through EU Law 
The final sections of Chapter 5 zoomed in on lawyers that proactively aim to 
exploit opportunities in EU law and solicit references to the ECJ as part of their 
legal strategies. Such intentions often go beyond the direct interests of their 
clients and are aimed at serving the interests of larger collectives. Domestic 
doctrinal deadlock provides an important incentive for these cause lawyers to 
focus their efforts on getting a case referred to the ECJ in order to play out the 
matter at the supranational level. In these cases, the national judge especially 
forms an important barrier to strategic legal action. Although individual cases 
may serve as vehicles for change, by invoking judicial review of national policy, 
these lawyers do have to deal with the dilemma of serving collective interests by 
utilising one individual’s case. Especially in areas of law where the stakes are 
high for the individual, and the impact of the procedure in itself can be detri-
mental, lawyers have to balance the interests of their client with that of the col-
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lective they are aiming to serve. EU law thus provides the means for collective 
legal protection, but where the interests of the individual oppose those defending 
domestic policy, the resulting dispute is augmented and often prolonged. The 
collective interests associated with this kind of judicial review are, therefore, 
sometimes contrary to the direct personal interests of the individual client. In 
that sense, the individual may become an unwitting (and not always willing) 
champion for collective interests. Examples of lawyers continuing cases after 
their client has given up his or her struggle for a residence permit and returned 
to his or her country of origin, underline this tension between individual and 
collective interests. Such tensions may also have a detrimental influence on the 
effective enforcement of EU law through the courts. Where domestic doctrinal 
deadlock may increase the need for judicial review by the ECJ, the extended 
duration of such complex legal strategies can serve as a deterrent for potential 
claimants. Examples of lawyers’ difficulties finding willing clients in order to 
address certain perceived breaches of EU law attest to this fact. 
Building on the insights into strategic use of EU law by lawyers, Chapter 7 
focused on the preliminary reference procedure from the perspective of other 
strategic actors and analysed who were the actors most likely to signal opportu-
nities in EU law, and what strategies were most likely to succeed in applying EU 
law litigation strategies. The case studies in this research underscore that when 
and how legal strategies, including the mobilisation of EU law, can be success-
ful, is greatly dependent upon the ways in which parties are able to combine 
legal and extra-legal strategies and can pursue long-term strategies. In such 
long-term strategies, expertise and financial and organisational capital become 
increasingly important. The findings highlight the role of EU law experts, not 
only in signalling opportunities in EU law, but also in activating potential stake-
holders to pursue legal strategies. The presented examples show that using EU 
law as part of activist strategies by interest groups is not widespread. This may 
be due to the high uncertainty that is associated with the use of the legal arena. 
However, the success of some of the actions also shows that it could simply be a 
matter of a lack of expertise in this area. Therefore, the role of activist lawyers 
and academics with the necessary expertise and the ability to mobilise is ampli-
fied.  
I have shown how the most important structural problem such strategies 
have to overcome is the bringing together of expertise and court cases. The lack 
of direct access to the ECJ (as well as to the national courts in many cases) forc-
es strategic actors to employ individual cases in order to address issues, i.e. 
Member States’ non-compliance. In practice, this often means that the initiative 
of employing experts comes from lawyers who are confronted with a reference 
to the ECJ in one of their client’s cases. Therefore, much of the expert advocacy 
is added to a legal strategy in a post hoc manner, sometimes undermining the 
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effectiveness of such a strategy. As such, certain organisations able to bridge the 
gap between the experts and the legal practitioners who have a pool of cases 
from which to select are best situated to organise legal opposition to government 
practices. Alter and Vargas pointed out, based on examples in the United King-
dom, that in order for actors aiming to create pressure in the national system for 
doctrinal change, all it takes is one sympathetic judge located anywhere in the 
national legal system.7 The examples discussed confirm some of the elements of 
pressure through law in the European context identified by Harlow and Rawl-
ings, who conclude: “If the best use is to be made of pressure through interna-
tional and [EU] law, new networks and new techniques are essential. Sharp issue 
focus, plaintiff stacking, forum shopping, political and legal campaigns in tan-
dem are essential elements in transnational campaigns”.8 In that sense, forum 
shopping would help to find sympathetic members of the judiciary. However, 
the cases presented in Chapter 7, also reveal the drawbacks of such strategies. 
For example, given the observed general ‘reluctance amongst the judiciary, and 
other adjudicators, to give effect to Community law principles’9, increases the 
costs associated with efforts that fail to find such sympathetic judges. Such costs 
and uncertainty can certainly discourage would-be applicants from bringing 
cases, and make it that much harder for strategic actors to utilise this legal strat-
egy. In practice, as expected, we see strategic actors acting in a more post hoc 
fashion by joining in legal action after a case is referred to the ECJ. This often 
occurs after requests for help by the lawyers in that case, but sometimes through 
offering assistance on their own initiative.  
The analysis in Chapter 7 thus underscores how the possibilities in prelimi-
nary references are hampered by high uncertainty and, therefore, present a more 
problematic cost-benefit calculation. The recent emergence of initiatives by 
asylum and migration lawyers, academics and interest groups collaborating to 
more effectively employ EU law strategies, show how actors in the field of mi-
gration and asylum law try to cope with these structural aspects, and have the 
potential to build expertise in such supranational legal strategies. Such collabo-
rations between practitioners, organised interest groups and EU law experts 
therefore provide a most fruitful way of gaining access to the ECJ and tapping 
into the possibilities of EU law and supranational review.  
                                                        
7  Alter & Vargas 2000, 475. 
8  Harlow & Rawlings 1992, 289. 
9  Blom et al. 1995: 35. 
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9.7  Reviewing the Dual Logic of Private Enforcement 
Neofunctionalist accounts of European integration have stressed the circular 
reinforcement in litigation before the ECJ, and the mutual pursuit of ‘instrumen-
tal self-interest’ by private litigants, national judges and the ECJ as constitutive 
elements of Europeanisation dynamics. In this approach to legal and political 
dynamics in Europe, the private enforcement of EU rules before the national 
courts and especially the ECJ has been a central feature in the transformation of 
Europe. From an enforcement perspective of EU law too, private litigants have 
an important role to play by addressing in court possible infringements by Mem-
ber States. In that respect, the ‘dual vigilance’, of both the public and the Euro-
pean Commission is one of the central mechanisms of the European legal and 
political organisation. With regard to this enforcement function of EU law, it is 
important to recognise that until recent years almost half the cases dealt with by 
the Court have been direct actions, a significant portion of which have been 
Member States being taken to court by the Commission for a failure to comply 
with EU law. As described in Chapter 8, these infringement actions and the 
preliminary reference procedure can be considered two sides of the same coin, 
and from the enforcement perspective of the European Commission can be part 
of one and the same effort to force compliance by Member States. Understand-
ing the dynamics of European integration and the role of the legal arena there-
fore requires both avenues to be considered in tandem, and it underscores the 
enforcement function of private litigation. 
Chapter 8 juxtaposed the advantageous position that both the European 
Commission as well as the Member States occupy in the supranational legal 
arena with those of the generally one-shotter litigants that appear before the 
ECJ. When it comes to enforcing one’s rights at this level, the individual litigant 
may thus find him/herself in the presence of powerful supranational repeat play-
ers with interests that may or may not align with his or her personal stakes. In 
many respects, these players are much better positioned to make cost-benefit 
calculations, to be strategic in their actions and play the ‘long game’ in Eurolaw. 
Individuals, as well as more strategic players accompanying them, thus find 
themselves part of a game in which they do not hold all the cards. However, 
from the perspective of EU law enforcement, they play an important role none-
theless. In the case of the EU legal system, the effectiveness of some EU rules 
can be achieved almost exclusively when private parties assert their subjective 
rights before national courts.10 This dual logic of private enforcement dates all 
                                                        
10  One way in which this is expressed by the Court is in the ‘general interest function’ of 
private enforcement, the reasoning behind which is that the existence of a right for pri-
vate parties to pursue their private interest contributes at the same time to the protection 
→ 
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the way back to the early years of the Court when it posited the enforcement by 
rights claims as part of the ‘dual vigilance’ within the legal system. In this re-
spect, Wilman concludes that “[it] follows that the relevant case law and the EU 
legislation on private enforcement seek to ensure that the private parties con-
cerned can effectively enforce their rights vested in EU law before national 
courts both as a means to safeguard the effective judicial protection of those 
parties and as a way to ensure that EU law is effectively applied and enforced at 
national level. This duality in effect constitutes the very essence of the concept 
of private enforcement as it exists in the EU legal order”.11 Individual litigants, 
then, are essential agents of enforcement when bringing EU law claims before 
national courts. When their case is referred to the ECJ, they may find themselves 
up against the interests of Member States with specialised representation. On the 
other hand, they may find in the European Commission a powerful ally, assum-
ing that one’s interests are aligned with the Commission’s interpretation of EU 
law, its preferred policy outcomes and its enforcement priorities. The latter is in 
large part subject to political dynamics, and the Commission’s position and 
priority may be influenced by considerations of a potential political backlash. 
This is why the Commission seems to prefer to tackle potential Member States’ 
infringements by fostering private enforcement though national courts and pre-
liminary references.12  
From an enforcement perspective, the mechanism of private parties pursuing 
their own interests and in doing so simultaneously furthering the enforcement of 
EU law is obviously attractive. In this respect, Wilman invokes Adam Smith’s 
notion of the ‘invisible hand’, the unintended result of an individual’s pursuit of 
justice. However, this perspective does not necessarily include the practical 
perspective of these individual claimants. More often than not, the interests of 
individual claimants will be assumed to be relatively clear-cut, and, moreover, to 
be deduced from whichever matter is dealt with by the ECJ. Especially with 
regard to cases of compensation for a failure to comply with EU law, private 
claims serve to ensure the effective enforcement of EU legislation, and the pro-
tection of the public at large, by attaching a cost and discouragement to possible 
infringers: the Member States. The question is whether such a system of private 
enforcement is as effective where individual rights have a different character, 
where individual gains are less clear-cut and where the costs for private parties 
pursuing their interests may outweigh the possible benefits, as is often the case 
                                                        
of the public interest by discouraging practices that constitute infringements of EU rules. 
In practice the ECJ can be seen to link both expressions of effectiveness and treats them 
as ‘two sides of the same coin’. In fact, they often not only coincide but also effectively 
reinforce each other. Wilman 2015, 457-8. 
11  Wilman 2015, 463. 
12  Cf. Hofmann 2016. 
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for individual litigants. Newly emerging areas where the influence of EU law is 
expanding, including areas that significantly impact citizens’ lives, raise ques-
tions about the practical functionality of this dual logic. For instance, situations 
where the enforcement of a subjective right can be at odds with the effectiveness 
of public enforcement of EU rules and in situations where private parties may be 
persuaded to settle out of court, resulting in persistent non-compliance by Mem-
ber States. 
The deterrent effects of private enforcement serve the enforcement of EU 
law by providing a ‘genuine incentive to compliance’,13 but, on an individual 
level, may not be of direct interest to private parties seeking to enforce their 
rights. The reluctance of national judges to decide on conflicts between EU law 
and national law ex officio, while also referring to the ECJ sporadically and 
selectively, increases the burden of litigation. The deterrent effect of such a 
system will, therefore, more likely fall on private parties, who are effectively 
dissuaded from litigation, than on the trespassing Member States. The obstacles 
individual litigants encounter as well as the selective nature inherent in prelimi-
nary references thus greatly undermines the enforcement function of the refer-
ence procedure. One such obstruction to this function of the preliminary refer-
ence procedure, and possibly the most problematic obstacle from a public power 
perspective, is the fact that the Member States have the opportunity to prevent 
judgments from the ECJ, as discussed in Chapter 8. Since references frequently 
deal with questions of the legality of national legislation or policy in light of EU 
legislation, a judgment by the ECJ may threaten national policy. From the per-
spective of the national government, references can, therefore, be very unwel-
come, and the state will attempt to prevent a reference or a judgment. The find-
ings presented of lawyers signaling thwarted efforts at getting cases referred to 
the ECJ suggest that it is not unusual for the government to curtail possible neg-
ative judgments in this way. 
The results of this study thus illustrate how, depending on the potential im-
pact of an individual claim, individual cases are played out in a multi-level polit-
ical, administrative and legal arena that involves multiple interests. With their 
claim, parties may thus find themselves not only in opposition to a government 
body, but also the responsible ministries and, later in the procedure, face possi-
ble opposition from other Member States and even the European Commission 
all of whom have their own interest in the decision. Long-term strategies by 
national governments may be to the detriment of the individual party’s interests. 
                                                        
13  As expressed by the European Commission 1990, 12-13. On later occasions the Commis-
sion has considered private enforcement to be a ‘successful tool for policing markets’ 
and ‘a governance tool [which] can be used as a deterrent’. European Commission 2012, 
7. 
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Member States are in a position to make risk assessments and, in cases that pro-
voke a potentially unwelcome interpretation of EU law, move to contain the 
case by giving in; thus ‘losing a battle to win the war’. Although in some cases 
such calculations may result in a win on the individual front, in the end this 
results in non-compliance by a Member State. Those that do decide to battle to 
the end are in for the long haul, and many can be expected to be dissuaded from 
litigation. As one respondent, who handled his case in full himself, summed it 
up: “It really is David against Goliath”. The reliance on private enforcement of 
EU law, and the resulting unsystematic and selective address of enforcement 
deficits, in this sense has significant drawbacks and may require some critical 
reconsideration. 
9.8  Re-Positioning the Individual in the European Legal System 
This study gives impetus for a ‘re-positioning’ of the individual in the legal 
system of Europe as a field of opportunities. The insights in part confirm the 
idea of the European legal system, and specifically the preliminary reference 
procedure, as a powerful mechanism, both in providing opportunities for those 
claiming rights in court as well as in transforming governance in Europe. How-
ever, the extent to which EU law and preliminary reference can be harnessed by 
those who wish to attack national policies and try to steer both domestic and 
supranational legal and political developments, is significantly limited. The 
purported ‘emancipatory functionalism’ of EU law, as a legitimizing rhetoric, 
creates high expectations for European citizens by offering individual empow-
erment and “liberating civil society from the shackles of parliamentary democ-
racies”.14 However, one critical aspect to this individual rights rhetoric is the 
truism that the mere proclamation of rights does not necessarily mean actual 
social change. On what he famously called ‘the myth of rights’, Scheingold 
stated in this respect:  
 
“The assumption is that litigation can evoke a declaration of rights from courts; that 
it can, further, be used to assure the realization of these rights; and, finally, that 
realization is tantamount to meaningful change. The myth of rights is, in other 
words, premised on a direct linking of litigation, rights and remedies with social 
change.”15 
 
The legal approach to the subjects of rights, remedies, social change and litiga-
tion from an EU law perspective encourages a focus on judicial decisions and 
                                                        
14  Schepel 2004, 2. 
15  Scheingold 1974, 5.  
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their implementation. Hence, the extensive literature on the ECJ’s track record. 
The findings presented in this study critically examine the assumptions of mac-
ro-approaches to the preliminary reference procedure as a legal opportunity and 
an expression of ‘demands for integration’. They shed light on the practicality of 
the use of EU law and the preliminary reference procedure as a so-called 
‘shield’ and ‘sword’, empirically challenging the rights rhetoric and the narra-
tive of empowerment by showing the constraints on the use of this procedure as 
a means to an end. 
It has often been stressed that the distinct nature of the EU legal system, 
with the preliminary reference procedure as its most important instrument, 
makes for an enhanced opportunity to circumvent the domestic legal system. 
That same nature, however, makes deliberately aiming for the ECJ via this route 
a highly uncertain endeavour. The ability to make use of this procedure for un-
derprivileged parties is, next to structural barriers, greatly hampered by an une-
qual distribution in (legal) agency and largely contingent on the ability to em-
ploy experts. Although the development of the European legal system has pro-
vided new avenues for individuals to seek justice, and the ECJ has been an ally 
for certain specific private interests and judicial politics in past decades, the 
empowerment rhetoric surrounding this should thus be considered a significant 
overstatement of the actual empowering effects of EU law for individual liti-
gants. In practice, this is more about macro-legal developments and a form of 
extended political negotiation than about access to a meaningful form of justice. 
On the one hand, it does provide new possibilities for ‘trumping’ the domestic 
legal system whenever the supranational legislation provides opportunities 
against national policy or legislation; on the other hand, as a form of remedy the 
preliminary reference procedure remains a difficult ‘sword’ to harness and indi-
vidual claimants are often better off with (swifter) adjudication within the na-
tional system. The effective use of it is largely reserved for organisations and 
‘strategy entrepreneurs’16 with the necessary credentials, means and expertise.17  
As concluded by Kelemen: “Consumers, airline passengers, shareholders, 
environmental nongovernmental organizations, victims of discrimination, and 
firms do not sue for Europe. They sue for themselves. Yet in doing so, they 
serve as the eyes, ears, and long arm of Brussels, providing strength to an oth-
erwise weak state.”18 Individual litigants often unwittingly, and sometimes un-
willingly, performing this task should not lead them to be co-opted uncritically 
into theories of integration as the beneficiaries thereof. Treating these litigants as 
such foregoes the inherent tensions that exist in legal practice. It ascribes to 
                                                        
16  Cf. Vanhala 2017. 
17  Vauchez 2008a, 450. 
18  Kelemen 2006, 121. 
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them motivations and intentions absent in fact. It, moreover, may overlook dif-
ferences in agency among those that participate in the supranational political 
game. Rather than assuming pro-integrationist aims, or even sentiments, among 
those participating in the dynamics of integration-through-law, this can only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the important enforcement role 
of the procedure notwithstanding, we should be wary of considering the prelimi-
nary reference procedure as a veritable form of access to justice from a litigant’s 
perspective. 
9.9  Methodological Reflections 
The broad exploration of Euro-litigation and the resulting findings in this book 
direct attention to a broad range of mechanisms and ‘forgotten narratives’ in ag-
gregated analyses of the European legal system in general and litigation in par-
ticular. The findings provide ample suggestion for further research in certain 
fields of law or in specific parts of the (European) legal field. The inductive ap-
proach of this study into an underexplored subject has provided new perspec-
tives on largely uncharted territory. It provides a broad range of new insights 
and new narratives, but also presents us with particular challenges. Many of the 
political science approaches I have critically evaluated make use of econometric 
methods by reducing certain aspects of Euro-litigation (origin of reference, sub-
ject matter, etc.) to numerical units. This allows for complex model analysis 
based on functionally simplified representations of reality. Although I have 
identified several pitfalls, these approaches do allow for a high degree of control 
over one’s research data. The methodology utilised in this study bears no such 
advantages. The dependence on the availability of respondents, the high uncer-
tainty over the comprehensiveness of observation, the significant reliance upon 
the respondents’ perspectives, as well as the great diversity in legal subjects, 
types of actors, interests and trajectories of cases has provided – apart from a 
rich body of data – a daunting challenge of distilling relevant perspectives and 
generalizable characteristics. 
The methodological aim of this study – casting a wide net, without prejudg-
ing cases based on their doctrinal significance – has also had some repercussions 
for the depth with which issues that presented themselves inductively could be 
pursued. To capture fully the impact certain cases have on a local, national and 
supranational level requires a significant research effort with a selective focus 
on certain cases, and indeed certain areas of law or policy. The design of this 
research did not always allow for such an extensive archaeology of legal and 
political developments leading up to, and in the wake of certain cases. There is, 
therefore, a need to revalue the explanatory power of the case study. The recent 
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work by Nicola and Davies is an example of such reappraisal of ‘thick’ descrip-
tions, contextual histories and critical narratives by engaging with the personali-
ties involved behind the scenes of as selection of some of the Court’s Grands 
arrêts. The book convincingly shows how well-known ECJ cases can be retold 
through different contextual narratives, and thereby challenges the pervasive 
hegemony of legal reasoning in studies of Euro-litigation. However, by focusing 
exclusively on cases that have featured prominently in exactly that legal per-
spective on ECJ case law, it moves away from such perspective only in part. As 
concluded by Conant earlier, “scholars should try to look beyond an exclusive 
focus on ECJ decisions and references in order to explore how the majority of 
EU law is actually adjudicated, avoiding the blind spots associated with a dis-
proportionate focus on a central high court and its ‘constitutional’ judge-
ments”.19 This study has partly been able to overcome this focus on ECJ deci-
sions by looking beyond ‘constitutional’ judgments and not selecting cases 
based on their salience, but it has not – due to its focus on actual preliminary 
references and not on ‘non-litigation’ or failed efforts at Euro-litigation – com-
pletely moved away from a focus on the ECJ in its study of EU law mobilisa-
tion. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of national court decisions on EU law 
do not involve a reference to the ECJ and are independent decisions.20 The non-
purposeful portion of references from the perspective of litigants as well as the 
number of cases where EU law was mobilised without the aim of reaching the 
ECJ, underscores the need for future research to ‘domesticate’ in empirical focus 
on EU judicial politics. This study did not overcome the obvious limitation that 
preliminary references to the ECJ constitute only the tip of the iceberg when it 
comes to the degree to which EU law is litigated in national courts. As such this 
study has its own blind spots. What this study can only infer from certain illus-
trative findings leaves room for speculation, but also gives indications of what 
future research might focus on to fill the knowledge gap. 
9.10  Remaining Questions and Future Research Agenda  
Member States in Comparison 
An obvious remaining question is how the findings in this study compare to a 
similar analysis in other Member States. To what extent does national legal cul-
ture, described by Blankenburg21 as the interrelationship of law, institutional 
                                                        
19  Conant 2007a, 57. 
20  Conant 2002, 81-2. 
21  Blankenburg 1997. 
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structures and behavioural patterns, play a role in determining active EU law 
mobilisation? As we have seen, the ‘EU law consciousness’ varies considerably 
among practitioners, litigants, judges, and between areas of law, and appears 
limited overall. Therefore, a difference in legal culture could have significant 
influence on the manner in which EU law is mobilised in different national con-
texts. The structure of law matters for the outcome of the so-called ‘dialogue’ 
between the courts and the application of EU law. The national cultures of judi-
cial review as well as national standing rules and more general structures of 
access to justice are decisive elements for this dialogue as well. The existence or 
absence of a national culture of judicial review, and the existence or absence of 
a constitutional court, may influence the perception of the ECJ as a possible 
partner in this dialogue. This is the case for national judges and their proclivity 
to send cases to the ECJ as it is for national litigation cultures that may or may 
not focus on supranational review as a potential source of legal ammunition for 
political actors.22  
Legal Strategies and the Legal Lexicon of Practitioners 
Related to this question of difference in national cultures is the presence of ac-
tors that are capable of mobilising EU law in a strategic manner. In a more in-
ternational respect the question is what, if any, are the organised transnational 
networks of ‘Euro-lawyers’? And what are the issues and clients on which they 
are focused? A similar question is pertinent when it comes to transnational 
NGOs and their legal strategies. To what extent are such strategically important 
interlocutors involved in the creation, and more importantly, in the subsequent 
enforcement of newly developed EU legislation? And to what extent do they 
employ legal strategies, or choose to use different means. In other words, how 
do the findings in this study compare to ‘supranational interest representation’ 
via other avenues, like lobbying or more institutionalised forms of ‘functional 
participation’?23 In what way do such other forms of interest representation dif-
fer from or coincide with efforts of legal mobilisation? 
With the enforcement role of the legal profession in mind, the findings pre-
sented give indications of how EU law and norms (have) become integrated into 
the ‘legal consciousness’ of practitioners and reveal differences in both the 
‘litigability’ of certain principles as well as the practical knowledge among prac-
titioners when it comes to applying EU law in a meaningful way. In order to 
                                                        
22  See for example Cohen-Tanugi, who describes how the idea that litigation could be a 
powerful democratic instrument is totally foreign to French political culture. Cohen-
Tanugi 1985, 158. 
23  Smismans 2004.  
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better understand how EU law and norms find their way into the ‘legal lexicon’ 
of practitioners, future research could focus (more specifically than this study 
has been able to do) on how they deal with EU law on a day-to-day basis. How 
well are they acquainted with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, and with general 
principles of EU law? How significant are these norms considered to be from 
their perspective and how, when and why do they employ them before national 
courts? Special attention in this respect should be paid to differences between 
areas of law, both in available and applicable EU norms (non-discrimination 
may be relevant in trans-border tax law and social security cases, yet expectedly 
less so in private law) as well as in (possibly related) EU law consciousness 
among practitioners in different fields. To what extent are practitioners focused 
on EU law as a source of legal argumentation and to what extent is EU law inte-
grated into the legal consciousness of those who are charged with decentralized 
enforcement in a practical sense? 
A Shift Away from the Supranational Perspective 
The impact of the European legal system and the way EU legislation may be 
employed is not limited to the supranational level. Future research would do 
well to shift away from focusing merely on judicial interaction and supranation-
al jurisprudential developments and renew attention to the national, and subna-
tional level. The focus on the judicial dialogue between the ECJ and national 
courts is in large part the result of outside observers taking the internal logic of 
the legal system at face value, all the while overlooking what goes on beyond 
what is ‘purely legal’. Kelemen and Pavone conclude after a spatio-temporal 
analysis of preliminary references in Italy that “although population levels and 
domestic litigiousness best explain variation in reference rates, there is evidence 
that the domestic litigation effect is subnationally heterogeneous.”24 They rec-
ognise, in tandem with this study, that subnational mechanisms that would be 
proper units of analysis when studying causal factors in preliminary reference 
rates, e.g. cause lawyers, academic involvement in litigation, civil society organ-
isation, EU law specialisation among practitioners. Thereby confirming the need 
for avenues of research that focus on the ways in which the practice of EU law is 
entrenched locally. 
For example, this study has presented some examples of how the ‘threat’ of 
a reference may be used as a tactic as well. As such the threat of preliminary 
references can have effect beyond direct implementation. This leads to the infer-
ence that in Member States where national judges are relatively hesitant to refer, 
the incentive for lawyers and/or interest groups to employ this strategy will not 
                                                        
24  Kelemen & Pavone 2016, 1118. 
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develop as it might in countries like the Netherlands (and especially the UK, 
where there is for instance more extensive possibility for collective redress). We 
can expect to some extent a learning curve among legal professionals that can be 
nourished and encouraged by past successes to employ similar strategies. Fur-
ther research that delves into this aspect of EU law mobilisation should, there-
fore, focus on the level of practical knowledge of the EU legal system at the 
ground level, relevant EU legislation and the awareness of opportunities among 
practitioners, as well as their perceptions of the importance or desirability of 
using EU law in court. Comparative research between national legal systems as 
well as between different areas of law would yield the most significant insights.  
A Shift Away from the International Relations Perspective 
Related to the shifting away from a jurist’s perspective is the need to shift away 
from the political science perspective, which has dominated the study of the EU 
legal system in recent decades. Chapter 2 has outlined a state of the art of main-
stream research into the relation between preliminary references and EU integra-
tion. The international relations tradition in the study of the EU legal system and 
the ECJ has limited the study of EU law largely to questions of sovereignty and 
compliance. This perspective, although an essential part of EU studies, has been 
successful partly due to the exclusion of other relevant perspectives. Recently 
published literature shows that the criticisms voiced and the conclusions drawn 
in this study do not stand alone, and newly emerging research agendas and stud-
ies conducted in tandem with this study show promising new efforts in history, 
sociology and socio-legal studies towards further filling in the pervasive blind-
spots in EU integration studies. 25  
One of the still remaining perspectives of the European legal system is the 
way in which EU law has penetrated domestic life. The related questions that 
come to mind when approaching the EU focus more on how EU law has been 
integrating into local legal, political and social practice. How do local bureau-
cracies, for instance, deal with applying EU law? How, when and why does EU 
law become a strategic asset in political struggle, and when is it refused or re-
sisted, not only in legal contestation, but more broadly in political struggles? A 
related question is: how European is Euro-litigation? Research on litigation and 
European law should turn to developing a theoretical distinction in legal practice 
that is local and truly European. And how can a distinction be made? Based on 
the parties’ objectives? Based on the results? Based on the functionality of the 
(European) legal system? Further theorizations and empirical analysis should 
focus on these questions. This research has shown how these two in practice are 
                                                        
25  Cf. Bailleux 2014, Arnholtz 2014 and Nicola & Davies 2017. 
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not always easily distinguishable from each other, and how often practices that 
are essentially focused on local and national issues are called ‘European’. A 
better understanding of legal practice in Europe would contribute to enhancing 
our understanding of the ever evolving ‘community based on law’, not only 
from an institutional and legal, but also a societal perspective. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: Case Descriptions 
Breeding or Fattening? 
 
C-355/11, Judgment of 14/06/2012, OJ C 227/6 
A dairy farmer challenges the cuts in premiums he received for not complying 
with the ban on the tethering of calves laid down in the EU Directive on mini-
mum standards for the protection of calves. The reference to the ECJ asks 
whether the Directive applies only to calves kept for breeding or fattening, or for 
calves kept on the dairy farm. The Court states that the term ‘breeding’ does not 
have the same meaning in all EU languages. Yet, the term cannot be interpreted 
in a limited sense because the EU must respect animal welfare requirements in 
the field of agriculture. According to the Court, therefore, calves kept under the 
dairy farming system fall under the protection of the Directive. 
 
Catering Employees 
 
C-242/09, Judgment of 21/10/2010, OJ C 346/15 
In this case, the Court is asked to rule on the protection of workers in the case of 
a transfer of undertaking in a situation where an employee has two employers 
within one concern. The catering employees who, with the help of a labour un-
ion, brought this case were formally employed by a so-called personnel carrier, 
while working in another operating company within the larger corporation. The 
company decided to transfer its catering activities to a third party. The question 
was whether the staff acquired by the new employer could claim retaining their 
(old) employment conditions, as this staff had no employment contract with the 
operating company that transferred the catering activities. So far, Dutch legal 
doctrine has considered the relevant EU Directive only applicable to personnel 
who have a contract of employment with the alienator of the activities. Howev-
er, the Court considers that the protection of the Directive also applies in a situa-
tion like this one and protects the non-contractual employment relationship. 
 
Cattle Premiums 
 
C-170/08, Judgment of 11/06/2009, OJ C 180/18 
This case was brought by a farmer in light of the European common agricultural 
policy and the related income support for farmers. He was excluded from grants 
on the ground that the number of ‘animals determined’ at his farm was fixed at 
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zero following the finding of a prohibited substance in the urine of some of his 
bovine animals during an inspection in 2000. When establishing the so-called 
‘single payment’ income support for farmers in 2006, the national authorities 
assumed zero cattle, which led to a permanent reduction in the income support 
that the farmer could claim. The Court determines that for the calculation of the 
reference amount, account must be kept of the number of animals for which a 
direct payment has been or should have been granted. The Court concludes that 
abatements and exclusions imposed during the reference period on the basis of 
the European rules for market organization in the beef sector do not function 
permanently and should be disregarded in the calculation of the reference 
amount.  
 
Compulsory Insurance 
 
C-347/10, Judgment of 17/01/2012, OJ C 73/3 
A Dutch national who worked on a drilling platform outside Dutch territorial 
waters, but within the Dutch continental shelf, and who had moved to Spain 
appeals a denial of incapacity allowance because he does not meet the residence 
requirement. Supported by a labour union, his case is eventually brought before 
the ECJ. The question put to the ECJ is whether the European Basic Regulation 
on Social Security and the freedom of movement for workers apply to his situa-
tion. The Court finds that national legislation which states that it is the residence 
criterion which determines whether or not an employee working on a drilling 
platform on the continental shelf adjacent to a Member State may benefit from 
compulsory insurance in that Member State is contrary to EU law. Moreover, it 
must be found that such national legislation places non-resident workers, in a 
less favourable position than resident workers with regard to their social security 
cover in the Netherlands, and therefore undermines the principle of freedom of 
movement secured by EU law.  
 
Concealed Foreign Savings 
 
C-157/08, Judgment of 11/06/2009, OJ C 180/17 
This test case, brought by a large tax consultancy firm, concerns the question 
whether the longer tax recovery period of up to twelve years for concealed sav-
ings in another Member State, is contrary to free movement of capital and ser-
vices, due to discrimination in terms of legal certainty, and by making it less 
attractive for taxpayers to transfer savings to another Member State and keep 
them there. The ECJ indeed considers the longer period a barrier to free move-
ment because the longer recovery period makes retaining funds from income in 
another Member State less attractive. However, this restriction can be justified 
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with the aim of the effectiveness of fiscal controls and to fight tax fraud. The 
Court finds the measure appropriate and not disproportionate to achieve these 
legitimate goals. The measure is also necessary for those cases where the Mem-
ber State is not aware at all of taxable assets held in another Member State.  
 
Conditions of Residence 
 
C-484/07, Judgment of 16/06/2011, OJ C 232/4 
A Turkish national who came to the Netherlands in the context of family reuni-
fication with her parents, married a Turkish man, but remained living with her 
parents. After being informed about the marriage, the IND rescinded the resi-
dence permit retroactively with effect from the date of marriage. Based on 
Dutch policy the family relationship is supposedly broken by the wedding. The 
question submitted to the ECJ is whether her situation still satisfies the condi-
tions of residence of the Association Agreement with Turkey. The Court consid-
ers that the host Member State may require that during the first three years the 
family member indeed live with the parents. However, the host Member State 
may not set other conditions. The Dutch policy is considered in violation of the 
Association Agreement. 
 
Double Nationality 
 
C-7/10, Judgment of 29/03/2012, OJ C 151/3 
Two joined cases of family members of Turkish workers who face expulsion 
due to a criminal past. This measure is based on national rules for expulsion of 
aliens, the so-called ‘sliding scale’. Both family members object to their expul-
sion and rely on the EU Association Agreement with Turkey. Besides the Turk-
ish, their family members also have Dutch nationality. According to the Nether-
lands, this precludes the possibility of relying on Association law. In its judg-
ment the ECJ does not follow this reasoning. Family members of Turkish dual-
national workers may rely on the EU Association Agreement with Turkey 
against their expulsion for criminal convictions. Obtaining Dutch nationality 
does not matter. According to the Court, the expulsion of family members of 
Turkish workers must be done according to the rules of the EU Association 
Agreement with Turkey. 
 
Export of Benefits 
 
C-485/07, Judgment of 26/05/2011, OJ C 211/3 
In a collective action against the Netherlands Turkish pensioners who had re-
turned to Turkey appeal the withdrawal of an allowance for their invalidity pen-
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sion. According to new Dutch law limiting the export of benefits, the surcharge 
will be paid only to beneficiaries residing in the territory of the Netherlands. The 
reference to the ECJ asked whether such law is compatible with the Association 
Agreement between the EU and Turkey. The Court considered that Article 6 of 
Decision 3/80 on the coordination of social security schemes for Turkish em-
ployees is directly applicable in the Member States. Furthermore, the Court 
ruled that the allowance for the invalidity pension could not be withdrawn at the 
time that beneficiaries no longer lived in the Netherlands, since Article 6 of 
Decision 3/80 prohibits the instalment of a residence requirement.  
 
Extradition 
 
C-123/08, Judgment of 06/10/2009, OJ C 282/8 
This is a case concerning the possible extradition of a German national, fighting 
extradition to Germany, which had issued a European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 
Such a warrant can be refused on certain grounds. In this case Dutch grounds for 
refusal were stricter than those in EU law requiring a residence permit of the 
subject. Dutch policy denies extradition where foreigners, including EU citizens, 
have a permanent residence permit, which can be obtained after five years of 
stay. The question put to the ECJ was how this condition relates to EU law, 
which does not have a requirement for the duration of the stay. According to the 
Court, a Member State cannot require a residence permit of EU citizens, since 
such a document is not required for stay in the Netherlands. However, the Court 
also concludes that European law does not oppose a five-year requirement for 
refusal of extradition, since this limits the cases in which the court may refuse to 
carry out an EAW, by which the final goal of the intra-EU cooperation is facili-
tated.  
 
Extraterritorial Dredging 
 
C-106/11, Judgment of 07/06/2012, OJ C 217/4 
The case of a Dutch national who lives in Spain and works for a Dutch compa-
ny, on a dredger ship sailing under the Dutch flag in the territorial waters of, 
among others, China. He opposed the decision by Dutch authorities considering 
that he falls under the Dutch social security system and therefore has to pay a 
premium. The preliminary question asks whether the Dutch social security sys-
tem indeed applies to his situation. The Court answered this question in the af-
firmative, concluding that EU law prevents a person from being excluded from 
the national social security system in such a situation, simply because he does 
not live in the Member State concerned.  
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Fees in Migration Law 
 
C-242/06, Judgment of 17/09/2009, OJ C 267/8 
In a case of a Turkish national whose request for a residence permit was denied 
due to the failure to pay the required fee, Dutch increases in fees for residence 
permits are questioned in light of the ‘standstill clause’ in the Association 
Agreement between the EU and Turkey. The case, supported by a well-
organised group of lawyers, academics and interest groups, resulted in an align-
ment of the amount of fees for residence permits of Turkish nationals and EU 
citizens, and had spin-off effects for other groups of migrants, including third 
country nationals. 
 
Free Movement of Cannabis 
 
C-137/09, Judgment of 16/12/2010, OJ C 55/6 
In a test case set up in an agreement between a coffee shop owner and a Dutch 
municipality, the applicability of EU law to Dutch soft drugs policy is tested. In 
a pilot, the municipality of a border town issued a local prohibition of admission 
of persons who are not residents of the Netherlands in order to combat so-called 
drug tourism, and fined one coffee shop owner in alleged violation of said pro-
hibition. The coffee shop owner argued that legislation that forbids the sale of 
cannabis to non-residents constitutes unjustified unequal treatment of citizens of 
the European Union. In the context of this procedure, questions were put to the 
ECJ on the compatibility of the resident criterion with EU law. The Court ruled 
that a coffee shop owner cannot rely on Union law for the sale of cannabis. The 
reason for this is that, due to their nature, these substances are completely 
banned from imports and sales in all Member States. With regard to the ‘legal’ 
beverages and food items being sold in the coffee shop, the Court finds that 
restricting access to non-residents is a justified, appropriate and proportionate 
measure from the point of view of combating drug tourism.  
 
‘Formally Limited’ Residence Permits 
 
C-502/10, Judgment of 18/10/2012, OJ C 379/4 
An Indian national, in the Netherlands on a temporary residence permit in con-
nection with his work as a spiritual leader is denied a permanent residence per-
mit after five years of residence in the Netherlands. His application is rejected 
because his residence permit, according to the Secretary of State, is a so-called 
‘formally limited residence permit’ within the meaning of the Directive on the 
status of third country nationals who are long-term residents. According to the 
Court, the phrase ‘in cases where their residence permit is formally limited’ is an 
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autonomous European concept and must be interpreted uniformly. According to 
the Court, there is no formally limited residence permit within the meaning of 
national law, the formal limitation of which does not prevent the third country 
national concerned from establishing a permanent place of residence. It is up to 
the national court, in the light of all circumstances, to ascertain whether that is 
indeed the case. Upon returning to the national court, the Secretary of State re-
pealed its appeal to a lower court’s decision, which had vindicated the spiritual 
leader’s claim. 
 
Income Requirements 
 
C-578/08, Judgment of 04/03/2010, OJ C 113/13 
In this case, brought by a Moroccan national with a permanent residence permit 
wanting to be reunited with his Moroccan wife, the ECJ is asked whether or not 
the Netherlands can apply a requirement of an income of at least 120% of the 
minimum wage for family reunification. The claimant has been in the Nether-
lands since 1970. In 2006 the request for a provisional permit for his wife is 
denied based on the fact that he does not meet the income requirement laid down 
in Dutch law. The question is whether the Dutch income claim for family reuni-
fication is in violation of the Family Reunification Directive. The ECJ judges 
that the Netherlands cannot apply the rule that family reunions must always have 
an income of at least 120% of the minimum wage. It is to be used as a reference 
amount, but the income test must be accompanied by a concrete assessment of 
the applicant's situation. The Court further finds that the Netherlands cannot 
distinguish in the income test according to whether the marriage has occurred 
before or after the arrival of the family member to the Netherlands. 
 
Integration Abroad 
 
C-155/11 PPU, Order of 10/06/2011, OJ C 269/18 
This urgent preliminary ruling procedure questions the compatibility of the 
Dutch Civic Integration Abroad Act with the Family Reunification Directive. 
The case is about an Afghan woman who wants to be reunited with her husband 
and children, all of whom are legitimately staying in the Netherlands. Based on 
Dutch law she is required to pass a pre-entry civic integration test. Because she 
has not passed the basic examination, her request is denied. Supported by aca-
demics and the interest group the Dutch Refugee Council her case is referred to 
the ECJ. However, because the Dutch government grants a provisional residence 
permit during the proceedings, the Court finds that the main action has become 
devoid of purpose, therefore the case does not result in a ruling on the compati-
bility of the Dutch law with EU law.  
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Lessee Entitlements 
 
C-470/08, Judgment of 21/01/2010, OJ C 63/13 
This test case was set up in an agreement between an association of lessors and 
an entrepreneurial and employers’ organization. Under the so-called EU farm-
ers’ single payment scheme farmers can redeem income. Such grants are granted 
to a farmer as a tenant, but are at the same time linked to the farmland. The test 
case sought to answer the question what should happen with the payment enti-
tlements when a lease agreement ends. It was unclear whether the tenant had to 
transfer rights at the end of a lease agreement to the lessee. The Court decides 
that the payment entitlements stay with the tenant, based on the aims of the 
common agricultural policy of providing a fair standard of living for farmers. 
The link between rights and land only serves to ensure income support. Specula-
tive transfer and accumulation of rights without an agricultural basis is prevent-
ed in this way. 
 
Mortgage Interest Deductions 
 
C-527/06, Judgment of 16/10/2008, OJ C 313/4 
A civil servant living in Belgium and working in the Netherlands brings a claim 
to apply a mortgage deduction on his house in Belgium to his income tax in the 
Netherlands. The question put to the ECJ is whether his inability to do so consti-
tutes discrimination in light of the right to free movement of workers. The ECJ 
finds this to be the case because neither his state of residence nor his state of 
employment takes into account his personal and family situation, in this case the 
mortgage interest deduction, and thus his fiscal capacity. The free movement of 
workers opposes the fact that a taxpayer cannot deduct negative income from a 
property in his state of residence from his income tax in his state of employ-
ment, while such deduction is allowed to residents of the latter state. 
 
New Restrictions  
 
C-300/09, Judgment of 09/12/2010, OJ C 55/11 
These joined cases of two Turkish nationals who had lived legally in the Nether-
lands with their legally residing spouses for more than one but less than three 
years. Both their requests for an independent permit were denied due to the 
breaking of the marital bond before reaching three years of legal stay, a re-
quirement that had been relaxed to one year in 1983 but had been reinstated in 
2000. Both parties invoke the ‘standstill clause’ in the Association Agreement 
between the EU and Turkey, which precludes Member States from creating new 
restrictions regarding access to employment of legally resident Turkish workers 
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and their family members after 1980. While the Dutch government argued that 
there is no new restriction since the temporary easing of policy has only been 
reversed, the ECJ ruled differently. According to the Court, a relaxation for 
Turkish employees can no longer be reversed, as this creates a new constraint. 
 
Pensioners Abroad 
 
C-345/09, Judgment of 14/10/2010, OJ C 346/17 
This is a case of pensioners living abroad opposing payment of a premium de-
ducted from their pensions after the transition to a new Dutch health care sys-
tem. According to them, the premium is in violation of EU law. The question is 
about the ratio of the compulsory care premium with EU law. According to the 
Court, the EU rules on social security and the freedom of movement and resi-
dence within the EU do not obstruct the mandatory deduction of care premiums. 
However, it is up to the national court to determine whether the transition to the 
new health care system resulted in different treatment of residents and pension-
ers already living abroad. The national court subsequently concluded that the 
alleged difference in treatment between residents and non-residents – constitut-
ing discrimination – did not exist. 
 
Proportional Tax Deductions 
 
C-594/10, Judgment of 16/02/2012, OJ C 98/8 
A tax advisor appeals the lump sum correction to the VAT tax deduction, which 
he had received for use of two cars for business purposes, due to the personal 
use of said cars. The preliminary questions asked whether this Dutch scheme is 
compatible with requirements for a deduction limitation scheme laid down in the 
EU’s Sixth VAT Directive. According to the Court, there is no provision for the 
limitation of deductions. The Court concludes that the Directive contravenes a 
national tax regime based on a flat-rate method of calculation for expenditure 
related to private use, if it does not take into account proportionally the actual 
extent of that use. The correction should therefore be proportional to the use. 
 
Retroactive Withdrawal 
 
C-187/10, Judgment of 29/09/2011, OJ C 340/3 
A Turkish employee receives a temporary residence permit under condition of 
stay with his partner in the Netherlands. This residence permit is accompanied 
by permission to work without a work permit, which he does. One and a half 
years after commencement of his work, he requests a change in his residence 
permit from the ‘stay with partner’ to ‘continued residence’. Moreover, his resi-
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dence permit is withdrawn with retroactive effect due to the discontinuation of 
his relationship. The question put before the ECJ was whether Association law 
stands in the way of this withdrawal with retroactivity. The Court finds that this 
is the case, as a Turkish employee who has worked legally for one year has built 
up rights under Association law. These rights do not depend on the survival of 
the circumstances on the ground on which they originated. The Court concludes 
that it is contrary to Association law, as well as to the general principle of the 
respect for acquired rights, to withdraw a residence permit with retroactive ef-
fect after one year of legal work.  
 
Self-Employed Tax Deductions 
 
C-440/08, Judgment of 18/03/2010, OJ C 134/6 
This test case, brought by a small accountancy firm sought to answer the ques-
tion whether or not the Dutch self-employment deduction scheme is in accord-
ance with EU law. According to this arrangement, a Dutch resident has a right to 
deduct if he works more than 1,225 hours in his Dutch and/or foreign company. 
A foreign taxpayer is only entitled to deduction after working at least 1,225 
hours in the Netherlands. A case was brought in the name of one of the clients of 
the accountancy firm who operates a company in both Germany and the Nether-
lands and who has worked in Germany for more than 1,225 hours, but not in the 
Netherlands. The Court is asked to examine the scheme in light of the freedom 
to provide services and considers that it indeed discriminates based on residence. 
Domestic and foreign self-employed persons are in an objectively similar situa-
tion, which does not justify the difference in treatment. 
 
Student Finance 
 
C-158/07, Judgment of 18/11/2008, OJ C 6/4 
A German national studying in the Netherlands appealed a decision by the 
Dutch ‘IBG’ (the administrative body charged with the enforcement of Nether-
lands legislation relating to the financing of studies) to annul her maintenance 
grant and a request to repay excess sums. The IBG considered that she was not 
complying with requirements for legal stay and integration in the Netherlands, 
which were a prerequisite for the maintenance grant. The ECJ finds that since 
the granting of student grants to students from other Member States should not 
become an unreasonable burden, Member States may require that the students in 
question have shown a degree of integration. The Court finds that a term of resi-
dence is an appropriate, and not excessive, means to ensure that the student in 
question is integrated into the host country.  
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Subsidiary Protection 
 
C-465/07, Judgment of 17/02/2009, OJ C 90/4 
Two Iraqi nationals were denied an asylum claim to a temporary residence per-
mit based on the dangers they faced from indiscriminate violence in Iraq. The 
reference of their case to the ECJ (which was subsequently supported by a small 
group of cause lawyers and academics) sought an interpretation of the new EU 
Qualification Directive on asylum, stipulating the qualification for subsidiary 
protection. The ECJ was asked to answer the question whether, the Directive 
offered supplementary or other protection, potentially broadening the scope of 
the protection that asylum seekers enjoy under EU law, and therefore providing 
an interesting target for champions of the rights of asylum seekers. The ECJ 
concludes that the Directive does not require the applicant to be specifically 
targeted and that the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically 
affected, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be 
eligible for subsidiary protection. 
 
Suckler Cow Premiums 
 
C-446/06, Judgment of 28/02/2008, OJ C 107/5 
Case of a Dutch farmer who challenges the cuts in premiums he received for his 
suckle cows. His case evolves into a question of whether or not Member States 
may place conditions on the right to EU premiums based on usual animal hus-
bandry practice. While the European Commission argues against it, the Court 
finds that the term ‘suckler cow’ is not defined accurately enough in the imple-
menting regulation. Therefore, Member States are free to determine conditions 
based on common animal husbandry practices within their territory.  
 
Tethered or Chained? 
 
C-187/07, Judgment of 03/04/2008, OJ C 128/14 
A Dutch farmer who houses his calves in individual half-open boxes while tying 
them with a rope of around three metres, challenges a fine he received based on 
tying the young calves in place in violation of rules laid down in the EU Di-
rective on minimum standards for the protection of calves. He argues that the 
calves are not bound within the meaning of the Directive. The Court looked to 
the general and common meaning of the word ‘tethered’ and the different lan-
guage versions of the Directive. The Court found that a calf was bound in the 
sense of the Directive when held in place with a tethering device, regardless of 
the nature and length thereof and regardless of the reason for tying. 
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APPENDIX B: References According to Member State 
Member State Total Number 
of Preliminary 
References 
since 1961 
Ranking  
according to 
Total Number 
of References 
Number of 
References 
between 
2008-2012 
Ranking in  
period 2008-
2012 
     
Austria 490 7 39 11 
Belgium1 820 5 156 3 
Bulgaria 101 17 54 8 
Croatia 8 26 0 27 
Cyprus 7 27 0 27 
Czech Republic 53 21 21 18 
Denmark 184 9 33 15 
Estonia 18 24 10 24 
Finland 102 16 25 17 
France 954 4 119 5 
Germany 2300 1 352 1 
Greece 178 10 36 14 
Hungary 136 12 53 9 
Ireland 91 18 18 19 
Italy 1388 2 226 2 
Latvia 55 20 11 22 
Lithuania 45 22 11 22 
Luxembourg 91 19 18 19 
Malta 3 28 1 26 
Netherlands 975 3 1482 4 
Poland 108 15 39 11 
Portugal 153 11 39 11 
Romania 123 14 45 10 
Slovakia 38 23 18 19 
Slovenia 17 25 4 25 
Spain 437 8 93 7 
Sweden 126 13 30 16 
United Kingdom 612 6 113 6 
     
Total 9613  1712  
Data collected from the ECJ’s yearly statistics, available at: https://curia.eu. 
                                                        
1  Member States in bold are the original Members of the European Communities. 
2  These are the total of new references lodged at the ECJ in the selected five-year period. 
Hence, the different number from that of the selection for this research that included the 
cases dealt with by the Court in the same period. 
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Summary 
Introduction 
This book is the result of empirical socio-legal research on the practise of the 
preliminary reference procedure of the EU legal system. Under Article 267 
TFEU a national judge may request the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to pro-
vide an interpretation of a provision of EU law, enabling national courts to ques-
tion the ECJ on the interpretation or validity of European law. Such questions of 
EU law will arise in national court cases before the courts of different Member 
States. The preliminary reference procedure is used when a national court or 
tribunal refers a question of EU law to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling so as to 
enable the national court, on receiving that ruling, to decide the case before it. 
The reference for a preliminary ruling offers a means to guarantee legal certainty 
by uniform application of EU law.  
Each year the ECJ delivers over a thousand decisions on the basis of EU law 
that affect the Members States as well as the lives of their citizens. These citi-
zens now are no longer citizens only of their respectful countries but they are 
also European Union citizens. This status is reflected in the way the EU law is 
formulated. The ‘language of rights’ or ‘rights based regime’ – the notion that 
the EU legal system functions predominantly by formulating (enforceable) 
rights – stood at the basis of much change within Europe through the jurispru-
dence of the ECJ and the efforts of the European Commission in holding Mem-
ber States accountable for their failure to comply with the seemingly ever-
expanding body of EU law. The authority of the ECJ to interpret EU legislation 
combined with a growing focus on individual rights seems to signal a shift to-
wards greater empowerment of the individual within the European legal system. 
In the famous words of Federico Mancini – one of the most influential ECJ 
judges in the history of the institution – “[taking] law out of the hands of bu-
reaucrats and politicians and [giving] it to the people”.1 
Critically examining such narratives surrounding the use the preliminary 
reference procedure as a tool for empowerment and strategic litigation the cen-
tral research question that guides this study is: To what extent can EU law in 
general and specifically the preliminary reference procedure be considered an 
opportunity for empowerment and who is (most) likely to use it? In order to 
provide an answer to this central research question, different parts of this study 
aim to answer the following sub questions: Who goes to court in Europe, and 
why? Who is (most) likely to make use of the opportunities in EU law and which 
                                                        
1  Mancini & Keeling 1994, 183.  
SUMMARY 
 
320 
legal strategies are effective? To what extent can Euro-litigation be considered 
empowering to individual litigants?  
Theoretical Context 
While the narratives surrounding EU law and the ECJ seem to suggest other-
wise, the Court was not the focus of much research in the early years of its exis-
tence. Up until the 1980s predominantly legal scholars, who approached the 
Court in formalistic terms, dealt with the Court. Then, authors like Stein and 
Weiler opened up the idea of the Court as a political actor, sparking debate 
about its legitimacy.2 Subsequently, scholars in political science with a ‘law in 
context’ approach finally caught on to the transformative role the Court and 
European law actually played in the integration of Europe. Now, decades later, 
and after a wave of research into the connection between law and integration in 
Europe, the dominant narrative in EU integration studies suggests that legal 
integration, or ‘integration-through-law’ was the result of three constitutive 
elements: the first, the point of departure, were the ‘constitutional’ doctrines of 
the European legal system that were created by the Court in a series of transfor-
mational judgments. The second element includes on the one hand, the mobili-
zation EU law by multinational companies, transnational interest groups as well 
as EU institutions, seizing the newly formed institutional opportunities, and on 
the other hand, the national courts’ progressive – yet turbulent – acceptance of 
the general principles established by the Court. The final element of this theory 
saw the activation by private and national actors of the preliminary reference 
procedure in turn offering new opportunities for the Court to assert and extend 
the scope of its case law (discrimination, environment, fundamental rights, etc.). 
The resulting dynamic, according to this theory of integration, created a self-
reinforcing mechanism that caught interest groups, multinationals, EU institu-
tions, Member States and the ECJ in a circle of Europeanization, a system that 
has not been designed by any specific actor, but to which everybody contributes 
in its own way.  
It has generally been understood that litigation, a court’s resolution of socie-
tal questions or disputes, can lead to the clarification and expansion of existing 
laws and to the construction of new rules.3 The semi-constitutional character of 
EU law and the fact that ECJ judgments are binding throughout the European 
Union has made the Court in Luxembourg the subject of both legal and political 
analysis. The ECJ is now widely considered to be responsible to a great extent 
                                                        
2  Stein 1981; Weiler 1991. 
3  Shapiro 1981. 
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for the unprecedented European integration – first and foremost of its legal sys-
tem but by extension of political and social spheres as well. These developments 
have changed the relationship between citizen and authority, making citizens 
subject to new international norms. In this respect the preliminary reference 
procedure is rightfully heralded as the backbone of the European legal system. 
Historically, the most far-reaching judgments by the ECJ have resulted from 
preliminary references, and in various cases they were the result of active litigat-
ing efforts by the parties involved. 
Although the ECJ’s case law, and therefore litigation through the prelimi-
nary reference procedure, is recognised as an essential element in the process of 
European integration, the litigation process in itself has remained a rather unex-
plored topic. A large body of research into the integration of Europe has given 
special weight to the role of private litigation in activating the preliminary refer-
ence system and by extension fostering integration dynamics in Europe. Private 
parties are recognized to play an integral part in this equation, in that they are 
the ones expected to activate this system by engaging in the procedure. How-
ever, while there is strong consensus about the pivotal role the procedure has 
had in the transformation of Europe, there remains significant ambiguity on why 
the system is used, and who is primarily responsible for its success. While pri-
vate litigants are seen as central actors in the integration dynamics there is still 
little insight into who goes to Court in Europe, and why. As such, so-called 
‘Euro-litigation’ remains somewhat of a black box.  
Approach and Methodology 
The objective of this study is to provide in-depth case analyses in a field that has 
long been dominated by macro perspectives and large-n databases. Pointing to 
the many black boxes and assumptions that can be found in much of the existing 
scholarship, this thesis utilizes a bottom-up approach to cases that reach the ECJ 
through preliminary references. Rather than considering the rationales behind 
these cases ex post facto – attributing EU law interests and motives to the plain-
tiffs with the benefit of hindsight – this study suggests a new perspective: one 
that looks at the cases from the perspective of the litigants and the legal actors 
themselves, following them from the generation of the litigation up to the trial at 
the Court, and back again to the legal, social and political consequences on the 
ground. To this end, this study employs a qualitative sociology and ‘thick de-
scription’ methodology and deals with a limited corpus of cases, taking a local 
viewpoint to consider how in practice individuals, local interests, NGOs, legal 
expertise and judicial politics articulate concretely.  
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The study employs a bottom-up perspective, employing semi-structured in-
terviews, forty-five in total, with actors that were in one way or another involved 
in litigation through preliminary references. Taking all judgments of the Court in 
the period 2008-2012 in preliminary reference cases from Dutch courts, a selec-
tion was made of all cases that included at least one ‘individual’ litigant. Out of 
100 references a total of 38 met this criterion. In 25 of these cases at least one 
participant was traced, often this was the lawyer, but also the litigants them-
selves and in some cases third parties like Unions, NGOs or academics that were 
involved in the proceedings. Additionally, academic experts, a staff member of 
the European Commission’s legal department, a former agent of the Netherlands 
before the Court, and additional counsellors with experience with preliminary 
references were interviewed.  
Main Empirical Findings 
Part II (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) presents the results of the empirical analysis, guided 
by the question: who goes to court in Europe, and why? Chapter 4 deals with the 
assumptions of rational action and interest in previous studies on Euro-litigation, 
gives a tentative typology of individual litigants in the Dutch context and analy-
ses the various ways in which national court cases reach the ECJ. Focusing on 
the perspective of the litigants this chapter reveals the diverse nature and origins 
of references to the ECJ, ranging from migration related cases to tax law and 
agricultural subsidies, all with their own specific contexts. When looking at the 
motives behind litigation there is a general distinction to be made in how ac-
tively involved these litigants actually are. Therefore, a distinction can be made 
between active, passive and completely absent litigants. A striking conclusion is 
that active litigants are only a small minority. There are only a few stories of 
actually active litigants that aim for and are personally involved in proceedings 
before the ECJ. These litigants share a common character trait, which is one of 
resilience. When considering that references to the Court extend regular pro-
ceedings by two years on average (taking into account that this is only the period 
in between national proceedings), these cases sometimes take up to eleven years 
to conclude. In that respect, Chapter 4 sheds light not only on the opportunities 
in EU law, but also the possible cost of a reference. Especially considering some 
of these cases involve people who have lost their right of residence or who are in 
conflict with their employer, such lengthy proceedings can be very detrimental. 
Chapter 5 subsequently focuses further on how individual cases may be 
proxies for greater interests, either by organised collectives or due to the trans-
formative effects of a reference to the ECJ. It deals with how lawyers aim to 
have cases referred to the ECJ as well as the tensions that arise between litigants 
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and lawyers aiming to serve more collective interests. In such cases the actual 
litigant is often more passive or even completely absent. These are cases with 
other interested parties that either litigate a certain question in the form of an 
orchestrated test case, or cases where the lawyers are the ones who keep a case 
going because of more collective interests that may be served with an ECJ 
judgment. In a sense, every reference to the Court is a test case, regarding a 
particular question of EU law. For the outside observer, the important question 
then is who is the one actually asking. Chapter 6 therefore focuses on the per-
spective of the lawyers involved in these references and directs our attention to 
the practical aspects of ‘lawyering a reference’ and focuses on the ways in 
which legal practitioners deal with the challenges in exercising their professional 
duties when confronted with a reference to the ECJ. Although the theory of 
integration-through-law stresses the ‘use’ of the system by self-interested actors, 
which makes it sound like references to the court always involve self-interested 
strategic actors, it is important to note that references are not always part of a 
strategy, nor always a very welcome development.  
Here again, there is an important distinction between proactive and reactive 
litigation. In at least half of the cases studied, there was on the part of the parties 
(both litigant and lawyer) no active effort to push for a reference at all. What this 
means is that these parties, and therefore also their lawyers are not prepared for 
a reference, nor is their case built for it. This has important repercussions for the 
way lawyers have to go about working on a case. Lawyers in these cases are not 
prepared for nor do they generally possess the expertise or experience to work a 
case at the level of the ECJ. Due to the spurious nature of references it is usually 
a once in a lifetime experience for lawyers, therefore, there is hardly any way 
they could build up any experience. This has implications for the amount of time 
lawyers have to put into a case, often against no additional remuneration, if they 
are even willing to put in the extra effort and not simply wait for the answers by 
the Court. In the case of a reference the expenses involved have (usually) not 
been factored in. Thus, there is always the question of whether lawyers can ac-
tually get the extra hours remunerated. In some cases, because lawyers recognise 
the significance of creating ECJ jurisprudence they themselves pick up the bill 
where their client is unable to do so. However, even when working a case, law-
yers often run into trouble because due to the referral to a Court with which they 
are unfamiliar, they have to argue the matter within the framework of a different 
legal sphere, in a different language so to speak, that of European law and ECJ 
jurisprudence. Depending on the complexity of the questions referred to the 
Court this is something outside of their daily expertise, which is why many of 
them turn to experts, usually in the form of EU law scholars, to help them work 
their case before the ECJ. These findings reveal that ‘using’ EU law and litigat-
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ing before the ECJ is something that does not come naturally for many practitio-
ners. 
While Chapter 4 tempers the tendency in research to ascribe to litigants mo-
tivations and intentions absent in fact, Chapter 5 on the other hand, has revealed 
that preliminary references may conceal more test cases, cause lawyering and 
overall strategic legal action than may be deduced from a glance at the legal 
documentation. In contrast to the unexpected referrals, there are cases in which a 
referral was deemed an option, was somewhat expected, or was actually pushed 
for by the litigants, their lawyer and possibly supporting third parties. Such cases 
include lawyers deliberately using EU law arguments and sometimes pressing 
the national court to refer the case to the Court. A small number of lawyers that 
were interviewed actively aim to use the preliminary reference procedure as a 
means to an end, especially in areas where collective interests may be served. 
The willingness of the national judge to refer forms an important obstacle to 
those aiming for a preliminary reference. In order to implore the national judge 
to refer a certain question, lawyers have to convince him or her of the salience of 
the question. The interviews with lawyers that aim to bring certain matters be-
fore the ECJ give insight into how ‘the art of’ soliciting a reference works in 
practice. It shows how practitioners go about pushing judges towards the deci-
sion to refer a case, especially by repeatedly bringing certain EU law arguments 
before national courts, stressing the need for resolution of questions of EU law 
through a reference to the ECJ. 
Continuing on the theme of strategic actors within the EU legal system Part 
III (Chapters 7 and 8) aims to answer the question of the strategic employment 
of EU law, and dissects who is (most) likely and able to use the preliminary 
reference procedure as a means to an end. Chapter 7 reveals that for the selected 
period especially in migration-related cases, which take up a quarter of all cases 
in the selection for this study, there is significantly more strategic employment 
of EU law. In these cases we see lawyers teaming up with academics and or-
ganisations like the Dutch Refugee Council to attack certain Dutch policies us-
ing EU legislation. The predominance of migration related cases can in part be 
explained by the large amount of new EU legislation in this area over the last 15 
years, in combination with a changing political climate in Dutch politics result-
ing in more stern migration policies. But also by the efforts of some strategic 
actors, who has played an important role in not only assisting lawyers when they 
asked for help, but also in contacting lawyers in references cases themselves, 
offering assistance as well as teaming up with interest organisations in order to 
litigate certain matters before the ECJ. An important note here is that even in the 
most strategic cases, or cases of so-called ‘pressure trough law’, the use of law 
for political ends, a reference to the Court is not always the preferred outcome, 
because of the extended length of the procedure and the extra work involved. 
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Chapter 8 focuses on the role played by two other key players on the field of 
the so-called ‘Eurolaw game’ – the European Commission and the Member 
States. Because due to a reference to the ECJ a national court case breaks out of 
the confines of the domestic legal system, the stakes are raised for both Euro-
pean Commission, in providing them the opportunity to challenge Member 
States for their breach of EU law, as well as for those Member States, who are 
then forced to defend themselves in another arena, with other opposition. In 
response, the actors can be seen to act strategically around preliminary refer-
ences, and the final empirical chapter therefore analyses the relative position of 
these ‘repeat players’ with regards to litigants and their counsel. Zooming in on 
particular cases and the tactics that were used behind the scenes revealed how 
both the European Commission and the Member States are in a particularly 
advantageous position that allows them to play the Eurolaw game skilfully. 
Litigating parties, with rare exceptions, as a result are in a clearly disadvantaged 
position when litigating before the ECJ. Since the vast majority of cases involv-
ing individual litigants directly or more indirectly concern questions of compati-
bility of national laws or policy with certain EU legislation, litigants often find 
themselves up against well-organised and experienced litigators defending the 
interests of the state and the integrity of national policy. Conversely, the Euro-
pean Commission may be a welcome ally in a litigant’s quest for justice or for 
strategic players attacking national policy. The Commission, tasked with safe-
guarding the effective implementation of EU rules and rights, can often be found 
arguing on the side of the litigants whenever a reference concerns the compati-
bility of national legislation with EU law. Examples provided in this chapter 
revealed that the Commission on occasion goes beyond mere advocacy in the 
courtroom in attempts to utilise preliminary references as part of its political 
strategy and efforts to enforce compliance. The advantage litigants may gain 
from allying with the Commission is, however, fully dependent upon the align-
ment of their interests with the goals and priorities of the Commission. The 
analysis in this chapter underscores how these privileged players are able to 
influence the Court’s case law both in court as well as in ways that are not di-
rectly visible to the outside observer. The resulting picture of the Eurolaw game 
is, therefore, one that is played on a non-level playing field. 
Main Conclusions 
Firstly, this study exposes that many preliminary references involve legal ques-
tions that are not at all remarkable examples of European integration. EU law 
has been integrating into national legal systems for a long time now, and in 
some areas this means that the questions reaching the Court are of a strikingly 
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mundane nature, having little to do with individual rights, let alone furthering 
integration. This means that when we try to analyse the work of the Court and 
remain at a distance, as much of the political science approaches to Euro-
litigation do, we catch everything at once, and interests are assumed ex post 
facto. This explains at least in part why such approaches reach such different 
and often contradicting conclusions. In that sense, this study can be read as a 
plea for changing the focus to more in-depth inquiry. 
Another important question this study tried to answer is who is most likely 
to make effective use of the opportunities provided by the EU legal system. To 
that end it has mapped the divergent interests and different levels of agency that 
different actors have in this opportunity structure. From the general lack of ex-
pertise among practitioners we have to conclude that ‘using’ EU law in a strate-
gic way is, even apart from more structural barriers like the cost of preparing 
more complex cases, reserved for a minority of legal professionals. Since the 
road to the Court is far from a highway, meaning there is little opportunity to 
petition the court directly, it often takes a combination of litigants, lawyers, 
experts, resources and organisation to activate the court in a strategically effec-
tive way.  
Finally, the effective functioning of the EU is greatly dependent on the func-
tioning of the legal system, and therefore on the dialogue between the national 
courts and the ECJ. This research shows that counting on private parties to play 
the role of EU law enforcer is a very optimistic assumption about people’s abili-
ties to actually do so. And the fact that this mechanism is riddled with difficul-
ties and barriers leads to some matters never being brought before a national 
court, never referred to the ECJ and therefore some questions never being ad-
dressed by the Court, potentially resulting in lopsided EU law enforcement. 
Overall, the conceptual framework and empirical strategy of this study pro-
duces important results. Most of all, it reveals what the odds are for a ‘social 
complaint’ to end up being framed as an EU law issue. Pointing to the many 
difficulties and costs involved when one gets involved in a preliminary refer-
ence, the book describes the complex and contingent ‘cocktail’ of individual 
entrepreneurship of the plaintiff, personal commitment of his or her lawyer as 
well as support from of a variety of collectives (unions, association of landown-
ers, special interest groups) capable of financing the costs of the trial. The re-
search demonstrates how the generation of an ‘EU law case’ actually takes 
shape. While it has long been overshadowed in the literature, this study exempli-
fies the critical role of lawyers and legal resources in this process. Given the 
extra time and extra cost involved for both lawyers and plaintiffs, it comes as no 
surprise that both NGOs and EU law scholars play a critical part in keeping EU 
litigation alive, remaining alert (and actively alerting others) when new opportu-
nities arise. On the whole, this study provides a new narrative on the EU legal 
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system that inserts living, acting people into what has up until now been a dis-
embodied narrative of ‘actors’ pursuing abstract goals and institutional interests; 
a narrative that provides a more sophisticated and realistic view of Euro-litiga-
tion than the ‘empowerment’ and ‘people’s court’ narratives that have domi-
nated for the past two decades. 
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Samenvatting 
Inleiding 
Dit boek is het resultaat van een empirisch rechtssociologisch onderzoek naar de 
praktijk van de prejudiciële verwijzingsprocedure van het rechtssysteem van de 
EU. Deze procedure stelt nationale rechters in staat om het Europese Hof van 
Justitie (EHvJ) vragen te stellen over de interpretatie of geldigheid van Europese 
wetgeving. Op grond van artikel 267 VWEU kan een nationale rechter het EHvJ 
verzoeken om uitlegging van een bepaling van Unierecht. De prejudiciële ver-
wijzingsprocedure wordt gebruikt wanneer een nationale gerechtelijke instantie 
een kwestie van EU-recht voorlegt aan het Hof, zodat de nationale rechter met 
inachtneming van de door het Hof gegeven uitleg van het Unierecht uitspraak 
kan doen over de bij hem aanhangige zaak. De prejudiciële procedure biedt een 
middel om de rechtszekerheid te waarborgen door een uniforme toepassing van 
het Unierecht in de verschillende lidstaten van de EU. 
Elk jaar doet het EHvJ meer dan duizend uitspraken op basis van EU-
wetgeving die zowel de lidstaten als het leven van hun burgers raken. Deze bur-
gers zijn niet langer alleen burgers van hun eigen landen, maar zij zijn ook bur-
gers van de Europese Unie. Deze status komt tot uiting in de manier waarop de 
EU-wetgeving is geformuleerd. De language of rights of het rights based regime 
– het idee dat het rechtssysteem van de EU overwegend functioneert door het 
formuleren van (afdwingbare) rechten – vormde de basis voor veel veranderin-
gen binnen Europa door de jurisprudentie van het EHvJ alsmede de inspannin-
gen van de Europese Commissie om de lidstaten aansprakelijk te stellen voor 
niet naleving van het almaar groeiende corpus aan EU-wetgeving. De autoriteit 
van het EHvJ om EU-wetgeving te interpreteren in combinatie met een groeien-
de aandacht voor individuele rechten lijkt een uiting te zijn van een verschuiving 
naar meer empowerment van het individu binnen het Europese rechtsstelsel. In 
de woorden van Federico Mancini – een van de meest invloedrijke rechters van 
het Hof in de geschiedenis van de instelling – “[taking] law out of the hands of 
bureaucrats and politicians and [giving] it to the people”.1 
Met een kritische benadering van dergelijke narratieven rond het gebruik 
van de prejudiciële procedure als een instrument voor empowerment en strate-
gisch procederen, is de centrale onderzoeksvraag van dit onderzoek als volgt 
geformuleerd: In hoeverre kan het EU-recht in het algemeen en de prejudiciële 
verwijzingsprocedure in het bijzonder worden beschouwd als een mogelijkheid 
tot empowerment en wie maakt er gebruik van? Om een antwoord te bieden op 
                                                        
1  Mancini & Keeling 1994, 183.  
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deze centrale onderzoeksvraag, zijn de verschillende delen van dit onderzoek 
gericht op het beantwoorden van de volgende sub vragen: Wie gaat naar het 
EHvJ en waarom? Wie maakt gebruik van de kansen in het EU-recht en welke 
juridische strategieën zijn effectief? In hoeverre kan Euro-litigation worden be-
schouwd als empowering voor individuele partijen?  
Theoretische Context 
Hoewel het discours over het EU-recht en het EHvJ anders suggereren, was het 
Hof in de eerste jaren van zijn bestaan niet de focus van veel onderzoek. Tot de 
jaren tachtig waren het voornamelijk juridische academici die het Hof onder-
zochten, veelal vanuit formalistisch oogpunt. Auteurs als Stein en Weiler wier-
pen vervolgens het idee op van het Hof als een politieke actor, wat discussie 
uitlokte over de legitimiteit van de instelling.2 In navolging hiervan wekte het 
Hof de interesse van academici in de politieke wetenschappen met een law in 
context-benadering door de transformerende rol die het Hof en de Europese 
wetgeving speelden bij de integratie van Europa. Nu, decennia later, en na een 
golf van onderzoek naar de samenhang tussen recht en integratie in Europa, 
suggereert het dominante verhaal in EU-integratie onderzoek dat juridische inte-
gratie, oftewel integration-through-law, het resultaat was van drie constitutieve 
elementen: de eerste, het uitgangspunt, waren de ‘constitutionele’ doctrines van 
het Europese rechtssysteem die door het Hof in een reeks van transformatieve 
uitspraken werden gecreëerd. Het tweede element omvat enerzijds het mobilise-
ren van EU-wetgeving door multinationals, transnationale belangengroeperingen 
en EU-instellingen, het aangrijpen van de nieuw gevormde institutionele kansen, 
en anderzijds de progressieve – maar turbulente – aanvaarding door de nationale 
rechtbanken van de algemene beginselen die het Hof heeft vastgesteld. Het laat-
ste element van deze theorie was de activering door particuliere en nationale 
actoren van de prejudiciële procedure, die op zijn beurt nieuwe kansen biedt 
voor het Hof om de reikwijdte van zijn jurisprudentie (discriminatie, milieu, 
fundamentele rechten, enz.) te handhaven en uit te breiden. De resulterende 
dynamiek, aldus de theorie, creëerde een zelfversterkend mechanisme dat belan-
gengroepen, multinationals, EU-instellingen, lidstaten en het EHvJ in een vici-
euze cirkel van Europeanisering gevangen heeft, een systeem dat niet is ontwor-
pen door een specifieke actor, maar waaraan iedereen op zijn eigen manier aan 
bijdraagt. 
Het is algemeen onderkent dat rechtspraak, de beslechting van maatschappe-
lijke vragen of geschillen door een rechtbank, kunnen leiden tot verduidelijking 
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en uitbreiding van bestaande wetten en tot het opstellen van nieuwe regels.3 Het 
semi-constitutionele karakter van het EU-recht en het feit dat uitspraken van het 
EHvJ bindend zijn in de hele Europese Unie heeft het Hof in Luxemburg het 
onderwerp van zowel juridische als politieke analyse gemaakt. Het EHvJ wordt 
nu algemeen beschouwd als verantwoordelijk voor een groot deel van de onge-
kende Europese integratie – in de allereerste plaats van het rechtssysteem, maar 
in het verlengde daarvan ook van politieke en sociale dimensies. Deze ontwikke-
lingen hebben de relatie tussen burger en autoriteit veranderd, waarbij burgers 
zijn onderworpen aan nieuwe internationale normen. In dit opzicht wordt de pre-
judiciële procedure met recht gezien als de ruggengraat van het Europese rechts-
stelsel. Historisch gezien zijn de meest ingrijpende uitspraken van het EHvJ het 
resultaat van prejudiciële verwijzingen en in verschillende gevallen waren deze 
het resultaat van de actieve rechtsinspanningen van de betrokken partijen. 
Hoewel de jurisprudentie van het EHvJ, en dus de geschillen via de prejudi-
ciële verwijzingsprocedure, wordt erkend als een essentieel element in het pro-
ces van Europese integratie, is het proces van rechtspleging op zich een vrijwel 
onontgonnen onderwerp gebleven. Een groot aantal onderzoeken naar de inte-
gratie van Europa heeft bijzondere aandacht geschonken aan de rol van private 
procesvoering bij het activeren van het prejudiciële verwijzingssysteem en bij 
uitbreiding van de integratiedynamiek in Europa. Van private partijen wordt 
erkend dat zij een integrale rol spelen in deze, omdat zij degenen zijn die dit sys-
teem in gang zetten doormiddel van activering van de prejudiciële procedure. 
Hoewel er consensus bestaat over de cruciale rol die de procedure heeft gespeeld 
bij de transformatie van Europa, blijft er veel onduidelijkheid bestaan over de 
reden waarom het systeem wordt gebruikt, en wie primair verantwoordelijk is 
voor het succes ervan. Terwijl private procederende partijen worden gezien als 
centrale spelers in deze integratiedynamiek, is er nog altijd weinig inzicht in wie 
naar de rechter in Europa gaat en waarom. Als zodanig blijft Euro-litigation een 
zogenoemde black box. 
Aanpak en Methodologie 
Het doel van deze studie is om in-depth analyse te leveren op een gebied dat 
lang gedomineerd wordt door macro-perspectieven en econometrische metho-
den. Verwijzend naar de vele blinde vlekken en aannames die te vinden zijn in 
een groot deel van de bestaande literatuur, maakt dit onderzoek gebruik van een 
bottom-up benadering van zaken die het EHvJ bereiken door middel van preju-
diciële verwijzingen. In plaats van de motieven achter deze zaken achteraf te 
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bekijken en EU-rechtsbelangen en motieven toe te kennen aan de procespartijen, 
suggereert deze studie een nieuw perspectief: een perspectief dat de zaken be-
kijkt vanuit het perspectief van de procespartijen en de juridische actoren zelf, 
hen volgend van het ontstaan van het geschil tot het proces voor het Hof, en 
weer terug naar de juridische, sociale en politieke gevolgen op het lokale niveau. 
Daartoe maakt deze studie gebruik van een kwalitatieve sociologische en thick 
description-methodologie en behandelt een beperkt aantal zaken, waarbij een 
lokaal standpunt wordt ingenomen om na te gaan hoe in de praktijk individuen, 
lokale belangen, ngo’s, juridische experts en juridische politiek concreet tot 
uiting komen. 
Het onderzoek maakt gebruik van een bottom-up perspectief, waarbij semi-
gestructureerde interviews, vijfenveertig in totaal, werden afgenomen met acto-
ren die op een of andere manier betrokken waren bij zaken met een prejudiciële 
verwijzing. Met als uitgangspunt alle uitspraken van het EHvJ in de periode 
2008-2012 in prejudiciële verwijzingszaken door Nederlandse gerechten, is een 
selectie gemaakt van alle zaken waarbij ten minste één ‘individuele’ procespartij 
betrokken was. Van de in totaal 100 verwijzingszaken voldeden veertig aan dit 
criterium. In zesentwintig van deze zaken werd ten minste één betrokkene getra-
ceerd, vaak was dit de advocaat, maar ook de procederende partijen zelf en in 
sommige gevallen derden zoals vakbonden, ngo’s of academici die bij de proce-
dure betrokken waren. Daarnaast zijn interviews afgenomen met academische 
experts, een medewerker van de juridische afdeling van de Europese Commis-
sie, een voormalig agent van Nederland voor het Hof, en andere advocaten met 
ervaring met prejudiciële verwijzingen. 
Belangrijkste Empirische Bevindingen 
Deel II (hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6) presenteert de resultaten van de empirische ana-
lyse, geleid door de vraag: wie gaat naar het EHvJ en waarom? Hoofdstuk 4 gaat 
in op de veronderstellingen van rationele actie en belangen in eerdere studies 
over Euro-litigation, geeft een tentatieve typologie van individuele procespartij-
en in de Nederlandse context en analyseert de verschillende manieren waarop 
nationale rechtszaken het EHvJ bereiken. Gericht op het perspectief van de par-
tijen onthult dit hoofdstuk de uiteenlopende aard en oorsprong van verwijzingen 
naar het Hof, variërend van zaken met betrekking tot migratie, belastingwetge-
ving en landbouwsubsidies, allemaal met hun eigen specifieke context. Bij het 
bekijken van de motieven achter rechtszaken is er een algemeen onderscheid te 
maken in hoe actief de betrokken procespartijen zijn. Er kan een onderscheid 
worden gemaakt tussen actieve, passieve en volledig afwezige partijen. Een op-
vallende conclusie is dat actieve partijen slechts een kleine minderheid vormen. 
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Er zijn slechts een aantal verhalen van feitelijk actieve procespartijen die streven 
naar, en persoonlijk betrokken zijn bij, procedures voor het EHvJ. Deze proce-
derende partijen delen een gemeenschappelijke karaktereigenschap, een van 
volharding. Omdat verwijzingen naar het Hof een procedure gemiddeld met 
twee jaar verlengen (rekening houdend met het feit dat dit slechts de periode is 
tussen nationale procedures in), duurt het soms tot elf jaar voordat deze zaken 
zijn afgerond. In dat opzicht belicht hoofdstuk 4 niet alleen de kansen in de EU-
wetgeving, maar ook de mogelijke kosten van een verwijzing voor procespartij-
en. Zeker gezien het feit dat sommige van deze zaken betrekking hebben op 
mensen die hun recht op verblijf hebben verloren of die in conflict zijn met hun 
werkgever, kan een dergelijke langdurige procedure zeer nadelig zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat vervolgens verder in op hoe individuele gevallen een 
proxy kunnen zijn voor grotere belangen, hetzij door georganiseerde collectie-
ven, hetzij door de transformerende effecten van een verwijzing naar het EHvJ. 
Hier wordt ingegaan op hoe advocaten ernaar streven om zaken naar het Hof 
verwezen te krijgen, evenals de spanningen die ontstaan tussen rechtzoekenden 
en advocaten met het doel meer collectieve belangen te dienen. In dergelijke 
gevallen is de feitelijke procespartij doorgaans meer passief of zelfs volledig 
afwezig. Dit zijn zaken met andere geïnteresseerde partijen die ofwel een speci-
fieke juridische vraag beantwoord willen krijgen door middel van een georke-
streerde testcase, ofwel gevallen waarin de advocaten degenen zijn die een zaak 
voortzetten vanwege meer collectieve belangen die kunnen worden behartigd 
met een uitspraak van het EHvJ. In zekere zin is elke verwijzing naar het Hof 
een testcase, met betrekking tot een specifiek EU-rechtsvraagstuk. Voor de ex-
terne waarnemer is de belangrijke vraag vervolgens wie de vraag feitelijk stelt. 
Hoofdstuk 6 richt zich daarom op het perspectief van de advocaten die bij deze 
verwijzingen betrokken zijn en richt onze aandacht op de praktische aspecten 
van de prejudiciële procedure en de manieren waarop advocaten en adviseurs 
omgaan met de uitdagingen die zich aandienen wanneer ze onverwacht worden 
geconfronteerd met een verwijzing naar het Hof. Hoewel de theorie van integra-
tion-through-law het ‘gebruik’ van het systeem door actoren die handelen vanuit 
eigen belang benadrukt – wat de suggestie wekt dat verwijzingen naar het Hof 
altijd over strategische actoren gaan – is het belangrijk op te merken dat referen-
ties niet altijd onderdeel van een strategie, noch altijd een zeer welkome ontwik-
keling zijn. 
Ook onder advocaten is er een belangrijk onderscheid te maken tussen pro-
actief en reactief procederen. In minstens de helft van de bestudeerde gevallen 
was er van de kant van de partijen (zowel procespartij als advocaat) geen actieve 
poging om een verwijzing af te dwingen. Wat dit betekent is dat deze partijen, 
en dus ook hun advocaten niet voorbereid zijn op een referentie, noch is hun 
zaak daartoe opgezet. Dit heeft belangrijke gevolgen voor de manier waarop 
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advocaten werken aan een zaak. Advocaten in deze zaken zijn niet voorbereid 
op en beschikken over het algemeen niet over de expertise of ervaring om een 
zaak op het niveau van het EHvJ van te verdedigen. Vanwege de onvoorspelbare 
aard van prejudiciële verwijzingen is het doorgaans een once in a lifetime erva-
ring voor advocaten, daarom is er nauwelijks mogelijkheid om relevante erva-
ring op te bouwen. Dit heeft gevolgen voor de hoeveelheid tijd die advocaten in 
een zaak moeten stoppen, vaak zonder aanvullende vergoeding, als ze al bereid 
zijn om extra inspanningen te leveren en niet simpelweg te wachten op de ant-
woorden van het Hof. In het geval van een verwijzing zijn de bijkomende kosten 
(doorgaans) niet ingecalculeerd. Het is dus altijd de vraag of advocaten de extra 
uren daadwerkelijk vergoed krijgen. In sommige gevallen, omdat advocaten het 
belang erkennen van het creëren van jurisprudentie van het EHvJ, nemen zij zelf 
de kosten voor hun rekening waar hun cliënt daartoe niet in staat is. Ook wan-
neer een zaak actief wordt verdedigd komen advocaten vaak in de problemen 
omdat ze, door de verwijzing naar een rechtbank waarmee ze onbekend zijn, de 
zaak moeten aangaan binnen het kader van een andere juridische sfeer, in een 
andere taal zogezegd; die van Europees recht en de jurisprudentie van het EHvJ. 
Afhankelijk van de complexiteit van de vragen die aan het Hof zijn voorgelegd, 
is dit iets dat buiten hun dagelijkse deskundigheid ligt. Daarom wenden velen 
zich tot deskundigen, meestal in de vorm van academici, om hen te helpen hun 
zaak effectief voor het Hof te bepleiten. Deze bevindingen benadrukken dat het 
‘gebruiken’ van EU-wetgeving en procederen voor het EHvJ iets is dat voor veel 
juristen niet vanzelfsprekend is. 
In tegenstelling tot de onverwachte verwijzingen zijn er echter ook gevallen 
waarin een verwijzing als een mogelijkheid werd beschouwd, enigszins werd 
verwacht of feitelijk werd afgedwongen door de procederende partijen, hun 
advocaat en mogelijk derde partijen. Dergelijke zaken omvatten advocaten die 
doelbewust EU-recht argumenten gebruiken en soms de nationale rechter expli-
ciet verzoeken om de zaak naar het Hof te verwijzen. Een klein aantal van de 
geïnterviewde advocaten streeft ernaar de prejudiciële verwijzingsprocedure te 
gebruiken als middel om een doel te bereiken, vooral op gebieden waar collec-
tieve belangen kunnen worden gediend. De bereidheid van de nationale rechter 
om te verwijzen vormt een belangrijk obstakel voor degenen die op zoek zijn 
naar een prejudiciële verwijzing. Om de nationale rechter te bewegen een be-
paalde vraag te stellen, moeten advocaten hem of haar overtuigen van het belang 
van de vraag. De interviews met advocaten die bepaalde zaken voor het EHvJ 
willen brengen, geven inzicht in hoe ‘de kunst van’ het zoeken naar een verwij-
zing in de praktijk werkt. Het laat zien hoe advocaten de rechters aanzetten een 
zaak te verwijzen, met name door herhaaldelijk bepaalde EU-recht argumenten 
aan te dragen, daarmee benadrukkend dat deze EU-rechtsvragen slechts kunnen 
worden opgelost door een verwijzing naar het EHvJ. 
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Voortbouwend op het thema van strategische actoren binnen het rechtssys-
teem van de EU heeft Deel III (hoofdstukken 7 en 8) tot doel een antwoord te 
geven op de kwestie van de strategische toepassing van het EU-recht, en ont-
leedt de meest waarschijnlijke actoren die gebruik maken van de mogelijkheid 
om de prejudiciële verwijzingsprocedure te gebruiken als een middel om een 
doel te bereiken. Hoofdstuk 7 laat zien dat er voor de geselecteerde periode met 
name in migratie gerelateerde zaken, die een kwart van alle gevallen in de selec-
tie voor deze studie beslaan, sprake is van aanzienlijk meer strategische inzet 
van EU-wetgeving. In deze gevallen zien we advocaten die samenwerken met 
academici en organisaties zoals de Vluchtelingenwerk Nederlands om bepaald 
Nederlandse beleid aan te vallen met behulp van EU-recht. De oververtegen-
woordiging van migratie gerelateerde zaken kan gedeeltelijk worden verklaard 
door de grote hoeveelheid nieuwe EU-wetgeving op dit gebied in de afgelopen 
15 jaar, in combinatie met een veranderend politiek klimaat in de Nederlandse 
politiek, resulterend in een strenger migratiebeleid. Maar ook door de inspan-
ningen van een aantal strategische actoren, die een belangrijke rol hebben ge-
speeld in het niet alleen assisteren van advocaten bij het vragen om hulp, maar 
ook bij het zelf contacteren van advocaten in verwijzingszaken, het aanbieden 
van hulp en het samenwerken met belangenorganisaties om bepaalde zaken voor 
het EHvJ te bepleiten. Een belangrijke opmerking hier is dat zelfs in de meest 
strategische gevallen, of gevallen van zogenaamde pressure through law – het 
gebruik van het recht voor politieke doeleinden – een verwijzing naar het Hof 
niet altijd de gewenste uitkomst is, vanwege de langere duur van de procedure 
en het extra werk dat ermee gemoeid is. 
Hoofdstuk 8 richt zich op de rol die twee andere hoofdrolspelers op het ge-
bied van de zogeheten Eurolaw-game spelen: de Europese Commissie en de 
lidstaten. Omdat door een verwijzing naar het Hof een rechtszaak de grenzen 
van het nationale rechtsstelsel verlaat, neemt het belang van een zaak toe voor 
zowel Europese Commissie, doordat zo’n zaak de mogelijkheid biedt om lidsta-
ten terecht te wijzen voor niet naleving van EU-wetgeving, en voor de lidstaten, 
omdat zij zich vervolgens moeten verdedigen in een andere arena, met nieuwe 
oppositie. Als reactie hierop zien we dan ook strategisch handelen door deze 
actoren rond prejudiciële verwijzingen. Het laatste empirische hoofdstuk analy-
seert de relatieve positie van deze repeat players in relatie tot procederende 
partijen en hun advocaten. Door in te zoomen op specifieke zaken en de tactie-
ken die achter de schermen werden gebruikt, bleek hoezeer zowel de Europese 
Commissie als de lidstaten zich in een bijzonder gunstige positie bevinden, 
waardoor zij de Eurolaw-game tactisch kunnen spelen. Procederende partijen, 
met zeldzame uitzonderingen, verkeren hierdoor in een duidelijk benadeelde 
positie wanneer zij voor het EHvJ procederen. Aangezien de overgrote meerder-
heid van de zaken waarbij individuele partijen rechtstreeks of indirect betrokken 
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zijn betrekking heeft op vraagstukken in verband met de verenigbaarheid van 
nationale wetgeving of beleid met bepaalde EU-wetgeving, bevinden procespar-
tijen zich dikwijls tegenover goed georganiseerde en ervaren procespartijen die 
de belangen van de staat en de integriteit van nationaal beleid verdedigen.  
Daarentegen kan de Europese Commissie een welkome bondgenoot zijn in 
de zoektocht van een partij naar gerechtigheid of voor strategische spelers die 
het nationale beleid aanvallen. De Commissie, die de taak heeft de effectieve 
uitvoering van EU-regels en -rechten te waarborgen, kan vaak aan de zijde van 
de partijen worden gevonden wanneer een verwijzing betrekking heeft op de 
verenigbaarheid van nationale wetgeving met EU-wetgeving. Uit de voorbeel-
den in dit hoofdstuk bleek dat de Commissie van tijd tot tijd verder gaat dan al-
leen maar pleiten in de rechtszaal in pogingen om prejudiciële verwijzingen te 
gebruiken als onderdeel van haar politieke strategie en inspanningen om nale-
ving af te dwingen. Het voordeel dat partijen kunnen behalen door zich bij de 
Commissie aan te sluiten, is echter volledig afhankelijk van de aansluiting van 
hun belangen op de doelstellingen en prioriteiten van de Commissie. De analyse 
in dit hoofdstuk onderstreept hoe zeer deze twee geprivilegieerde spelers de 
jurisprudentie van het Hof zowel in de rechtszaal als ook op manieren die niet 
direct zichtbaar zijn voor de externe waarnemer kunnen beïnvloeden. Geconclu-
deerd moet dan ook worden dat de Eurolaw-game op een ongelijk speelveld 
wordt gespeeld. 
Belangrijkste Conclusies 
Ten eerste laat deze studie zien dat veel van de prejudiciële verwijzingen juridi-
sche vragen betreft die geen opmerkelijke voorbeelden van Europese integratie 
zijn. Op veel gebieden is EU-wetgeving is al lange tijd geïntegreerd in de natio-
nale rechtsstelsels, en in sommige gebieden betekent dit dat de vragen die bij het 
Hof binnenkomen van een opvallend alledaagse aard zijn, die weinig te maken 
hebben met individuele rechten, laat staan de integratie bevorderen. Dit betekent 
dat wanneer we proberen het werk van het Hof te analyseren en op afstand blij-
ven, zoals veel van de politicologische en macro-benaderingen van Euro-litiga-
tion doen, alle mogelijke prejudiciële vragen tezamen worden bekeken en gere-
lateerde belangen ex post facto worden verondersteld. Dit verklaart ten minste 
gedeeltelijk waarom dergelijke benaderingen tot vaak zulke verschillende en 
soms tegenstrijdige conclusies leiden. In die zin kan deze studie worden gelezen 
als een pleidooi voor het veranderen van de focus naar een meer in-depth onder-
zoek. 
Een andere belangrijke vraag die deze studie probeerde te beantwoorden, is 
de vraag wie waarschijnlijk de mogelijkheden van het EU-rechtsstelsel optimaal 
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zal benutten. Daartoe heeft het de uiteenlopende belangen en relatieve agency 
van actoren in kaart gebracht die in deze structuur van mogelijkheden. Uit het 
algemene gebrek aan deskundigheid onder advocaten moeten we concluderen 
dat het ‘gebruik’ van EU-wetgeving op een strategische manier, zelfs afgezien 
van meer structurele belemmeringen zoals de kosten van het voorbereiden van 
complexere zaken, voorbehouden is aan een minderheid van juridische professi-
onals. Aangezien er geen gelegenheid is om rechtstreeks een verzoekschrift bij 
het Hof in te dienen, is er vaak een combinatie van procespartijen, advocaten, 
deskundigen, middelen en organisatie nodig om het Hof op een strategische 
manier te activeren.  
Tot slot is het effectief functioneren van de EU is in grote mate afhankelijk 
van de werking van het rechtssysteem en dus van de dialoog tussen de nationale 
rechters en het EHvJ. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat het rekenen op private partijen 
om de rol van EU-wetshandhaver te spelen een zeer optimistische veronderstel-
ling is over de mogelijkheden van mensen om dit daadwerkelijk te doen. Het feit 
dat dit mechanisme vol zit met moeilijkheden en hindernissen, leidt ertoe dat 
sommige zaken nooit voor een nationale rechtbank worden gebracht, nooit wor-
den doorverwezen en dat daarmee sommige vragen nooit worden behandeld 
door het Hof van Justitie, wat mogelijk kan leiden tot eenzijdige EU-wetshand-
having. 
Over het geheel genomen leveren het conceptueel kader en de empirische 
benadering van deze studie belangrijke resultaten op. Bovenal laat het zien wat 
de waarschijnlijkheid is dat een ‘sociale klacht’ uiteindelijk als EU-recht kwestie 
wordt geformuleerd. Met verwijzing naar de vele moeilijkheden en kosten die 
gemoeid zijn met de praktijk van een prejudiciële verwijzing, beschrijft het boek 
de complexe en veelal toevallige ‘cocktail’ van individueel ondernemerschap 
van de procespartij, persoonlijke betrokkenheid van zijn of haar advocaat en on-
dersteuning van verschillende collectieven (vakbonden, vereniging van grond-
eigenaren, belangenorganisaties) die in staat zijn de kosten van het proces te dra-
gen. Het onderzoek toont aan hoe de totstandkoming van EU-jurisprudentie 
daadwerkelijk vorm krijgt. Hoewel het in de literatuur lang overschaduwd is, 
illustreert deze studie de belangrijke rol van advocaten en juridische experts in 
dit proces. Gezien de extra tijd en extra kosten voor zowel advocaten als proces-
partijen, is het geen verrassing dat zowel ngo’s als academici een cruciale rol 
spelen bij het levend houden van Euro-litigation en jurisprudentie van het Hof, 
en bij het alert blijven (en anderen actief waarschuwen) wanneer zich nieuwe 
mogelijkheden voordoen. Deze studie biedt een nieuw verhaal over het rechts-
systeem van de EU dat levende, acterende mensen inbrengt in wat tot nu toe een 
‘ontlichaamd’ verhaal was van ‘actoren’ die abstracte doelen en institutionele 
belangen nastreven; een verhaal dat een meer genuanceerd en realistischer beeld 
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geeft van Euro-litigation dan het narratief van empowerment en het Hof als een 
People’s Court die de afgelopen twintig jaar hebben gedomineerd. 
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